Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-000198

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/55097/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

29th May 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HOFFMAN
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE ZUCKER

Between

AB
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)

Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms E Stuart-King of counsel instructed by Zeeshan Ahmad
For the Respondent: Ms S Leconte, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 21 May 2025

ANONYMITY ORDER

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant.

Failure to comply with this Order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant appeals against the decision of the Respondent dated 27 July 2023 refusing his protection claim. The appellant’s appeal was originally dismissed by First-tier Tribunal Judge Seelhoff promulgated on 18 November 2024. However, the decision of Judge Seelhoff was set aside by Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Ripley in a decision dated 15 April 2025 on the basis that it contained a material error of law. The appeal now comes before us to be reconsidered on the merits.
2. The Appellant was granted anonymity by the First-tier Tribunal. There has been no application to set that order aside and given that this case involves international protection, we are satisfied that Appellant’s right to anonymity outweighs the public interest in open justice.
Background
3. The Appellant is a citizen of Afghanistan. On 22 September 2020 he made an application for international protection as a refugee. On 27 July 2023 a decision was made by the Respondent to refuse the application. The Appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal. On 12 November 2024 the appeal was heard by First-tier Tribunal Judge Seelhoff, sitting at Hatton Cross. In a decision dated 18 November 2024, Judge Seelhoff dismissed the appeal on all grounds.
4. The basis of the Appellant’s claim was that he would be at risk on return due to fear of the Taliban and his imputed political opinion and membership of a social group as a consequence of a claimed blood feud and land dispute. Arguments were also made on the basis that the Appellant would be at risk as he would be perceived as “westernised”.
5. Not content with that decision by Notice of Appeal accompanied by Grounds dated 2 December 2024, the Appellant made application for permission to appeal to this Tribunal.
6. Permission was subsequently granted by First-tier Tribunal Judge Hollings-Tennant.
The error of law hearing before the Upper Tribunal
7. On 18 March 2025 the matter came before Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Ripley who decided as follows:
24. The decision of the Judge concerning Humanitarian protection and Article 3 ECHR is considered to contain an error on a point of law and is set aside pursuant to section 12 (2)(a) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (“the Act”).
25. By the agreement of the parties, the appeal as to Humanitarian protection and Article 3 ECHR is to be retained for remaking in the Upper Tribunal pursuant to section 12(2)(b)(2)(ii) of the Act.
26. The factual findings as to the protection claim, Article 8 and paragraph 40 of the Judge’s decision are preserved.
Findings
8. Our starting point is the preserved facts. The Appellant is a citizen of Afghanistan, who is now a young adult male, of no interest to the Taliban, who will not be perceived as westernised and who provided inconsistent evidence with respect to the events leading to his claim but who left Afghanistan whilst still a minor. Though he had claimed to suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder, the evidence was insufficient against the background of the Appellant being an unreliable witness. The specific facts found at paragraph 40 of Judge Seelhoff’s decision were:
“The Appellant is a fit and healthy young man aged approximately 20. It is likely that he has both family and tribal links in Afghanistan in terms of his mother and maternal uncle at least. It is likely that he would be able to make his way back to his home area and reunite with his family in Afghanistan”.
9. Ms Stuart-King accepted that the issues of humanitarian protection and article 3 of the European Convention stood or fell together so that our reconsideration of the background material placed before us would resolve both issues. That was because, although the Appellant attended before us, it was also agreed by the parties that the appeal would proceed by way of submissions only.
10. As a general proposition judges in the First-tier Tribunal are required to follow country guidance cases unless there is sufficient reason to depart from them: Roba (OLF - MB confirmed) Ethiopia CG [2022] UKUT 1 (IAC)
11. Ms Stuart-King cognisant of the guidance in the case in the case of AS (Safety of Kabul) Afghanistan CG [2020] UKUT 00130(IAC) urged us to find that the situation in Afghanistan had so changed for the worse since its promulgation that it should no longer be followed. The case of AS provided:
“Risk on return to Kabul from the Taliban
(i) A person who is of lower-level interest for the Taliban (i.e. not a senior government or security services official, or a spy) is not at real risk of persecution from the Taliban in Kabul.
Risk of serious harm in Kabul
(ii) There is widespread and persistent conflict-related violence in Kabul. However, the proportion of the population affected by indiscriminate violence is small and not at a level where a returnee, even one with no family or other network and who has no experience living in Kabul, would face a serious and individual threat to their life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence.
Reasonableness of internal relocation to Kabul
(iii) Having regard to the security and humanitarian situation in Kabul as well as the difficulties faced by the population living there (primarily the urban poor but also IDPs and other returnees, which are not dissimilar to the conditions faced throughout many other parts of Afghanistan) it will not, in general, be unreasonable or unduly harsh for a single adult male in good health to relocate to Kabul even if he does not have any specific connections or support network in Kabul and even if he does not have a Tazkera.
(iv) However, the particular circumstances of an individual applicant must be taken into account in the context of conditions in the place of relocation, including a person’s age, nature and quality of support network/connections with Kabul/Afghanistan, their physical and mental health, and their language, education and vocational skills when determining whether a person falls within the general position set out above. Given the limited options for employment, capability to undertake manual work may be relevant.
(v) A person with a support network or specific connections in Kabul is likely to be in a more advantageous position on return, which may counter a particular vulnerability of an individual on return. A person without a network may be able to develop one following return. A person’s familiarity with the cultural and societal norms of Afghanistan (which may be affected by the age at which he left the country and his length of absence) will be relevant to whether, and if so how quickly and successfully, he will be able to build a network.
Previous Country Guidance
(i) The country guidance in AK (Article 15(c)) Afghanistan CG [2012] UKUT 163IAC) in relation to Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive remains unaffected by this decision”.
12. The paragraphs of the immigration rules relevant to the consideration of this appeal are:
339C. An asylum applicant will be granted humanitarian protection in the United Kingdom if the Secretary of State is satisfied that:
(i) they are in the United Kingdom or have arrived at a port of entry in the United Kingdom;
(ii) they are not a refugee within the meaning of Article 1 of the 1951 Refugee Convention;
(iii) substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the asylum applicant concerned, if returned to the country of origin, would face a real risk of suffering serious harm and is unable, or, owing to such risk, unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country; and
(iv) they are not excluded from a grant of humanitarian protection.
339CA. For the purposes of paragraph 339C, serious harm consists of:
(i) the death penalty or execution;
(ii) unlawful killing;
(iii) torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of a person in the country of origin; or
(iv) serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict.
13. We had placed before us a considerable amount of material by both parties. The evidence to which we were taken by Ms Stuart-King is largely but not entirely referenced in her comprehensive Skeleton Argument. The evidence to which we were taken was largely but not entirely contained within two Country Policy and Information Notes relating to Afghanistan. We had before us a bundle of updated “objective” evidence and in making our findings do so with regard to the totality of the evidence to which we were referred.
14. Ms Stuart-King just stopped short of submitting to us that there was no longer anywhere in Afghanistan to which a person might now safely be returned. She pointed to the high number of civilian casualties in Kabul, both in the city and in its environs. A factor which she invited us to accept was that Judge Seelhoff accepted that there was evidence of the Appellant suffering from some mental health issues because he had had some counselling, even if such did not amount to PTSD. She pointed to food insecurity, poverty, high unemployment, high internal displacement figures, poor healthcare provision and funding shortfalls, all of which is more particularly addressed in the Skeleton Argument to which we have referred.
15. In bringing this appeal before us we remind ourselves that a principal, if not the principal cause of complaint was that the Judge at first instance failed to have regard to UNHCR background material. We note that the more up-to-date CPIN reports themselves reference some UNHCR evidence. For example, see 8.7 of the CPIN Afghanistan: Humanitarian situation version 3.0 August 2024 and 3.10.5 of the CPIN Afghanistan: Fear of the Taliban, version 4 August 2024.
16. It does not appear that the CPINs refer to the UNHCR guidance note on the international protection needs of people fleeing Afghanistan from February 2023. At para 29, the guidance note encourages States to provide a legal basis of stay, such as temporary protection, until such time as it is determined safe for people to return to Afghanistan. Furthermore, at para 31, the UNHCR calls on States to suspend forcible return of people to Afghanistan, including those who have had their asylum claims rejected. As is clear from reading the CPIN relating to the humanitarian protection, the British government has not adopted those recommendations and it continues to consider people on a case-by-case basis.
17. We note also that that the CPINs post-date most if not all the background material to which we were referred by Ms Stuart-King, drawing as it does from various other sources, and we therefore find that we can attach weight to their contents. The Foreign Policy Research Institute paper, The Rise and Fall of Afghanistan’s Local Defense Forces, dates from January 2025 and is the most recent document relied upon by the Appellant, but Ms Stuart-King did not refer us to any specific passages within it during the hearing and we find that its contents add little to the Appellant’s case.
18. Whist we accept that there has been an increase in the number of people needing humanitarian protection we accept also the evidence at 3.1.6 of the Fear of the Taliban CPIN that the situation is not so severe that a single adult male in good health is likely to face a real risk of harm. Insofar as it was argued that the Appellant has mental health issues, we reject that submission. The Appellant attended some counselling sessions against the background of him being found to be an unreliable witness; that is as high as the evidence goes. This is not a case in which the Appellant is saying that he is dependent upon medication which would not be available to him were he to be returned. In any event we remind ourselves of the agreed preserved facts which included the finding that the Appellant was “fit and healthy”.
19. We note the number of killings but, as we pointed out to Ms Stuart-King, based on the population of Kabul City of 880,592 cited at 8.3.8 of the CPIN Afghanistan version 3.0 August 2024 and the number of fatalities stated at paragraph 9 of the Appellant’s Skeleton Argument as a percentage of the population in Kabul such amounted to 0.034% in the year. She did not suggest the figure was otherwise. We note that there is food insecurity. We accept that there will be families that can scarcely “get by”. The background material paints a mixed picture but the Appellant, whom we were told came from a rural area, has not satisfied us that he cannot re-engage with his family (a preserved fact). He has not satisfied us that his family would not be able to provide for him. He has failed to satisfy us that he is not from one of those areas closer to Kabul which is less adversely affected in terms of food insecurity than many others (as to which see 8.3.7/8 of the Humanitarian situation CPIN). He has not satisfied us that he would not be able to find work with his family. The evidence does not point to no food but rather a scarcity causing prices to rise. That scarcity has in part been caused by climate change and drought resulting in crop failure but with the Appellant coming from a rural area it seems to us, and we so find, that the Appellant’s family on balance will be involved in food production if only subsistence farming. In making that finding, we have taken into account that the appellant has told Brent Social Services that before coming to the UK, he worked on his family’s land and was also a shepherd (see page 109 of the consolidated hearing bundle) and that he said in his asylum statement that his father was a farmer (page 147). It is to be remembered that the burden of proof is upon the Appellant and even allowing for the application of the lower standard he has failed to satisfy us that he would be unable to access his basic needs.
20. While the Appellant argues that we should depart from the country guidance case of AS (Safety of Kabul) Afghanistan CG, such a finding is unnecessary. This is case in which there are preserved findings of fact that the appellant does not have a well-founded fear of the Taliban or anyone else in Afghanistan for that matter. He also has family there, who we are satisfied likely remain on their farmland in Kunduz Province and can provide for him In the circumstances, we are satisfied that the Appellant can be expected to return to his family home: he does not need to remain in Kabul or relocate to another part of the country.
21. Pulling the various strands together whilst we recognise the difficulties and hardship faced by many in Afghanistan the Appellant has not satisfied us that he meets the test justifying entitlement to the relief sought.
22. Though Ms Stuart-King raised the possibility of article 8 being relevant we note that the findings with respect to that were to be preserved.
Notice of Decision
The Appellant’s appeal is dismissed on all grounds.

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

27 May 2025