Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-000200

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/50168/2024
LP/08533/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 27 January 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE O’BRIEN
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RHYS-DAVIES

Between

JMV
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr J Doerfel of Counsel
For the Respondent: Ms S Rushforth, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Cardiff Civil Justice Centre on 21 October 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant is a citizen of the Philippines born in 1984. She entered the United Kingdom on 27 February 2019 and claimed asylum on 22 May 2022. She claimed to fear persecution or serious harm from money lenders in the Philippines.

2. The respondent refused her claim on 12 October 2023. In short, the respondent accepted that the appellant had borrowed money from two individuals. However, she did not accept that the appellant was at real risk of serious from the money lenders. Alternatively, the respondent considered that the appellant would have sufficiency of protection or alternatively could reasonably relocate internally to avoid any risk.

3. The appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal (FtT) on 2 January 2024 on protection and human rights grounds. It appeared to the FtT that the appeal had been submitted out of time; however, it extended time in the interests of justice. The appeal was heard on 21 October 2024 and dismissed by the FtT Judge (‘the judge’) in a decision dated 26 November 2024. The judge accepted that the loan sharks’ threats amounted to ‘ill treatment’ [18], but that the appellant would have sufficiency of protection [19] and that she could reasonably and safely relocate internally within the Philippines [20]. As for the appellant’s case under Article 8 ECHR, the judge found that the appellant did not satisfy the Immigration Rules (implicitly if not explicitly from [22]) and that removal would not be disproportionate [27].

4. The appellant appealed to the Upper Tribunal on 9 December 2024. In grounds drafted by Counsel appearing before the judge, it was alleged that the judge erred as follows. In respect of his conclusions on Article 3 ECHR, the judge failed to take into account the fact that police warnings to the money lenders had had no effect, overlooked reputably sourced background material, and failed to take into account evidence of obstacles facing the appellant on return. The latter error had infected the judge’s conclusions under Article 8. In addition, the judge had applied the wrong test when considering her case within the Immigration Rules, and had failed to consider in any event whether obstacles could be avoided in the medium or long term. When considering Article 8 outside the Immigration Rules, the judge had failed to consider the public interest in retaining in the United Kingdom individuals on the occupation shortage list, and failed to make a finding on whether family life existed between the appellant and her mother-in-law. Finally, the judge had failed to consider whether there were exceptional and compassionate circumstances warranting a grant of discretionary leave.

5. Permission was granted by another FtT Judge, stating ‘the grounds of appeal as propounded are clearly arguable particularly in regard to the insurmountable/very significant test’.

Submissions

6. The parties each made oral submissions, in Mr Doerfel’s case supplementing his grounds of appeal. The respondent had not submitted a rule 24 response. Whilst we seek to summarise briefly the submissions below for ease of reading, we took a careful note of what was said and took the submissions into account in their entirety.

7. Mr Doerfel submitted that the appellant’s parents had continued to receive threats even after Police warnings to the money lenders. The judge had failed to take that evidence into account. The judge had before him a well-researched report published by a reputable source – an International Consortium of Investigative Journalists – contrary to the judge’s observations at [19]. When assessing reasonableness of relocation and obstacles to integration, the judge had failed to take into account evidence of age discrimination in the Philippines, the appellant’s debt burden and the appellant’s husband’s own long-term prospects in the Philippines. There was no evidence that the appellant’s family could support her. The judge had failed to take into account the public interest in retaining migrants in public health and/or shortage occupations and had failed to address how the Covid-19 pandemic had forced the appellant and her husband to remain in the United Kingdom beyond their planned return date.

8. Mr Doerfel accepted that the judge’s findings on sufficiency of protection and internal relocation were alternative grounds for dismissing the appeal and that there needed to be errors in both conclusions for the errors to be material. He also accepted that the appellant’s loan shark debts were not relevant to the question of internal relocation. He did, however, submit that the existence of legitimate business debts could properly constitute or contribute to the unreasonableness of relocation and/or to whether the appellant satisfied Appendix PL. At the exchange rate applicable at the date of the hearing, the appellant’s 800,000 peso bank amounted to £10,255 with a 12% interest rate applicable. Her ability to establish a new business would be very restricted whilst the debt remained unchanged. Mr Doerfel submitted that the issue of whether the appellant could restructure her debts was not raised before the judge.

9. Ms Rushforth submitted that the background evidence fell short of establishing insufficiency of protection, irrespective of the reputability of the sources. The judge did not appear to have been told that police warnings had been ineffective. He would, however, have been aware at the hearing on October 2024 that the last visits from the loan sharks was in February 2024. There was no error in the judge’s assessment of internal relocation. The judge made an unfortunate slip of the pen when dealing with PL5.1, but had in mind the correct test. There was no significant difference in any event between ‘very significant obstacles’ and ‘insurmountable obstacles’. There was no record of the appellant arguing that family life existed with her mother-in-law. The appellant’s contribution to British society was neutral at best in the balance (indeed, it undermined any suggestion she would be unable to work in the Philippines).

10. Mr Doerfel responded that the grounds set out clearly the errors in the judge’s reasoning. It was incorrect to say that ‘insurmountable obstacles’ denoted the same test as ‘very significant obstacles’. He was Counsel before the judge and would not mislead the Upper Tribunal regarding the submissions made at the hearing below

Consideration

11. The judge’s findings regarding sufficiency of protection are set out at [19]:

‘19. The Respondent submits that there is a sufficiency of protection in the Philippines. It is common ground that the Appellant’s father has not sought the protection of the police in the Philippines. During cross-examination the Appellant said that her husband’s family had also been threatened by the loan sharks due to their proximity to the Appellant’s family home. The Appellant said that her sister-in- law had gone to the police and they had said they would give a warning to the person who had made threats. The last visit from the loan shark was said to have been in February 2024. Mr Doerfel referred to background country evidence in the Supplementary Bundle as to a lack of sufficiency of protection. None of the articles or reports provided are from a named or reputable source. Bearing in mind that the Appellant’s sister-in-law was able to receive assistance from the police I find that the Appellant has not demonstrated that there would be an insufficiency of protection on return, even to the lower standard.’

12. The appellant complains that the judge failed to take into account that her sister’s complaint to the police, and consequential warning to the loan sharks, had not had a protective effect because threats had been made in February 2024, after the police warning. However, it is clear from the judge’s findings that he did expressly take into account those matters, and so the ground as pleaded fails.

13. It is argued that the judge overlooked relevant evidence, a report by Katie McQue entitled, ‘Philippine lenders and labor agents fleece workers seeking overseas jobs, interviews and confidential documents show’. The reason why we can be satisfied that the report was overlooked, it is said, is the judge’s view that none of the background evidence was from a named or reputable source, whereas this report was the product of the ‘International Consortium of Investigative Journalists’ (ICIJ). However, having expressly referenced the background evidence to which Mr Doerfel referred, we are not persuaded that the judge then overlooked one of the lengthiest articles within that evidence. As for criticism of the judge’s view that the article was not from a ‘named or reputable source’, we have been taken to no evidence of the reputability of the ICIJ to establish that the judge’s view of the sources was irrational.

14. As it is, the hearing took place on 21 October 2024, and there is no indication in the decision that the judge was told either that the appellant’s in-laws reported the threats in February 2024 or that there were any further threats thereafter. Insofar as the same is suggested, we are unpersuaded that the judge’s conclusions on sufficiency of protection were not reasonably open to him.

15. In any event, as accepted by Mr Doerfel, any error in the judge’s conclusions on sufficiency of protection could only be material if his findings on internal relocation were also erroneous. However, we do not find that they are for the following reasons (which apply equally to the appellant’s criticism’s of the judge’s findings on private life within the Immigration Rules).

16. The crux of the appellant’s criticism is twofold: a failure to take into account full evidence regarding age discrimination, the appellant’s debt burden and her husband’s long-term prospects; and, misapplying the test in PL5.1 (which it appears to be suggested is the applicable test for reasonableness of relocation).

17. The judge’s findings on internal relocation are found at [20]:

‘20. For completeness I have gone on to consider whether it would be reasonable to expect the Appellant and her husband to relocate in the Philippines. The loan sharks feared are non-state agents and the Appellant does not claim that they have links with the authorities. During the asylum interview the Appellant was asked about the prospect of relocating and her recorded answer was that ‘it’s too difficult to… transfer’. In the appeal statement the Appellant refers to the difficulty of avoiding social media and disclosing her whereabouts in the Philippines. In her appeal statement the Appellant refers to age discrimination in employment in the Philippines such that she and her husband would struggle to find work. The Appellant and her husband have other family members in the Philippines including their children and the Appellant’s siblings. Although the Appellant’s siblings have their own families I find that they could be relied on to provide initial support on return or in the event that the Appellant and her husband struggled to find work for a period of time, as was the case in the UK. In the circumstances I have no hesitation in concluding that internal relocation would be reasonable on the facts of this case.’

and his findings on obstacles to reintegration are found at [22]:

‘22. For similar reasons I find that there would not be insignificant obstacles for the Appellant on return. I accept that there may be some obstacles involved in moving to a new area but the Appellant would be able to relocate with her husband, they speak the language and they would be able to develop a private life on return. In those circumstances I find that the obstacles would not reach the threshold of insurmountable obstacles.’

18. It is clear that the judge expressly considered the appellant’s claims of age discrimination, and her debt with the loan sharks. As for the outstanding bank loans, we struggle to accept that they could arguably constitute or contribute to ‘very significant obstacles to integration’ for the purposes of the Immigration Rules or to the unreasonableness of relocation for the purposes of the Refugee Convention. That cannot have been the intention of Parliament or the drafters of the Refugee Convention, nor are we persuaded that it reflects the case law that Appendix PL (and its predecessor, paragraph 276ADE) was intended to codify. In any event, it is mere supposition to suggest that an outstanding bank loan of £10,255 (we are told) would prevent the appellant from re-establishing herself in business, such that it was not rationally open to the judge to find no very significant obstacles to reintegration and/or that relocation was not reasonably open to the appellant.

19. As it is, the evidence does not establish that the appellant would be unable to find work anywhere at the age of 40 (as she was at the date of the FtT hearing), and certainly it was rationally open to the judge not to accept that was the case. It is clear from [22] that he was persuaded the appellant and her husband would only need third-party support for a period of time. As for the appellant’s criticism of the judge’s finding that the couple could rely during that time on family support, it was for her to prove to the contrary, and it was rationally open to the judge to find (as he manifestly did) that she had not done so.

20. Turning to the test applicable under PL5.1, the judge directs himself correctly on the point at [8b]. It is true that he refers in [22] to the ‘threshold of insurmountable obstacles’. Mr Doerfel submits that this is a different and higher threshold. We are unpersuaded that that is so; the phrase ‘insurmountable obstacles’ as a term of art is found in EX.1(b) being applied to family life with a qualifying partner continuing outside the United Kingdom, and is defined in EX.2 thus:

‘the very significant difficulties which would be faced by the applicant or their partner in continuing their family life together outside the UK and which could not be overcome or would entail very serious hardship for the applicant or their partner.’

21. We find that there is no substantial difference between ‘insurmountable obstacles’ (as so defined) and ‘very significant obstacles’ to integration. In any event, the judge expressly found at [22] that there were no significant obstacles for the appellant on return and so, a fortiori, he found that there were no very significant obstacles to reintegration. We find that it is clear from reading the paragraph as a whole that his use of ‘insignificant’ was a manifest typographical error, which we have no doubt he would have corrected under the slip rule had it been brought to his attention.

22. Turning to Article 8 outside the Rules, the appellant complains that the judge failed to consider the public interest in allowing her to remain in the United Kingdom and failed to resolve her claim of family life with her mother-in-law (or failed to take that into account when assessing proportionality.

23. The first argument is without merit. Paragraphs 2 to 4 of the headnote to Thakrar (Cart JR; Art 8: value to community) [2018] UKUT 00336 (IAC) state as follows:

‘(2) Before concluding that submissions regarding the positive contribution made by an individual fall to be taken into account, for the purposes of Article 8(2) of the ECHR, as diminishing the importance to be given to immigration controls, a judge must be satisfied that the contribution is very significant. In practice, this is likely to arise only where the matter is one over which there can be no real disagreement. One touchstone for determining this is to ask whether the removal of the person concerned would lead to an irreplaceable loss to the community of the United Kingdom or to a significant element of it.

(3) The fact that a person makes a substantial contribution to the United Kingdom economy cannot, without more, constitute a factor that diminishes the importance to be given to immigration controls, when determining the Article 8 position of that person or a member of his or her family.

(4) If judicial restraint is not properly maintained in this area, there is a danger that the public’s perception of human rights law will be significantly damaged.’

24. Furthermore, at [115]-[117], the President of the Upper Tribunal said:

‘115. If judicial restraint is not properly maintained in this area, there is a danger that the public’s perception of human rights law will be adversely affected.

116. The following example is, perhaps, useful. Let us assume a judge is faced with two human rights appeals in respect of individuals whose situations are entirely the same, save for the fact that one is a bus driver and the other a brain surgeon. The judge might have his or her own view as to which occupation is of more value to the United Kingdom. But that view, alone, should not lead the judge to treat them differently under Article 8. Were the judge to do so, he or she would be seriously trespassing upon the respondent’s policy realm.

117. It must be emphasised that UE is binding authority that, in an appropriate case, the weight to be given to the importance of maintaining immigration control can be diminished by reason of the effect that the removal of the appellant from the United Kingdom would have upon the community. I have tried to identify what are the correct criteria for determining if the case is, in fact, an appropriate one.’

25. The appellant has worked in the United Kingdom as a carer. The judge expressly accepts that at [23]. However, he makes no findings on her contribution such that her removal from the United Kingdom could cause a loss to society of anywhere near the significance to influence the public interest, nor have we been taken to materials from which would could conclude that that the judge’s failure to make such findings was unreasonable.

26. That leaves the judge’s consideration of the appellant’s claimed family life with her mother-in-law. Mr Doerfel confirmed that he submitted such family life existed, and the respondent did not make any rule 24 response to the ground of appeal in question, nor ask for a transcript to be made of the closing submissions. In short, we are satisfied that Mr Doerfel did indeed submit in closing that the appellant, her husband and his mother enjoyed Article 8 family life together.

27. However, we are not satisfied that the judge proceeded on a contrary basis. We have found above that the judge made a typographical error in using ‘insignificant’ when he manifestly intended to use ‘significant’. We suspect that he similarly mistakenly inserted a ‘not’ into the operative sentence in [23], such that it was intended to read, ‘It was claimed that there are greater than normal emotional ties warranting a finding of family life between them.’ We are of this view, given the preceding sentence, ‘The appellant and her husband are supported by his mother in the UK’, which summarises the basis upon which Mr Doerfel indeed argues for the existence of family life.

28. It nevertheless remained open to the judge to reject the claimed family life, which he clearly did in the final sentence of [22], in which he said, ‘I find that the Appellant’s right to respect for her private life is engaged in this appeal.’ The only evidence before us on the issue is the appellant’s witness statement dated 29 May 2025, her supplementary witness statement of 19 October 2024 and the mother-in-law’s undated statement at p20 of the appellant’s original bundle.

29. In her first witness statement, the appellant says, ‘Currently, I am being supported by my mother-in-law and I have no other source of income…’. In her supplementary witness statement, the appellant in addition says, ‘My husband and I have been staying in his mother’s house here in the UK since we arrived. She has been supporting us ever since and provides her with accommodation, food, clothes, and other necessities that we might need.’ Her mother-in-law says:

‘We had been supporting [the appellant and her husband] since their arrival in the United Kingdom, and we continue to do so as they are the only family we had here in the U.K, my husband is already retired and 1 will be retiring in few more years. My Son…and his Wife…are only family that we have here in the UK and as their mother I had been longing for my children, 1 hope you find it in your heart the importance of having a family as I truly need them, Thank you so much for your kind consideration and understanding.’

30. As the Court of Appeal recently restated in IA & ors v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 1516, support is not in itself sufficient to establish the existence of family life, which requires further elements of financial and/or emotional dependency. By the time of the hearing, whilst the appellant, her husband and his parents appeared still to be living together, the appellant was working. It cannot be a said that rejection of claimed family life was irrational, perverse or unreasonable.

31. In any event, any error would in any event have been immaterial. At [27], the judge says:

‘27. The Appellant and her husband have overstayed in the UK. While they have family in the UK, they have two children in the Philippines and a wider family network. I find that there are no compelling considerations in favour of the Appellants remaining in the UK and I find that their removal would not amount to a disproportionate interference with their Article 8 ECHR rights.’

32. He clearly takes into account the appellant’s family in the United Kingdom before concluding that removal would nevertheless be proportionate. That was a decision unarguably open to the judge.

33. Dealing briefly with the submission that the judge failed to consider whether there were exceptional and compassionate circumstances warranting a grant of discretionary leave, it adds nothing to the challenge to the judge’s Article 8 assessment. Either the respondent’s decision was unlawful under s6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 or it was not. As we have found above, the judge was entitled to find that it was not.

34. For these reasons, the appeal fails and the judge’s decision stands.

Notice of Decision

1. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error, or alternatively any material error, of law.

2. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal stands undisturbed.

Sean O’Brien

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

20 January 2026