Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-000128

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/62465/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On the 12 August 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HANSON
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RHYS-DAVIES

Between

AHMED OPENYEMI BAKARE
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: In person.
For the Respondent: Miss Rushforth, a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer.

Heard at Cardiff Civil Justice Centre on 24 July 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
1. Both members of the panel have contributed to this decision.
2. The Appellant, a citizen of Nigeria, appeals with permission a decision of a judge of the First-tier Tribunal (‘the Judge’), who determined the merits of his appeal on the papers on 24 February 2024, which was dismissed. The appeal was against refusal by the Secretary of State of his application for leave to remain in the United Kingdom on Article 8 human rights grounds. The date of application was 31 August 2022 and the Secretary of State’s decision 3 October 2023.
3. The Judge sets out the issues in dispute at [4] of the decision under challenge in the following terms:
4. The appellant says that the following are the issues for me to resolve:
(a) Significant obstacles, which would make a potential return to Nigeria lead to unjustifiable consequences;
(b) Adverse treatment on return as a result of past events;
(c) Lack of familial and other support structure on return to Nigeria;
(d) Discrimination, as a member of a particular social group;
(e) Paragraph 276ADE (1)(vi) (or its replacement under the current version of the Immigration Rules);
(f) Private life with Ms. Vanessa Marayen.
4. The Judge’s findings are set out from [10] of the decision under challenge.
5. The Appellant sought permission to appeal which was granted by another judge of the First-tier Tribunal on 10 January 2025.
Discussion and analysis
6. The Judge was asked to consider the merits of the appeal on the papers and therefore only had available those documents the Appellant and Respondent had provided. The Appellant had provided a hearing bundle on 2 February 2024 and further evidence on 11 February 2024.
7. The Appellant’s grounds of appeal mention [11] of the determination in which the Judge refers to a previous decision of another First-tier Tribunal judge (‘the previous judge’) , which dismissed the Appellants appeal, and finds that “Nothing submitted by the appellant gives me reason to disturb or reopen those findings” The Appellant’s claim that the judge materially erred in law in failing to take account of additional relevant material that was adduced in support of the appeal is undermined by a reading of the decision as a whole. The final sentence of [11] does not support a claim that the Judge failed to consider the evidence as it is a clear finding that, notwithstanding the additional evidence, there was insufficient to warrant departing from the findings of the previous judge.
8. The Judge properly took as the starting point the decision of the previous judge promulgated on 17 March 2022 in accordance with the Devaseelan principle. That approach is legally correct. On that occasion the Appellant was represented.
9. The previous judge considered the Appellant’s claim to face a real risk on return to Nigeria as a result of his albinism which he claimed would breach his Articles 2 and 3 ECHR rights, and that his return would amount to an unlawful interference with his private life pursuant to Article 8 ECHR.
10. The previous judge clearly noted the Appellant’s evidence in relation to risk of death or serious harm, specifically from ritualists seeking out the bodies of albinos, or, in the alternative, that there will be very significant obstacles to his reintegration into Nigeria.
11. The previous judge found the Appellant to be a credible witness and was prepared to accept that he had suffered discrimination previously, and his subjective belief that they were motivated by a desire to harm him because of his condition, and that he has suffered discrimination and bullying in Nigeria by reason of his albinism.
12. The previous judge found, however, that the Appellant did not suffer persecution or serious harm in Nigeria prior to coming to the UK. It was found at its highest, he was subject to discrimination.
13. In relation to whether the Appellant’s subjective fear was objectively well-founded, the previous judge considered the background information and in particular an UN news report dated 29 July 2021 and the US State Department Nigeria human rights report 2020. Notwithstanding the background information the previous judge found:
35. Notwithstanding the background information relied upon, I was unable to find, even to the lower standard, that there was a real risk of unlawful killing or serious harm including torture or degrading or inhuman treatment. I reached that conclusion having particular regard to the following, material factors:
35.1. The Appellant would be returning to Nigeria as a highly educated adult. He was not abandoned or ill-treated by his family when a child. Indeed, he described his childhood with fondness and affection. Much of the background information reported the targeting of albino children by ritualists, which, selfevidently, does not include the Appellant.
35.2. Notwithstanding his subjective fears, the Appellant lived in Nigeria, albeit subject to discrimination, until he was 26 years old. Whilst not wishing to minimise the difficulties he faced, the Appellant was able to complete his education to university level and secure post-graduate study in the UK. The discrimination he faced, for the reasons explained above, never reached the levels required to constitute a breach of Article 2 or 3 of the ECHR, even during his childhood (which, according to the background evidence, was the period when he was most at risk).
35.3. Save for general references to the police’s inability to protect him, the Appellant has been unable to adequately show that there is insufficiency of state protection available to him in Nigeria (which is equally applicable to an assessment of risk under Articles 2 and 3 of the ECHR as it is to international protection claims). The risks relied upon by the Appellant arise from non-state actors. There is a functioning police force in Nigeria and there appears to be, from the background information adduced, an awareness of, and an intention to address, discrimination arising from albinism across Africa.
14. The previous judge therefore found insufficient evidence to establish that the Appellant faced a real risk of being unlawfully killed contrary to Article 2 ECHR, or to be subjected to serious harm or inhumane or degrading treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR.
15. The Appellant’s bundle filed on 2 February 2024 was composed of the appeal form, the reasons for refusal letter, the Appellant’s grounds of appeal, and Appellant’s emails, in addition to the Respondent’s documents.
16. The bundle of 11 February 2024 was composed of the Appellant’s medical evidence, supplementary submissions made by the Appellant, a supplementary witness statement, supplementary witness statement from his UK-based sponsor, and a report from the European Union Agency for Asylum, paragraph 2.10. Individuals with albinism. The text of which reads:
COI summary
[Targeting, 3.9]
In Nigeria, some people with albinism suffer from discrimination, stigma and social exclusion, including by their families. However, in relation to accusations of witchcraft, skin colour (albinism) does not seem to represent a major factor.
Risk analysis
The individual assessment whether discrimination could amount to persecution should take into account the severity and/or repetitiveness of the acts or whether they occur as an accumulation of various measures.
Not all individuals under this profile would face the level of risk required to establish well-founded fear of persecution. The individual assessment of whether there is a reasonable degree of likelihood for the applicant to face persecution should take into account risk-impacting circumstances, such as: perception of the local community, perception of the family, etc.
Nexus to a reason for persecution
Available information indicates that persecution may be for reasons of membership of a particular social group, in particular with regard to an innate characteristic (albinism) of this group in Nigeria, and their distinct identity because they are perceived as being different by the surrounding society. In case of individuals with albinism accused of witchcraft, persecution may also be for reasons of religion. See Individuals accused of witchcraft.
17. There is no legal obligation upon the Judge to set out in the determination each and every aspect of the evidence provided. The question is whether that evidence was taken into account with the required degree of anxious scrutiny. We find in this appeal that it was. The document referred to above is an extract of the report and specifically states that not all individuals under this profile would face the level of risk required to establish a well-founded fear of persecution. It is therefore a matter of fact in each individual appeal.
18. The Appellant also seeks to rely on the decision of the Upper Tribunal in JA (child – risk of persecution) Nigeria [2016] UKUT 00560 (IAC), which does not arguably assist him.
19. The headnote of JA reads “A child can be at risk of persecutory harm contrary to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child in circumstances where a comparably placed adult would not be at such a risk”.
20. Whilst the case involved a seven-year-old child from Nigeria who suffers from albinism the Tribunal found at [25]:
25. We must make it clear that we are approaching this on the basis that the position and the particular vulnerability of children must be the starting point. But this is a case which depends upon its facts and the circumstances of the child having been brought up in this country and not having faced the general approach to albinos that exists in Nigeria. Thus we do not regard this as really being appropriate to be a test case for albinos who are due to be returned to Nigeria or who face the turning down of any application made to stay in this country. Those will depend upon the circumstances of their individual positions, their age, no doubt and their background. That is why we say that this is not a case that can be regarded as one which is of general application save for the approach. But the approach is one which is as we understand is not in itself contentious. It is merely that Mr Melvin understandably submits that what he is likely to suffer by way of discrimination is not sufficient to amount to persecution.
21. The case reinforces the need for a fact specific assessment as was carried out by the Judge.
22. Whilst the Appellant has provided a more substantial bundle of country information and an application pursuant to Rule 15(2A) of the Upper Tribunal Procedure Rules, the Appellant specifically accepts in the application that those documents were not documents before the Judge. They are therefore not relevant to considering whether the Judge erred in law on the basis of the evidence that had been made available.
23. Those documents also do not appear to be recent and would indicate the Appellant might be in difficulty pursuant to the Ladd v Marshall test. The Judge cannot be criticised for not considering documents which had not been provided to the First-tier Tribunal, although they may be relevant if the Appellant makes a further application.
24. The Appellant’s claim in relation to the evidence provided to the Judge is not disputed. His difficulty is that the material does not establish that he was entitled to succeed with his appeal for the reasons given by the Judge. Even if the material established that an albino was entitled to recognise as a member of a particular social group it would still have been necessary for the Appellant to show he faces a real risk of harm or persecution for this reason. In any event, as noted during the course of the hearing by Judge Rhys Davies, this was a human rights appeal in which the Appellant applied solely on the basis of Article 8 ECHR rights on the basis of his private life and existence of insurmountable obstacles to reintegration into Nigeria.
25. We accept that the assessment of the issues set out by the Judge was relevant, but because the Appellant did not apply to be recognised as a refugee or for leave pursuant to Articles 2 or 3 ECHR, the Judge was entitled to focus solely upon the issues at large, in accordance with the current practice direction of the First-tier Tribunal.
26. It is not made out the Judge failed to consider any aspect of the evidence with the required degree of anxious scrutiny. An informed reader is clearly able to understand not only the findings made by the Judge but also the reasons for the same.
27. Whilst the Appellant disagrees with the Judge’s decision and the weight given to the evidence, weight was a matter for the Judge and mere disagreement is not sufficient to establish material legal error.
28. The Judge made factual findings and it has not been shown the conclusion there was insufficient to depart from the findings of the previous judge is a finding outside the range of those reasonably available to the Judge on the evidence.
29. It has not been shown that the weight given to the evidence was in any way unfair or irrational. A reading of the material provided to the Judge did not support the Appellant’s claim that he will face a real risk of harm or persecution, on the balance of probabilities as this is a human rights claim, sufficient to amount to insurmountable obstacles or to make his removal disproportionate.
30. The Judge clearly undertook the required balancing exercise and was entitled to find that the Appellant could not succeed under the Immigration Rules and to conclude that the Respondent had established that the decision was proportionate.
31. We have had regard to the guidance provided by the Court of Appeal in Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 462 at [2], Ullah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 201 at [26] and Hamilton v Barrow and Others [2024] EWCA Civ 888 at [30-31]. The Court of Appeal have made it clear that appellate judges should not interfere with a decision of a judge below unless it is ‘plainly wrong’.
32. Whilst we understand the Appellant’s desire for a more favourable outcome to enable him to remain in the United Kingdom, applying the correct legal test to the evidence before the Judge and the findings made by the previous judge and in the determination under challenge, together with the Appellant’s skeleton argument and submissions made to us, we cannot find that the Appellant has established that the Judge’s determination is plainly wrong. It is clearly a finding within the range of those reasonably open to the Judge on the evidence and has not been shown to rationally objectionable. On that basis we dismiss the appeal.
33. As noted, the Appellant has provided further evidence that was not available to the Judge. Whether that is sufficient to enable him to make a fresh application for either Asylum or protection based on Article 2 or 3 ECHR grounds is a matter upon which he may wish to take advice. That is not, however, a matter for us at this stage.
Notice of Decision
34. The First-tier Tribunal has not been shown to have materially erred in law.
35. The determination shall stand.

C J Hanson

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
25 July 2025