Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-000086

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/60589/2023
LP/09535/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

16th May 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE PINDER

Between

JC
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr J Collins, Counsel instructed by Sentinel Solicitors.
For the Respondent: Ms A Everett, Senior Presenting Officer.

Heard at Field House on 7 April 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The Appellant appeals the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (‘the FtT’). On 4th November 2024, the FtT dismissed the Appellant’s appeal against the Respondent’s decision of 30th October 2023, in which the Respondent refused the Appellant’s protection and human rights claim, made on 5th June 2020 when he was a child.
2. I have maintained the Anonymity Order in favour of the Appellant. I consider that, on the specific facts of this appeal, the maintenance of the integrity of the United Kingdom’s immigration system and the Appellant having raised a claim to international protection are such that an Anonymity Order is a justified derogation from the principle of open justice. Furthermore, the Appellant is a recognised Victim of Trafficking (‘VOT’).
3. The initials used for the Appellant are not his own initials but since these were the ones chosen by the FtT when granting anonymity, these are maintained within the proceedings in this Tribunal so as to avoid any case-management or administrative difficulties, between the parties and/or in the Tribunal.
Factual and Procedural Background
4. The Appellant is a national of Albania, who is now 22 years old. Having fled a gang who had trafficked him as a child in Albania, he was re-trafficked at the age of 16 years old from France into the United Kingdom on 4th March 2020 and forced to work in the illegal drugs trade. On 4th June 2020, the Appellant managed to escape and he subsequently claimed asylum the following day, 5th June 2020. Following a referral to the Single Competent Authority (‘SCA’) via the National Referral Mechanism (‘NRM’), the SCA made a positive Conclusive Grounds decision on 27th January 2023. It was not in dispute therefore that the Appellant was a VOT (see [5]). As referred to above, on 30th October 2023, the Respondent Secretary of State refused the Appellant’s protection claim.
5. The Appellant appealed against the decision of the Respondent to the FtT and his appeal was heard before a panel of the FtT on 29th October 2024. The Appellant pursued his appeal on the basis that he feared re-trafficking and/or punishment by the men who forced him to work in Albania and by the men who forced him to work in the UK, as well as fearing re-trafficking more generally. The FtT agreed to consider the Appellant as a vulnerable witness, pursuant to the Presidential Guidance Note No. 2 of 2010: Child, Vulnerable Adult and Sensitive Appellant (‘the Presidential Guidance’), on grounds of his medical history, including a diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder (‘PTSD’) (see [6]).
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal
6. In dismissing the appeal and in so far as is relevant to this appeal, the FtT’s findings of fact and conclusions include the following:
(a) The Appellant is a member of a Particular Social Group (‘PSG’), for the purposes of the Refugee Convention, as he has been recognised as a VOT and therefore has a common background that cannot be changed. The FtT considered DH (Particular Social Group: Mental Health) Afghanistan [2020] UKUT 223 (IAC) – [11]-[14];
(b) There was an inconsistency in the Appellant’s accounts concerning whether or not the gangs had shown interest in his family: for instance, the Appellant’s oral evidence was that one year ago (at the time of the hearing), his parents told him about two or three visits from one of the gangs but in his witness statement, the Appellant had stated that the gang members had not shown interest in his family. The Appellant’s explanation in submissions, via his Counsel, was that this was not an inconsistency, because the latter was about interest in his family whereas the former was about interest in him. The FtT was not persuaded that this adequately explained the inconsistency – [19]-[20];
(c) The FtT also considered it implausible that the Appellant would not have more specific detail about the gangs’ claimed visits, such as whether there were two or three of them, what was said, how many members of the gang visited, which ones, whether they were the ones the Appellant’s father recognised from the bar or different, and which, if any, members of the Appellant’s family were at home when they visited. The FtT found that the Appellant’s evidence on this was insufficiently detailed, implausible, internally inconsistent, and uncorroborated – [19];
(d) In light of the above, together with the passage of time since the Appellant had had any direct contact with either gang, the fact that he was a child when he was forced to work for them and is now an adult, the FtT was not satisfied that the Appellant continues to be of adverse interest to either set of criminals - [21];
(e) The FtT noted at [22] the contents of paragraph 339K of the Immigration Rules concerning past persecution/harm to be regarded as a serious indication of a person’s well-founded fear of persecution or real risk of suffering serious harm, unless there are good reasons to consider that this will not be repeated;
(f) The Appellant has features, which heighten his vulnerability to trafficking. His family have relatively low social status and economic standing, and the Appellant has a low level of education. The FtT accepted the medical evidence that the Appellant has PTSD and is likely to benefit from medication and counselling. The FtT also noted that the Appellant is not currently receiving any medication or counselling, and that he failed to attend his last two appointments with a psychologist – [23];
(g) The Appellant is from Tirana. At the time of the FtT appeal hearing, he was 21 years old. The FtT did not accept his claim that he would have no support network on return to Albania. His mother, father, and two sisters still live in the same family home as he did when he lived there and the Appellant is still in contact with his family. The FtT found that there was no compelling evidence that the Appellant’s family would consider him to have brought dishonour to them or that they would reject him for any other reason. The FtT was satisfied that he could return to live with them and that they would support him – [23];
(h) The Appellant’s family were not able to protect him from forced labour in the past. However, this took place when he was a child, and when he did not disclose to his parents what was taking place, and in the UK, when he was a child and alone in an unfamiliar country without parental support. His circumstances are different now, and a result of these distressing experiences, the Appellant and his family have an improved understanding of trafficking, which will help mitigate the risks – [24];
(i) The Appellant continued to live at an address known to his traffickers for two months after he had stopped working for them without being re-trafficked and on his own evidence, he was able to go out every day during that time – [25];
(j) The FtT was not therefore satisfied that he faces a risk of re-trafficking on return from those known to him or more generally – [26].
7. The FtT went on to consider matters in the alternative and to assess the issues of sufficiency of protection and internal relocation. In respect of these two issues, the FtT was satisfied that in the specific circumstances of this Appellant, the reasonable steps which the State are expected to take to prevent the persecution feared have been taken and that there is such a legal system in place ([38]). The FtT also noted that the Appellant was able to access assistance and support from professionals and other persons when in need in the UK, which he had done as a child in an unfamiliar country. The FtT considered that he would be able to do so again, especially when back in Albania, in a country and with a language that he is familiar and there would also be adequate mental health care for him there ([39]).
8. On internal relocation, the FtT found at [41] that that they “were not convinced” by the Appellant’s evidence that his former traffickers had the claimed links to the police or any other authorities as his evidence was vague, lacking in detail and uncorroborated. The FtT also noted the Appellant’s ability to live in the UK without the support of his family.
9. At [45]-[47], the FtT considered the Appellant’s alternative Article 8 ECHR claim on grounds that he would face very significant obstacles to re-integrating Albania on account of his particular vulnerabilities. Taking forward the findings made in the context of the Appellant’s protection claim, the FtT found that the Appellant would have access to the mental health care that he required and would be able to benefit from support from his own family, so that the Respondent’s decision did not pose a disproportionate interference with his rights under Article 8.
10. Accordingly, the FtT dismissed the Appellant’s appeal on both protection and human rights grounds.
The Appellant’s appeal to the Upper Tribunal
11. The Appellant applied for permission to appeal raising several grounds of appeal against the FtT’s findings. These concerned the consistency of the Appellant’s account on post-flight adverse interest from the gangs who trafficked the Appellant, the assessment under Paragraph 339K of the Immigration Rules, risk on return, sufficiency of protection and internal relocation.
12. Upper Tribunal Judge Grey, in granting permission to appeal, found it arguable that the FtT had failed to factor in their credibility assessment the Appellant’s young age at the time that he was first trafficked in Albania and later on, as well as his mental health condition. Judge Grey considered that all other grounds may be argued since the credibility assessment of the FtT may have impacted on their other findings. Judge Grey noted that it remained for the Appellant to establish that any error is material including in relation to the assessment of sufficiency of protection.
13. In response, the Respondent did not file and serve a Rule 24 reply.
14. At the hearing, both parties’ advocates made further oral submissions on each of the grounds of appeal pursued and Ms Everett, on behalf of the Respondent, defended the FtT’s decision. I have addressed the Appellant’s written pleadings and the parties’ respective oral submissions in the section below when setting out my analysis and conclusions. At the end of the hearing, I reserved my decision and provide this below with my reasons.
Analysis and conclusions
The Appellant’s first ground of appeal
15. Through the Appellant’s first ground of appeal, Mr Collins argued that the FtT had materially erred in law when finding that the Appellant had been inconsistent in respect of one aspect of his account, that concerning post-flight adverse interest from those who had previously trafficked him.
16. Mr Collins’ primary position is that there was in fact no inconsistency because it was clear from the Appellant’s account that members of the gang, who had trafficked him in Albania, had come to his house looking for him but in relation to adverse interest in his family, he had been “unable to comment.” Mr Collins submitted that the Appellant had given his account on two different issues.
17. Having carefully considered the FtT’s assessment of the Appellant’s evidence on this issue, I agree with Mr Collins that the FtT has erred in finding that there was an inconsistency as the evidence does not support such a finding. At para 10 of his most recent statement dated 13th May 2024, the Appellant had stated as follows:
“10. I am unable to comment on why gang members have not shown interest in my family. I believe that if they had, my family may not tell me so as to not make me worry.”
18. I also note that the Appellant provided the following information at paras 10 and 16 of his earlier witness statement, dated 25th August 2020:
“10. (…) I remained in hiding in my home for about two months. My father thought that the danger would pass but whilst I was in hiding at home members of the gang would come to the house looking for me. My father told them that I was not around. I remained in hiding but it was clear that the gang would not leave me alone.
(…)
16. (…) I have been in contact with my parents and I am told that the gang in Albania have come to the house after I had left the country looking for me. My father has been threatened. My father also told me that he had been approached by an Albanian man who told my father that I had escaped from the house in UK without paying my debt.”
19. At [19], the FtT recorded the Appellant’s oral evidence to have been that the gang members in Albania had not contacted him since he came to the UK but had gone to his family home. The FtT does not give a reason at [19] as to why they are unpersuaded with the Appellant’s explanation, namely that there is in fact no inconsistency. The reason that follows relates to plausibility, which I address further below and which appears, from the use of the word ‘also’, to be in addition to rejecting the Appellant’s own explanation.
20. With several of the Appellant’s accounts, as recorded above and which are given in different forms, namely his initial witness statement, his substantive asylum interview and his oral evidence at the hearing, all confirming that members of the gang did visit his home, I am satisfied that the FtT erred in law in finding that the single sentence in the Appellant’s witness statement of 13th May 2024 was a contradiction or an inconsistency.
21. It is also clear from the Appellant’s 2023 statement that he prepared this in response to the Respondent’s refusal letter and the contents of that statement follow the list of concerns raised by the Respondent in the refusal decision ([750]-[751] of the consolidated bundle). The reference in the refusal decision to the Appellant’s family not receiving any further adverse attention cross-refer to questions 139-144 of the Appellant’s substantive interview. These questions are all premised on whether the gang members had gone to the family home to look for the Appellant. When read in that context, it is clear that the Appellant at para 10 of his statement is confirming that he cannot explain why the gang members have not pursued his family in their own right, as opposed to the Appellant confirming that they had in the past come looking for him at the family home. With how the questions were put to the Appellant and with how the Respondent raised the issue of the Appellant’s family in the list at [750]-[751], the Appellant’s explanation that he was effectively addressing two different issues was on the whole reasonable and it was incumbent on the FtT to address this and to provide a reason for rejecting the same. Their failure to do so is in my view an error of law.
22. I also consider that the reasons of implausibility given by the FtT at [19] are problematic: the FtT does not address the Appellant’s explanation that he thought that his family may have been trying to protect him by withholding such information from him. Moreover, it is well-established that assessments of plausibility are generally unhelpful as they often entail subjective assessments and/or cultural and socio-economic assumptions.
23. If I am wrong on the above, I am also satisfied that the Appellant has demonstrated that his alternative ground of appeal against the FtT’s credibility findings on a crucial aspect of his protection claim is made out. Whilst the FtT agreed to treat the Appellant as a vulnerable witness, as I summarised at para 5 above, there is no consideration in the body of the FtT’s assessment and findings at [16]-[19] as to whether the Appellant’s multiple vulnerabilities (age at the relevant times, being a recognised VOT and having a diagnosis of PTSD) impacted on his ability to provide what can be regarded as a consistent or credible account.
24. There was no dispute as to the Appellant’s multiple vulnerabilities and at para 17 of his report, Dr Tripathi states that “(the Appellant) presents with low mood, anxiety, panic attacks, nightmares, flashbacks of the past trauma, avoidance of social situation, paranoia, lack of energy and motivation, poor concentration, fleeting suicidal ideations and an impairment of day-to-day functioning.”
25. Ms Everett, on behalf of the Respondent, submitted that the FtT was entitled to find that there were inconsistencies in the Appellant’s account and to draw conclusions from those accordingly. Whilst acknowledging the Appellant’s vulnerabilities, she submitted that there was no evidence of any cognitive difficulties on the part of the Appellant, which hampered his ability to give an accurate description of relevant events.
26. It is well established that this Tribunal, as an appeal court, will not readily interfere with findings of fact by the FtT because it is that tribunal which has considered all of the evidence, including the taking of oral evidence. However, the Presidential Guidance is clear: a structured approach is required. This was reiterated by the Court of Appeal in AM (Afghanistan) v SSHD [2017] EWCA Civ 1123 and the Upper Tribunal in SB (vulnerable adult: credibility) Ghana [2019] UKUT 398 (IAC): it is for the judicial fact-finder to determine the relationship between the vulnerability and the evidence that is adduced.
27. Moreover, the guidance contained in the Presidential Guidance and the leading authorities set out above, as well as in the Equal Treatment Bench Book, does not set a threshold limited to cognitive abilities. A case-specific assessment is required and I am satisfied that this was not carried out by the FtT for the reasons above, contrary to Ms Everett’s submissions. Thus, I am satisfied that the FtT’s failure to determine this amounts to an error of law.
28. I am also satisfied that the errors above are material. The Appellant’s account of what interest the gang members have shown against him post-flight, including through his family, is highly relevant to the FtT’s assessment of risk and in turn to whether there is sufficiency of protection and a viable internal relocation option.
The Appellant’s second and third grounds of appeal
29. I address these two grounds together. The Appellant’s second ground is succinct and is a complaint that the FtT only fleetingly referred to the principle contained in paragraph 339K of the Immigration Rules without properly or adequately engaging with this and considering the Appellant’s evidence against this. Had this ground been pleaded in isolation, I would not have been satisfied that this amounted to an error of law, or a material error of law. The FtT provided reasons as to why, it its view, the serious harm that the Appellant had been subjected to was not reasonably likely to re-occur.
30. The Appellant’s third ground effectively attacks those reasons. The Appellant submits that in rejecting at [41] the Appellant’s claim that the trafficking gangs in Albania had links to the police as “vague, lacking in detail, and uncorroborated”, the FtT adopted a higher standard of proof than is applicable. The Appellant argues that this is also indicated by the FtT’s use of the terms “not convinced by his evidence”.
31. I am satisfied that the FtT has at the very least required corroboration on this issue without considering whether or not it was reasonable to expect the Appellant to be able to provide such corroboration. Considering the Appellant’s vulnerabilities and that he was trafficked on two occasions, the second of which involving international reach since the Appellant was trafficked from France to the UK, I am satisfied that this failure amounts to a material error of law particularly since the traffickers’ links to the police is relevant to all three issues of risk, sufficiency of protection and internal relocation.
The Appellant’s fourth to sixth grounds of appeal
32. Similarly, I address these three remaining grounds together. Whilst each ground concerns a different issue, namely the FtT’s findings first on whether or not the Appellant would be able to return to his family home and benefit from his family’s support, second on whether there is sufficiency of protection and third on whether the Appellant can reasonably internally relocate, each ground is premised on the same claimed failure of the FtT to assess these matters against the Appellant’s vulnerabilities.
33. The FtT’s finding at [23] that the Appellant’s family have not disowned the Appellant and that they would support him was a finding reasonably open to the FtT on the evidence before it but I do not consider that this is determinative of whether or not the Appellant’s family support amounts to a protective factor, in the context of the Appellant’s history and vulnerabilities, which were again undisputed.
34. At [24], the FtT did consider that the Appellant’s family had not been able to protect the Appellant previously but concluded that the Appellant’s “circumstances are different now, and as a result of these distressing experiences, the Appellant and his family have an improved understanding of trafficking which will help mitigate the risks”. If this is a finding that the Appellant, assisted by his family, would be able to protect himself against any risk of re-trafficking as a result of his past experiences and any resilience or knowledge derived from the same, this is a finding that is unsupported by any evidence, background, expert or otherwise. As the Upper Tribunal found in TD and AD (Trafficked women) (CG) [2016] UKUT 92, “(r)e-trafficking is a reality”. Furthermore, it is a finding that is reached without, it would appear, consideration of the Appellant’s accepted vulnerabilities: it is unclear what the FtT meant by “his circumstances are different now”. The Appellant is an adult now but the FtT does not explain its reasoning as to why this protects him against a risk of re-trafficking, particularly when he continues to suffer from poor mental health and has already been re-trafficked once already.
35. Ms Everett submitted that the Appellant’s improved understanding of trafficking was a reasonable consideration to have taken into account. I have very carefully considered the Respondent’s submissions in response to the Appellant’s ground but I am satisfied that there was little, if any, evidence to firstly support a finding that the Appellant has an improved understanding of trafficking and secondly, to support a finding that such an understanding, if there were to be one, alleviates - to the extent found by the FtT - any risk of re-trafficking.
36. Similarly, the FtT found at [39] that the Appellant’s “experiences are likely to assist him in being able to articulate any need for assistance from the relevant Albanian authorities”. Such a comparison is again not supported in evidence and is reached without specific consideration of the opinions of Dr Tripathi, who assessed the Appellant and whose diagnosis of PTSD the FtT accepted. Whilst the FtT acknowledges at [39] the Appellant’s PTSD diagnosis, it appears to find, without support, that the traumatic experiences, that led to this diagnosis, may also now empower the Appellant to seek assistance from the authorities.
37. Lastly, I am also satisfied that the FtT fell into error in its assessment of whether the Appellant can benefit from a viable internal relocation option. Its consideration of whether the traffickers have influence over the police is erroneous as considered above. Furthermore, the FtT found that the Appellant had effectively managed without family support in the UK but I am satisfied that the FtT did so without assessing the evidence adduced by the Appellant of the support he has derived from Hackney Social Services, as reported on by Dr Tripathi from para 15.1 of his report:
“15.1 I spoke to (the Appellant)’s support worker Feddrica Graziani from Hackney Social Services. Feddrica informed me that (the Appellant) is being supported by the Hackney Social Services for the past 3 years as he was deemed as a vulnerable person. She has been working with (the Appellant) and provides support around accommodation, finances, and general support. Feddrica informed me that the support is available until he turns 21 after which he will be referred to the home office for accommodation and finance. Feddrica described (the Appellant) as a polite and responsive person who will reach out to her when in need of support.
15.2 Feddrica informed me she has found (the Appellant) presenting as low and anxious and afraid with a feeling of being stuck. It was the social services who organised psychological sessions for (the Appellant) in 2021 due to concerns regarding his low mood.”
38. For the same reasons as I gave when considering the first ground of appeal, I am satisfied that the errors found above, and as pursued under the Appellant’s fourth to sixth grounds of appeal, are material. The FtT’s failures to consider the Appellant’s vulnerabilities when assessing the impact of any family support, sufficiency of protection and internal relocation is contrary to applicable country guidance and amounts to a failure to take into consideration relevant matters. I am satisfied that these errors have had a material impact on the outcome of this appeal.
39. In the circumstances, I am satisfied that the FtT has materially erred in law and the FtT’s decision to dismiss the appeal is therefore set aside pursuant to s.12(2)(a) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007.
40. Both parties agreed that were I to find in the Appellant’s favour in respect of his grounds of appeal, it was appropriate for the Appellant’s appeal to be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal. Having considered and applied the guidance in paragraph 7 of the Senior President's Practice Statement as well as the guidance in AEB v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] EWCA Civ 1512 and Begum (Remaking or remittal) [2023] UKUT 46 (IAC), I am satisfied that it is appropriate to remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal as substantial fact-finding is required.
Notice of Decision
41. The decision of the FtT dated 4th November 2024 contained material errors of law and is set aside.
42. This matter is to be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal with no preserved findings, save for the following:
(a) The Appellant is a victim of trafficking (not disputed – see [5]);
(b) A vulnerable witness (also not disputed, see [6]); and
(c) A member of a Particular Social Group (see [11]-[14]).

Sarah Pinder

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

09.05.2025