Tribunal decisions

The decision

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Case Number: UI-2025-000094
First-tier Tribunal Ref: PA/55028/2024
LP/04032/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Field House
Decision & Reasons Promulgated
On 7 October 2025

On 5th of November 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE J K SWANEY

Between

MSN
(anonymity direction made)
Appellant

and

the secretary of state for the home department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms E Atas, counsel, instructed by Logan Kingsley Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr J Nappey, senior presenting officer

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
DECISION AND REASONS
Anonymity
1. I have made an anonymity order because the need to discharge the United Kingdom’s obligations under the Refugee Convention outweighs the public interest in open justice.
Background
2. The appellant is a citizen of Iraq. He appeals the decision made on 13 October 2025 to dismiss his appeal against the refusal of his international protection and human rights claims.
3. The appellant claimed asylum in the United Kingdom on 7 August 2022. His claim was refused on 19 February 2024, and he appealed the decision. His claim was based on his fear of persecution for reason of his political opinion. It was accepted that his claim under article 8 of the ECHR stood or fell with his asylum claim.
4. The issues that came before the First-tier Tribunal judge (the judge) were: whether the appellant was credible; whether he would be at risk on return to Iraq as a result of sur place political activities in the United Kingdom; and whether he could re-document himself.
5. The judge found as follows:
(i) The appellant is not credible in light of internal inconsistencies in his evidence and inconsistencies between his evidence and the available documentary evidence; and his failure to claim asylum in either Poland or France.
(ii) The appellant has scarring including burns and an injury to his nose, but they were not caused in the manner claimed by the appellant.
(iii) Any mental health conditions the appellant may have are not linked to his experiences in Iraq.
(iv) The appellant left Iraq using his own passport for reasons other than a well-founded fear of persecution.
(v) The appellant has attended demonstrations in the UK, but his political activity is opportunistic, and his political beliefs are not genuine.
(vi) Background evidence does not show that the Iraqi authorities have the capacity to monitor political activities in the UK.
(vii) The appellant’s sur place activities do not give rise to a real risk.
(viii) The appellant is in contact with his family in Iraq and all his documents save for his passport were left with them when he left Iraq.
6. The appellant applied for permission to appeal, which was refused by the First-tier Tribunal. The appellant made an application for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal, which was granted on limited grounds. The matter came before me for a decision as to whether the judge made a material error of law.
Submissions
7. As stated, permission to appeal was granted on limited grounds. They are:
(i) The judge arguably failed to consider relevant background evidence regarding monitoring of political activities and/or failed to give adequate reasons for rejecting that evidence.
(ii) The judge arguably failed to have regard to relevant country guidance and background evidence regarding redocumentation and/or failed to give adequate reasons for the findings made on redocumentation.
8. I heard oral submissions from both representatives and considered the contents of the composite bundle in reaching my decision.
9. Ms Atas submitted that in finding that the appellant’s sur place activities were opportunistic and that he had no genuinely held political beliefs, the judge failed to have regard to Danian v SSHD [1999] EWCA Civ 3000. She submitted that even if the appellant engaged in political activity in the United Kingdom in bad faith, his claim could nevertheless succeed if those activities would put him at risk on return. For this reason, she submitted that the judge’s failure to give adequate reasons in relation to the issue of monitoring is material.
10. Ms Atas submitted that the judge’s attention was drawn to YB (Eritrea) v SSHD [2008] EWCA Civ 360 in the skeleton argument, in which Lord Justice Sedley observed that it will often be difficult to find direct evidence of covert monitoring and that it was likely to be unavailable. She also relied on WAS (Pakistan) v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 894 for her submission that the appellant did not need to show that he had definitely come to the attention of those he fears; only that there is a real risk that he had done so.
11. Ms Atas drew my attention to the evidence that was before the judge regarding monitoring. When I asked, she submitted that the evidence is not limited to Iraq but accepted that none of the evidence expressly confirms that there is capacity to monitor individuals outside of Iraq, including in the United Kingdom.
12. In respect of the redocumentation issue, Ms Atas submitted that the judge failed to give adequate reasons for finding that the appellant was not in contact with his family in Iraq, which infected the judge’s finding that his family could assist by providing his documents on arrival. She also submitted that the judge failed to make reference to relevant country guidance in SMO & KSP (Civil status documentation; article 15) Iraq CG [2022] UKUT 00110 (IAC) on the redocumentation point. In particular, Ms Atas submitted that the judge was wrong to find that a lack of a passport was not an insurmountable problem in light of the finding in SMO that a laissez passer would be confiscated on arrival and the background evidence regarding the existence of manned checkpoints in the IKR.
13. Mr Nappey confirmed that the respondent opposed the appeal for the reasons set out in her response made pursuant to rule 24 of the Procedure Rules.
14. Mr Nappey submitted that when looking at the judge’s findings on the appellant’s sur place activities, it was necessary to consider the judge’s findings as a whole, including the finding that the appellant was not credible in relation to his activities in Iraq. He contended that this is the starting point for the judge’s findings about his sur place activities. Mr Nappey submitted that the judge made clear findings about the threat the appellant alleged to have received via Facebook, and that the judge did give sufficient reasons for the finding that the appellant’s sur place activities were opportunistic.
15. In relation to the complaint that the judge failed to have regard to the background evidence on monitoring, Mr Nappey highlighted the judge’s finding that there was no evidence that the government of the IKR has the ability to monitor demonstrations outside the Iraqi embassy or that the central government of Iraq shares any information with the government of the IKR to help them locate known subversives. Mr Nappey submitted that the judge engaged with the background evidence that was before him, and that he made adequate and sustainable findings in relation to it. In the alternative, he submitted that even if the judge did not make adequate findings in relation to the background evidence, it is not material, because the judge reached the only rational conclusion that could have been reached.
16. On the judge’s failure to have regard to relevant country guidance, Mr Nappey accepted that the judge failed to refer to SMO. He submitted however that this was not a material error because the judge nevertheless made findings in line with the guidance in SMO. Mr Nappey highlighted that the findings of fact made by the judge were not challenged in the grounds of appeal and submitted that they cannot now be challenged.
17. Mr Nappey submitted that the judge gave clear findings at paragraphs 17 and 18 of the decision as to why he did not accept the appellant’s evidence that he is not in contact with his family. In addition, the judge made a clear finding that the appellant left Iraq using his own passport and that he left all other documents with his family in Iraq. Mr Nappey submitted that the judge’s findings that the appellant is in contact with his family and that he left his identity documents with them means that the judge’s conclusions are in line with SMO and that there is no real risk of treatment in breach of article 3 of the ECHR because the appellant’s family could attend the airport to confirm his identity and bring his original documents. Mr Nappey submitted that the judge’s reasons given at paragraph 24 of the decision are brief, but reflect the guidance given in SMO.
18. Mr Nappey noted the appellant’s reliance on SA (Removal destination, Iraq, Undertakings) v SSHD [2022] UKUT 00037 (IAC) before the judge and queried whether the position was maintained given that the position since that case was decided has changed because returns direct to the IKR are now possible. He submitted that the guidance in SMO surpasses that in SA. Ms Atas confirmed that the reliance was maintained but indicated that she had no further submissions to make in addition to what was said in the skeleton argument. She simply submitted that the judge had failed to consider that enforced returns to any area of federal Iraq are not supported.
Discussion
Monitoring of political activities
19. The judge’s findings about the appellant’s sur place activities must, in my view, be considered in the light of his finding that the appellant is not credible in relation to other aspects of his claim. This is made clear at paragraph 13, and in paragraphs 14 to 21 which contain the reasons for that finding. The judge finds that the appellant is not credible in relation to: his account of how he left Iraq; his journey to the United Kingdom and his explanation for his failure to claim asylum in safe countries through which he passed; his evidence about his activities for NGM; the reliability of documentary evidence from NGM; his claimed lack of contact with his family and other relatives in Iraq; the reliability of the evidence about his efforts to trace his family through the Red Cross; and his evidence about how his scars were caused.
20. The judge gives brief, but adequate reasons for the finding that the appellant does not hold true political beliefs and that his sur place activities are opportunistic.
21. I find that the judge has considered the background evidence on monitoring. The judge noted that no evidence was brought to his attention to suggest that it is possible for the government of the IKR to monitor activities in the United Kingdom or that the central government of Iraq passes information to the government of the IKR. None is referred to in the skeleton argument that was before the judge.
22. In relation to Ms Atas’ submissions about YG (Eritrea) and WAS (Pakistan), I note that what Sedley LJ held was that:
Where, as here, the tribunal has objective evidence which ‘paints a bleak picture of the suppression of political opponents’ by a named government, it requires little or no evidence or speculation to arrive at a strong possibility – and perhaps more – that its foreign legations not only film or photograph their nationals who demonstrate in public against the regime but have informers among expatriate oppositionist organisations who can name the people who are filmed or photographed. Similarly it does not require affirmative evidence to establish a probability that the intelligence services of such states monitor the internet for information about oppositionist groups. The real question in most cases will be what follows for the individual claimant.
23. While I accept that direct evidence that the appellant is in fact being monitored is not required, it is necessary for him to be able to show that there is a real risk that he has or would come to the adverse attention of the authorities. The evidence about monitoring capabilities is relevant to that question. If there is no evidence which confirms that there is any capability of the authorities to engage in such monitoring, there is no basis on which to make a finding that he is at real risk.
24. I have considered Ms Atas’ submission that the evidence does not expressly state that monitoring capabilities are limited to Iraq. I note the passages quoted in the skeleton argument and have considered the source material. Page 29 of the US State Department report on Iraq for 2022 refers to the monitoring of social media. This is set out in the section of the report entitled ‘Internet Freedom’. The reference to the restriction or disruption of access to the internet must in my view refer to access in Iraq. The report is about Iraq specifically and the there is nothing to suggest that the government is capable of restricting access to the internet in countries other than Iraq. Similarly, the reports about monitoring online communications are in my view about monitoring communications in Iraq. There is nothing to suggest otherwise, and in the context of a report about human rights, if there was evidence that the government monitored individuals and their activities outside of Iraq, this would be made explicit. There is nothing in the US State Department report to suggest that civil society organisations outside of Iraq reported that their activists’ social media accounts were monitored by government or militia forces.
25. The Freedom House Freedom on the Net Iraqi 2022 report contains similar information about the monitoring of online communications, but again, there is nothing to suggest that this relates to online communication outside of Iraq. That report refers to the capability of Iran backed militias to monitor online activities, but again, there is nothing to suggest that this includes online activities outside of Iraq. I note that the information about accessing Facebook accounts is in the context of accessing information held by internet service providers in Iraq and there is nothing to suggest that this extends to information held by internet service providers outside Iraq.
26. I expressly asked Ms Atas whether any of the evidence positively confirmed a capacity to monitor activities in the United Kingdom, and she accepted it does not. She submitted however that the evidence does not exclude this possibility. I have considered this submission but reject it. The burden of showing that he is at risk on return is on the appellant. The country reports and evidence are all prepared about the situation in Iraq. This is clear from the way in which the reports are drafted and the sources of the evidence considered. An inference that they may not exclude the position in the United Kingdom is not sufficient to discharge the burden on the appellant. I find that the background evidence relied on before the judge related to the position in Iraq and does not disclose any capability to monitor, or any actual monitoring of social media outside of Iraq.
27. In relation to attendance at demonstrations in the United Kingdom, no specific evidence was relied on before the judge to suggest that these are monitored, or if they are, by whom, or whether that information is shared with the authorities in the IKR. No such evidence was drawn to my attention.
28. I find that the judge considered the evidence about monitoring that was before him. I accept that he did not refer to the evidence in any detail and did not give reasons for rejecting the evidence. For the reasons set out above, I find that the failure to give reasons is not material, because had the judge done so, the only rational conclusion he could have reached is that the evidence does not demonstrate that the IKR authorities have the capacity to monitor social media and/or online communication outside of Iraq, including in the United Kingdom and that it does not demonstrate that the Iraqi central government monitors activities in the United Kingdom or if they do, that they transmit information to the IKR.
Redocumentation
29. It is accepted by the respondent that the judge did not refer to SMO when considering the issue of redocumentation. For the reasons that follow, I find that this is not a material error of law.
30. The respondent failed to specify in the refusal of the appellant’s asylum claim the location in Iraq to which she proposed to return him. She did not specify whether she intended to return him to Baghdad, or to a destination in the IKR. However, in her review, she states clearly at paragraph 48 that the appellant will be removed to the IKR, either via Sulaymaniyah airport or Duhok airport. Ms Atas’ reliance on SA is therefore misplaced, as return via Baghdad is not contemplated and there is no issue arising either in relation to the appellant’s family providing him with his documents in Baghdad or any risks the appellant might face during onward travel from Baghdad to the IKR.
31. The appellant’s evidence before the judge was that he had left all his documents except his passport with his family in Iraq. The judge gave reasons for placing little weight on the appellant’s attempt to find his family through the Red Cross. The judge’s reasons are sustainable. The judge made sustainable findings that the appellant is not credible, including in relation to his evidence that he was not in contact with his family.
32. The judge found that the appellant’s lack of a passport was not an insurmountable problem, and it is asserted that this is a finding not adequately reasoned. In my view the finding must be viewed in the context of the judge’s other findings, including that the appellant had left all his other documents with his family and that he was not credible in relation to his lack of contact with them.
33. The judge found that the appellant could, with the assistance of his family, obtain his original documents. The significance of this finding is that the appellant’s family could send his documents to him in the United Kingdom, enabling him to establish his identity and nationality for the purposes of obtaining either a passport or a laissez passer. In the alternative, the appellant’s family could attend the airport to provide him with his documents. He would thereby be able to establish his identity and use the documents for onward travel within the IKR. Ms Atas’ submission about the existence of manned checkpoints within the IKR therefore falls away.
34. So, while the judge did not explicitly refer to SMO, I find that his findings were consistent with the guidance given in that case and there is no evidence that the judge did not have it in mind when making those findings. The judge’s decision does not contain a material error of law.
Conclusions
35. In summary, I find that the judge failed to give reasons for rejecting the evidence about monitoring, but that this was not a material error of law, because the judge reached the only rational conclusion open to him on the basis of that evidence.
36. I find that the judge failed to refer explicitly to SMO when considering the issue of redocumentation, but that this was not a material error of law because his findings were consistent with the Upper Tribunal’s guidance and there is nothing to suggest that the judge did not have the guidance in mind when making them.
Decision
37. The judge’s decision does not contain a material error of law.
38. The appeal is dismissed.

Signed J K Swaney Date 24 October 2025
Judge J K Swaney
Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge