Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case no: UI-2025-000092

First-tier Tribunal Nos: PA/51978/2024
LP/03117/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On the 11 August 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE CHAPMAN

Between

TS
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms J Lanigan, Counsel, instructed by Virgo Solicitors Ltd
For the Respondent: Mr J Nappey, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 28 May 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, [the Appellant] (and/or any member of his family, expert, witness or other person the Tribunal considers should not be identified) is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant (and/or other person). Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant is a national of Albania facing deportation on the basis of an 18 month sentence of imprisonment imposed for the production of Class B drugs (cannabis) during his incarceration in a “cannabis house.” The competent authority subsequently accepted that the Appellant was a victim of trafficking. The Appellant appealed on that basis and also due to the fact that he was co-parenting his son by his former partner, born on 6 February 2023. His appeal to the First tier Tribunal succeeded but the SSHD sought and obtained permission to appeal and following a hearing before the Upper Tribunal on 18 March 2025 an error of law was found. The decision and reasons in respect of that hearing is appended.
2. The appeal came before the Upper Tribunal for re-making. The issues to be determined are whether:
2.1. the Appellant has a well-founded fear of persecution or would be subjected to treatment contrary to article 3 ECHR arising from the blood feud in Albania;
2.2. the Appellant has well-founded fear of persecution or would be subjected to treatment in breach of Article 3 as a former male victim of trafficking;
2.3. the requirements of paragraph 13.2.5(a), (d) and (e) of the Immigration Rules are met;
2.4. in the alternative, there are very compelling circumstances over and above the second exception to deportation.
3. The Appellant’s solicitors lodged a consolidated bundle including updating statements dated 10 April 2025 from the Appellant and his former partner, CM; an addendum report from Dr James Korovilas dated 6 May 2025 and a letter from the Appellant’s father dated 12 May 2025 and copy of the identity page of his passport and updating medical evidence in respect of CM.
4. Ms Lanigan asked that both the Appellant and CM be treated as vulnerable witnesses, a request I acceded to. Both gave evidence and were cross-examined by Mr Nappey. A typed full record of proceedings was made and the hearing was also recorded.
The Relevant Law
5. Paragraph 13 of the Immigration Rules provides inter alia:
“Section 2: Article 8 ECHR exceptions to deportation
13.2.1. Where a foreign national has been convicted in the UK or overseas and received a custodial sentence of at least 12 months; has been convicted of an offence that has caused serious harm; or is a persistent offender, the public interest requires the foreign national’s deportation unless:
(a) the private life exception in paragraph 13.2.3, or the family life exception in paragraph 13.2.4, is met; or
(b) there are very compelling circumstances such that removal would be contrary to the Human Rights Act 1998.
13.2.4. The Article 8 family life exception is met where the foreign national has:
(a) a parental relationship with a child that meets all the requirements of paragraph 13.2.5
13.2.5. The foreign national has a parental relationship with a child and all of the following apply:
(a) the relationship is genuine and subsisting; and
(b) the child is either a British citizen or has lived in the UK continuously for at least the 7 years immediately before the date of the decision to make the deportation order; and
(c) the child is at the date of the decision to make the deportation order resident in the UK; and
(d) it would be unduly harsh for the child to live in the country to which the foreign national is to be deported; and
(e) it would be unduly harsh for the child to stay in the UK without the foreign national who is to be deported.”
6. In EH (blood feuds) Albania CG [2012] UKUT 00348 (IAC) the UT held inter alia as follows:
“1. While there remain a number of active blood feuds in Albania, they are few and declining. There are a small number of deaths annually arising from those feuds and a small number of adults and children living in self-confinement for protection. Government programmes to educate self-confined children exist but very few children are involved in them.
2. The existence of a 'modern blood feud' is not established: Kanun blood feuds have always allowed for the possibility of pre-emptive killing by a dominant clan.
3. The Albanian state has taken steps to improve state protection, but in areas where Kanun law predominates (particularly in northern Albania) those steps do not yet provide sufficiency of protection from Kanun-related blood-taking if an active feud exists and affects the individual claimant. Internal relocation to an area of Albania less dependent on the Kanun may provide sufficient protection, depending on the reach, influence, and commitment to prosecution of the feud by the aggressor clan.
4. International protection under the Refugee Convention, Qualification Directive or Articles 2 and 3 ECHR is not available to an appellant who is willing and intends to commit a revenge killing on return to his country of origin, by reference to that intention.
5. Where there is an active feud affecting an individual and self-confinement is the only option, that person will normally qualify for Refugee status.
6. In determining whether an active blood feud exists, the fact-finding Tribunal should consider:
(i) the history of the alleged feud, including the notoriety of the original killings, the numbers killed, and the degree of commitment by the aggressor clan toward the prosecution of the feud;
(ii) the length of time since the last death and the relationship of the last person killed to the appellant;
(iii) the ability of members of the aggressor clan to locate the appellant if returned to another part of Albania; and
(iv) the past and likely future attitude of the police and other authorities towards the feud and the protection of the family of the person claiming to be at risk, including any past attempts to seek prosecution of members of the aggressor clan, or to seek protection from the Albanian authorities.
7. In order to establish that there is an active blood feud affecting him personally, an appellant must produce satisfactory individual evidence of its existence in relation to him. In particular, the appellant must establish:
(i) his profile as a potential target of the feud identified and which family carried out the most recent killing; and
(ii) whether the appellant has been, or other members of his family have been, or are currently, in self-confinement within Albania.’
7. In TD and AD (Trafficked women) CG [2016] UKUT 00092 (IAC) the UT held inter alia:
“Much of the guidance given in AM & BM (Trafficked women) Albania CG [2010] UKUT 00080 (IAC) is maintained. Where that guidance has been amended or supplemented by this decision it has been highlighted in bold:
"a) It is not possible to set out a typical profile of trafficked women from Albania: trafficked women come from all areas of the country and from varied social backgrounds.
b) Much of Albanian society is governed by a strict code of honour which not only means that trafficked women would have very considerable difficulty in reintegrating into their home areas on return but also will affect their ability to relocate internally. Those who have children outside marriage are particularly vulnerable. In extreme cases the close relatives of the trafficked woman may refuse to have the trafficked woman's child return with her and could force her to abandon the child.
c) …
d) In the past few years the Albanian government has made significant efforts to improve its response to trafficking. This includes widening the scope of legislation, publishing the Standard Operating Procedures, implementing an effective National Referral Mechanism, appointing a new Anti-trafficking Co-ordinator, and providing training to law enforcement officials. There is in general a Horvath-standard sufficiency of protection, but it will not be effective in every case. When considering whether or not there is a sufficiency of protection for a victim of trafficking her particular circumstances must be considered.
e) There is now in place a reception and reintegration programme for victims of trafficking. Returning victims of trafficking are able to stay in a shelter on arrival, and in 'heavy cases' may be able to stay there for up to 2 years. During this initial period after return victims of trafficking are supported and protected. Unless the individual has particular vulnerabilities such as physical or mental health issues, this option cannot generally be said to be unreasonable; whether it is must be determined on a case by case basis.
f) Once asked to leave the shelter a victim of trafficking can live on her own. In doing so she will face significant challenges including, but not limited to, stigma, isolation, financial hardship and uncertainty, a sense of physical insecurity and the subjective fear of being found either by their families or former traffickers. Some women will have the capacity to negotiate these challenges without undue hardship. There will however be victims of trafficking with characteristics, such as mental illness or psychological scarring, for whom living alone in these circumstances would not be reasonable. Whether a particular appellant falls into that category will call for a careful assessment of all the circumstances.
g) Re-trafficking is a reality. Whether that risk exists for an individual claimant will turn in part on the factors that led to the initial trafficking, and on her personal circumstances, including her background, age, and her willingness and ability to seek help from the authorities. For a proportion of victims of trafficking, their situations may mean that they are especially vulnerable to re-trafficking, or being forced into other exploitative situations.
h) Trafficked women from Albania may well be members of a particular social group on that account alone. Whether they are at risk of persecution on account of such membership and whether they will be able to access sufficiency of protection from the authorities will depend upon their individual circumstances including but not limited to the following:
1) The social status and economic standing of her family
2) The level of education of the victim of trafficking or her family
3) The victim of trafficking's state of health, particularly her mental health
4) The presence of an illegitimate child
5) The area of origin
6) Age
7) What support network will be available.”
Decision and reasons
8. I make the following findings in relation to the protection claim and issue 1 i.e whether the Appellant has a well-founded fear of persecution arising from a blood feud:
8.1. The Respondent accepts that the Appellant’s family were involved in a blood feud but not that the Appellant would be at risk on return due to the fact that his father remains alive and living in the family home for the last 10 years and his cousin, who committed the murder which started the blood feud, is serving a long prison sentence. Ms Lanigan submitted that the Appellant withstood robust cross-examination and his account was unshaken and firm in relation to the Pula family and he should be found to be credible. The Appellant accepted that the Pula family do not have influence throughout Albania and that is to his credit. I accept that the Appellant may have a subjective fear of persecution or serious harm from the Pula family.
8.2. Applying EH (blood feuds) (op cit) to the facts of the Appellant’s case, Mr Nappey relied on the fact that the Appellant returned to Albania in 2017 without being approached by anyone from the Pula family and that his family remain in the family home at the same address. Mr Nappey submitted that the Appellant’s evidence today had changed in that for the first time he said that he had gone to the police (in 2017) but this was not credible. He submitted that no other family members had been targeted and no-one is in self-confinement and therefore there is no active blood feud affecting the Appellant personally. Ms Lanigan submitted that if returned the Appellant would be the only young male who would be an available target as the others have fled the country. She submitted that the passage of time in and of itself is no safeguard. I have taken account of the letter from the Appellant’s father at SB 231 where he states inter alia that “we are repeatedly under frequent threat and harassment from the male members of the Pula family. The most recent visit being in March, where they approached my property and caused minor damage to with the intention of scaring me and my family. As it stands they claim they are awaiting for Taulant to come back to Albania stating he cannot hide forever … I fear reporting this would cause even more issues than I’m already having with my number constantly being rang with calls threatening me …”
8.3. Mr Nappey submitted that the CPIN with regard to Actors of Protection states that generally a person is able to access protection from the State with regard to non-State actors: [2.1], [2.8] and this is protection to the Horvath standard. This also applies with regard to blood feuds: [3.1.1.] and [4.1.1] and internal relocation is a possibility where the risk does not extend beyond the home area.
8.4. With regard to the country expert reports of Dr James Korovilas, Mr Nappey submitted that he should have but failed to comment on the Pula family as an aggressor clan and in light of the fact that he has not referred to any background evidence supporting the power of the Pula family and has not addressed the positive evidence as to sufficiency of protection, his opinion cannot outweigh the counter evidence. Ms Lanigan submitted that significant weight should be attached to the report and that the expert found at SB 205-26 that a significant risk remained.
8.5. I have taken careful account of the expert report in this respect at SB 204. Whilst I accept that blood feuds do exist, I note, firstly, that only a very few examples are given by the expert and none more recently than October 2021 and secondly that there is no reference to them taking place in Tirana but rather, as is traditional, in Northern Albania.
8.6. I have applied the CG case of EH (blood feuds) (op cit) [6] above refers, noting in particular, provisions at [7] that: “in order to establish that there is an active blood feud affecting him personally, an appellant must produce satisfactory individual evidence of its existence in relation to him. In particular, the appellant must establish:
(i) his profile as a potential target of the feud identified and which family carried out the most recent killing; and (ii) whether the appellant has been, or other members of his family have been, or are currently, in self-confinement within Albania.”
8.7. I find that the Appellant has not established that he would be targeted by members of the Pula family if he returned to Albania. I do not believe, even to the lower standard, that what the Appellant’s father says in his statement is true but rather that it was designed to assist his son in his appeal against deportation or at the very least is an exaggeration of any threat made. He is a male member of the family and says that he has been threatened but has remained unharmed. There has been only one murder, of a member of the Pula family by the Appellant’s cousin, who is serving a long prison sentence for murder. Whilst it is asserted that all the young men in the Appellant’s family have left, this has not been particularised, other than the names of the cousin’s two brothers nor any evidence produced of where they have gone, other than an assertion that they went to Italy and Greece. No-one is in self-confinement and the Appellant’s family have remained living in the family home.
8.8. Consequently, I do not accept to the lower standard that the Appellant has a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of a blood feud with the Pula family in Albania.
9. I make the following findings in relation to issue 2: whether the Appellant has a well-founded fear of persecution as a former male victim of trafficking:
9.1. Mr Nappey submitted that there is no Convention reason and there would be an article 3 risk only. Ms Lanigan submitted that the Appellant is a member of a particular social group as a male victim of trafficking and the test was disjunctive as this is a pre NABA case cf. DH (Afghanistan) [2020] UKUT 00223 and EMAP [2022] UKUT 00335 on the basis of innate characteristic. She submitted that both limbs were satisfied in light of the evidence regarding social stigma: see [9.1.2] and [9.1.3] of the CPIN on Trafficking 2024 regarding men and boys as well as women and girls. I note that the source consulted at [9.1.2] stated that men never identify themselves as victims of trafficking and that it was more difficult to identify male VOT. I further note that [3.3.3] provides that: “There is, however, little evidence in the sources consulted that men and boys face the same societal stigma or discrimination as lone women.” I note that the Appellant remains in close contact with his father and family in Albania and has not been stigmatised by his family as a result of his being trafficked. I conclude that whilst the Appellant has been recognised as a victim of trafficking in the United Kingdom, based on the evidence as a whole, he would not be identifiable as such on return to Albania such that he would form part of a particular social group.
9.2. I therefore proceed to consider the risk on return to the Appellant as an individual from the criminal gang on an article 3 basis.
9.3. Ms Lanigan submitted that the Appellant has been consistent in terms of threats from the gang who trafficked him and the need for him to repay the debt: SB 201 which is corroborated by the report of Dr Korovilas at SB 201-202 and the absence of any principle of “debt forgiveness.” The expert opined at SB 203 that the Appellant’s fears are realistic. Mr Nappey raised a credibility issue which is that the country expert report says it is reasonable the Appellant’s father was approached by money lenders but at the same time his father’s witness statement does not mention that, nor does the addendum report by Dr Korovilas. I find that is not correct in that the Appellant’s father’s letter at SB 231 states: “Another concern of mine is the criminal gang and their connections with Albania, leading to again the danger his puts my son and family in.” The addendum report of Dr Korovilas is concerned only with the issue of risk arising from the blood feud and his inability to offer a definitive opinion, in response to a matter raised in the Respondent’s review and so I do not accept Mr Nappey’s submission in this respect.
9.4. I place weight on the expert evidence of Dr Korovilas who I find is a reputable and experienced expert who has provided reasons and sources for his opinions. He addresses in detail at SB 198-202 the potential risks arising to the Appellant as a consequence of the debt owed to the criminal gang from who he borrowed money to support himself during the covid related lockdown as a consequence of which he was forced to work in a cannabis “factory” which resulted in his 18 month conviction and subsequent recognition as a victim of trafficking. The expert, fairly in my opinion, states that it is very difficult to definitively assess the actual level of risk faced by the Appellant since there are several unknown variables which are impossible to assess eg his value to the gang and the ruthlessness of the individuals but he concludes at SB 202: “However the point I am making here is that the criminal gang that were threatening (the Appellant) could feasibly locate, capture and harm him should he return to Albania. Essentially the nature of these criminal gangs if such that (the Appellant) faces a genuine risk of being either capture or otherwise harmed by the criminal gang to whom he owes money.”
9.5. I note that the CPIN provides at [3.3.4] that: “In general, the available evidence does not indicate that men and boys who have been trafficked to the UK will be at risk of serious harm on return for that reason alone. Whether they face a risk of such treatment will depend on their personal circumstances, such as their age, education, skills and employability, area of origin, health or disability, availability of a support network, and the intent and reach of their traffickers.” (emphasis added)
9.6. I find that the key issue in this case is the debt that is owed to the criminal gang/former traffickers by the Appellant that they seek to recoup and that there is intent to find the Appellant for this reason. I find in light of the expert opinion that there is a reasonable likelihood or real risk that the Appellant’s father has been approached by the criminal gang seeking repayment of the debt owed to them by the Appellant and that there is a real risk that they will seek repayment of the debt from the Appellant or through his family if he is returned to Albania.
9.7. Mr Nappey submitted that there is no evidence of the reach of the traffickers and the Appellant could obtain sufficient protection. He relied on the CPIN on Trafficking July 2024 at [3.1.2] which highlights that the risk of re-trafficking is small and the Appellant has family in Albania and would not be without support. The CPIN at 3.3.1 held that, in general male victims of trafficking are not at serious risk of harm or re-trafficking. Whilst some might be more vulnerable it is not his case as the Appellant does not have mental health issues himself and has been educated to the age of 17 and the CPIN states he could seek protection or relocate. Ms Lanigan submitted that there was an implementation gap between theory and practice in relation to sufficiency of protection in trafficking cases: see SB 250-257 including the low number of convictions and the reasons for this; issues with identification, corruption, lack of training and weak institutions and at SB 253 that there is an endemic problem with direct relationships with law enforcement and criminal elements in Albania and at SB 256 that the risk of re-trafficking is high cf. TD & AD and the CPIN on trafficking at 5.4 with regard to impunity. She submitted that the passage of time has will have made no difference. I find that there is a real risk in light of the evidence that the Appellant would not be able to obtain sufficient protection from the police as there is a real risk that the criminal gangs are connected with or have corrupted them.
9.8. Mr Nappey submitted that the Appellant could internally relocate within Albania in order to avoid detection and that the Appellant could go to Tirana and he is someone who has a support network and speaks Albanian and would not be seen with suspicion as such. He submitted that financial assistance for male victims of trafficking was available and that applying the criteria in TD & AD (op cit) it would not be unduly harsh for him to internally relocate. I do not find the CG case of particular assistance in this case given that the Appellant is a male victim of trafficking, is not a member of a particular social group and is not vulnerable in the same manner as many female victims of trafficking for the reasons set out above and also because his fear, which I have found to be well-founded, is based on a debt that he owes. Ms Lanigan pointed out that the expert report makes clear that Tirana would provide most opportunity for the Appellant to establish himself and find security: SB 211 and that there is ample background evidence that individuals and family members can be easily located: see SB 204. SB 245, 247 and 250.
9.9. My concern with internal relocation in this case is that the Appellant is from Tirana and so cannot reasonably be expected to internally relocate within the same city. Dr Korovilas states at SB 207-209 that a number of issues arise with internal relocation in the Albanian context: the absence of family support in a new area, which would make it much harder to secure employment or housing and increase the risk of him falling into the hands of the criminal gang; the difficult in maintaining anonymity in Albania because family and regional origins are a strong part of social identity; the fact there are only 3 million people in Albania and it is a small and traditional country where people maintain strong family links; he is likely to be viewed with suspicion as he would be unable to provide a reasonable explanation for his relocation so it would be assumed he is escaping from a shameful or dishonourable past and could face ostracism or stigma and the fact he would need to register with the municipality he moved to and so could be traced through the registration system.
9.10. I find in light of the evidence that it would be unduly harsh for the Appellant to relocate and there would remain a real risk that he could be identified by the criminal gang and that he would be subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment or torture, contrary to article 3 of ECHR which also may include re-trafficking.
10. I make the following findings of fact in relation to Issue 3 – the applicability of the family life exception at paragraph 13.2.5(a), (d) and (e) of the Immigration Rules:
10.1. I find the Appellant and CM to be credible witnesses. Their evidence was very largely consistent with their written statements and with each other’s oral evidence.
10.2. I find that the Appellant plays an active role in his son’s life and is effectively, at times, a joint carer even though he and his partner have now separated and are co-parenting. CM stated and I accept that he is able to provide his son with personal care. She said: “when he is there he does the exact same tasks as me he will prepare his food, change his nappy, take him for haircuts and provides him with everything I do and he is better behaved with him.” I accept the Appellant’s evidence that the reason he is living in Essex 1 hour 40 minutes away from CM and his son who live in Hertfordshire is because he is living with a family friend rent free as he is unable to work, but that he does visit his son between 3 and 5 times a week and stays over when needed eg if CM is ill or her mental health is “very bad” and that he would move to be nearer to his son if he were able to.
10.3. I accept the consistent evidence that the Appellant also accompanies his son to medical appointments. This point was also supported at SB 121 by a letter from Sue Neale, a parent infant therapist at the Herts Community Perinatal team who says it is important for CM’s wellbeing to have the support of the Appellant with their sessions and a photograph at SB 131 of the Appellant with his son at a medical appointment when he had a chest infection. I was told that their son has speech and language delay and suspected autism.
10.4. I find that CM has both physical and mental health difficulties, which are set out in letters from medical practitioners and in her oral evidence, including: a hearing disability caused by domestic violence (not by the Appellant), in respect of which she is awaiting a cochlear implant; PTSD in respect of which she is prescribed Fluoxetine and ADHD. I accept the Appellant’s evidence that he will always need to be there for his son because of CM’s mental health difficulties.
10.5. Whilst CM did form a new relationship I accept the evidence, which was not disputed, that this relationship has since ended and that in any event he did not offer support in terms of the Appellant and CM’s son. I accept CM’s evidence that she used to be supported by her grandparents but they died in 2017 and 2020 respectively; her relationship with her mother has broken down and whilst she could turn to her father (who lives in Oxfordshire) for financial support she does not feel able to obtain support from him in relation to care for her son or her mental health, not least because of the distance. Whilst she receives some support from friends eg with her own short medical appointments they have their own children and are not able to do more. She said her son goes to nursery twice a week and it is one hour away by bus from where she lives in a village. CM said that their son has a health visitor but there was no social services involvement.
10.6. I also accept that if the Appellant were to be deported CM would only be able to visit him in Albania with their son once or at the most twice a year, if at all, as she stated and I accept, that she struggles travelling and has panic attacks and does not currently feel capable of taking their son on a flight to Albania and she probably could not afford it, having been signed off work for health reasons.
10.7. I take account of the OASys report at SB 182 which found on 11 June 2024 that the Appellant presented a medium risk to the public in the community. I accept that the Appellant complied with all the requirements imposed by his probation officer and I take account of SB 180 which records that he is very motivated to address his offending behaviour. I also take account of the sentencing remarks where the judge found that “there was no evidence that you were anything other than a gardener” and that the appellant was doing so in order to pay off a debt.
11. I reach the following conclusions in relation to Issue 3:
11.1. I find that the relationship between the Appellant and his son F is genuine and subsisting. Whilst Mr Nappey submitted that it was not, this submission was based on the fact that the Appellant lives some distance away (1 hour 40 minutes) and does not live with his son and that the photographs are not dated or time stamped. As to the assertion there is no evidence that he attends medical appointments that is not made out on the evidence before me: [10.3] above refers. I find that the requirements of paragraph 13.2.5(a) are met.
11.2. I find that it would be unduly harsh to expect CM and their son to relocate to Albania. I accept in light of her health issues and the current investigations into her son’s speech and language delay that she is dependent upon the NHS in the UK and that she could not expect to access the same level of care in Albania. I find that CM would struggle to learn and speak Albanian due to her hearing disability and will not be able to access the specialist medical support she currently receives from UCLH. It would clearly not be in F’s best interests to relocate to Albania without his mother. Therefore, I find that the requirements of paragraph 13.2.5.(d) of the Rules are met.
11.3. I find having carefully considered CM’s evidence that it would be unduly harsh for the Appellant’s son to remain in the United Kingdom without him due to the impact this would have on her and her fear that she would become “unstable” again, with a risk of self-harm and a breakdown which would clearly adversely impact on her ability to parent her son effectively. I also bear in mind her evidence that her sister’s children have been taken into care due to her mental health struggles and inability to look after them. I consider that the requirements of paragraph 13.5.2.(e) are met in light of CM’s particular personal and family circumstances and the absence of alternative support to that provided by the Appellant.
11.4. Therefore, whilst taking into account the Appellant’s 18 month sentence and the strong public interest in the deportation of foreign national offenders, I find that the family life exception to deportation is met for the reasons set out above and consequently the public interest does not require the deportation of the Appellant.
12. In light of my findings above there is no need to go on to consider issue 4 and whether there are very compelling circumstances over and above the second exception to deportation.

Notice of decision
13. The appeal is allowed on human rights grounds (articles 3 and 8).

Rebecca Chapman

Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Chapman

8 August 2025