Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-000112

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/63731/2023
LP/08526/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 29 May 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RUDDICK
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SOLANKI

Between

LA
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Aghyere, Sony Sadaf Haroon Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms Ahmed, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 10 April 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. We have made an order to anonymise the Appellant. An anonymity order was made in the First-Tier Tribunal. Having considered Guidance note 2022 No 2: Anonymity Orders and Hearings in Private, we agreed that the need to protect the identity of the Appellant in the light of his asylum claim necessitates a departure from the principle of open justice.
2. The Appellant is a citizen of Bangladesh and was born in 1985. He entered the UK on 11 December 2020 and claimed asylum on 10 May 2021. His claim was refused on 27 November 2023.
3. The issue for us is whether the First-tier Tribunal (‘FtT’) Judge George (‘the Judge’) erred in law, in a decision dated 7 November 2024, when dismissing the Appellant’s appeal against the decision of the Respondent to refuse his protection and human rights claim.
Background to the Claim
4. The Appellant asserts that he would be at risk on return to Bangladesh as he is a gay man. Whilst in school in Bangladesh, he had a relationship with another boy, T, from the neighbouring village. At this point, he considered himself to be bisexual. He later married a woman in Bangladesh. He says that the priest of the mosque that he attended told his mother about the Appellant and T holding hands and this is what caused her to arrange marriage. He no longer has any attraction to women and he states that he is gay.
5. The Appellant says that his wife only found out about his sexuality once he had come to the UK. She told him not to contact her anymore because he was a bad person. The Appellant’s family know about his sexuality because the wife told them and because of posts on social media (not made by him).
6. He came to the UK as he was brought here from Qatar by his employer, who he was a domestic worker for. He was subjected to ill treatment by his employer in Qatar. He fled from him at the airport on arrival in the UK on 11 December 2020. The Appellant says that in the UK he is openly gay and he is member of a LGBT group and visits LGBT bars and clubs. He had also been in casual relationships with men in the UK. At the time of the hearing before us he stated he was in a committed relationship.
Procedural History
7. The Appellant’s appeal was dismissed in a decision dated 7 November 2024. That decision found that the Appellant was not credible and that there would be no breach of Article 8 ECHR by his return.
8. The Appellant appealed to the FtT. He was refused permission to appeal in a decision dated 22 December 2024. He renewed his application for permission to appeal. He was granted permission to appeal by Upper Tribunal Judge Rastogi on 12 February 2025.
9. The Respondent served a Rule 24 Reply on 25 February 2025. The Appellant thereafter served a Rule 25 Reply.
10. The matter came before us in an error of law hearing on 10 April 2025.
Submissions
11. We heard submissions from both representatives.
12. The documents before us and the parties included a 264-page bundle prepared for the hearing, which includes all the documents which were before the FtT. This bundle also contained a Rule 15(2A) application. At the start of the hearing Mr Aghyere agreed that this application/new evidence was not relevant to whether there was an error of law in the FtT decision. We have not considered it.
Findings and Reasons
13. We have addressed below two issues in the decision of the FtT. Whilst several issues are raised in the grounds of appeal, we consider that the issues we set out below are sufficient to find that there is a material error of law and that the decision must be set aside.
14. At §17 of the FtT decision the Judge opens her findings on credibility and states
‘In his screening interview, the appellant said that he was claiming asylum because he was a bisexual and because of an event that happened 6 months ago in Qatar. In his oral evidence, he said that this event was because employer would beat and torture him and he could not return to Bangladesh because he was gay. I find this evidence inconsistent from an internal point of view. The screening interview is the first point of contact and although not going into detail, the appellant does not talk about being gay but rather says he is bisexual and he says he is claiming asylum because of an event in Qatar. Although it formed part of the same question, it did not clearly identify that he was gay and that he had suffered some form of persecution for being gay. I find that what he was actually complaining about was the treatment from his employer as opposed to identifying any possible persecution because of his sexuality.’
15. We find that this is incorrect having read the screening interview. At 4.1 of the screening interview the Appellant is asked ‘Please briefly explain all of the reasons why you cannot return to your home country?’ His answer to this question reads as follows :
“I cannot return back home because I am bisexual, and I sleep with men and I am not safe or secure in my home country. They will kill me if they find me. Group of religious people. About six months ago whilst I was living in Qatar. “
16. It was wrong for the Judge to have said that he was claiming asylum because of an event in Qatar and that his complaint was about treatment from his employer as opposed to his sexuality. His answer clearly started by stating that he feared return to his home country, Bangladesh, owing to his sexuality.
17. We also bear in mind that this is a screening interview. They are brief interviews, they are not audio recorded, and they are not required to be verbatim records. Moreover, Ms Ahmed reasonably agreed with us that one could not be sure of what exactly the Appellant was asked here when considering the whole of his answer; see Mapah v SSHD [2003] EWHC 306; YL (Rely on SEF) China [2004] UKIAT 00145.
18. At §24 of the decision the Judge states that
‘The appellant said that he had relationships in the UK. He only produced one witness to this effect, SA who said he was not in a relationship with him although they sometimes had sex. There was no other evidence to support him being in a gay relationship, whether sexual or romantic. The appellant has not provided any other evidence of any life as a gay man. He has not provided evidence of belonging to any groups or organisations despite saying that he belonged to an LGBT group. He has not provided evidence about attending gay clubs. There are no photographs provided of him with any other gay men. There are no photographs and little detail of his relationship with SA. The alleged media posts which the appellant says were discovered by his family and led to them knowing he was gay have not been provided. In the light of my findings about the lack of credibility of his core claim and the lack of supporting evidence of living a gay life in the UK, I find it hard to accept the evidence of SA.’
19. Before us, Ms Ahmed sensibly accepted that there was an error in §24 of the decision. Whilst she argued that this was not material, we disagree for the reasons we set out below.
20. The evidence before the FtT included the following:
i. Witness Statement from SA (who gave oral evidence and whose evidence is considered by the FtT at §24);
ii. Letter from MH with ID stating he has refugee status on the basis of his sexuality, he has had casual relationships with the Appellant and known him since 2023;
iii. Letter from BA with ID which says he has refugee status based on his sexuality, he met the Appellant in 2022, they became friendly, they exchanged numbers and have had intimate relations, he can confirm the Appellant’s sexual orientation and is aware of the risks he faces in Bangladesh;
iv. Letter from MR with ID which says that he met A at a gay cruising club in 2023, they have had intimate moments and attended other gay venues together, they remain good friends;
v. Apanjon LGBT Organisation Letter from Chairperson which states the Appellant has been an active member since April 2021, he attends monthly meetings and uses their services for one to one sessions, he has been seen attending gay clubs and being intimate with other gay men there;
vi. Apanjon LGBT Organisation Membership Card;
vii. Medical Records which contain an entry on 6 October 2023 which states the Appellant has problems sleeping and is stressed, his homosexuality has caused problems, he is unable to visit his home country owing to homophobia and is an asylum seeker, that the impression was insomnia and antidepressants offered but he was not yet ready so was prescribed zopiclone.
21. It follows that the Judge was simply incorrect to say there was no evidence, bar the evidence of SA, of the Appellant living as a gay man. He produced letters from three other individuals who attested to this, and whilst they did not attend court to give oral evidence their written evidence should have been considered and weighed appropriately.
22. The Judge was plainly wrong to say there was no evidence of belonging to any organisations or groups. The evidence from Apanjon is exactly that and it provided detail in respect of the Appellant’s involvement with them and their knowledge of his sexuality.
23. The Appellant’s disclosure of his sexuality to his GP and the stated impact this has on him is also relevant evidence which was missed.
24. Whilst Ms Ahmed did defend the decision on other grounds, we cannot say that the decision of the FtT would have inevitably been the same had the above errors not occurred. This is because credibility is a holistic assessment. We therefore find these errors to be material.
Notice of Decision
25. For the aforementioned reasons, we find that there is a material error of law in this decision. The decision is set aside.
26. The parties agreed that if a material error of law was found the matter should be remitted to the FtT given credibility would need to be assessed afresh. We agree that this is correct considering 7.2 of the Practice Statement of the Immigration and Asylum Chambers of the First-tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal. We remit this matter to the FtT, to be heard before any Judge aside from First-Tier Tribunal Judge S George.

P. Solanki

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

6 May 2025