Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-000146

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/03300/2020

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 22 September 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RIMINGTON

Between

VOM
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms V Easty, Counsel, instructed by Migrant Legal Project
For the Respondent: Mr B Hulme, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 21st July 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity as this was a protection appeal.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant appeals the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Lester dated 18th November 2024 dismissing the appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s refusal of his international protection and human rights claim on 5th June 2019.
2. The appellant is of Iraqi nationality of Kurdish ethnicity. He arrived in the UK on 20th May 2019 illegally and claimed asylum on 5th June 2019. He asserts he was affected by the attacks on Tuz Khurmato when he was assisting his uncle in his shop who was providing assistance to the Peshmerga.
3. The grounds of appeal against the FtT decision are as follows.
Ground 1
4. There was a misapplication by the judge of the lower standard of proof to be applied when assessing credibility in asylum claims and the judge applied an impermissibly high standard of proof in assessing the appellant’s credibility. The grounds cited MAH (Egypt) [2023] EWCA Civ 216 at [52]:
“It is also well established that the standard required is less than a 50% chance of persecution occurring. Even a 10% chance that an applicant will face persecution for a Convention reason may satisfy the relevant test: see Cardozo-Fonseca, at 440, cited by Lord Keith in Sivakumaran, at 994; and Chan Yee Kin v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379, a decision of the High Court of Australia given by Mason CJ, cited with approval by Brooke LJ in Karanakaran v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2000] 2 All ER 449, at 464”.
It was further suggested as per Karanakaran [2000] EWCA Civ 11 at [103] that it would be wrong to exclude matters from consideration simply because a decision maker believes that they probably did not occur and at [61] of MAH it was held that a judge should be cautious before finding an account inherently incredible. A judge must only do so on reasonably drawn inferences and not simply conjecture or speculation. The grounds also cited Kasolo [1985] 13190.
5. It was asserted that the judge did not apply the correct standard of credibility in relation to where his uncle and the Peshmerga exchanged information, for example, at [63] where the judge found the appellant was inconsistent in his oral evidence and his substantive asylum interview.
6. In oral evidence when asked where information would be exchanged, the appellant stated that it was sometimes in the shop where he worked and sometimes outside.
7. It was put to the appellant that at question 109 of his substantive asylum interview he was asked if he was ever there when his uncle passed on intelligence and he said that he was not because he was in the shop. “The appellant clarified that he would get information when a Peshmerga came to print something, but that if his uncle brought information from outside the shop then he would not know about that”.
8. The judge erred in finding this to be more than minor because the question asked was different to that asked in the substantive interview. The question of where information would be exchanged is broader was there when his uncle passed on the information. Second, even if the judge was not satisfied that the appellant had sufficiently answered the purported inconsistency the discrepancy was no more than minor.
Ability to hide in Tuz Khurmato (TK)
9. At [73] to [74] the judge found it was implausible not credible and inconsistent with objective evidence that first, the appellant was able to avoid Hashdi Shaabi by staying in the house for two days, and second, once in Kirkuk he was able to avoid risk by staying inside for six months while his uncle went out.
10. This was an over-reliance on the judge’s assessment contrary to Kasolo, Karanakaran v Secretary of State at [62].
Use of the Fake Passport
11. At [79] the judge found the appellant’s failure to previously mention that he relied on a fake passport to exit Iraq negatively affected his credibility.
12. The judge erred in finding this to be more than a minor inconsistency for two reasons. First, the appellant was not specifically asked whether his passport was real or fake during his substantive interview and it was unfair to hold it against him. He had consistently stated his uncle arranged his exit including his passport, and second, even accepting the omission the question of whether or not his passport was fake was not pertinent to the purpose of his protection claim.
Ground 2
13. There was a failure to take into account the combined impact of the appellant’s age, the passage of time, and his mental health when assessing the evidence.
14. The judge failed to consider the impact of the appellant’s poor mental health, including a diagnosis of mixed anxiety and depressive disorder. These factors are referred to in the judgment, but it is plain from the reasoning and the conclusions that in substance the impact of these factors on the appellant’s ability to recall past events and to know certain details was not properly considered.
Ground 3
15. A breach of requirements of fairness by relying on the 2020 statement. At [75] the judge found there to be more than minor inconsistency between the appellant’s oral evidence and a witness statement dated 20th October 2020 (“the 2020 statement”). The statement was prepared for a previous appeal by different representatives, and the appeal was decided on the papers with none of the findings preserved.
16. It was procedurally unfair for the appellant to be cross-examined on the 2020 statement which was:
(1) over four years ago;
(2) not adopted by the appellant as part of his evidence and thus it is not sure that it was read back to him in Kurdish;
(3) he was a vulnerable witness;
(4) the statement was prepared by the appellant’s previous representatives;
(5) the statement was relied on for the first time by the respondent in her review;
(6) at the start of the hearing, the respondent’s representative did not state his intention to rely on the 2020 statement during the appeal and the appellant was denied a proper opportunity to provide instruction;
(7) the judge noted that the appellant had only been reminded of his third witness statement on the day of the hearing.
17. This was material because this was a central part of the narrative of the appellant as to the risk he faced.
Ground 4
18. There was a failure to make findings on the appellant’s account of losing his CSID. The judge found a lack of credibility generally undermined his claim that he would be at risk but failed to exercise caution required in finding the appellant’s account inherently incredible. The appellant’s evidence was that the agent took his documents in Turkey.
Ground 5
19. There was a mistake of fact and/or failure properly to consider the appellant’s evidence in relation to contact with his family. At [82] the judge noted that it was the appellant’s evidence that he had called his family using his mobile phone but there was no response. The appellant’s response when asked what happened when he tried to call his family was “Nothing happens, it’s dead” and the appellant did not therefore state he had failed to use his phone, but rather he had tried and called. It was irrational for the judge to come to the above conclusion that he was not credible about something that he did not say in evidence.
20. At [87] the judge addressed the weight to be afforded to a letter from the Red Cross dated 5th November 2024. The judge treated the fact that the appellant completed a tracing referral as a neutral point, based on the final paragraph of the letter. The judge concluded this assertion by the Red Cross does not affect the weight that the Tribunal can place on a Red Cross family tracing referral. In so stating the judge failed to properly consider the weight to be attached to the Red Cross letter himself, instead deferring to the opinion of the Red Cross as expressed in the generic disclaimer. This was material because in the appellant’s particular circumstances whereby the means by which he can contact his family were extremely limited, the letter served as evidence of his unsuccessful attempts to reach them and therefore the impossibility of his family aiding redocumentation.
Submissions
21. Ms Easty relied on the written grounds but further submitted in relation to ground 3 that there was a Practice Direction in relation to case management dated November 2024 and the judge clearly did not adhere to it or consider the FtT Practice Direction when admitting the documentation such as the witness statement of the appellant given in 2020. There was a flawed approach to credibility where the judge refers to plausibility as compared with profound inconsistencies. She submitted there was no inconsistency in relation to the transfer of information to the Peshmerga as reflected by the judge at [63] and I was referred to questions 109 to 112 of the appellant’s asylum interview.
22. When the appellant was still in TK his family were able to avoid the risk, and the judge referred to background evidence but was not clear what the judge was referring to. The expert confirmed that the appellant’s movements were consistent with country evidence. The reason the appellant and his family did not leave immediately was because they were trying to find somewhere in Kirkuk and that was not considered by the judge. The expert Professor Bluth confirmed that there were reasons why people did not leave immediately.
23. The city they transferred to was a city of 1,000,000 plus and not a small village. This required further analysis on the basis that the uncle might have gone out at night and people could hide away.
24. In relation to the passport this was a lesser point, but the appellant was not asked in interview if the passport was provided by himself.
25. In relation to ground 2 the appellant was a minor at the time and the judge did not engage with the evidence in accordance with AM (Afghanistan) [2017] EWCA Civ 1123. The judge needed to look at this more carefully and engage with what being a minor meant in that context. For example, in terms of education the judge should have asked whether primary education in Iraq was the same as it was here. Judges were obliged to assess the cultural background.
26. In relation to ground 4 and the CSID the appellant gave evidence that he gave it to the agent in Turkey and simply the judge did not believe him. The appellant had stated that he had contacted his family in his appeal statement and there had been no response.
27. The judge gave the Red Cross letter neutral weight, but this was a significant factor and in fact the Red Cross had been contacted in 2019, see PDF 54. It was not correct to state that the appellant had simply made no effort, and the judge simply relied on the disclaimer of the Red Cross. Ms Easty added that the Red Cross relied on the details that they had been told and then set out to trace and that was why there was a disclaimer.
28. Ms Easty confirmed that this was in fact more of a reasons challenge.
29. Mr Hulme submitted that in terms of ground 1 the judge had clearly applied the correct standard of proof, and the submissions simply amounted to a disagreement with the judge’s findings. At [24] to [29] the judge had directed himself appropriately, and at [63] the judge was entitled to rely on this inconsistency and weight was a matter for the judge. The findings were reasonably open to him.
30. The point on the passport was that this was not something the appellant had previously adopted in terms of his asylum interview, and I was referred to PDF 137 at A5.4. The appellant had been asked if he had ever held a passport in his own name in the nationality he gave in section A (Iraqi) and he stated yes. At question 44 AIR the appellant confirmed that he travelled to Turkey using his own passport, and at question 45 his uncle arranged that passport. Mr Hulme submitted that this was the appellant’s own passport which had survived scrutiny by the Iraqi and Turkish authorities, he flew to Turkey, and it was open to the judge to take the later assertion that it was fake as an inconsistency into account. None of the points raised showed the judge misapplied the standard of proof.
31. In terms of ground 2 there was no material error, and I was invited to consider the preface at 30.
32. The judge had approached the matter with all the various factors in mind and what more was the judge required to do. It was not that he was expected to recite those factors at every paragraph. At [27] to [28] the judge confirmed that the evidence was considered in the round and the judge further recognised that the appellant was only educated to primary level and was not in any sense suggesting he was well educated.
33. In terms of ground 3 and the 2020 witness statement the appellant himself was relying on an even older statement from 18th June 2019. The appellant was suggesting that he was ambushed by his previous statement and there were no opportunities to take instructions but at [19] and [21] of the decision showed that it was plain that at some stage the appellant and Counsel had time to address the contents of this statement. There were none of the objections raised by Ms Easty now which were raised before the First-tier Tribunal and no recording of the proceedings. Clearly the appellant’s Counsel did not object to the witness statement being admitted and no further issue was raised thereon, see [20]. That was the time for Counsel to take instructions, and it did not appear that the point that the statement had not been read back to the appellant in his language was raised at the time.
34. Turning to the review, Counsel had provided this before the hearing, and it was not suggested that the appellant required more time to consider the contents of the review. There was no reference in the determination to the submission of late evidence and the opposition of Counsel that it be admitted.
35. There was no transcript and no recording of the hearing and no further statement from Ms Buttle and the Record of Proceedings was not served.
36. In terms of ground 4 at [88] to [95] the findings were reasonably open to the judge. The judge clearly did not find him credible, and the grounds were simply a disagreement with the judge’s findings.
37. In terms of ground 5 the judge was entitled to find that the contact with his family was not credible. There was no further documentary evidence from the Red Cross that there was any form of engagement with the appellant, and at [86] and [87] the judge treated the letter in a manner open to him. The generic disclaimer is reasoned and goes no further than to say he has now been registered. The judge is being told to ignore the disclaimer, but it was open to him to take the approach he did.
38. In response Ms Easty referred to the Practice Directions at 5.3 which underlined that an assessment of what is just was required and there needed to be an evaluation by the judge for admitting the late evidence. Ms Buttle was junior Counsel who did not make a “massive fuss”, but it was the Secretary of State who chose to serve her evidence at 8.53am on the morning of the hearing.
Conclusions
Ground 1
39. The premise of ground 1 is that the judge misapplied the relevant standard of proof when assessing credibility in asylum cases. A close reading of the decision demonstrates that the judge set out the legal framework at [24] and was quite clear that although the burden of proof was on the appellant as per Karanakaran v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] All ER 449 the single standard of proof applied by the judge was a reasonable degree of likelihood. The judge at [27] and [28] reiterated that he considered all of the evidence and submissions and noted that there was no requirement for corroborative evidence. This was not a post-NABA case, and the standard of proof was consistent throughout. As set out at [62] of Karanakaran, a case which the judge cited,
“None of this means that the Tribunal is required to take at face value an account of facts proffered by an appellant no matter how contrary to common sense and experience of human behaviour that account may be. The decision maker is not expected to suspend its own judgment”.
In terms of the inconsistency regarding the exchange of information between the uncle and the Peshmerga, the appellant’s answer at question 109 of his substantive interview was clear that he was not present on the passing of intelligence because he was “in the shop”. It was open to the judge to find this was more than a minor inconsistency bearing in mind the passing of intelligence was directly related to the reason that the uncle and the appellant were being targeted. I am not persuaded that there was a difference in the questions bearing in mind the questions related to the location where information was passed and that the appellant stated in oral evidence that in fact intelligence was passed sometimes in the shop and sometimes outside whereas in his AIR 109 when asked if he was there when the uncle gave information he said ‘no’ as he was in the shop. This is a distinct contrast in the evidence.
40. The judge gave a variety of reasons for rejecting the credibility of the appellant (and I address the issue on AM (Afghanistan) below. Indeed, the reasoning was reliant on internal inconsistencies within the appellant’s own evidence. The judge, however, carefully set out SB (vulnerable adult: credibility) Ghana [2019] UKUT 00398 and noted the medical and expert reports prior to the assessment of the evidence [27]-[47]. The judge did consider the limited education of the appellant such that he had not attended secondary education, but the judge correctly noted that the was in fact educated for about 5 or 6 years rather than being wholly uneducated.
41. At the heart of the claim was the appellant’s uncle’s role (and thus the appellant’s association) in the Peshmerga. In particular at [61] the judge found that in his third witness statement the appellant stated that his uncle was in the Peshmerga, but at AIR q107 he said his uncle had no rank [in the Peshmerga] whereas in his oral evidence he said his uncle was officially a member. That was a finding open to the judge and, aside from the witness statement, notably a contradiction between the appellant’s oral and asylum interview evidence
42. In terms of the ability to hide in Tuz Khurmato, the judge recorded at [69] that the other Kurdish houses were being attacked during that time and the appellant hid in his house but when asked whether his house was being attacked replied that he did not know. As the judge also records at [72] the appellant and his uncle were known in TK and on his evidence the Hashdi Shaabi (HS) (from whom the appellant said he was at risk) had been passed evidence including photographs which identified them showing that he and his uncle were working with the Peshmerga, and further that they were being looked for by HS who wanted to kill them.
43. It was thus open to the judge to find that it was not credible that he and the appellant were able to remain in Tuz Khurmato even for two days against that background which the judge had previously considered. The judge was entitled to find that for the appellant to state that he did not know if his house was attacked was not credible. That is the overall conclusion at [73] and adequately reasoned.
44. In terms of relocation to Kirkuk, as the judge recorded at [70], the appellant was asked why the family had gone to Kirkuk when it had been taken over by HS. Albeit that it was a bigger place they remained there for six months and apparently had no problems but did go out. His uncle experienced no adverse attention. That the appellant and his uncle would relocate to an area which had been taken over by HS (who were looking for them) was simply not credible and it was entirely open to the judge to make that conclusion, particularly in the light of the findings made at [75].
45. This was not an over-reliance on the judge’s own assessment of plausibility or credibility. The grounds state that the appellant may have been “fortunate to evade coming to the attention of the authorities whilst hiding in TK and Kirkuk” but it was from the appellant’s own inconsistent evidence (having factored in his previous minority, passage of time and mental health [75]) that the judge drew his conclusions.
46. In terms of the fake passport, again the judge’s findings were open to him bearing in mind as Mr Hulme pointed out that the judge found “the passport had not been flagged as fake in Iraq or Turkey at the airport”. The judge was entitled to find that in neither the full asylum interview nor in his witness statement did the appellant say that the passport was fake and the first time he mentioned it was in oral evidence. Indeed, at AIR qs44 to q53, as the judge notes at [76], the appellant went to Turkey “using his own passport. He said that his uncle arranged the passport. He said it was an Iraqi passport and that it had his picture in it”. The appellant was specifically asked about this passport in interview and did not volunteer any information as to its details until his oral evidence. It was submitted that this was not connected to the protection claim but as the appellant’s ultimate assertion is that he was being pursued by HS forces and effectively escaped Iraq on a false passport, this matter was clearly connected to credibility and the judge was entitled to consider the point.
47. There was no error in the approach to the standard of proof and assessment of credibility by the judge, particularly bearing in mind the remainder of the findings.
Ground 2
48. In terms of ground 2, the decision does not reflect that the judge failed to take into account the appellant was a vulnerable witness or failed to approach the evidence in the light of AM (Afghanistan). At [31] the judge identified the appellant had come to the UK as a minor and was at [33] clear that the appellant suffered with mental health conditions of mixed anxiety and a depressive disorder. At [33-34] the judge clearly stated the following:
“33. (3)His mental health issues. These are set out in the report of the expert psychiatrist Dr Buttan. He concluded (see Section 8 of the report - professional opinion) that the appellant suffers with the mental health conditions of mixed anxiety and a depressive disorder. On the scoring system which is objectively accepted amongst mental health professionals the appellant has severe depression. He also has moderate anxiety. From what I read in the report it is unclear what mental health treatment he is receiving (see Dr Buttan section 4.1 to 4.4 – support and treatment needs), and Dr Buttan notes that he has not received any treatment for his mental health conditions. However that does not diminish the conclusions of the expert psychiatrist of the mental health conditions that the appellant suffers with.
34. In addition to these three issues I directed that the appellant was to be treated as vulnerable for the purposes of the hearing. Potential breaks were discussed with the advocates. I also agreed to be guided by the appellant and is counsel if either felt an additional break was needed. The cross examination was relatively short and did not require a break, although one was provided at the end of his evidence”.
Specifically, at [35] the judge stated that when assessing these matters as part of the appeal “I remind myself of the caselaw – SB (vulnerable adult: credibility) Ghana [2019] UKUT 00398” and he set out the three points from the headnote. The head note of SB (vulnerable adult: credibility) Ghana SB (vulnerable adult: credibility) Ghana references first, that just because the appellant is a vulnerable adult does not mean that any adverse credibility finding is to be regarded as inherently problematic, secondly by applying the Joint Presidential Guidance Note No 2 of 2010 vulnerability should be factored in when assessing the credibility of that evidence, and thirdly that it is for the judicial fact finder to determine the relationship between the vulnerability and the evidence that is adduced. It is evident that the judge had considered all of the evidence and was not required to recite those factors every time he made an analysis of the evidence. Further, the judge realised the limitations of the appellant’s evidence and there was no indication that the judge imposed his own cultural beliefs on the evidence as can be seen from my analysis above.
Ground 3
49. This asserted that there was a breach of requirements of fairness by relying on the 2020 statement from a previous appeal. It was suggested that the previous appeal was decided on the papers but subsequently set aside by the Tribunal. Ms Easty relied on a departure from the SPT Practice Directions issued on 2nd November 2024 and that the judge had not applied his mind or considered the justness of admitting that statement. The judge, however, carefully considered the admission of this evidence between [15] to [21] of his decision. I note that the written grounds made no reference to the SPT Practice Directions 2024. However, at [16] the judge was aware that the witness statement dated 26th October 2020 was a statement which had been part of the appellant’s previous evidence, prepared by his solicitors in a previous case, was signed by him and properly presented in the evidence as his witness statement. The judge also noted that that appeal was considered on the papers with the appeal dismissed and subsequently remitted by the Upper Tribunal. The judge was fully aware of the circumstances of that statement (including the lack of an interpreter attestation which is clear on the face of the statement) and was fully aware of the late submission by the Secretary of State of that statement. The judge was also aware that there had been no oral evidence.
50. The SPT Practice Directions 2024 does set out at section 8 directions to the parties as to the content of witness statements and attestations of interpreters but that does not disapply the overriding objective of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 (the UT Rules) nor restrict the judge from exercising his case management powers under Rule 5. Indeed, under the rubric ‘11. The substantive hearing and the issues-based approach’ at 11.3. of the SPT Practice Statement is stated: ‘The judge may clarify and discuss these matters, and decide any preliminary matters, to achieve a fair hearing in accordance with the Overriding Objective’. That is what the judge did.
51. In my view the judge was correct at [18] to note that it remained a fact that the third statement was the appellant’s own evidence which had been previously put before the Tribunal in the form of a witness statement. As the judge indicated at [19] the appellant and Counsel before the judge in the instant appeal were permitted time to go over the statement before cross-examination was continued. At [20] and [21] the judge stated the following:
“20. The appellant did not object to the statement being cross examined upon by the respondent as they accepted it was part of the evidence. However at the time and in closing submissions they did make the reasonable point that the appellant had only been reminded of this third witness statement on the day of the hearing.
21. I heard submissions from both advocates. The respondent relied on the refusal letter, review, bundle and oral evidence. The appellant relied on the skeleton argument (ASA), bundle and oral evidence”.
52. I am not persuaded thus that it was procedurally unfair for the appellant to be cross-examined on the inconsistency because the statement was produced on the day. The judge was aware of the relevant permutations in relation to this witness statement, the witness statement emanated from the appellant himself, and the appellant was given time with Counsel to go over that statement. None of the objections raised at [19] of the grounds including the issue as to interpreter withstand scrutiny bearing in mind that it was only on submissions before the FtT that the point was merely made that the appellant had only been “reminded of this third statement on the day of the hearing”.
53. Critically there was no objection by counsel to the admission of the statement at the time and time was given to the appellant and his representative to go over the statement. Even after that no adjournment was requested and no issue with interpretation raised.
54. First the appellant had relied on an earlier statement from 2019, secondly it was presented as a witness statement and signed by him, thirdly there was no issue raised at the time in relation to whether it had been read back to him and this was obviously an afterthought by Counsel, fourthly the judge was well aware that the appellant was a vulnerable witness, fifthly the statement was in fact prepared by legal representatives and it is not to the point that his current representatives did not submit the statement because this is his statement from the appellant himself, sixthly, the point was taken by the judge of the late submission (or should I say late reference to the witness statement), and finally the appellant was given time with Counsel to go over the statement.
Ground 4
55. Turning to ground 4 and the failure to make findings on the appellant’s account of losing his CSID, the judge noted at [81] that the appellant had confirmed that he had an ID card in Iraq referring to it as a taskira. On the basis that the appellant had been found not credible, on sound and cogent reasoning as identified above, and that the appellant had confirmed in his interview that he had his family’s telephone numbers on a mobile phone, it was open to the judge to conclude at [83] that the appellant had travelled with his mobile phone with his family’s contact details on it on his journey to the UK and to find at [85] that “On his evidence despite having the phone with all of his family’s contact details on it he did not speak to any of them since he had left Iraq in November 2018”. It was unarguably open to the judge to find that that this was not credible. The fact is that the appellant had a record of his family’s details and contact numbers on his phone, and it was entirely open to the judge to conclude that he did not find the appellant’s account he could not contact his family not credible. As pointed out there was no transcript and no recording of the hearing and no further statement from Ms Buttle, merely a reference as to the evidence in the grounds. Even if the appellant had stated the phone was dead as asserted in the grounds, the judge had already made adverse credibility findings against him as to his family details and phone.
56. It is clear that at [94] the judge states:
“It is for the Appellant to show that he could not obtain the necessary documentation. I am not satisfied, that he does not have a CSID or that he has no family member who can either send it to him or meet him on arrival in Iraq or within a reasonable period thereafter to hand it to him. With the CSID and the assistance of a family member, the appellant will be able to travel to his home area, re-register, and get his INID, without encountering difficulties which would place him at risk”.
It was the alternative that the appellant had a contactable family member, that was the point the judge made. That was open to the judge.
Ground 5
57. In terms of the Red Cross letter, again it was open to the judge to rely on the disclaimer from the Red Cross and as Ms Easty stated this would rely on the details given by the appellant to the Red Cross. Although there was reference in the social work records that the question of the Red Cross tracing had been raised, there was no documentation from the Red Cross identifying that it was indeed raised at this time. I was referred to a mere passing reference within the social work records. The evidence from the Red Cross was dated from 5th November 2024 and that specifically states that:
“The fact that a tracing request is or is not open should not be considered as evidence that a person sought is/is not missing or indeed that the person does/does not exist. Neither should the opening of a tracing request be considered as credible evidence of efforts to contact family members”.
On this basis the judge was merely observing the disclaimer of the Red Cross, and it was open to the judge to observe the Red Cross disclaimer and find the tracing was at best a neutral point.
58. Overall, I find no material error of law in the decision in which there was adequate reasoning.
Notice of decision
59. On the basis of the findings and conclusions by the judge the decision will stand. The appeal remains dismissed.

Helen Rimington

Judge of the Upper Tribunal Rimington
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

12th September 2025