Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-000070

First-tier Tribunal Nos: HU/52160/2022
IA/03377/2022

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 8th February 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SAINI

Between

PT
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

The Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr J Greer, Counsel; Deus Nexus Solicitors
For the Respondent: Dr S Ibisi, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House via CVP on 23 January 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, [the appellant] (and/or any member of his family, expert, witness or other person the Tribunal considers should not be identified) is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant (and/or other person). Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The Appellant appeals against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Hollings-Tennant dismissing his human rights appeal seeking leave to enter the United Kingdom to join his father, a Vietnamese national with limited leave to remain. The Appellant applied for permission to appeal, which was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Ruddick in the following terms:
1. The appellant is a 19-year-old man from Vietnam who is seeking entry clearance to the UK to join his biological father. The application for entry clearance was made before the appellant turned 18, and the appeal turns largely on the issue of whether his father has sole responsibility for him.
2. The FTT found that the appellant’s account of the events leading to his father taking sole responsibility for him and his account of his current circumstances was not made out. In reaching this decision, the FTTJ listed a number of what appear to be clear inconsistencies in the appellant’s documents, noted that the name on money transfer receipts is not the appellant’s and there was no explanation for this (although none was asked for) and found it implausible that the appellant’s mother would have waited five years to find someone else to care for her son, if his step-father had seriously assaulted his as claimed.
3. Ground Three argues that the FTT erred by finding the mother’s delay in responding to her husband’s violence implausible. It is arguable that this was an error, given what is widely known about how genuine victims of domestic violence may behave; the appellant cites the ETBB, but the point is an obvious one. It will be for the appellant to establish that this error was material, in the context of the inconsistencies in the evidence identified by the FTT.
4. The other grounds are less persuasive, but I do not limit the grounds.
2. The Secretary of State provided a Rule 24 response which did not go into any detail other than to indicate that the appeal was formally resisted. Nonetheless, I heard full submissions from both parties which I have taken into account in reaching my decision.
Findings
3. At the close of the hearing, I reserved my decision which I shall now give. I do not find that there are material errors of law in the decision such that it should be set aside. My reasons for so finding are as follows.
4. In respect of the first ground, arguing that there was a procedural unfairness in the judge taking points against the Appellant which were not raised by the Respondent and not canvassed during the hearing, the complaint relates to paragraph 21 which can be found in the midst of the judge’s assessment of the key issue in this appeal, namely, sole parental responsibility, and, in the middle of the judge’s findings, which run from paragraph 19 through to 29 on this first issue. In relation to paragraph 21, the complaint is that the judge identified that the money transfers which were sent to support the Appellant’s son (PT) featured a name which did not correspond to the Appellant, his mother or the family friends, said to be caring for him. This, it is agreed, is a matter which was not put to the Appellant during the hearing and therefore he did not have the opportunity to address it. Bearing in mind the well-known principles of the Supreme Court’s judgment in TUI UK Limited v Griffiths [2023] UKSC 48, this was an opportunity that the Appellant undoubtedly should have had. Having clarified the grounds drafted by Mr Greer with him during the hearing, he clarified that they are not a challenge to the fact that the judge placed ‘little weight’ on the inconsistency in the named recipient on the money transfers, but moreover, that no weight should have been placed on this evidence at all by the judge in assessing the Appellant’s credibility. Again, I agree fully with this submission and therefore find that this finding represents an error of law.
5. However, at the same time, I bear in mind that this is but one of a great number of errors and inconsistencies in the Appellant’s evidence that the judge found and held against the Appellant, which the Appellant has not sought to challenge in his appeal. Those inconsistencies are to be found in paragraphs 21, 22, 23, 24, 25 and 29 (i.e. these paragraphs remain even giving the Appellant the full benefit of his Grounds of Appeal, which seek to challenge the initial part of paragraph 21 and also paragraphs 26, 27 and 28). Therefore, just by looking at the number of other errors and inconsistencies found and not challenged, it can be seen that the Appellant faced a substantial challenge in demonstrating materiality of the errors he had raised in the Grounds of Appeal, as observed by Upper Tribunal Judge Ruddick in granting permission to appeal. I shall turn to the remaining errors in these paragraphs at the close of my decision when reaching my conclusion on materiality of any errors identified, However, I could not help but notice that even Mr Greer described the error of law in Ground 1 as ‘peripheral’ and ‘marginal’. Nonetheless a technical and legal error of law has been identified in Ground 1, which I note.
6. Turning to Ground 2 and the argument that the judge has made a mistake of fact in relation to the police report of 2014, which revealed that the mother had reported to the police that the Appellant was beaten by his de facto stepfather, but in the course of that report had referred to her husband as the stepfather rather than as the biological father of the Appellant. revealed an inconsistency according to the judge between the Appellant’s account and the documents before him. I do not find that an error has been correctly identified in this ground, as although the grounds at paragraph 6 argue that the Appellant’s mother always knew that her husband is not the Appellant’s father and it was her state of mind that would form the basis for what she told the police which appears in their report, the report also states that a copy was given to the stepfather in 2014, and I find that it is not persuasive for the Appellant to highlight that the report did not also state that the report was received by the stepfather and was read by him. The fact that the report mentioned the husband/de facto stepfather, was only a stepfather and not the true father of the Appellant, and that it was given to him, was documentary evidence before the judge upon which he was entitled to place weight and was open to the judge find that it undermined the Appellant’s assertion that the de facto stepfather only discovered he was not the Appellant’s true father five years later in 2019 when he was informed as such. This was clearly inconsistent with the document which revealed he was not the biological father and was which apparently given to him five years earlier. I pause to note that this was not an issue which the Appellant argued that he had not had the opportunity to address or that he was unaware of, or which had not been raised against him in the course of this appeal. Therefore, the point was validly taken by the judge and was open to them to note. Thus, I do not find that Ground 2 identifies in an error of law.
7. Turning to Ground 3, and the final ground upon which permission to appeal was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Ruddick, the Appellant argued that weight was given to an immaterial or improper matter, that being the Appellant’s mother’s action in failing to leave her marital home and remain in a violent relationship, despite the violence to herself and her child as identified in paragraphs 27 and 28 of the decision. The grounds quite rightly pointed to the Equal Treatment Bench Book and, in particular, Chapter 6 at Paragraphs 53 and 55, which reads as follows:
“There are a number of significant reasons why women do not leave dangerous partners. Survivors can be at a higher risk when they leave violent partners. There are other ties to their homes, including identity, family, money and status, which operate as strong motivators for staying in a violent relationship. There can be complex psychological reasons at play; an important factor is often the erosion of self-esteem and self-worth to the point of believing that the violent behaviour was justified, with the woman blaming herself for the violence that she has endured…
…
…
…
• In some communities, a woman leaving her abusive husband may be at risk of reprisals or even of being killed by her own or her husband’s family for bringing ‘shame’ onto the family or community.
…
• Concern about the impact upon children of moving away from their home, school or community, or the loss of a support network for the woman or her children with disabilities or special needs may mean particular hardship, isolation and the possibility that similar support may never be found in the area she moves to.”
8. With that in mind, I do find that the Tribunal erred in speculating as to the mother’s motivation for behaving in the way that she did without first considering the nature of violent domestic relationships and what the Equal Treatment Bench Book says about whether or not a person may remain in such a relationship, and the consequences upon children of quitting such relationships. Therefore, I do find that Ground 3 establishes an error of law.
9. Turning then finally to the materiality of the errors identified in Grounds 1 and 3, I remind myself that Ground 1 identifies a legal error of law in that the inconsistency over the recipient named in the money transfers from Western Union was not put to the Appellant giving him the opportunity to explain who this individual is. Albeit extremely late in the day, at the hearing, I canvassed with Mr Greer whether there were any instructions he wished to convey as to who that named individual was which might affect my decision on materiality. Mr Greer confirmed that there was nothing he wished to convey which might help emphasise the importance of the error he had identified in his grounds. As I have stated above, even acknowledging that an error of law exists in relation to that portion of paragraph 21, I must bear in mind in assessing materiality (for Ground 1 as well as Ground 3), the guidance given by the Court of Appeal in the decision of ASO (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 1282 and [44] of Lady Justice Elisabeth Laing’s judgment which states as follows in relation to materiality of errors of law identified by the Upper Tribunal:
“First, if there were no errors of law, the UT should have dismissed A’s appeal. Second, if there were any errors of law, it is not possible to decide whether they were material without deciding, first, the nature and extent of any such errors, and to what extent, if any, the decision rested on those errors. Third, it is not possible to decide whether any errors are material without considering whether a rational tribunal would have been bound to come to the same decision on the evidence which the F-tT considered. … when a court decides whether or not errors are material, it is wrong in principle to apply a notional blue pencil to the potentially erroneous passages, as those passages may be relevant to a decision about materiality, if that point is reached.”
10. With that in mind, applying the approach in ASO (Iraq), returning to the error identified in the first portion of paragraph 21, I bear in mind the nature and extent of the error which was to potentially misapprehend the financial support given to the Appellant by the Sponsor. This error plainly had an impact upon the FTTJ’s decision, as it featured in the course of the findings on sole responsibility, although, as I have noted, it is merely one of several factors raised against the Appellant which have gone unchallenged. I have difficulty in accepting that this error is material because notwithstanding that it is but one of the factors raised against the Appellant, the Appellant has not, as one might expect, helped demonstrate the materiality of this error, perhaps by putting forward an explanation as to who the named individual on the money transfer slips is, or even as one commonly sees in appeals, by putting forward a further witness statement explaining the identity of this person and their connection to the Sponsor and the Appellant, by way of a Rule 15(2A) application to adduce new documentary evidence, which the Appellant could have applied to adduce and have admitted before the Upper Tribunal (notwithstanding that it was not before the First-tier Tribunal), which would in circumstances such as this, have readily been admitted as it was being put forward in the context of a TUI UK Limited v Griffiths scenario where the Appellant had not had an opportunity to address a point raised in a decision for the first time. Therefore, in the absence of any explanation or such material to illustrate the materiality of the error, despite this being highlighted as something that the Appellant would need to grapple with by Judge Ruddick in granting permission, I cannot see any materiality of the error identified in Ground 1 which would have potentially altered the outcome of the appeal.

11. Turning to Ground 3 and the error identified in relation to the fact that the judge speculated as to the behaviour which the Appellant’s mother demonstrated in failing to quit the marital home in the five year period before the identity of the biological father was made known to the husband/de facto stepfather, this criticism appears close to the end of the judge’s assessment and again is but one of the several factors raised against the Appellant. The nature of the error is clearly one which should not have been made without consideration of the Equal Treatment Bench Book. However, I struggle with the extent of the error in this ground as it is connected to Ground 2 and the de facto stepfather’s unawareness that he was not the true father which has not been made out on the arguments before me as the Appellant has not been able to explain the discrepancies in Ground 2, or the discrepancies identified elsewhere in the decision, as to the unawareness of his true paternity until 2019, notwithstanding the police report from 2014, which was given to the de facto stepfather. Therefore, the complaint in this ground is somewhat hollow when taken in the context of the previous findings which have been made on the same underlying topic. Therefore, this error is also immaterial to the outcome reached.

12. However, before concluding my findings on materiality, I shall briefly rehearse the other unchallenged findings of fact below, which the Appellant must accept are correct and rightly made as they have not been challenged in the appeal before me, and which give context to my conclusion. Those credibility findings and issues which have been held against the Appellant are as follows:

(a) paragraph 21: a limited number of money transfer receipts have been adduced in evidence with only three from 2020 and two from 2021 despite the Sponsor knowing he is the Appellant’s biological father since 2019;

(b) paragraph 22: limited evidence of contact in the form of screenshots of video calls which do not establish that the sponsor has taken control over the Appellant’s care, his education or other relevant matters such as his health or the direction of his upbringing which have not been demonstrated by other documents which could evidence parental responsibility, or perhaps things such as oversight of education or chat histories between the Appellant and Sponsor demonstrating the nature and context of any discussions had between them;

(c) paragraphs 23 – 24: the whereabouts and living circumstances of the appellant and his mother after the true paternity was discovered in 2019, whereas a letter dated December 2021 stated that the Appellant and his mother were living with the de facto stepfather, which undermined the assertion as to living arrangements and whether or not the mother had abdicated parental responsibility as claimed;

(d) paragraph 25: the appellant stating in the Visa Application Form of December 2021 that he lived with his mother whereas the Sponsor had asserted that the Appellant moved to live with a family friend in 2019;

(e) paragraph 26: the discrepancy unsuccessfully challenged in Ground 2 that the appellant’s de facto stepfather was given a police report which named him as a stepfather rather than a biological father in 2014 not being explained in the context of why he only discovered his not being the appellant’s father in 2019;

(f) paragraph 28: no explanation being given for why the appellant’s mother in 2012 did not inform the sponsor that he was the appellant’s father knowing he was going to leave the country and why no means of contact was established then alongside why the appellant’s mother was trying to contact the sponsor since 2013;

(g) paragraph 29: the fact that the DNA test is dated December 2020 whereas the appellant claims to have discovered and accepted his true paternity in 2019 (the December 2020 date coinciding with the Appellant’s first entry clearance application).

13. Thus, bearing in mind the nature and extent of the inconsistencies identified in the Appellant’s evidence concerning the factual account given and the lack of evidence demonstrating sole responsibility; and, bearing in mind that the burden of proof rests with the Appellant in such appeals, I do not find that the errors identified in Grounds 1 and 3 point to material errors of law in the decision requiring it to be set aside in its entirety, as I find that, “…(i)t is clear on the materials before the First-tier Tribunal that any rational Tribunal would have come to the same conclusion” (cf. Secretary of State for the Home Department v AJ (Angola) [2014] EWCA Civ 1636 at [49]).

14. In light of the above findings, I do not find that there are material errors of law identified such that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal should be set aside.
Notice of Decision

15. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal shall stand.

16. The appeal to the Upper Tribunal is dismissed.

P. Saini

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

3 February 2026