Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-000184

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/52817/2023
IA/00930/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 26th February 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE STERNBERG

Between

AR
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Applicant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr. Forrest, advocate, instructed by Rea Law Ltd
For the Respondent: Ms. Blackburn, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House by CVP on 13 February 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The appellant, a citizen of Albania, was granted permission to appeal the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Gillespie (‘the judge’) who dismissed the appellant’s appeal by a determination dated 14 November 2024, following a hearing which took place in Glasgow on 25 October 2024. That appeal challenged the respondent’s decision to refuse his asylum claim dated 28 April 2023.
2. First-tier Tribunal Judge Mulready refused permission to appeal on 2 February 2025. Upper Tribunal Judge Rastogi granted permission to appeal on 1 April 2025. In granting permission, Judge Rastogi observed at [5] ‘It remains for the appellant to establish that any error is material given the factors the judge took into account when assessing sufficiency of protection which may mean that the outcome would nevertheless have been the same’. The judge made an order granting the appellant anonymity in their determination. I maintain that order given the nature of the appellant’s claims.
3. The hearing took place before my by CVP on 13 February 2026. At the start of the hearing I confirmed that all parties could hear and see each other. I then heard submissions from Mr. Forrest for the appellant and Ms. Blackburn for the respondent. I received a composite bundle running to 945 pages in advance of the hearing. That bundle contained an application to admit further evidence under rule 15(2A) of the Upper Tribunal Procedure Rules 2008 in the form of an updated statement from the appellant’s partner dated April 2025, stating that she was pregnant at that time. Mr. Forrest informed me that she had subsequently given birth in June 2025.

Decision of the First-tier Tribunal
4. In order to understand the challenges advanced by the appellant to the judge’s decision, it is necessary to summarise that decision in a little detail. The judge began his judgment (at [1]-[10]) by setting out the basis of the appellant’s claim and the law in summary. The appellant claims to have been a victim of human trafficking and at risk of re-trafficking on return to Albania. The judge noted that on 31 July 2023 the Single Competent Authority had determined that the appellant had suffered exploitation in Albania from May/June 2012 to October 2012 in Albania and in the UK from October 2012 to 2012/2013. The Judge set out the documents relied on by the respondent and the refusal decision of 28 April 2023. The judge summarised the appellant’s account that he had been mistreated in Albania, his travel to the UK and his account of modern slavery in the UK as well as his subsequent relationship formed with a Spanish citizen in the UK.
5. The judge summarised the issues in dispute and the evidence he heard (at [11]-[12]), these included whether the refugee convention is engaged, whether the appellant falls within a particular social group as a male victim of modern slavery and human trafficking in Albania, his credibility, whether there is sufficiency of protection in Albania, whether he could relocate internally and whether his removal would constitute a disproportionate interference in his right to a private and family life in the UK.
6. The judge set out his consideration on the protection claim (at [13]-[44]) noting that the person said to be responsible for AR’s enslavement in Albania, Emiliano Shullazi, was sentenced to imprisonment in November 2018. The appellant feared Shullazi’s friends, relatives and associates, the evidence of a psychotherapist, Sonya Landesman, relied on by the appellant addressed his experiences in the UK but not in Albania. The judge summarised the submissions of the parties including on the Country Guidance case of TD and AD (Trafficked women) CG [2016] UKUT 92 (IAC). The judge found that the appellant has not been acting under duress for the past 10 years. Support is available to victims of trafficking in Albania. The report of the psychotherapist does not attract great weight. There is sufficiency of protection and a viable internal relocation option.
7. In relation to article 8 ECHR the judge found (at [45]-[48]) that the factors raised by the appellant are outweighed by the public interest. At that time he was not living with his partner. The judge found he does not meet the immigration rules and the factors in s.117B of the Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 weigh against him. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed.

Grounds of Appeal
8. The appellant advances four grounds of appeal:
i. Ground 1 argues that the judge erred in law by concluding that the appellant has not proved a well-founded fear of persecution or a real risk of serious harm because he ignored or did not properly taken into account the risk that he will be re-trafficked if returned. The appellant fears the associates of the person who trafficked him. The Judge was wrong to conclude that only trafficked women will form a particular social group for the purposes of the refugee convention. The judge erred in not giving appropriate weight to the report of Ms. Landesman. The judge ignored or did not properly take into account the risk of re-trafficking bearing in mind the headnote of TD & AD at (d) and (f)
ii. Ground 2 asserts that the judge erred in law in concluding there was sufficiency of protection in Albania, noting that a system of protection must be effective. The judge afforded little weight to the expert report’s on sufficiency of protection. The conclusion that the expert was not independent was not rational, the judge was wrong to reject the expert’s evidence on this issue and there was no basis for concluding that sufficiency of protection is available
iii. Ground 3 is that the judge erred in law in concluding that internal relocation is available by not considering this issue holistically, as required by MB (Internal relocation – burden of proof) Albania [2019] UKUT 392.
iv. Ground 4 is that the judge erred in law by finding family life does not exist, by not considering the effect of the appellant’s relationship with his partner and her parents.
9. I consider these grounds in turn below.

The Rule 15(2A) application
10. Although it was only dealt with briefly by the parties, I record for completeness that I grant the application made by the appellant to admit further evidence under rule 15(2A). I accept that it comprises updated evidence of the relationship between the appellant and his partner, including that they have had a child together. However, as I will explain under the head of ground 4 below, that evidence would only become relevant at the stage of remaking the decision in the event that there is a material error of law in the judge’s decision rather than itself showing an error of law. In fairness to Mr. Forrest, he did not suggest that the new evidence itself did show an error of law on the part of the judge on article 8 ECHR.

Ground 1: the risk of re-trafficking
11. Mr. Forrest relied on the grounds of appeal and submitted that the judge erred in law by not properly taking into account the risk of re-trafficking. The Respondent argued that trafficked men were not a particular social group but the judge accepted at [27] that trafficked men may, in principle, be a particular social group. The judge did not take proper account of the appellant’s circumstances. At paragraph [28] the judge set out the headnote in the Country Guidance case of TD and AD including sub-paragraph (d) of the head note, requiring consideration of each individual’s particular circumstances. The judge dealt with this by referring to the circumstances in which it was said there would be sufficiency of protection at paragraphs [33]-[39], based on the country evidence including the Country Policy Information
Note; that was not enough. In TD and AD, headnote at (h), the correct approach was set out, the judge failed to take that approach. That was noted in the grant of permission to appeal at [4]. The judge looked at this issue by reference to factors relating to a different issue, on sufficiency of protection. At paragraph 43 the judge elided sufficiency of protection and internal relocation.
12. Ms. Blackburn submitted that the judge dealt with the risk of re-trafficking at paragraphs [18]-[22] and gave reasons for their conclusions. The persons who had trafficked the appellant were prosecuted and imprisoned. The appellant did not rely on any risk from the friends or relatives of the person he said trafficked him; there was only a passing reference to this at paragraph 21. The same logic would apply to the possibility of sufficiency of protection from the police. The judge’s findings should be considered holistically. The Judge explained at [29] the factors that are relevant in TD and AD and applied them.
13. In assessing this ground, I note that it seeks to overturn the judge’s findings of fact on an issue in controversy between the parties, the judge having heard the appellant give evidence and be cross-examined.
14. Therefore, the approach I should take is set out by the Court of Appeal in Yalcin v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 74; [2024] 1 WLR 1626, by Underhill LJ at [50]-[51]:
50. … I should recapitulate the approach that should be taken in considering whether the FTT made an error of law. At para. 72 of his judgment in HA (Iraq) (but with reference to the appeal in AA (Nigeria)) Lord Hamblen said:
"It is well established that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist fact finding tribunal. In particular:
(i) They alone are the judges of the facts. Their decisions should be respected unless it is quite clear that they have misdirected themselves in law. It is probable that in understanding and applying the law in their specialised field the tribunal will have got it right. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently – see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49; [2008] AC 678 per Baroness Hale of Richmond at para 30.
(ii) Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account – see MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 49; [2011] 2 All ER 65 at para 45 per Sir John Dyson.
(iii) When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out – see R (Jones) v First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) [2013] UKSC 19; [2013] 2 AC 48 at para 25 per Lord Hope."
51. Mr Malik relied on that passage but added some further points by way of amplification. The only one that I need mention is that in AA (Nigeria)1 in this Court Popplewell LJ said, at para. 34:
"Experienced judges in this specialised tribunal are to be taken to be aware of the relevant authorities and to be seeking to apply them without needing to refer to them specifically, unless it is clear from their language that they have failed to do so."
15. In general terms, I agree with Ms. Blackburn on this ground. First, the judge gave clear and sustainable reasons for finding that the appellant was not at risk of being re-trafficked, given that the persons who he said were responsible for his trafficking had been prosecuted in Albania and had been sentenced to imprisonment. I also accept that there was only passing reference to the possibility of the appellant facing a risk from friends, relatives or associates of the person who had trafficked him, such that the judge was correct to discount this issue as founding a real risk to the appellant.
16. Second, whilst the respondent did not accept that men were a particular social group, the judge disagreed with this submission and found at [27] that trafficked men ‘may well’ form a particular social group. There was no challenge to this finding by the respondent on this appeal. That finding supported the appellant’s case.
17. Third, I do not accept that the judge did not properly apply the guidance summarised in the headnote in TD and AD, in circumstances where the appellant sought to apply that country guidance, decided by reference to women, to men. I do not consider that there was a lack of consideration of the particular circumstances of the appellant. Nor was the judge required mechanistically to set out each of the factors at sub-paragraph (h) of the headnote of that decision in determining if there was a risk of persecution. Instead, the judge considered the issue in the round and reached a conclusion that was open to him. Those findings were set out in detail in the judge’s determination, including at [18]-[22] on the prosecution of those who the appellant said had trafficked him. At [23]-[25], [30]-[32] and [40] the judge made findings in relation to the evidence of Ms. Landseman and gave reasons for not accepting her evidence on critical issues. Those reasons included a lack of references and footnotes in her report, the fact that she considered the appellant to be young and vulnerable, when he was now 32, had learned English and had sought expert advice and, in the judge’s view her report had strayed into the realm of advocacy on behalf of a party. Those were all conclusions which were open to the judge to reach on that report. The judge also made findings applying the Country Guidance itself at [26]-[29] and in relation to objective material referred to in the Country Policy Information Note at [33]-[42]. I do not consider that the judge’s analysis reveals a lack of consideration of the appellant’s particular personal circumstances, on the contrary, the judge applied the relevant evidence and law to the appellant’s personal circumstances and determined that he did not face a real risk of re-trafficking. Accordingly, I conclude that this ground does not show any material error in the judge’s determination of this issue.
18. I reject this ground.

Ground 2: sufficiency of protection
19. Mr. Forrest submitted that the judge erred in relation to this issue. The expert dealt with sufficiency of protection in her report at pages 83-91. There was a degree of irrationality in the judge’s findings. The judge was faced with two sources of evidence. The judge should have accorded considerably more weight to Ms. Landesman’s conclusions. At paragraph 29 the judge considered that the opinion of the expert challenged the summary of the country guidance. The judge was faced with detailed evidence from the expert and more general evidence from the Home Office, they erred in placing greater weight on the more general evidence.
20. The respondent submitted that the judge set out what sufficiency of protection means at paragraph 17 and made a clear finding that such protection was available to the appellant including taking into account the risk of re-trafficking. Overall there was no error with the judge’s reasoning, their findings were open to them on the evidence. The judge correctly found that the appellant is not vulnerable and gave reasons for that finding at paragraph [30]. As to the expert evidence, the grounds amount to a disagreement with the judge’s decision on this point. It is clear that the judge preferred the evidence in the CPIN, they were entitled to do that. Paragraphs [38]-[39], paragraphs [16], [23], [29]-[32] and [40] provide ample reasons why the judge rejected the expert evidence. The judge was entitled to give that report less weight. Weight was a matter for the judge, they explained their findings and their reasons. The Tribunal should be slow to interfere with those findings of a specialist fact finding tribunal.
21. First, in analysing these submissions I bear in mind the decision in Yalcin, set out above. This ground of challenge turns on the assertion that the judge ought to have reached a different conclusion on the evidence before him, should have given greater weight to the evidence of the expert relied on by the appellant, Ms. Landesman, and therefore should have concluded differently on the issue of internal relocation. In my judgment, at is heart, this ground amounts to little more than a disagreement with the judge’s findings and conclusions, having had the benefit of hearing the appellant’s evidence, cross-examination and submissions from both parties on it immediately thereafter. I do not consider that the judge’s reasoning contains any error of law with respect to the matters raised under this ground.
22. Second, the appellant criticises the judge’s approach to the expert evidence, it seems to me that the assessment of that evidence and the weight to ascribe to it were quintessentially matters for the judge. I do not consider there is any material error in his decision to prefer the evidence in the Country Policy Information Note to the opinions of the expert relied on by the appellant. He was correct to conclude as he did for the reasons he gave. I have summarised some of those criticisms at §17 above, including the judge’s findings that the opinions expressed by Ms. Landesmann were not supported by footnotes referring to the background evidence, notwithstanding the lengthy bibliography appended to her report, that she mischaracterised the appellant as young and vulnerable and that she had engaged in advocacy on his behalf rather than providing independent expert opinion. By contrast, the judge found that the Country Policy Information Note on Trafficking in Albania was a properly sourced document. The judge was entitled to prefer that evidence to the evidence of Ms. Landesman and to give her report less weight for the reasons that he gave.
23. Third, at its height this ground amounts to a disagreement with an aspect of one of a number of matters which the judge considered relevant. These were proper matters for the judge to take into account. It is apparent that Ms. Landesman did not accept the material provided by the respondent on sufficiency of protection, but the judge was entitled to prefer that material over the evidence of Ms. Landesman for the reasons that he gave. I accept the Respondent’s submission that I should be slow to interfere with the findings of fact a specialist First-tier Tribunal and I decline to do so. I do not consider the judge’s conclusions on that evidence to be irrational.
24. For these reasons, I find that ground 2 does not give rise to any error of law.

Ground 3: internal relocation
25. Mr Forrest submitted that there is no reasoning at paragraph 43 of the judge’s judgment explaining why the judge found sufficiency of protection and viable internal relocation were available to the appellant. The test is different in relation to each of these issues. There was no reasoning as to why internal relocation would not be unreasonably harsh.
26. For the respondent Ms. Blackburn submitted that paragraph 43 should be read in the context of the preceding paragraphs, discussing the appellant’s age, health and support available to him. The judge could have been clearer, but their conclusion shows that they found that the appellant could relocate anywhere in Albania as there is sufficiency of protection; this appellant is not at risk as the authorities would be able to protect him. Even if the judge erred in relation to internal relocation they did not need to make findings on this issue, given their findings on sufficiency of protection. A person does not need to relocate internally if there is sufficient protection throughout Albania, so the issue does not arise. If Ground 1 fails then that is also relevant to the risk from which the appellant would require protection or need to relocate. The judge was not satisfied that criminal gangs would be interested in the appellant.
27. First, I accept that there is a superficial attraction to the appellant’s submission on this point. The judge’s judgment at paragraph 43 simply states that there is sufficiency of protection and that there is a viable internal relocation option. It is correct that the judge did not give detailed reasons for explaining why internal relocation would not be unreasonably harsh for the appellant. However, it seems to me that that approach is to look at paragraph 43 in isolation. It must be considered in its context. It follows the judge’s detailed discussion of why there is sufficiency of protection for the appellant. In that context, to make a finding that internal relocation was also available, was not, in my judgment a material error of law. I accept the respondent’s submissions that the judge’s conclusion that internal relocation is available to the appellant must be considered in the context of his earlier findings in relation to the appellant’s age, health, lack of vulnerability and the background evidence on support that would be available to him in Albania.
28. Second, to put the matter another way, as Judge Rastogi observed when granting permission to appeal, ‘It remains for the appellant to establish that any error is material given the factors the judge took into account when assessing sufficiency of protection which may mean that the outcome would nevertheless have been the same’. I am not persuaded by the appellant’s submissions that the lack of reasoning in relation to internal relocation is a material error of law, since, in my judgment, if the lack of reasoning relating to internal relocation is an error, the outcome would have been the same had the judge conducted a more detailed and thorough analysis of the availability of internal relocation and the question of whether internal relocation would be unreasonably harsh for the appellant.
29. Third, and accordingly, I am satisfied even if there was an error in the judge’s findings on this issue I do not consider it to be a material one. That finding was made in the context of the earlier paragraphs of the determination which I have considered above. Even if the judge ought to have given more detailed consideration to internal relocation and should have given reasons as to why internal relocation would not be unreasonably harsh, that could not have led the judge to reach a different conclusion on the appellant’s claim overall given the failure of grounds one and two and the judge’s finding that there was sufficiency of protection available to the appellant, without limitation as to any particular geographic area in Albania. I do not consider that if the judge had resolved the contents of this ground in the appellant’s favour and had found that internal relocation was not available that would have led the judge to a different conclusion overall given their conclusions on sufficiency of protection and the lack of risk to the appellant of re-trafficking.
30. This ground of appeal fails

Ground 4
31. In support of this ground, Mr. Forrest submitted that the judge erred in finding that the appellant had no family life. The judge should have taken all the circumstances into account, they were not. The Tribunal should allow the rule 15(2A) application, the applicant’s partner gave birth on 25 June 2025. That is fresh evidence. It underlines the submission that the appellant and his partner are in a relationship and they have a child. The appellant made reference to this issue at paragraph 7 of his witness statement (bundle p.40). There is a material error.
32. Ms. Blackburn submitted that it is accepted that there is an error at paragraph 45 of the judgment in relation to the relationship between the appellant and his partner but that error is not material. The judge explained why the appellant would not qualify for leave as a partner in any event. Not all relationships qualify as family life. The judge considered the relationship as more akin to a boyfriend/girlfriend relationship. That was correct at that time, they were not living together nor sharing finances. The judge was entitled to make the findings he did on the evidence before him. The issue of the appellant’s relationship with his partner’s parents is not referred to in the skeleton argument of the appellant below. That would not pass the test in Kugathas [2003] EWCA Civ 31. The judge made findings available to them in the evidence. There is no objection to the rule 15 material being admitted but it has little relevance to whether there is an error of law, it would only be relevant to remaking.
33. I can state my decision on this ground of appeal with brevity. First I accept the concession made by the respondent that the judge erred in relation to whether the appellant enjoyed family life with his partner. I do not consider that that error was material, essentially for the reasons advanced by the respondent. Had the judge found that the appellant and his partner enjoy family life it would not have made a material difference to the judge’s decision on this ground.
34. Second, the judge provided a careful analysis of the appellant’s private life at [46]-[48] and conducted the balancing exercise required of him. I consider that he did so properly. His conclusions on article 8 were, in my judgment, unimpeachable.
35. Third, whilst the grounds of appeal referred to a failure by the judge to make reference to the appellant’s relationship with his partner’s parents, there is no mention of this in the appellant’s skeleton argument prepared for the hearing before the judge at [3.4]. Nor do I find that consideration of such a relationship could have caused the judge to conclude differently on this issue.
36. Fourth, whilst I admit the material relied on by the Appellant under rule 15(2A), I do not consider that it shows that the judge fell into an error of law. It is updating evidence that might be relevant if the decision were to be remade, but it does not show any material error of law on the part of the judge.
37. This ground of appeal fails.

Notice of Decision
38. The First-tier Tribunal’s decision did not involve the making of an error of law.
39. The appeal is dismissed.
40. For the purposes of an application for permission to appeal against this decision under section 13(11) and (12) of the Tribunals Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 the relevant appellate Court is specified as being the Court of Session.

D Sternberg

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

20 February 2026

NOTIFICATION OF APPEAL RIGHTS

1. A person seeking permission to appeal against this decision must make a written application to the Upper Tribunal. Any such application must be received by the Upper Tribunal within the appropriate period after this decision was sent to the person making the application. The appropriate period varies, as follows, according to the location of the individual and the way in which the Upper Tribunal’s decision was sent:

2. Where the person who appealed to the First-tier Tribunal is in the United Kingdom at the time that the application for permission to appeal is made, and is not in detention under the Immigration Acts, the appropriate period is 12 working days (10 working days, if the notice of decision is sent electronically).

3. Where the person making the application is in detention under the Immigration Acts, the appropriate period is 7 working days (5 working days, if the notice of decision is sent electronically).

4. Where the person who appealed to the First-tier Tribunal is outside the United Kingdom at the time that the application for permission to appeal is made, the appropriate period is 38 days (10 working days, if the notice of decision is sent electronically).

5. A “working day” means any day except a Saturday or a Sunday, Christmas Day, Good Friday or a bank holiday.

6. The date when the decision is “sent’ is that appearing on the covering letter or covering email