Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-000157

First-tier Tribunal Nos: PA/67103/2023
LP/08214/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

10th April 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE WILLIAMS

Between

KH
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr M Schwenk of Counsel, instructed by Kings Law Solicitors Limited
For the Respondent: Mr E Terrell, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 31 March 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals with the permission of First-tier Tribunal Judge Robinson against the decision of First-tier Judge Clarke (“the Judge”). By a decision promulgated on 3rd November 2024, the Judge dismissed the appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s refusal of his claim for international protection.
Background
2. The appellant is a national of Iran who entered the United Kingdom on 15th March 2022 and made a protection claim on the same day. The claim was advanced on the basis that the appellant was at risk on account of his imputed political opinion. In summary, the appellant claimed to have been asked by the Etela’at to spy on commanders within the Kurdish Democratic Party-Iran (“the KDPI”) and is at risk from them because of his refusal to do so. The appellant further claimed to be at risk from the KDPI because they suspected him of spying.
3. That claim was refused by the respondent on 16 November 2023 for a number of reasons outlined in the refusal letter. The respondent accepted that the appellant was of Iranian nationality and Kurdish ethnicity, as well as his employment as a security officer for a telecommunications company. She did not accept as credible the appellant’s claim to have been approached by the Etela’at, or that he was at risk from the KDPI. It was accepted that if the claim was made out, the appellant would not be able to avail himself of State protection, nor could he relocate internally.
The appeal to the First-tier Tribunal
4. The appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal. The hearing took place before the Judge on 22nd October 2024. The appellant was represented by Counsel and the respondent by a Presenting Officer. The Judge heard evidence from the appellant through a Kurdish Sorani interpreter. Following submissions from both advocates, the Judge reserved her decision.
5. In her reserved decision promulgated on 3 November 2024, the Judge dismissed the appeal on all grounds. The Judge found, inter alia, that the appellant’s account was not credible because of inconsistencies therein. She further found that the appellant’s failure to claim asylum in France was a factor damaging his credibility. The Judge found the appellant had fabricated the claim and that there was ‘no likelihood of persecution or risk of harm or ill-treatment’. There was also a finding that the appellant was ‘probably’ in possession of his CSID.
The appeal to the Upper Tribunal
6. The appellant subsequently sought permission to appeal. The grounds are not well particularised but can be distilled as two grounds.
7. The first ground is a challenge to the judge’s assessment of the appellant’s credibility, arguing that inadequate reasons were given for her finding that the appellant was not credible. The judge is also said to have failed to explain why she rejected the appellant’s reasons for not claiming asylum in France. The second ground focused on the Judge’s application of the country guidance case of SMO and KSP (Civil status documentation; article 15) Iraq CG [2022] UKUT 00110.
8. Permission to appeal was granted by First-tier Tribunal Judge Robinson on 14th January 2025, albeit that permission was limited to the ground relating to the inadequate reasons provided by the Judge for rejecting the appellant’s credibility. The grounds at [10] assert that the only reasons the Judge gave for rejecting the appellant’s account are at [26]. It is submitted that this is a bare statement and the judge has not given adequate reasons for rejecting the appellant’s account.
The Error of Law Hearing
9. The hearing took place in the form of a hybrid hearing. I was sitting at Field House, and both representatives appeared via the Cloud Video Platform. There were no issues with connection and I was content both advocates were able to participate effectively. Both made submissions and at the end of the hearing I delivered an extempore decision which I have now perfected.
Discussion and Findings
10. Before me Mr Schwenk submitted that the section of the judge’s determination which she entitled ‘Findings of Fact and Conclusions’, is essentially a recitation of the evidence that she heard. I find however that the assertion made in the grounds represents a failure to consider the judge’s decision in its entirety. It is clear from a fair reading of the decision that the Judge’s consideration of the appellant’s credibility starts at [10]. It is further clear that the Judge gave a number of reasons as to why she did not accept the credibility of the appellant’s narrative.
11. At [16] of her decision, the Judge considered the appellant’s discrepant evidence about whether it was the Ettela’at or characters from the PUK who spoke to him via the telephone he was given. At [17] the Judge noted a threat detailed in the witness statement which had not previously been disclosed.
12. At [21] the judge expresses the point that there were details of the appellant’s claim not referred to in the screening interview. I am aware of the authorities which outline the treatment which omissions from the screening interview should receive, (e.g., YL (Rely on SEF) China [2004] UKIAT 00145). The Judge in her decision notes the expectation of brevity in the screening interview and in my judgement was entitled to consider the appellant’s omissions in these circumstances as ones damaging to his credibility.
13. The Judge further expresses her rejection of the appellant’s explanation that the brevity of the screening interview was the reason for his omission of key aspects of his claim, the Judge being of the view that being asked what would happen upon return to Kurdistan would be a trigger for the appellant to mention the KDPI or the PUK.
14. At [23] the Judge highlights inconsistencies in the appellant’s evidence, noting he had adopted his witness statement and confirmed it had been read back to him at the outset of the hearing, therefore rejecting his claim that neither of those things had happened. In my judgement, [26] is simply the Judge’s conclusion of the findings she has made, as Mr Terrell for the respondent submits. This could not be clearer, as even the wording of [26] starts, “drawing the strands together”.
15. In considering whether the ground relating to adequacy of reasons is made out, I remind myself of what was said by the Upper Tribunal in Budhathoki (reasons for decisions) [2014] UKUT 00341 at [14].
It is however necessary for First-tier Tribunal Judges to identify and resolve the key conflicts in the evidence and explain in clear and brief terms their reasons for preferring one case to the other so that the parties can understand why they have won or lost.
16. I find that a fair reading of the determination would disclose to the appellant precisely why he had lost, to use that phrase. The appellant’s employment as a security guard for Asiacell had been accepted by the respondent and so there was in reality limited factual dispute for the Judge to determine when considering the issue of credibility and subsequently the issue of risk upon return.
17. The key point of the appellant’s case was the threat or the pressure to spy that he says he received from the Iranian Intelligence Services. The judge considered the appellant’s inconsistent evidence about that point. She further considered another key aspect of the appellant’s claim being omitted from the screening interview, that being a fear of the Kurdish authorities.
Conclusion
18. Whilst I agree that there are elements of the decision which could have been better expressed, the Judge discharged her duty to make adequately reasoned findings on the issues in dispute. I therefore do not find that the sole ground of challenge is made out and I do not find that there is any material error of law in the decision of the First-tier Tribunal.
Notice of Decision
19. The appeal to the Upper Tribunal is dismissed. The decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Clarke dismissing the appellant’s appeal on protection grounds shall stand.

CJ Williams

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

4th April 2025