Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-000163

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/00889/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 21 August 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HOFFMAN

Between

ILYAS HIRABE
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr P Shea, of Counsel instructed by Alison Law Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms N Kerr, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 30 July 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The appellant, who is a citizen of the Netherlands, appeals against the decision of the respondent dated 26 March 2024 refusing his human rights claim and confirming her intention to deport him from the United Kingdom.
2. The appellant’s appeal was originally allowed by the First-tier Tribunal in a decision promulgated on 30 October 2024. However, in a decision promulgated on 12 June 2025 a panel of the Upper Tribunal (consisting of Deputy Judge Deakin and myself) set aside that decision on the basis that it contained a material error of law. The case was adjourned for a de novo remaking hearing. A copy of the error of law ruling is appended to this decision.
3. For the reasons set out below, I have dismissed the appellant’s appeal.
Background
4. The appellant was born in 1999. He arrived in the UK from the Netherlands with his parents in January 2004 when he was four years old. On 29 May 2019, he was granted indefinite leave to remain under the EU Settlement Scheme.
5. However, on 6 December 2023, the appellant was convicted at Snaresbrook Crown Court of possessing an offensive weapon in a public place and two counts of possessing a controlled Class A drug with intent to supply (heroin and cocaine). He was sentenced to 40 months’ imprisonment.
6. The appellant’s conviction resulted in the respondent notifying him on 18 January 2024 that she intended to deport him from the UK. On 6 February 2024, the appellant responded by providing with the respondent with reasons why he should not be deported.
The respondent’s decision
7. The respondent treated the appellant’s representations as a human rights claim and they were considered and rejected in the Stage 2 deportation decision dated 26 March 2024. In that decision, the respondent found that the appellant did not meet any of the exceptions to deportation under the Immigration Rules. In particular, the respondent was not satisfied that the appellant was culturally and socially integrated in the UK or that there were very significant obstacles to him re-establishing his private life in the Netherlands. Furthermore, she found that there were no very compelling circumstances to his case that would render his deportation in breach of his right to a private life under Article 8 ECHR.
8. It is that decision which is the focus of this appeal.
The hearing
9. At the outset of the hearing, Mr Shea, representing the appellant, requested an adjournment. The basis of the application was that he believed that the remaking hearing had been listed before me in error because I was one of the judges who heard the respondent’s successful error of law appeal against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal. Mr Shea submitted that it would be unfair and contrary to the interests of justice for the same judge to preside over both the error of law and remaking hearings.
10. I explained to Mr Shea that there had been no mistake in listing the appeal before me because it was standard practice for the same judge or judges to be seized of a case while it is before the Upper Tribunal. Accordingly, the same judge or judges who heard an error of law appeal and had adjourned the remaking aspect of the case to another day will therefore be expected to remake the decision unless their diary prevents them from doing so, in which case a transfer order must be made in accordance with section 9 of the Practice Statements of the Immigration and Asylum Chambers of the First-tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal dated 11 June 2018. I was therefore satisfied that it was not unfair for me to hear the appeal and I accordingly refused the application for an adjournment. I did, however, explain to the appellant the distinct tasks that the Upper Tribunal must undertake in error of law and remaking hearings.
Evidence
11. I had before me the 214-page composite bundle that had been prepared by the respondent for the error law hearing. This included the evidence that each party relied upon before the First-tier Tribunal. While the appellant’s witness statement was missing from that bundle, I was able to obtain a copy of this from a separate copy of the appellant’s First-tier Tribunal bundle.
12. The appellant did not comply with the directions made pursuant to the error of law decision permitting him to serve new evidence and/or an updated skeleton argument prior to the hearing.
13. The appellant gave oral evidence before the Upper Tribunal along with his mother, Ms Muna Hassan, and his older sister, Miss Isra Hirabe. They each adopted their written statement as their evidence-in-chief and all three were cross-examined by Ms Kerr, representing the respondent. Mr Shea only re-examined Ms Hassan. As their evidence is set out in their written statements and the record of proceedings, it is not rehearsed in this decision unless where it is necessary to do so.
Issues
14. Mr Shea explained that the only issue to be determined by the Upper Tribunal was whether the appellant met the private life exception to deportation set out under s.117C(4) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (“the 2002 Act”) (“Exception 1”).
15. Ms Kerr confirmed that the respondent maintained that the appellant did not meet the second and third limbs of Exception 1, i.e. that he was culturally and socially integrated in the UK; and that there would be very significant obstacles to his reintegration on return to the Netherlands.
The legal framework
16. The deportation of foreign national offenders is governed by the UK Borders Act 2007 Act (“the 2007 Act”). Section 32 provides for the automatic deportation of foreign criminals sentenced to at least 12 months' imprisonment. Section 33 sets out the exceptions to automatic deportation. For the purposes of the present appeal, this includes where the person’s deportation would breach their rights under the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”): see s.33(2)(a).
17. Section 117C of the 2002 Act sets out considerations that a court or tribunal must take into account when considering the Article 8 ECHR rights of a foreign criminal appealing against a decision to deport them from the UK:
117C Article 8: additional considerations in cases involving foreign criminals
(1) The deportation of foreign criminals is in the public interest.
(2) The more serious the offence committed by a foreign criminal, the greater is the public interest in deportation of the criminal.
(3) In the case of a foreign criminal (“C”) who has not been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of four years or more, the public interest requires C's deportation unless Exception 1 or Exception 2 applies.
(4)  Exception 1 applies where—
(a)  C has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of C's life,
(b)  C is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom, and
(c)  there would be very significant obstacles to C's integration into the country to which C is proposed to be deported.
(5)  Exception 2 applies where C has a genuine and subsisting relationship with a qualifying partner, or a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a qualifying child, and the effect of C's deportation on the partner or child would be unduly harsh.
(6)  In the case of a foreign criminal who has been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least four years, the public interest requires deportation unless there are very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2.
(7)  The considerations in subsections (1) to (6) are to be taken into account where a court or tribunal is considering a decision to deport a foreign criminal only to the extent that the reason for the decision was the offence or offences for which the criminal has been convicted.
18. The burden of proof is on the appellant to prove the facts of his case applying the civil standard of balance of probabilities. The relevant date is the date of the hearing.
Findings
19. There is no dispute that the appellant meets the definition of a “foreign criminal” under s.32 of the 2007 Act: he is not a British citizen; he has been convicted in the UK of an offence; and he was sentenced to a period of imprisonment exceeding 12 months. Under s.32 of the 2007 Act and s.117C(1) of the 2002 Act, Parliament has made it clear that the deportation of a foreign criminal is conducive to the public good and in the public interest. Furthermore, under s.117C(2) of the 2002 Act, the more serious the offence committed, the greater the public interest is in their deportation.
20. Having read the judge’s sentencing remarks, I am satisfied that the nature of the offending, which involved possession of an offensive weapon and possession with intent to supply two Class A drugs, was serious. This is reflected by the fact that, despite having no prior criminal record and having pleaded guilty at the earliest opportunity, the appellant was nevertheless sentenced to a period of 40 months’ imprisonment. As the sentencing judge noted, the appellant “was in need of money and [he] decided this was to be how [he] made money.”
21. I accept that the appellant is remorseful for his crimes and that the OASys report assesses him to be at low risk of reoffending. I also accept his evidence that the severe consequences his conviction has had on his immigration status has also convinced him that returning to crime is not an option for him.
22. Nevertheless, under s.117C(3), in the case of a foreign criminal who has not been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of four years or more, the public interest requires their deportation unless Exception 1 (private life) or Exception 2 (family life with a qualifying partner or child) is met. The appellant only seeks to rely on Exception 1. I therefore deal with all three of the criteria relevant to Exception 1 below.
Exception 1
Length of residence
23. The respondent accepts that the appellant has been lawfully resident in the UK for most of his life and he therefore meets this criterion.
Social and cultural integration
24. Ms Kerr submitted that despite the length of the appellant’s lawful residence in the UK, his criminal offending has broken his social and cultural integration. She argued that this was evidenced not just by the appellant’s criminal offending but by his explanation as to why he turned to crime, i.e. in order to get money to help his family. Ms Kerr submitted that if the appellant was culturally and socially integrated, he would have been aware that he could apply for benefits rather than resort to drug dealing.
25. Whether a person is culturally and socially integrated in the UK is to be determined with “common sense” and with regard given to the appellant’s “upbringing, education, employment history, history of criminal offending and imprisonment, relationships with family and friends, lifestyle and any other relevant factors”: see [51] (per Lord Stephens with whom the other judges agreed) of SC (Jamaica) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 15.
26. In the present case, I am satisfied that the appellant is culturally and socially integrated. Save for some time spent in the Netherlands in 2019, he has lived in this country for 21 years, having arrived here aged four. He was educated in this country from pre-school to college level. He speaks fluent English with a London accent. He has worked in a variety of jobs including for Wilkinsons, Uber Eats and Tesco. His immediate family, including his mother, siblings, uncles, grandmother, niece and nephew, live here. Prior to committing the offences that led to his imprisonment on 6 December 2023, the appellant did not have a criminal record and appears to have been of good character. I am satisfied that his offending and imprisonment, while to be deprecated as contrary to British values, did not therefore serve to cancel out the various factors that suggest the appellant has a strong attachment to the UK. Neither am I satisfied that Ms Kerr’s submission that the appellant’s ignorance that he could have claimed benefits while out of work rather than resort to crime is a particularly weighty factor in demonstrating a lack of integration.
Very significant obstacles to integration in the Netherlands
27. In considering the appellant’s ability to reintegrate on return to the Netherlands, I have had regard to what is said by Sales LJ at [14] of the judgment in Secretary of State for the Home Department v Kamara [2016] EWCA Civ 813:
“The idea of "integration" calls for a broad evaluative judgment to be made as to whether the individual will be enough of an insider in terms of understanding how life in the society in that other country is carried on and a capacity to participate in it, so as to have a reasonable opportunity to be accepted there, to be able to operate on a day-to-day basis in that society and to build up within a reasonable time a variety of human relationships to give substance to the individual's private or family life.”
28. The Court of Appeal (per Newey LJ with whom Simon LJ agreed) in Secretary of State for the Home Department v Olarewaju [2018] EWCA Civ 557 at [26] explained that a “very real culture shock” is not the same as “very significant obstacles” and, in the present case, I am satisfied that the culture shock would not be significant. The appellant already has some experience of visiting and living in the Netherlands. Like the UK, the Netherlands is a west European liberal democracy. Geographically, it is very close to Britain. I therefore find that life in the Netherlands is unlikely to be significantly different to life in the UK.
29. While the appellant’s early years were spent in the Netherlands, he moved to the UK in 2004 when aged four. Since then, the appellant has visited the Netherlands on several occasions with his family because one of his sisters is buried there. Until recently, his uncle lived there. While the appellant’s mother was vague in oral evidence about when her brother left the Netherlands and returned to Somalia, Ms Kerr did not put it to her that she was not telling the truth. I am therefore satisfied that the appellant’s uncle has returned to Somalia. The appellant was unclear in oral evidence about whether his uncle’s wife and child still live in the Netherlands. When asked about this in cross-examination, he merely stated that he was not in regular contact with his uncle. However, Ms Kerr did not press the appellant on this point nor did she raise this with the appellant’s mother or address it in her closing submissions. I do not therefore take it to be the respondent’s case that they can support the appellant on return.
30. The evidence of the appellant’s mother and sister is that the former works only part time and the latter is unemployed. They both said that they would be unable to support the appellant financially in the Netherlands. Their evidence was not challenged by Ms Kerr and I therefore accept it. I am not, however, satisfied that the appellant is likely to be destitute on return for the following reasons.
31. The fact that the appellant has visited Netherlands periodically since his arrival to the UK and, until recently, had family living there, means that he has some knowledge of the country and will not be starting completely from scratch in terms of learning about the place. Importantly, the appellant spent some time in the country in 2019. While omitted from his witness statement, the OASys report records that the appellant told his probation officer that, “In 2019, he moved to The Netherlands to live with his uncle for just under a year, however [he] moved back to London as he missed the rest of his family.”
32. At the hearing, the appellant claimed that he had only been in the Netherlands for seven or eight months. Ms Kerr did not question that. As already mentioned, during that time he obtained a qualification as a forklift driver following which he secured a job. In oral evidence, the appellant claimed that the forklift driver qualification was taught in English and he was fired from his job because he could not understand Dutch. When it was put to the appellant during cross-examination that he had told his probation officer that he returned to the UK because he missed his family, he said that “missing your family is always going to be a thing.”
33. I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the forklift course was taught in English. I am not, however, satisfied to the civil standard that the appellant returned to the UK having been fired from his job because he did not speak Dutch. The OASys report says that the appellant returned to the UK because he missed his family and I am satisfied that is more likely than not to be the true reason. The appellant would have had no reason not to tell the probation officer the truth. Furthermore, prior to the hearing before me, the appellant had not previously claimed to have been fired from his job in the Netherlands. I note that the First-tier Tribunal judge recorded at [19] that the appellant had been evasive about whether he had worked in the Netherlands and, as already mentioned, the appellant’s witness statement does not touch on the issue. When Ms Kerr asked him whether he had previously claimed to have been fired from his job in the Netherlands, the appellant did not give a direct answer. Instead, he said that he had faced lots of difficulties living in the Netherlands and likened it to “living in Hell”. He went on to say that if that was not the case, he would still be living there.
34. Having taken into account the differing reasons the appellant has given for why he left his job in the Netherlands and the lateness of his claim to have been fired, I find that the appellant’s claim to have been sacked because he could not speak Dutch is more likely than not an invention designed to bolster his claim that he cannot integrate in the Netherlands due to the language barrier.
35. Regarding the language barrier, I am satisfied that appellant likely has only a limited grasp of Dutch because (a) he has grown up in a family where Somali is the main language; (b) he left the Netherlands as a small child; and (c) he has since spent most of his life in the UK. I am, however, satisfied that it is likely that he has picked up some Dutch while living there in 2019. Moreover, I am satisfied that the appellant could be expected to learn Dutch were he to be deported to the Netherlands. In oral evidence, he claimed that it was easy for him to learn English as a small child going to school in this country. But, he said, while “not rocket science”, it was still difficult to learn a new language as an adult. However, adults frequently learn new languages and given that the appellant is only 25 years old, I am satisfied that he is young and intelligent enough to learn Dutch, not least given that it is a language he likely has at least a basic familiarity with.
36. I am also satisfied that a failure to speak Dutch is not likely to be a very significant obstacle to the appellant’s reintegration, including on his immediate return. First, I take judicial notice that a large proportion of the Dutch people speak English, many to a high standard. Second, from the appellant’s own evidence, it is clear that English is used in the Netherlands. The appellant said in cross-examination that before he had even arrived in the UK as a four-year-old he had learned some English words, likely from watching TV. Moreover, he was able to obtain a qualification in the Netherlands by attending a course taught in English and, thereafter, he was able to obtain a job despite claiming that he cannot speak Dutch.
37. On return to the Netherlands, Ms Kerr submitted, the appellant could turn to the Dutch government for social security assistance while he re-establishes himself in the country. Mr Shea responded that the respondent had not provided evidence to show that the Dutch government gives benefits to its citizens or that the appellant would be so entitled. However, the burden is on the appellant to prove that he will be left destitute on return. During cross-examination, he said that he had not investigated whether he could claim benefits in the Netherlands because he was focussed on remaining in the UK. On consideration, I am satisfied that it is more likely than not that, as west European liberal democracy, the Netherlands has a benefits system in place for its citizens who are out of work.
38. In any event, I am satisfied that the appellant could reasonably be expected to find work for himself in the Netherlands. He is young and in good health. He has transferrable skills having obtained an education in the UK and worked here in a variety of jobs, including as a delivery driver. He also has a qualification obtained in the Netherlands to operate forklift vehicles. Importantly, the appellant has previously been able to secure a job for himself in that country as a forklift driver despite not being a Dutch speaker. To the extent that he may need to learn Dutch in order to broaden his career options, for the reasons already given, I am satisfied that he can reasonably be expected to learn the language.
39. As I have already found, life in the Netherlands is unlikely to be significantly different to life in the UK. Therefore, once settled in the Netherlands, the appellant can reasonably be expected to make new friends and a new life for himself.
40. I appreciate that the appellant wishes to remain in the UK and that he will miss his family here if he is deported to the Netherlands. However, that is not a real obstacle, let alone a very significant obstacle, to him re-establishing his private life in that country. Furthermore, the evidence before the Tribunal was that the appellant’s family travelled to the Netherlands periodically to visit his sister’s grave and, consequently, it can reasonably be expected that they will visit him there as well.
Conclusion
41. For the reasons given above, the appellant does not meet the requirements of Exception 1 because there are no very significant obstacles to him reintegrating on return to the Netherlands.
42. I am therefore satisfied that the appellant’s deportation will not amount to a disproportionate interference with his right to a private life.

Notice of Decision
The appellant’s human rights appeal is dismissed

M R Hoffman

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

4th August 2025

Annex: Error of Law decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-000163

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/00889/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

…………………………………

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HOFFMAN
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE DEAKIN

Between

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT

Appellant
and

ILYAS HIRABE
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr E Tufan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
For the Respondent: Mr T Hussain, counsel, instructed by Alison Law Solicitors

Heard at Field House on 23 May 2025

DECISION AND REASONS

1. By determination promulgated on 30 October 2024, FTJ Roots allowed Mr Hirabe’s appeal against his deportation order on the basis that he fell within the terms of section 117C(4) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (“Exception 1”). The Secretary of State appeals against the Judge’s determination.

Material Background

2. Mr Hirabe is a Dutch national. He was born in 1999.

3. Mr Hirabe claims to have arrived in the United Kingdom in January 2004. He was granted Indefinite Leave to Remain on 29 May 2019 under the European Union Settlement Scheme. On 6 December 2023, Mr Hirabe was convicted of various offences. He was sentenced to 40 months’ imprisonment.

4. The Secretary of State made a decision to deport Mr Hirabe on 15 January 2024. Mr Hirabe made a human rights claim. This was refused on 26 March 2024 and a Deportation Order was signed on 28 March 2024. Mr Hirabe appealed the refusal of his human rights claim to the First-tier Tribunal.

5. Mr Hirabe’s appeal was heard on 11 October 2024. We note in particular the Judge’s findings that:
a. Mr Hirabe had spent time in the Netherlands in 2019. The Judge found that this was less than a year (para. 17 of the Determination).
b. Mr Hirabe had obtained a forklift driving qualification while in the Netherlands. This followed a short course which Mr Hirabe was able to complete “mainly in English” (para. 18 of the Determination);
c. He had worked for a brief period while in the Netherlands. The Judge found that Mr Hirabe had had to return to the United Kingdom “due to language issues” (para. 19 of the Determination). We note that the OASys Report quoted by the Judge at para. 21 of the Determination states that Mr Hirabe returned to the United Kingdom because he “missed his family”.
d. Mr Hirabe obtained qualifications in mechanics at Newham College and/or Epping Forest College (para. 22 of the Determination). He worked in the retail sector and as a delivery driver in the United Kingdom (para. 24 of the Determination).
e. All Mr Hirabe’s immediate family reside in the United Kingdom, although he did spend some time residing with his Uncle and Aunt by marriage in the Netherlands in 2019 (para. 28 of the Determination). Mr Hirabe’s uncle was found to have now returned to Somalia (paras 16-17).
f. Mr Hirabe was found to speak “very limited Dutch”. The Judge went on to find that “this did not mean he could not acquire Dutch within a reasonable period of being removed there” and the Judge did not consider Mr Hirabe’s lack of Dutch to be a “particularly important factor, albeit it would make his adjustment more difficult for a period” (para. 29 of the Determination).

6. In considering Exception 1 private life the Judge found that Mr Hirabe had been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of his life and that Mr Hirabe is and has remained socially integrated in the United Kingdom (paras. 31 and 37 of the Determination). Neither conclusion is challenged in this appeal. In relation to the third limb of Exception 1, the Judge found that Mr Hirabe would face very significant obstacles to integration (paras. 38-44 of the Determination). The Judge accordingly found that Mr Hirabe satisfied the requirements of Exception 1 and allowed Mr Hirabe’s appeal.

7. The Secretary of State sought permission to appeal on two grounds:
a. The Judge erred in his consideration of whether Mr Hirabe was socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom (Ground 1).
b. The Judge’s findings as to Mr Hirabe’s ability to integrate into the Netherlands were perverse and/or inadequately reasoned (Ground 2).

8. UTJ Bulpitt granted the Secretary of State permission to appeal on Ground 2 only.

Legal Framework

9. It is the role of the Upper Tribunal, when considering a decision of the First-tier Tribunal, to determine whether or not the making of the decision at first instance “involved the making of an error on a point if law” (section 12(1) of the Tribunal, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007). The question for us is not whether we agree with the Judge at first instance, but whether or not the Judge’s determination fell within the range of permissible options. And, in considering whether the Judge did err in law, we remind ourselves that the First-tier Tribunal is an expert Tribunal to which appropriate respect is owed (see Lady Hale’s comments in AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49; [2008] 1 A.C. 678, at [30]).

10. Section 117C of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 sets out specified exceptions to the public interest in the deportation of foreign criminals. Section 117C(4) provides as follows:

(4)Exception 1 applies where—
(a) C has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of C's life,
(b) C is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom, and
(c) there would be very significant obstacles to C's integration into the country to which C is proposed to be deported.

11. The Court of Appeal explained the approach that should be taken to the “very significant obstacles” limb in Secretary of State for the Home Department v Kamara [2016] EWCA Civ 813; [2016] 4 W.L.R. 152 per Sales LJ at [14]:

In my view, the concept of a foreign criminal's "integration" into the country to which it is proposed that he be deported, as set out in section 117C(4)(c) and paragraph 399A, is a broad one. It is not confined to the mere ability to find a job or to sustain life while living in the other country. It is not appropriate to treat the statutory language as subject to some gloss and it will usually be sufficient for a court or tribunal simply to direct itself in the terms that Parliament has chosen to use. The idea of "integration" calls for a broad evaluative judgment to be made as to whether the individual will be enough of an insider in terms of understanding how life in the society in that other country is carried on and a capacity to participate in it, so as to have a reasonable opportunity to be accepted there, to be able to operate on a day-to-day basis in that society and to build up within a reasonable time a variety of human relationships to give substance to the individual's private or family life.

12. It is well established that the reasons given by a First-tier Judge need not be extensive. They must, however “…enable the reader to understand why the matter was decided as it was and what conclusions were reached on the “principal controversial issues”, disclosing how any issue of law or fact was resolved…” (per Lord Brown of Eaton under Heywood in South Bucks County Council v Porter [2004] UKHL 33; [2004] 1 WLR 1953).

Discussion

13. We note the Judge properly directed himself that the “very significant obstacles” limb “implies a high threshold” (para. 38 of the Determination) and that the Judge stated that he had carried out a “broad evaluative assessment” (para. 44 of the Determination) when considering whether Mr Hirabe faced “very significant obstacles” to integration in the Netherlands. Nevertheless, in our judgment the Judge’s conclusion that Mr Hirabe would face “very significant obstacles” to integration should he be deported was not reasonably open to him given evidence before the Judge and the facts he found. Alternatively the Judge failed to provide sufficient reasons for his conclusions. In either case we consider the Judge erred in law.

14. The Judge found that Mr Hirabe lived in the Netherlands until he was around 4 years old. He had spent some time in the Netherlands in 2019, staying with family members. The Judge did not specify the length of time save for finding that it was “less than a year”. The Judge accepted that, while in the Netherlands, Mr Hirabe obtained a qualification (albeit after a short course conducted mainly in English) and was briefly engaged in employment. The Judge did not consider Mr Hirabe’s lack of fluency in Dutch to be “particularly important factor” (para. 29 of the Determination). While he found that Mr Hirabe spoke very little Dutch, he was of the view that there was no reason Mr Hirabe could not acquire conversational Dutch in a reasonable period.

15. Against this background we do not consider it was reasonably open to the Judge to find that Mr Hirabe would face “very significant obstacles” to integration in the Netherlands absent his identifying significant countervailing factors. We do not consider that the Judge did so.

a. In his witness statement before the First-tier Tribunal, Mr Hirabe stated that he had returned “periodically” to the Netherlands with his family for “very short visits” in his “younger years” (para. 8/page 91). In our view this was relevant to the assessment of whether Mr Hirabe would face “very significant obstacles” to integration. It was not addressed by the Judge. We find this omission to constitute an error of law.
b. At para. 39 of his Determination, the Judge referred to CI (Nigeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 2027 and noted case law established that “... there must be some evidential basis for an assertion and finding that he remains familiar with Dutch culture.” The Judge went on to find that “…Any assertion that he has any strong familiarity with Dutch culture is not supported by the evidence, notwithstanding the time he spent there in 2019. He has spent virtually all his life living in the UK and is socially and culturally indistinguishable from many of his peers with whom he will have grown up and associated.” In our judgment the reasons for the Judge’s conclusion on this point are not rationally connected to his conclusions. The fact that Mr Hirabe is well integrated in the United Kingdom has no bearing on whether he remains familiar with Dutch culture. Further, CI (Nigeria) turned on particular facts (recorded by Legatt LJ at [86]) that are not found in Mr Hirabe’s case. Given Mr Hirabe’s history and family connections (as set out above) we do not consider the Judge’s findings on this point were reasonably open to him.
c. At para. 43 of the Determination the Judge found that, while Mr Hirabe “…will be able to acquire conversational Dutch without significant difficulty, it will take much longer [for him] to have sufficient ability for him to integrate in a meaningful sense.” These propositions are in significant tension with each other (and, indeed, with the Judge’s findings at para. 29 of his Determination). We find that the Judge’s findings in relation to Mr Hirabe’s linguistic ability and the impact of this on his future integration to be inconsistent and not reasonably open to him. Alternatively, the Judge failed to provide adequate reasons for his conclusions on this point.
d. Further, the Judge noted two reasons given for Mr Hirabe’s return to the United Kingdom following his time in the Netherlands in 2019 (namely language issues and missing his family – see paras. 19 and 21 of the Determination). The Judge did not, however, expressly resolve this tension. While we consider the Judge’s findings at para. 29 to suggest that language issues were not a significant barrier to integration and so it is likely he considered Mr Hirabe returned to the United Kingdom because he missed his family, this is not clear from the Judge’s reasoning. In our judgment this failure to make findings on an important point of fact and provide adequate reasons for the same constitutes a material error of law.
e. The Judge found that Mr Hirabe would not benefit from significant support from his family in the United Kingdom or the Netherlands. While lack of support may weigh in an assessment of the “very significant obstacles” test, we find that the Judge failed to provide sufficient reasons to explain how this factor outweighed those factors tending to suggest that Mr Hirabe would not face “very significant obstacles” to integration in Dutch society should he be deported.

16. In his submissions before us, Mr Tufan drew our attention to the case of Ackom v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 537. In that case Andrews LJ (with whom Nugee and Newey LJJ agreed) paid particular regard to the fact that it was proposed to deport Mr Ackom to Germany and that “life in Germany is not significantly different from life in the UK”. While we accept Mr Hussain’s submissions that Ackom post-dated Mr Hirabe’s appeal before the First-tier Tribunal and that the Court of Appeal’s findings on matters of fact are not determinative of factual findings in other cases, we do consider the Court of Appeal’s reasoning in Ackom to be relevant by analogy to the present appeal. The Netherlands, like Germany, is an EU country in which life is not obviously significantly different from life in the United Kingdom. In our judgment this was an issue that the Judge was required to address when considering the very significant obstacles test. We find his failure to do so constituted an error of law.

Conclusion

17. In our judgment the Judge’s conclusion that Mr Hirabe would not face “very significant obstacles” to integration in Dutch society should he be deported was not one that was reasonably open to him consistent with the Court of Appeal’s guidance in Kamara. Alternatively, the Judge failed to provide adequate reasons to support his conclusions. In either event we find the Judge erred in law.

18. We have carefully considered whether any of the Judge’s findings can be preserved. However, given the lack of cogent reasons for a number of the facts found, and given the Judge’s failure to address matters of potential importance, we do not consider it would be safe to do. We accordingly set aside the decision in its entirety. Mr Hirabe’s appeal is to be retained by the Upper Tribunal for redetermination.

Notice of Decision

The appeal to the Upper Tribunal is allowed.

The decision of the First-tier Tribunal is set aside in its entirety with no findings of fact preserved.

Directions

1. The remaking of this appeal is to be listed for the first available date at Field House with a time estimate of 3 hours.

2. Any updating evidence either party wishes to rely upon must be electronically filed with the Upper Tribunal and served on the other party 21-days prior to the remaking hearing.

3. Mr Hirabe is to file and serve a skeleton argument, if so advised, no later than 14 days before the resumed hearing.

4. The Secretary of State is to file and serve a skeleton argument, if so advised, no later than 7 days before the resumed hearing.

ANDREW DEAKIN

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

6 June 2025