The decision



IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-000108

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/65080/2023
LH/06468/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 25 July 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SILLS

Between

Tirth Singh
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

The Secretary of State of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr S Muzenda, Longfellows & Co Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr Wain, Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 4 July 2025


DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The Appellant appeals on human rights grounds under s82 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (the 2002 Act) against the Respondent’s decision dated 22 December 2023, refusing his application of 4 April 2023 for leave to remain.
2. In an oral decision given on 12 March 2025, with the approved transcript issued on 22 April 2025, I found that the FTT Judge had made material errors of law in the decision of 25 November 2024 dismissing the Appellant’s appeal. I set aside that decision and directed that the decision be remade in the Upper Tribunal after a further oral hearing. That hearing came before me on 4 July 2025.
Factual Background
3. The Appellant entered the UK on 26 July 2021 with entry clearance as the dependant of a student which was valid until 31 May 2023. On 18 February 2023 the Appellant’s leave was curtailed so as to end on 12 April 2023 as his then partner had ceased to study.
4. The Appellant claims that he met his current partner and Sponsor in August 2022. He moved in with her and her two children, now aged 14 and 16, in January 2023. The Appellant applied for leave to remain on the basis of his relationship with his new partner on 4 April 2023.
5. The Respondent refused the application on 22 December 2023. The Appellant could not satisfy the partner definition. There were no suitability issues. The Appellant met the immigration status requirements. The requirements of EX1 were not met as the partner definition was not satisfied and the Appellant did not have any children. There were no exceptional circumstances.
6. The Appellant appealed. The Appellant divorced his former wife and married the Sponsor on 28 August 2024.
The Hearing
7. At the outset of the hearing, I confirmed the documents relied upon by the parties and clarified the issues with the parties. Mr Wain accepted that the partner definition, while not satisfied at the date of decision, was now satisfied following the marriage. However, the Respondent did not accept that the relationship between the Appellant and Sponsor was genuine and subsisting. Nor did the Respondent accept that the Appellant had a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with the Appellant’s children. I heard evidence from the Appellant and the Sponsor. The Sponsor’s eldest son was in attendance but did not give evidence or observe the hearing. I heard submissions from the representatives and reserved my decision.
Legal Framework
8. It is for the Appellant to show that Article 8(1) of the ECHR is engaged and if so, it is for the Respondent to show that the decision was in accordance with the law, made in pursuance of a legitimate aim and that it was proportionate to the legitimate aim. The standard of proof is the balance of probabilities. Sections 117A to 117D of the 2002 Act are relevant to any assessment under Article 8 of the ECHR. S117B(6) states:
‘(6)  In the case of a person who is not liable to deportation, the public interest does not require the person's removal where—
(a)  the person has a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a qualifying child, and
(b)  it would not be reasonable to expect the child to leave the United Kingdom.
Findings
9. I will consider the relevant factual issues in dispute first, before applying the applicable law to those findings. As set out above, the Respondent disputes that the Appellant and Sponsor are in a genuine and subsisting relationship.
10. Mr Wain argued that the Appellant had acted dishonestly in failing to inform the Respondent that his previous relationship had come to an end and that this damaged his credibility. Both the Appellant and Sponsor were asked about this. Having heard their evidence, I accept that neither of them appreciated that the Appellant should have informed the Respondent that the relationship ended. I also accept that the Appellant and Sponsor thought they acted promptly when the Appellant applied to extend his leave to remain before his previous leave expired. I do not consider that this behaviour significantly damages the credibility of either witness.
11. The details of the life together of the Appellant and the Sponsor were consistent. The Sponsor works full time. As a result, she pays all the bills. The Appellant accepted that the Sponsor was responsible for financial decisions. It was the Appellant who was responsible for most domestic tasks. The Sponsor’s evidence was that the Appellant takes the children to school and takes them to clubs. He cooks for them, plays with them and takes them to the park. He assists them with their studies. The Appellant and Sponsor both confirmed that her children did not attend their legal wedding. They had attended the religious ceremony. The Appellant stated that they had gone on a school excursion on the day of the wedding to a theme park. The Sponsor could not recall the reason they did not attend and I take this into account.
12. Mr Wain criticised the Appellant for stating his occupation was a construction worker on the marriage certificate when he was not working. I consider this criticism unjustified. The Appellant’s case is that he had been working as a construction worker but had stopped working by the time of the marriage as his leave to remain had not been extended. He has provided his Construction Skills Certification Scheme card. On the marriage certificate, the Appellant was not being asked what his current work was, the question was more general than that. I consider it understandable that the Appellant would give the type of work of his last job as his occupation on the marriage certificate.
13. The Appellant and Sponsor were asked in evidence about the role that the children’s father played in their lives. This was not something that had been addressed in the witness statements. Both witnesses stated that the father had substance abuse issues and saw the children rarely. The children do not stay overnight with their father. The Appellant stated that the children last saw their father 4 months ago but did not give a precise date. The Sponsor stated that that they saw their father rarely, once every two or three months. They had last seen him in December 2024, which by now is over 6 months ago. While the evidence in general terms about the children’s relationship with their father was consistent, there were discrepancies on the precise details of when the children last saw their father. I note that the evidence is that the frequency of contact with the children’s father has reduced since the hearing before the FTT in November 2024, at which point it was recorded as being monthly.
14. There is some documentary evidence about the role the Appellant plays in the family’s life. There are letters from both children. A letter from the pharmacy confirms the Appellant and the children are registered there and that the Appellant collects the prescriptions for the children. A letter from the one child’s school confirms that he lives with his mother and the Appellant. A letter from the Gudwara confirms the claimed family relationships. There are various family photographs.
15. Mr Wain took issue with the joint bank account provided by the Appellant, suggesting that it was only set up for the purposes of his immigration application. There are a limited number of transactions and the account appears to be little used. I accept that the account may well have been set up for the purposes of creating documentary evidence of the relationship, but that does not necessarily indicate that the relationship is not genuine.
16. In assessing whether the relationship is genuine and subsisting, I take into account that the sole basis of the Appellant’s entry to the UK was his previous relationship, and that when that broke down, he may way having been seeking a new relationship to prolong his stay. On the other hand, I also take into account that the Appellant and Sponsor share the same religious and cultural background.
17. Having considered the documentary and oral evidence I reach the following factual findings. I find both the Appellant and the Sponsor to be credible witnesses. They have provided consistent accounts of their relationship. Their evidence is corroborated by photographs and documentary evidence such as from the school and the Gudwara. The only factor of significant suggesting that the relationship may not be genuine is the Appellant’s immigration status, but that is outweighed by the other evidence indicating that the relationship is genuine. So, I accept that couple’s account of the relationship. The couple met in August 2022. The Appellant moved in with the Sponsor and her children in January 2023. A religious wedding took place that month. They married in August 2024. The Appellant stopped working around March 2023. Since then, the Sponsor has been working full time, and the Appellant has assumed primary responsibility for the domestic duties in the household such as taking the children to and from school, and cooking. I do not consider the fact that the children did not attend the legal marriage to be significant in circumstances where a religious marriage had already taken place. I accept that the children see their father infrequently and do not stay overnight with him. I accept the evidence that their father has substance abuse issued. While there were discrepancies in the evidence about the contact the children have with their father, I find that these were due to the fallibility of memory and imprecise answers, rather than any attempt to mislead. I accept on balance that the children last saw their father in December 2024, the only precise date provided, which is over 6 months ago.
18. Having made these findings of fact, I turn to consider the legal questions I must address. Both representatives focused their submissions on whether the Appellant could satisfy the requirements of s117B(6) set out above. I will assess this issue first. If I find that the Appellant does satisfy that provision, I must find that the Respondent’s decision is disproportionate and allow the appeal.
19. I was referred to and have considered a number of different authorities which provide guidance on the question of a genuine and subsisting parental relationship. R (on the application of RK) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (s.117B(6); "parental relationship") IJR [2016] UKUT 00031 (IAC) provides guidance when considering the relationship with children of someone who is not their biological parent. The case held:
‘1. It is not necessary for an individual to have "parental responsibility" in law for there to exist a parental relationship.

2. Whether a person who is not a biological parent is in a "parental relationship" with a child for the purposes of s.117B(6) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 depends on the individual circumstances and whether the role that individual plays establishes he or she has "stepped into the shoes" of a parent.

3. Applying that approach, apart from the situation of split families where relationships between parents have broken down and an actual or de facto stepparent exists, it will be unusual, but not impossible, for more than 2 individuals to have a "parental relationship" with a child. However, the relationships between a child and professional or voluntary carers or family friends are not "parental relationships".’
The assessment is highly fact sensitive. While relevant to the assessment, there is no essential requirement for either direct personal care or important decision making (see SR (Subsisting Parental Relationship – s117B(6)) Pakistan [2018] UKUT 00334 (IAC) and AB Jamaica [2019] EWCA Civ 661).
20. In the present case, given the very limited contact that the biological father has with the children, I am satisfied that he plays no meaningful role in their lives at the present time. In contrast, the Appellant has lived with the children for around two and a half years. For most of that time, the Appellant has not been working. The Sponsor has been working and the Appellant has taken on domestic responsibilities. He is involved in their day to day lives, such as by taking them to school and to clubs, preparing their meals, supporting them with schoolwork and spending leisure time with them. While direct personal care may not be a requirement, noting the ages of the children, given the fact that the Appellant lives with the children, I am satisfied that such direct personal care is provided, such as by preparing their meals. I accept that the main decision maker in relation to the children is the Sponsor, who is after all their mother. Nonetheless, given the length of time that the Appellant has lived with the Sponsor and the children, and the household division of labour between the Appellant and the Sponsor, I am satisfied that the Appellant has by now stepped into the shoes of a parent and established a genuine and subsisting relationship with both children.
21. In considering the question of whether it would be reasonable to require the children to leave the UK, I have applied the guidance from KO Nigeria [2018] UKSC 53 . I must consider what is reasonable for the children in their real world context, but not balance their interests against any misconduct of their parents. The children are 14 and 16. They were both born in the UK, are British citizens, and have lived their whole lives in the UK. They are both at an important stage in their education. Their mother is also British. I accept that they have cultural ties to India and can speak Punjabi. I also accept that the Appellant has family in India. Nonetheless, given the strength of the children’s ties to the UK, it is clearly in their best interests to remain in the UK. I also accept that it is in the best interests of the children that they remain in the UK with their mother and the Appellant. He has by now formed part of their family unit and has stepped into the shoes of a parent. Were the Appellant to leave, this would cause further disruption for the children. The Sponsor would once again be a single parent which would place additional burden upon her. So, I am satisfied that it is in the best interests of the children to remain in the UK with the Sponsor and the Appellant. Those best interest are a primary consideration. In view of their best interests, respective ages, British citizenship, length of residence in the UK, and the stages of their education, I find that it would not be reasonable to require the children to leave the UK with their mother and the Appellant. I therefore find that the Appellant satisfies the requirements of s117B(6) of the 2002 Act which is determinative of the Appellant’s appeal on ECHR Article 8 grounds.
22. I therefore conclude as follows. In view of the above, I find that the Appellant has established family life in the UK with his wife, the Sponsor, and her two children. The Respondent’s decision interferes with that family life such as to engage the right to family life as it would require him to leave the UK and his family would either need to leave the UK too, or be separated from him. The decision is in accordance with the law and in pursuit of a legitimate aim, namely the maintenance of immigration control. As the Appellant satisfies the requirements of s117B(6) of the 2002 Act, the decision is disproportionate. I therefore allow the appeal on ECHR Article 8 grounds.

Notice of Decision
The appeal on human rights grounds is allowed.


Judge Sills

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber


18 July 2025