Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-000067

First-tier Tribunal Nos: PA/53782/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On the 12 August 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE I LEWIS

Between

Z. W.
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr T Hussain of Counsel, instructed by Lei Dat & Baig Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms S McKenzie, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 17 April 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. This is an appeal against a decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Cowx promulgated on 14 November 2024 dismissing an appeal on protection grounds against a decision of the Respondent dated 14 March 2024 refusing an application for asylum made on 25 October 2022.
2. The Appellant is a 38-year-old national of Cameroon. She entered the UK on 10 September 2022 with leave as a student. On 22 October 2022 her husband and four children entered the UK.
3. The Appellant claims to have taken part in schoolteacher strikes against the ruling Francophone government in Cameroon between 2016 and 2022, and to have been involved in demonstrations/protests organised by the Cameroon Anglophone Civil Society Consortium. She claims that she was arrested in early 2017 after taking part in a demonstration; it is her case that she was detained for 3 days, during which she was kicked and beaten, before being released without charge but on bail. Her life essentially returned to normal until she was arrested in April or May 2018 and detained for one day, being interrogated and ill-treated; she was again released on bail without charge. She does not claim to have experienced any further difficulties until she left for the UK on a student visa.
4. The Appellant had been granted entry clearance for the purpose of studying a 1-year Masters degree at Aston University. However, she did not embark on this course. It is her case that her uncle, who was to fund the course, informed her that his bank account in Cameroon had been frozen after he was arrested on suspicion of sending money to the Appellant for the purpose of buying arms for Anglophone separatists in Cameroon. The same uncle had funded the air tickets for the Appellant’s husband and children – who arrived in the UK three days before she made her application for asylum. The Appellant claims that her husband has since left her and the children, she had initially informed the Respondent that he had returned to Cameroon, but later stated that she believed he was still in the UK.
5. The protection claim was refused for reasons set out in a ‘reasons for refusal’ letter (‘RFRL’) dated 14 March 2024. The Respondent did not accept any of the material facts of the Appellant’s claim (RFRL at paragraph 10). Some of the Respondent’s reasoning in this regard is premised on the Appellant having stated that her husband had returned to Cameroon; it is only subsequent to the Respondent’s decision that she has altered her narrative in this regard.
6. The Appellant appealed to the IAC.
7. The First-tier Tribunal Judge was not satisfied that the Appellant feared persecution (Decision at paragraph 5.1). For reasons set out at paragraphs 5.3-5.14 the Judge found the Appellant to be an “incredible” witness.
8. The Appellant sought permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal. Three grounds of challenge were raised. Permission to appeal was granted by First-tier Tribunal Judge Brannan on 5 January 2024 limited to the first ground of challenge only: see further below.
9. The Respondent has not filed a Rule 24 response, but Ms McKenzie confirmed that the Appellant’s challenge was resisted.
Analysis
10. In order to understand the basis of challenge and the scope of the grant of permission to appeal – and therefore the scope of the issues before me – it is convenient to set out in its entirety the first ground of challenge, and also to set out the material parts of the grant of permission to appeal.
11. The first ground is in these terms:
“5. At paragraph 5.3 the Judge states that the appellant has not produced any form of objective evidence such as documents or photographs which one would expect to exist if she indeed was a teacher for as long as claimed. The judge states that it is not her evidence that she is completely cut off from friends, family and supporters in Cameroon whom one would expect could assist her in obtaining such evidence which would carry more weight than the evidence from her family members which she has supplied.
6. The judge states that her colleagues and staff at school could have provided evidence of her employment as a teacher, her qualifications and their own first hand evidence of her participation in the strikes. It is respectfully submitted the Judge has made material error because the appellant at paragraph 56 of her narrative witness statement explained that she does not have much contact with many people in Cameroon apart from her family members. At paragraph 41 of the same statement she explained that her uncle had blocked her for fear of being threatened by the authorities. It is therefore respectfully submitted the Judge has made material error with respect to the appellants evidence that she does not have contact with people in Cameroon other than her immediate family. It is therefore submitted that she was not in a position to obtain the type of evidence that Judge has suggested. And this amounts to a material error of law.”
12. Further to this, paragraph 5.3 of the Decision is in these terms:
“ZLW claims to have worked as a teacher in Cameroon who went on strike for a number of years and attended demonstrations against the government. She has provided her own testimony on these points. Her supporters, namely as her sister ZVN, her son BNT, a priest APM and a lawyer KJN, have provided written statements to the same effect. However, she has not produced any form of objective evidence, such as documents or photographs, which one would expect to exist if ZLW was indeed a teacher for as long as claimed, even if she was on strike. It is not her evidence that she is completely cut off from friends, family and supporters in Cameroon whom one would expect could assist her in obtaining such evidence. Her sister ZVN and APM felt able and safe enough to attend the office of KJN to provide an affidavit. I draw the inference from such willingness that colleagues and staff at her school could just as easily provide evidence of her employment as a teacher, her qualifications and their own first-hand evidence of her participation in the strikes and protests. I consider that such evidence would be more cogent and carry greater weight than the very brief and generalised evidence of ZVN, APM, KJN and BNT. I accept that friends and relations may give truthful evidence on ZLW’s, but I am equally aware that they might also be prepared to give untruthful evidence to assist ZLW in securing residence for herself and her children in the UK. In the absence of other, more obtainable objective evidence I give limited weight to the evidence friends and family.”
13. In material part Judge Brannan stated:
“4. Ground (a) is more difficult. The Judge appears to have strayed beyond the reasons for refusal and review by expecting further documentary support for the appellant’s claim. Furthermore, the Judge looked at whether the appellant was a teacher, had qualifications and had a place at university. These are all matters that the respondent would be able to check using the information in the Confirmation of Acceptance for Studies (“CAS”), the reference for which was given in visa application form. In my view, there is an arguable error of law in the form of unfairness by going beyond the matters in dispute and determining facts against the appellant which may be true based only on the respondent’s records. These facts appear to have been a key part of the judge’s reasoning and therefore would be material to the outcome of the appeal. Permission is therefore granted only in relation to ground (a).
5. It would be sensible for the respondent or appellant to provide the CAS when preparing for any Upper Tribunal hearing.”
14. A CAS has now been filed in these proceedings.
15. In my judgement, Ground 1 as drafted does not disclose an error of law. In substance, at paragraph 5.3 the First-tier Tribunal Judge in evaluating the weight to be given to the evidence presented in support of the Appellant’s narrative account of having been a teacher, identifies that, in his judgement, it would have been reasonable to expect the Appellant to provide better evidence than she did – in particular from former colleagues and staff in respect of her employment, qualifications, and their first-hand knowledge of participation in strikes and protests. The challenge does no more than point to the Appellant having stated “that she does not have much contact with many people in Cameroon apart from her family members”. The Judge’s evaluation – “I draw the inference… that colleagues and staff at her school could just as easily provide evidence…” - is essentially a finding of fact that was open to the Judge on the evidence. Moreover, the Judge adequately explains such finding within the same paragraph. It does not directly contradict the Appellant’s own statement which implicitly acknowledges that she has some contact with some people in Cameroon beyond her family. Insofar as the Grounds appear to be premised on “the appellant’s evidence that she does not have contact with people in Cameroon other than her immediate family”, it is the Grounds that are inconsistent with paragraph 56 of her witness statement dated 17 January 2024.
16. As such it appears to me that the grant of permission to appeal introduces an element that is not actually pleaded.
17. Moreover, contrary to the grant of permission, whilst the Appellant’s claim to be a teacher is not expressly addressed in the RFRL, it is explicitly stated that the Respondent does not accept any material facts of her claim. Her claimed profession is inevitably a material fact. In my judgement First-tier Tribunal Judge Cowx did not ‘stray’ beyond the RFRL.
18. I note that Mr Hussain acknowledged in the course of argument that paragraph 10 of the RFRL had the effect of ‘putting the Appellant on notice’ that all facts were in dispute.
19. Further, the assumption seemingly made in the grant of permission to appeal - that checking the CAS would provide corroboration - is demonstrably misconceived. Whilst the CAS confirms enrolment on a 1-year MSc course in Human Resource Management, and that the sponsoring institution (Aston University) was satisfied in respect of English language competency by reason of having seen evidence of a Bachelors degree in accounting, this does not establish that the Appellant ever worked as a teacher in Cameroon. Mr Hussain accepted that the CAS did not corroborate the Appellant’s claimed employment as a teacher.
20. For the avoidance of any doubt, I acknowledge that the CAS does provide a factual basis to counter the Judge’s observation at paragraph 5.11 based on the Appellant not having provided any evidence from the University confirming her place on the course. However, the Judge’s analysis at paragraph 5.11 et seq in respect of the Appellant’s intentions in coming to the UK is not the subject of Ground 1. Nor is it the subject of the two grounds upon which permission to appeal was refused. No challenge had been raised at any stage in respect of this analysis.
21. The utility of the CAS in establishing that the Appellant did have a place at Aston University is not directly material to the specific issue of her activities in Cameroon. It does not assist the Appellant in developing Ground 1 as pleaded.
22. At its highest, the CAS might provide a foundation for arguing that the Judge’s evaluation of credibility was factually mis-premised. However, in this regard in my judgement the fact that the Appellant did have a place at Aston University does not undermine the remainder of the Judge’s reasoning as to whether she ever genuinely intended undertaking the course. In all the circumstances I am not persuaded that any misconception in respect of a place having been offered at Aston University amounts to a material error of law in the context of evaluating the Appellant’s narrative of events in Cameroon, and in particular in respect of the Judge’s analysis and reliance upon the absence of corroborative evidence that might reasonably have been obtained from former colleagues were her account truthful.
23. In all such circumstances I conclude that Ground 1 as pleaded does not disclose an error of law. Nor is any material error of law identifiable by considering Ground 1 in conjunction with the observations made by Judge Brennan in granting permission to appeal.
24. For completeness, I note that the substance of paragraph 5.14, in which Judge Cowx sets out an alternative consideration on the premise that the Appellant had come to the adverse attention of the authorities in the past, is not the subject of any challenge – as was acknowledged by Mr Hussain. It follows, that even if there were some error of law in the Judge’s evaluation of the Appellant’s narrative history in Cameroon, it cannot avail the Appellant because the Judge concluded that even with such a history as was claimed, in circumstances where the Appellant had led an untroubled life for over 4 years before departing for the UK, and where her uncle could easily have demonstrated that monies were not intended to purchase arms but to purchase education, there would be no risk to her.
25. For the reasons given, I find that there is no material error of law and in the circumstances the decision of the First-tier Tribunal stands. The challenge of the Appellant is dismissed accordingly.

Notice of Decision
26. The Decision of the First-tier Tribunal contains no material error of law. The decision stands accordingly.
27. The Appellant’s appeal remains dismissed.

I Lewis
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

24 July 2025