Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-000129

First-tier Tribunal Nos: PA/54576/2023
LP/09544/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

30th May 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RIMINGTON
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE IQBAL

Between

MI
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms A Jones (Counsel) instructed by Simmans Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr E Terrell, Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 10 April 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The application for permission to appeal was made by the appellant, MI, against the decision of Judge of the First-tier Tribunal Monson, who dismissed the appeal on 6 November 2024 following a hearing on 21 October 2024.

2. The appellant is an Albanian national born in 1996 and she appealed the decision of the respondent, dated 18 July 2023, refusing her protection and human rights claim. The respondent accepted the appellant’s identity and nationality, further that her claim fell to be considered as part of a particular social group, which amounted to a Convention reason. It was further accepted that the facts of the appellant’s claim raised a family dispute. However, it was not accepted that the appellant’s claims to be at risk from her in-laws as a result of her husband’s passing and their demand that she marry the other son as part of the tradition, were well-founded.

3. The appeal was dismissed on humanitarian protection human rights (Article 3 of the ECHR) grounds as it was not accepted that there were substantial grounds for believing that on return to Albania she would face a real risk of suffering harm or ill-treatment.

The Judge’s Decision

4. The Judge made detailed findings on the appellant’s claim. At [40] he noted the respondent accepted the core of the appellant’s claim of there being a dispute between her family and her in-laws who were insistent that she should marry their second son after the passing of her husband. At [41] the Judge considered it was reasonable to be sceptical about the level of threat posed by the in-laws given the appellant had been vague about the circumstances in which demand and threats were made to her family aside from two occasions when she stated that her in-laws came round to the family home.

5. It was considered she was, on the basis of medical evidence, contained in the appeal bundle, accepted as someone who suffered with anxiety and depression, such that she was to be treated as a vulnerable adult [42], however at [43] that the medical evidence was limited to as far back as 2023, and did not support an undiagnosed serious mental health condition based on her evidence that she had deteriorated since her screening interview and asylum interview.

6. At [45] the Judge found that the appellant’s evidence in her substantive asylum interview was more reliable than the subsequent embellishments found in her appeal statements and oral evidence. Further, at [46] he did not accept that her in-laws were persons of influence or had criminal connections or as recorded at [47] that her family continued to receive threats from her in-laws after she departed for the UK was contrary to her position in her asylum interview. Her claim that her in-laws had connections tin Italy was also found not to be credible.

7. At [48] the Judge noted a discrepancy in the appellant’s oral evidence that she had ceased contact with them when she was only two to three months’ pregnant given in her interview she stated she was still in contact with them at eight months pregnant.

8. At [49] the appellant’s account not to know what had been said in the change of circumstances letter sent by her former solicitors, without them having taken instruction from her was found not to be credible. Further at [50-51] the Judge found it was unclear why the appellant ceased to be in contact with her family due to a fear of her in-laws as there was no clear evidence of the family cutting off contact with the appellant due to her having a child out of wedlock. Especially as he noted at [52] the family had been supportive and protective of her in relation to her in-laws demands such that it was clear that they did not share the same traditional views of her in-laws.

9. The Judge from [53] – [56] considered the evidence of Dr Korovilas (country expert) and noted that he had failed to take into account, when assessing internal relocation, the fact that the appellant had lived under the protection of her own family for two years prior to her departure from Albania. Further, the expert failed to consider that there had been no attempt by the in-laws to punish the appellant contrary to his assertion that there was a “realistic possibility that the late husband’s family have been seriously dishonoured“. It was also noted the expert had failed to engage with the fact that the appellant’s male family members were not living in confinement. Considering all these matters the Judge concluded at [58] – [59] that it was unlikely that she had a well-founded fear of persecution and that there were no substantial grounds for believing that she would be unable to return to the family home in Tirana.

10. The Judge also concluded that in the unlikely event that the threats from her in-laws were renewed then there were no grounds for believing the appellant and family could not access sufficient protection from the police or courts, especially as there was no credible evidence that the in-laws were persons of influence.

11. For these reasons, at [61] the Judge concluded that the appellant did not qualify for humanitarian protection or protection under Article 3 of the ECHR and noted there was no suggestion that the threshold in AA (Zimbabwe) [2020] UKSC 17 on medical grounds was met. At [63] the Judge concluded in light of his findings of fact on the protection claim, “There are not very significant obstacles to the Appellant’s reintegration into life and society in Albania” and at [65] having considered Article 8 of the ECHR outside the Rules having considered the best interests of the child and section 117B of the 2002 Act, concluded the decision to return the appellant to Albania was proportionate.

Grounds of Appeal

12. There were three grounds of appeal. First, it was argued that the Judge had failed to take into account the evidence outlined by the appellant in her interview despite finding it more reliable than the oral evidence and statement of the appellant. Second that the Judge’s findings that as her family supported her refusal to marry her brother-in-law, they would likewise not reject her for having had an illegitimate child, was perverse and irrational. Third that the Judge had not given sufficient or indeed any real consideration to whether the factual nexus, even if not amounting to a protection claim, when taken together with her severe mental health difficulties could amount to significant obstacles.

Grant of Permission

13. The First-tier Tribunal refused permission on 22 December 2024, however on renewal, permission was granted by the Upper Tribunal on 5 February 2025, noting that ground 3 was arguable given that it was not sufficient to dismiss the appellant’s claim that there were “very significant obstacles” to a reintegration into Albania on the same basis as the Appellant’s protection claim, in light of the facts that she was a single mother with an illegitimate child and mental health problems. Grounds 1 and 2 were considered to be less meritorious, however the grant of permission was not restricted.

The Hearing

14. At the error of law hearing, we received helpful submissions by Ms Jones and Mr Terell, all of which are a matter of record

15. We note the Rule 24 on behalf of the respondent, dated 12 March 2025 and in response, a Rule 25 was filed dated 26 March 2025 on behalf of the appellant,. At the outset of the hearing Ms Jones made clear that she would not be relying on Rule 25 as it appeared to go beyond the remit of the grounds on which permission had been granted on.

16. In relation to Ground 1, she submitted that the interview was not properly taken into account, particularly as it was seen as more reliable over the oral evidence that the appellant had given. It was noted that many of the questions related to the appellant’s nationality and other matters not relevant to the claim. However, of note were the appellant’s response to question 88 of the interview where she outlined that her in-laws had threatened to kill her many times if she did not marry their son and at question 95 – 97, the evidence that the in-laws had come to the house on two occasions to discuss the possibility of her returning and that they had ‘insulted’ her and ‘offended’ her because her family would not allow them to marry her to her brother-in-law. As a result Ms Jones submitted that the Judge’s failure to consider this evidence contained in an interview the Judge found as a reliable accounting of her claim amounted to a material error of law.

17. In relation to Ground 2, she submitted that the expert report outlined clearly that expecting a widow to marry her brother-in-law was something that was considered very traditional and not common practice across Albanian society. On the other hand, the report outlined that mothers of illegitimate children more generally were stigmatised in Albanian society. Therefore it was submitted that the Judge’s conclusions that her family would continue to support her, as he equated their support against the forced marriage to her brother-in-law, to them accepting an illegitimate grandchild with an unknown father, was perverse.

18. As per Ground 3, Ms Jones further outlined that whilst this was not an Article 3 claim with reference to the appellant’s mental health, as there was a different test for stigma, discrimination and societal prejudice, and the Judge’s failure to consider these matters under the umbrella of very significant obstacles amounted to an error of law.

19. In response, Mr Terrell pointed to his Rule 24 and in the first instance outlined that while the Rule 25 was not being relied on, at paragraph, as it appeared to go beyond the ground at [4], it misrepresented parts of the determination in quoting the Judge’s finding that the Appellant had no well-founded fear of persecution and stated that “in the unlikely event that there were threats from the in-laws” whereas the Judge’s finding on this could be found at [59] and it highlighted “In the highly unlikely event that the threats from the in-laws are renewed, there are not substantial grounds for believing the Appellant and her family would not be able to access sufficient protection from the police or the courts.” This quite clearly was a departure from the Judge’s actual findings as acknowledged by Ms Jones and I simply note this for the sake of completeness at this stage.

20. Mr Terrell further submitted that in considering the appellant’s claim it was clear not much was in dispute, as noted in the Judge’s decision at [40]. He further submitted contrary to Ground 1, there was nothing to show the Judge had ignored the evidence in the interview. The evidence recorded in [41] was that the in-laws had come round to her house on two occasions, was reference to what was said in the interview and his conclusion at [45] simply considered that the appellant’s oral evidence appeared to exaggerate the criminal connections of her in-laws. In his Rule 24, he noted that “The Upper Tribunal is bound to assume the judge did take into account the whole of evidence absent compelling reasons to the contrary (Volpi & Anor v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 paragraph 2(iii). There is no such basis in this case”. He further noted that the Judge’s decision was detailed and clear on all the evidence. Insofar as Ground 2 was concerned, he submitted that as this was a perversity ground there was a high threshold and there was nothing to demonstrate the Judge was not entitled to make those findings. At [47], he outlined the Judge did not accept the family continued to receive threats after she departed for the UK, [48] and that there was a discrepancy of when she was last in contact with her family. Further the Judge considered at [49] – [52] the evolution of the appellant’s claim in relation to her mental health and contact with her family, there being no clear evidence of contact being cut off with her family, especially given their previous support of her. He submitted that the Judge had been clear there was no evidence about them being conservative, such that they would not accept the appellant’s child. He highlighted the expert report did not assist given the findings at page [7]of the report, where he addressed the in-laws operating on very traditional reading of Albanian customs and at page [15] of the report noting the stigma of women with illegitimate children. This was because he had failed to address whether on the facts of the appellant’s claim, the parental support she received against traditions involving marriage to her brother-in-law, would be comparable to support she could expect to receive from her family given her illegitimate child.

21. In relation to Ground 3, Mr Terrell acknowledged the Judge dealt with the issue of very significant obstacles briefly however, that this simply reflected the way in which the case was argued. He highlighted that the appeal skeleton argument before the First-tier Tribunal at [23] was based on the Tribunal accepting a particular factual premise, i.e. she would be forced to live alone with her child, with no family or support network and so would not be able to integrate within Albanian society. However, this was rejected by the Judge as he concluded that the appellant’s family would protect and support them. Mr Terrell pointed to Lata (FtT; principal controversial issues) India [2023] UKUT 163 (IAC) highlighting that it was not open to the appellant to reargue the case on a basis that the Tribunal was not invited to consider in the first instance. He further referred to the test in Parveen v SSHD [2018] EWCA Civ 932 and submitted that given the findings made by the Judge it was difficult to see how any other rational Tribunal could have concluded the appellant would face very significant obstacles to her integration on return.

Conclusions

22. We remind ourselves at the outset of the need to exercise appropriate judicial restraint before concluding there has been a material error in the Judge’s decision. We have read the decision holistically and remind ourselves that it is generally unhelpful for First-tier Tribunal judgments to rehearse every detail or issue raised and that as long as key conflicts in the evidence have been resolved and clear reasons for the decision are given then there is generally no reason to interfere with such a decision.

23. Firstly, in relation to Ground 1, we are satisfied that the Judge holistically considered the evidence before him when reaching conclusions on the appellant’s claim. At [40] he noted that the core of the appellant’s claim, in relation to the pressure she had received from her in-laws to marry their second son, was accepted by the Respondent. As highlighted by Ms Jones, question 88 of the interview, records the appellant’s answers as to the extent of her difficulties that is she was threatened on many occasions and that her family home had been visited on two occasions. We find the Judge’s findings at [41] set out below were therefore consistent with the Appellant’s evidence in asylum interview:

“Aside from two occasions when she says that the in-laws came round to the family home, the thrust of her evidence is that the threats were conveyed indirectly by mutual friends or acquaintances, and the appellant has never specified the context in which these communications were made”. [41]

24. The Judge clearly recorded at [47] that the Appellant ‘represented in her asylum interview that things were quiet now’. It is against this background the Judge concluded he was not satisfied with the ‘new detail’ which emerged that her in-laws had criminal connections or connections in Italy [46] or that there were any further threats from her in-laws against her family after she left [47].

25. There is nothing in the Judge’s approach which discloses that the Judge has not properly considered the evidence in its entirety and these reasons we find Ground 1 has no merit.

26. Considering Ground 2, we are satisfied that this no more than a mere disagreement with the Judge’s findings. There is no expert or other evidence to differentiate between the levels of conservatism in Albanian society or anything to differentiate the levels of support she might expect from her family, depending on her circumstances. The Judge’s findings at [51] – [52] were clear that given her family were supportive and protective over her in refusing to exceed the demands that she should marry her brother-in-law, in turn there were no ‘substantial grounds’ or ‘clear evidence of the family cutting off contact with the appellant due her having a child out of wedlock’. We are satisfied accordingly that the Judge’s to conclusion that “there is not a real risk of the appellant’s family abandoning her and her child rather than protecting and supporting them” was within the reasonable range of responses for the and likewise there is no merit on Ground 2.

27. In relation to Ground 3, Mr Terrell acknowledged the Judge’s findings at [63] in relation to very significant obstacles to integration on return, were brief. We note this, however and go on to consider the appellant’s case as put before the First-tier Tribunal. Firstly we note the appellant’s skeleton argument submitted to the First-tier Tribunal at [23] set out as follows:

“For the same reasons outlined above, there would plainly be very significant obstacles to the Appellant’s reintegration in Albania without familial and societal support. If the Appellant is forced to leave the UK, she will be living alone with her child; her vulnerabilities will be exposed. Albania is a community driven society. The Appellant does not have family or a support network to return to and thus she will not be able to integrate within the Albanian society with her child. …”[emphasis added]

28. The Judge’s findings at [63] were that “In light of my findings of fact on the protection claim there are not very significant obstacles to the appellant’s reintegration into life and society in Albania.” [our underlining]. In rejecting the appellant’s protection claim, the Judge rejected of the fact that the appellant did not have a supportive and protective family [52] especially as it was clear the appellant was able to live with her family for two years prior to her departure from Albania [54] and after the death of her husband. This clearly demonstrates the Judge has properly considered her familial support against the appellant returning as a lone woman and/or any stigma for having an illegitimate child, which is contrary to the complaint raised in the grounds

29. The other factor relied on in the Grounds is the appellant’s mental health and we were referred to [24] of the skeleton that referred to the appellant having a strong private life and that she had been receiving specialist support in the UK in the form of accessing a health and wellbeing coach etc and “such support would not be replicated in Albania”.

30. However, we are satisfied that the Judge had in mind the evidence submitted by the appellant in this respect as outlined in the decision at [43], noting the lack of medical evidence post 2023 and finding that the deterioration in her mental health was as a result of the refusal of her claim [45]. Therefore in rejecting the level of mental health difficulties in her protection claim, it is clear this is a factor he also had in mind in reaching his conclusions at [63].

31. We have also noted in respect of mental health services available the refusal letter outlined the CPIN Albania: medical and healthcare provision May 2023, paragraph 3.1.1 to 3.1.7 in relation to public health programmes in Albania and sections 1 to 3 of the CPIN Albania: Mental healthcare December 2022 that confirmed that mental health programmes available in Albania with section 4.3 – 4.4 outlining treatment available for depression. We are satisfied that the Judge in considering the refusal letter would no doubt have been alive to the services available to the appellant before reaching his decision on very significant obstacles.

32. In summary, the Judge made relevant findings, took all relevant considerations into account, gave adequate reasons, applied the facts to the law and reached rational conclusions in relation to very significant obstacles.

33. It follows the appellant’s appeal to the Upper Tribunal must be dismissed.

Notice of Decision

34. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error of law and the decision shall stand. The appeal to the Upper Tribunal is dismissed.

S Iqbal

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
29th May 2025