UI-2025-000211

• Status of case: Unreported
• Hearing date: 6 Jan 2026
• Promulgation date: 8 Feb 2026
• Publication date: 24 Feb 2026
• Last updated on: 24 Feb 2026

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-000211

First-tier Tribunal No:
[HU/01029/2024]

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 8th February 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RUDDICK

Between

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
and

BN
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr S. Vokes, instructed by Richard Nelson LLP
For the Respondent: Mr E. Terrell, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 6 January 2025

­Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.


DECISION AND REASONS
1. This decision is the remaking, under section 12 (2) (b) (ii) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, of a First-tier Tribunal (“FTT”) decision promulgated on 18 November 2024 but set aside by the Upper Tribunal (“UT”) in a decision promulgated on 27 August 2025.
2. It is accepted that the appellant was the victim of sexual offences as a child, and anonymity is therefore required under Section 1 of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992.
3. The Secretary of State for the Home Department (“SSHD”) is the appellant in these proceedings, because Mr BN succeeded in his appeal before the FTT and the SSHD was granted permission to appeal against the FTT’s decision. For ease of reference, however, I will refer to the parties as they were before the FTT. All further references to “the appellant” are to Mr BN and to “the respondent” are to the SSHD.
Background
4. The appellant is a citizen of Portugal and was born in Portugal in 1983. He came to the UK in June 1992, when he was nine years old, and he has lived in the UK ever since. The appellant came to the UK together with his younger brother, FN, to join his parents, who had moved to the UK for work two years before. They have all lived lawfully in the UK since their arrival, obtaining first permanent rights of residence under European law and then indefinite leave to remain under Appendix EU of the Immigration Rules.
5. On 7 February 2024, the respondent decided to deport the appellant under section 32(5) of the UK Borders Act 2007, because of very serious criminal offences he had committed in 2023. The appellant responded by making a human rights claim on 26 February 2024, and on 31 May 2024, the respondent refused that claim. The appellant now appeals against the refusal of his human rights claim. He says that he meets the test established by Parliament for when the public interest, exceptionally, does not require the deportation of a foreign criminal.
6. My role is to decide whether or not, on the facts of his individual case, the appellant meets the statutory requirements for being allowed to remain in the UK in spite of his criminal offending.
The hearing
7. At the hearing before me, all parties had sight of the following documents:
(i) The respondent’s bundle prepared for the error of law hearing before the UT, filed on 21 May 2025 (331 pages);
(ii) The UT’s decision of 27 August 2025 (11 pages);
(iii) The appellant’s bundle for the remaking hearing, filed on 17 October 2025 (259 pages);
(iv) The respondent’s skeleton argument for the remaking hearing, dated 18 November 2025 (6 pages);
(v) The respondent’s supplementary bundle, containing the evidence regarding social security rights in Portugal that she had relied on in the decision on appeal, filed on 25 November 2025 (61 pages);
(vi) An amended psychiatric report by Dr H. Al-Taiar, dated 25 November 2025 and filed on 9 December 2025 (41 pages). This supersedes his report of 25 September 2025, contained in the bundle of 17 October 2025; and
(vii) An addendum psychiatric report by Dr H. Al-Taiar, dated 9 December 2025 and filed on 16 December 2025 (20 pages).
8. Mr BN was present by videolink and his parents, brother and other relatives were present in person. However, the parties informed me that it had been agreed that the appeal would proceed by submissions only, because the only evidence before me that had not been before the FTT were the documents listed at (v)-(vii) above. The appellant’s brother FN spoke up once during the hearing to correct what he considered to be a misstatement of fact by Mr Terrell, but I reminded him that it was Mr Vokes’ role to respond to Mr Terrell. I have disregarded FN’s submission.
9. After agreeing on which of the FTT’s factual findings had been preserved, as set out at [25] below, the parties addressed me on whether the FTT’s legal finding that there were no “very significant obstacles” to the appellant’s reintegration in Portugal was also preserved. I consider those submissions at [18]-[20] below.
10. I then heard thorough and thoughtful submissions first from Mr Terrell and then from Mr Vokes, for which I am grateful. I do not set them out here, but I have taken them into account and I will refer to them, where relevant, in my discussion below.
Legal framework
11. The legal framework of this appeal is that established by Parliament in Sections 117B and 117C of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. Part 13 of the Immigration Rules mirrors the statute in all respects relevant to this appeal.
12. Section 117B sets out “public interest considerations applicable in all cases.” The considerations that are relevant here are that
“(1) The maintenance of effective immigration controls is in the public interest;
“(2) It is in the public interest, and in particular in the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom, that persons who seek to enter or remain in the United Kingdom are able to speak English […].
“(3) It is in the public interest, and in particular in the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom, that persons who seek to enter or remain in the United Kingdom are financially independent […].
“(4) Little weight should be given to—
“(a) a private life […]
“that is established by a person at a time when the person is in the United Kingdom unlawfully.
“(5) Little weight should be given to a private life established by a person at a time when the person's immigration status is precarious.”
13. At section 117C, Parliament set out the “additional consideration in cases involving foreign criminals”:
“(1) The deportation of foreign criminals is in the public interest.
“(2) The more serious the offence committed by a foreign criminal, the greater is the public interest in deportation of the criminal.
“(3) In the case of a foreign criminal (“C”) who has not been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of four years or more, the public interest requires C's deportation unless Exception 1 or Exception 2 applies.
“(4) Exception 1 applies where—
(a) C has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of C's life,
(b) C is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom, and
(c) there would be very significant obstacles to C's integration into the country to which C is proposed to be deported.”
“(5) Exception 2 applies where C has a genuine and subsisting relationship with a qualifying partner, or a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a qualifying child, and the effect of C's deportation on the partner or child would be unduly harsh.
“(6) In the case of a foreign criminal who has been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least four years, the public interest requires deportation unless there are very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2.”
14. This statute sets out a complete code, within which I must make my decision. In doing so, I must be guided by the decisions of the senior courts, wherever relevant.
Exception 1
15. Exception 2 cannot apply in this case because the appellant has no children and he does not at present have a partner. He says, however, that he meets Exception 1.
16. Even if the appellant is able to establish that he meets Exception 1, he cannot succeed for this reason alone, because he has been sentenced to more than four years’ imprisonment. I am nonetheless required to determine whether he meets Exception 1 as a necessary step in the analysis of whether there are very compelling circumstances “over and above” those it describes: Kapikanya v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 987 at [42].
17. The respondent accepts that the appellant has lived in the UK lawfully for most of his life and that he is socially and culturally integrated in the UK. It is the respondent’s view, however, that there are no very significant obstacles to his reintegration in Portugal. This was also the finding of the FTT. The UT’s decision did not specifically preserve this finding.
18. I heard preliminary submissions from the parties on the issue of whether I should make my own finding on whether Exception 1 was met. Mr Vokes’ submitted that I must do so, because I had updating evidence before me that had not been before the FTT. Mr Terrell initially argued in his skeleton argument that I should treat the FTT’s finding as preserved, because the appellant had not previously challenged it before the UT (although it is not clear how he could have done so, as he had won before the FTT and therefore had no grounds to bring a cross-appeal) . At the hearing before me, he accepted that it was open to me to make my own finding on this issue, but suggested that I should do so in accordance with the principles set out in Devaseelan.
19. I consider that more relevant guidance can be found in AB (preserved FtT findings; Wisniewski principles) Iraq [2020] UKUT 268 (IAC). Having reviewed that guidance, I consider that it is right for me to come to my own decision about whether Exception 1 is met. This is for several reasons. First, if the UT decides to remake a decision, it is for the UT to decide the nature and scope of the hearing that is required for that purpose: ([15] citing Sarkar v SSHD [2014] EWCA Civ 195 at [37]). The UT did not make a decision on this issue on 27 August 2025, and the decision therefore remains for me to make.
20. Secondly, the finding in question is not one of “pure fact”; it involves the application of a legal standard to a set of facts. The FTT did not err in making the findings of fact it did, on the basis of the evidence before it. Nor did it err in its application of the test of “very significant obstacles to integration” to those factual findings. It is trite, however, that human rights cases must be decided on the basis of the facts as at the date of decision and having taken into account all relevant evidence. I have evidence before me that was not before the FTT, filed in accordance with Rule 15(2A) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008. That evidence is directly relevant to the very significant obstacles to integration question. It would make little sense for me to take that evidence into account, as I must, but to nonetheless consider myself bound by the FTT’s answer to that question.
21. Answering the question of whether there would be very significant obstacles to the appellant’s reintegration in Portugal requires a broad evaluative judgment of whether he will have “a reasonable opportunity to be accepted there, to be able to operate on a day-to-day basis in that society and to build up within a reasonable time a variety of human relationships to give substance to his private or family life.”: Kamara v SSHD [2016] EWCA Civ 813 at [14]. The threshold is “self-evidently elevated […] such that mere hardship, mere difficulty, mere hurdles and mere upheaval or inconvenience, even where multiplied, will generally be insufficient.”: Parveen v SSHD [2018] EWCA Civ 932 at [9] (citing Treebhawon v SSHD [2017] UKUT 13 (IAC) at [37]). There must be specific factors that “prevent or seriously inhibit” integration Ackom (aka Bonsu) v SSHD [202] EWCA Civ 537 at [22] (emphasis in the original).
22. The analysis must be fact-sensitive. There is no checklist of relevant factors, but in Ackom Lady Justice Andrews (with whom Lord Justices Nugee and Newey agreed) set out helpful guidance. Factors that may be significant include the appellant’s “good health, the ability to work, academic abilities, ability to adapt to the local culture, and robustness of character”: [22]. In some cases, the cumulative effect of “a lack of ties with the country of destination, no familiarity with that country, no friends or family there to help with integration, and an inability to speak the language” may create very significant obstacles to integration ([45]), but such factors cannot be determinative. It is essential to take into account not only the “nature and character of the individual concerned” but also all relevant evidence about the country of destination: [46]. The latter may include evidence of any significant social and cultural similarities (or differences) between that country and the UK, how widespread knowledge of the English language is there, and the society’s openness to outsiders (See, generally [35]-[41], in which Andrews LJ sets out the evidence about Germany that the respondent said the FTT had failed to take into account). It is also necessary to take into account “any reasonable step that could be taken avoid or mitigate the obstacles identified”: [42] This may include accessing public benefits or services that might be available to the appellant to assist his reintegration (such as welfare benefits to prevent destitution). Finally, it is necessary to recognise that something more is required than a long absence from the receiving country and the impediments to employment and integration created by a history criminal offending and imprisonment, because in that case Exception 1 would always be met (on the basis of section 117C(4)(a) alone): [47].
23. The appellant in Ackom was a citizen of Germany, and this appellant is a citizen of Portugal. As Mr Terrell clarified at the hearing before me, however, it is not the respondent’s position that Ackom established a legal presumption against the existence of very significant obstacles to reintegration into European countries. What it does is require is that decision-makers take into account not only the specific evidence before them (such as of the existence of a social welfare system: [47]), but also that, more generally, life in European counties “is not so different from life in the UK.”: [46]
Very compelling circumstances
24. Section 117C(6) applies in this case because the appellant was sentenced to more than four years’ imprisonment. The key principles governing the application of this statutory test are set out in the leading case of HA (Iraq) v SSHD [2022] UKSC 22. I summarise those principles as follows:
(i) The “very compelling circumstances test requires a full proportionality assessment to be carried out, weighing the interference with the rights of the potential deportee and his family to private and family life under article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) against the public interest in his deportation.”: [5]
(ii) The threshold of “very compelling circumstances” is “appropriately high” and only a “very strong claim indeed” can succeed: [48]-[49].
(iii) The threshold can be met either by showing that one of the exceptions is met and that there are “especially compelling” factors, going “well beyond what would be necessary” to meet that exception, or by taking into account factors relevant to the exceptions “in conjunction with other factors”: [50].
(iv) The “relevant factors will include”:
(a) the nature and seriousness of the offence committed by the applicant;
(b) the length of the applicant’s stay in the country from which he or she is to be expelled;
(c) the time elapsed since the offence was committed and the applicant’s conduct during that period;
(d) the nationalities of the various persons concerned;
(e) the applicant’s family situation, such as the length of the marriage, and other factors expressing the effectiveness of a couple’s family life;
(f) whether the spouse knew about the offence at the time when he or she entered into a family relationship;
(g) whether there are children of the marriage, and if so, their age; and
(h) the seriousness of the difficulties which the spouse is likely to encounter in the country to which the applicant is to be expelled …
(i) the best interests and well-being of the children, in particular the seriousness of the difficulties which any children of the applicant are likely to encounter in the country to which the applicant is to be expelled; and
(j) the solidity of social, cultural and family ties with the host country and with the country of destination: [51]
(v) In assessing the nature and seriousness of the offence, a decision-maker should take into account all relevant factors. These will include, but are not limited to, the sentence imposed. It is important to recognise that the sentence may have been reduced for reasons related to the offender rather than to the seriousness of the offence, such as an early guilty plea, any previous offending, or caring responsibilities. The impact on society as a whole is likely to be relevant, but care must be taken to avoid double counting, as this is also reflected in the sentence: [66]-[71].
(vi) Rehabilitation is capable of being a relevant factor, but the amount of weight to be given to rehabilitation in any particular case will be fact-sensitive. It will generally be of little weight, because it will “normally do no more than show that the individual has returned to the place where society expects him (and everyone else) to be.” It would be wrong, however, to treat it as never being capable of playing a significant role. In particular:
“Where a tribunal is able to make an assessment that the foreign criminal is unlikely to re-offend, that is a factor which can carry some weight in the balance when considering very compelling circumstances.”
This is because it reduces the weight of one public interest factor that weighs in favour of the deportation of foreign criminals, namely the protection of the public from future offending: [58] See also: [119]
(vii) Rehabilitation cannot reduce other important elements of the public interest in deportation, in particular, “wider policy considerations of deterrence and public concern.”: [58]
Findings of fact
Preserved findings
25. As agreed at the hearing before me, in its decision of 27 August 2025, the UT preserved all of the factual findings set out at [18] of the FTT’s decision. These were:
(i) The appellant entered the United Kingdom in 1992 when he was nine years old. The evidence of the appellant, his brother and his mother had been “clear and consistent” about this.
(ii) The appellant has been resident in the United Kingdom since 1992, attending primary and secondary school and university here.
(iii) His residence has always been lawful.
(iv) The appellant has his parents and younger brother, FN, in the United Kingdom. The appellant’s father, JN, works as a chef. JN has suffered two strokes, but is still working. The appellant’s mother, LN, works as a cleaner. FN works for a charity. FN has his own family. “None of this evidence was disputed” by the respondent’s representative below.
(v) The appellant has worked variously at McDonald’s, at a bank, as a facilities manager at a hospital, as a senior account manager at two different companies, in financial services and in energy recruitment. Most recently, he had a recruitment consultancy business, but at the time of the appeal to the FTT, that business was dormant. “[N]one of this evidence was disputed”.
(vi) The appellant has an ex-partner, S, with whom he had been in a relationship for four years. That relationship ended in January 2024. S has two children. The appellant was “very open about this in his evidence.”
(vii) The appellant has no friends or family in Portugal.
(viii) The appellant and his family own no property in Portugal.
(ix) However, the appellant has visited Portugal regularly since childhood.
(x) The appellant’s parents have also visited Portugal regularly.
(xi) The appellant speaks Portuguese fluently.
(xii) The appellant, his brother and his mother had been “very candid” in their evidence about their various ties to Portugal.
(xiii) The appellant has struggled with his mental health. Before his criminal sentencing, the appellant was assessed by Dr Arvind Kumar Gupta, a consultant general adult psychiatrist, as being “extremely vulnerable” with “a traumatic upbringing” and presenting with “poor mental state [and] anxiety”.
(xiv) At the time of the hearing before the FTT, the appellant was not receiving any treatment for his mental health but had been attending group therapy and well-being courses in prison and had been focussing on practising stoicism. The appellant’s candour was again noted.
The appellant’s offence
26. In December 2023, the appellant pleaded guilty to two very serious criminal offences, which he had committed earlier that year: bomb hoax – place article with intent and robbery. He was sentenced to 16 months for the first offence and 63 months for the second, to run concurrently.
27. I have read the sentencing remarks with care and taken them into account in their entirety. I set out what I consider the most material aspects of them here.
28. The appellant entered a bank branch wearing a mask, a hood and reflective sunglasses. He approached the counter and put an A4 piece of paper against the glass that said, “Put the money in the bag. I have a bomb.” He then repeated this threat orally. He placed a clear container on the counter. It contained a black cylinder that was not a bomb but was designed to look like one. The bank cashier who saw it believed it was real. She handed over £5,000 from her till to the appellant, who placed the money in his rucksack. He then told her that there was another bomb by the front door, which would go off in 20 minutes, and that after 20 minutes, she could call the police. He left the branch, got into his own car, and drove away. The police were called and the branch was evacuated. The police identified the appellant from CCTV footage of him getting into his own car. He was located at his home, where he was arrested. He made an immediate and full confession.
29. The sentencing judge (”the Judge”) applied the sentencing guidelines for “street robbery” or “less sophisticated commercial robbery,
“because there evidently was planning in this case and the targeting of the commercial business, but it was also largely unsophisticated in terms of its execution and the ease with which you were then detected and detained.”
30. She assessed his culpability as high, because he had produced an imitation bomb with the intention of threatening very serious violence. The Judge noted the medical evidence in which the appellant was assessed as “an extremely vulnerable individual”. This did not reduce his culpability, however, because according to the medical evidence,
“whilst you were under a lot of pressure or stress at a time of this offending, there is no evidence your mental health was compromised to the point you did not know what you were doing, and no evidence to suggest that you suffered a full or partial collapse of your mental health, such that it impacted on your intent.
The Judge also noted, “in fairness” to the appellant, that he had not suggested that his culpability was reduced because of his mental ill health.
31. The Judge then assessed the harm caused by the offence as “serious psychological harm”, rejecting the submission of both the prosecution and defence that the harm was only “medium”. Two cashiers had written witness statements saying that they had believed the bomb was real and that they had thought they were going to die. Both had described the ongoing adverse impacts on them -- emotionally, physically, socially and professionally -- of the terror they had experienced.
32. The Judge identified two aggravating features: the degree of planning, as indicated by the wearing of a disguise and the preparation of the note and the imitation bomb, and the targeting of premises “where large sums of cash are capable of being stored, albeit […] that the amount actually taken was limited to just under £5,000”. These were “outweighed”, however, by the following mitigating factors:
“importantly, […] you are a man with no previous convictions or cautions prior to this offending, and that is something that weighs heavily in your favour. And I have read the many character references that had been uploaded on your behalf by friends and family, by people who know you well and speak of a very different person to the man that committed this offence. And I also take into account all that is said in those psychiatric and psychological reports about the trauma that you experienced in your childhood and the impact that has had on your mental wellbeing, including emotional deregulation, anxiety and impaired social cognition, [with regard to] all of which, in due course, you will benefit from a therapeutic intervention.
“I take into account, also, that this being your first remand and, certainly, at the time of your remand, there were some concerns about your mental health and self-harm. I also accept that this offending is out of character, as evidenced by your background, and it was an extreme reaction to you finding yourself in debt and your personal circumstances at the time. And I bear in mind that this is your first experience of custody and I do not underestimate how difficult that would have been for you [...] And I take into account that you have been, by all accounts, a model prisoner; you have engaged in the prison regime, you are engaging well, you are supportive of others, you are seemingly a trusted prisoner and undertaking work to improve yourself. And alongside that, I take into account the letter that you yourself have written to me and I thank you for that. I do accept that your remorse of this offending is genuine.”
33. Taking into account the relevant sentencing guidelines, the degree of culpability, the harm caused, and the aggravating and mitigating factors, the Judge took a sentence of seven years for the robbery and two years on the bomb hoax as the starting point after trial. The sentenced imposed was then reduced by 25% because of the appellant’s guilty plea.
34. Following the guidance set out in HA (Iraq) at [60]-[71], I take the sentence imposed as a key indicator of the seriousness of the offence, but not the only indicator. “Any evidence” that bears on the nature and seriousness of the offence is relevant. This does not include the appellant’s guilty plea, even though it led to a significant reduction in in his sentence. This may be relevant to rehabilitation, but not to the seriousness of the underlying offence. I find that the same is true for other mitigating factors taken into account by the sentencing judge in this case, such as the appellant’s conduct in prison and his expressions of remorse.
35. I find on the basis of this evidence that this was clearly a very serious offence. If not for the appellant’s guilty plea, it would have attracted a lengthy sentence of seven years for the robbery and two years for the bomb hoax, and even the starting point of seven years took into account factors related to the offender rather than the offence, such as his previous good character and his remorse. The appellant’s actions caused serious psychological harm to at least two identified victims, as well as physical harm to one of them, because the resulting insomnia exacerbated a serious underlying health condition. It is also likely to have caused some psychological harm to other members of the public who were caught up in the bomb scare.
36. For these reasons, I consider that the appellant’s offences were very serious indeed.
The appellant’s mental health
37. There are three psychiatric reports before me. The first was completed by Dr. A.K. Gupta in October 2023, at the instruction of the appellant’s criminal solicitors. Dr Gupta was asked to address three questions:
(i) The appellant’s fitness to plead and stand trial;
(ii) “Whether, for legal purposes, the Defendant [now, the appellant] may have been ‘insane’ at the time of acting;
(iii) Whether a hospital order was “an appropriate mechanism for case disposal.”
38. I put weight on this report. The author’s relevant expertise and experience is set out in detail, and the report is balanced and well-structured and contains all required self-directions about the author’s independence and his duty to the court. That independence is reflected in Dr Gupta’s clear finding that the appellant was in control of his actions and was unlikely to have been suffering from any acute episode of mental illness at the time of the offence. Moreover, the sentencing Judge appears to have accepted its findings, and the respondent has raised no criticisms of it.
39. Other than the second question – which Dr Gupta answered in the negative – the specific questions Dr Gupta was asked to address are not directly relevant to the legal issues in this appeal. I nonetheless consider some of Dr Gupta’s findings relevant to the issues before me, in particular, to the appellant’s propensity to reoffend and his capacity for reintegration in Portugal.
40. Dr Gupta recorded that the appellant had disclosed to him that while living with his grandmother in Portugal (after his parents relocated to the UK), he had been sexually abused by a relative for a period of two years. This had had a significant, long-term impact on his mental health. Among other things, it had led to difficulties maintaining relationships and a deep sense of insecurity. He also described “significant interpersonal difficulties”, which “often led to misunderstandings, arguments and falling out with people.” He carried “perceived and anticipated feelings of rejection and abandonment” as well as “mistrust in people”.
41. Dr Gupta was not instructed to provide a medical diagnosis, but in the course of considering the appellant’s fitness to stand trial, he assessed the appellant as “extremely vulnerable” and his mental state as “poor”. In terms of treatment, he recommended:
(i) medication for agitation and anxiety and sleep disturbance;
(ii) psychoeducation related to dysfunctional personality traits;
(iii) “DBT [dialectical behaviour therapy] skills aimed at improving emotional distress, emotional dysregulation, mindfulness, and inter-personal effectiveness”; and
(iv) Engagement in meaningful and socially inclusive activities.
42. Such treatment would need to be provided in a supportive and validating environment, but this could be either in prison or in the community. Dr Gupta concluded that if the appellant engaged in treatment, his prognosis was good.
43. The other two reports before me were completed by Dr H. Al-Taiar. The respondent has raised significant concerns about the reliability of these reports, both in her skeleton argument of 18 November 2025 and in Mr Terrell’s submissions before me. I therefore begin by setting out my reasons for putting weight on them.
44. I begin my analysis with a consideration of the final, amended version of Dr Al-Taiar’s main psychiatric report, dated 25 November 2025. Both parties agreed at the outset of the hearing that this superseded the first version of the same report, dated 25 September 2025. However, I have taken into account the respondent’s criticisms of the 25 September 2025 report wherever relevant to my decision about what weight to put on the two later reports.
45. In her skeleton argument of 18 November 2025, the respondent raised the following criticisms of the 25 September 2025 report:
(i) Dr Al-Taiar did not appear to have seen the FTT determination; this was significant, as he did not appear to be aware that the appellant had regularly visited Portugal and had admitted in oral evidence that he spoke Portuguese fluently;
(ii) The conclusion that deportation to Portugal would be retraumatising was “difficult to reconcile” with the fact that the appellant had visited Portugal regularly prior to his offence;
(iii) The accuracy of the diagnosis of complex PTSD was undermined by the fact of the appellant’s visits to Portugal and by Dr Al-Taiar’s “failure to engage” with Dr Gupta’s report. This was significant because “Dr Gupta does not suggest in their report that the Appellant was presenting any symptoms of PTSD.”
(iv) The expert’s diagnosis was “unpersuasive” because he failed to consider whether the appellant’s symptoms could be attributable to alternative or lesser diagnoses. Here, the respondent makes two specific complaints. First, that the appellant’s tendency to sabotage intimate relationships could in theory be attributable to anxiety, and that his sense of guilt for his parents’ long journeys to visit him in prison is “perfectly rational” and not a symptom of what the respondent calls “over-blaming” (Dr Al-Taiar’s term is “self-blame”).
46. On 20 November 2025, applying the principles set out in TUI UK Ltd v Griffiths [2023] UKSC 48, the Upper Tribunal adjourned the appeal in order to give Dr Al-Taiar an opportunity to respond to these criticisms. He did so in an addendum report dated 9 December 2025.
47. With regard to his failure to consider the FTT determination, Dr Al-Taiar acknowledged that the documents listed in the 25 September 2025 report related to a different client altogether and apologised for the administrative error. He stated, however, that this had not affected the body of his report, which had been based entirely on materials related to this appellant. I accept that this is the case. The names and dates for the documents listed in the 25 September 2025 bear no relation to this appellant, and there is no further reference to them anywhere in the body of the report. Everything in the body of the report relates to this appellant only, in considerable detail, and there is no further indication that material has been cut and pasted from a generic template.
48. In the revised version of the report, Dr Al-Taiar does confirm that he has had sight of all of the materials in the FTT and UT bundles (which includes Dr Gupta’s report and recent medical records) and of the FTT determination. I have no reason to doubt the veracity of this statement. This is not, however, a complete answer to the respondent’s criticisms, which point to specific facts (the appellant’s fluency in Portuguese and frequent travel to Portugal) and evidence (Dr Gupta’s report) which Dr Al-Taiar had not expressly considered.
49. Dr Al-Taiar has considerable experience that is directly relevant to the issues in this appeal, and this weighs in favour of accepting his conclusions. He is a Consultant Forensic Psychiatrist and has been employed by the Oxford Health NHS Foundation Trust since 2016. He works in a Medium Secure Unit, and he currently provides specialist mental health care to forensic patients and expert witness opinions for the Parole Board as well as HM Tribunals. He is a medical member of the HM Tribunal Service, and will therefore be aware of his duty this Tribunal. He has also set out in appropriate terms his awareness of that duty and the various rules under which it arises.
50. Dr Al-Taiar’s report also contains evidence of his independence. He does not minimise the appellant’s culpability for his criminal offending ([7.2]-[7.3]). He also makes several findings that could support the respondent’s position that the appellant would be able to reintegrate in Portugal. These include that the appellant’s “educational and occupational history demonstrates intelligence, capability, and adaptability” ([6.5]) and that since the offence he has made “demonstrable progress in developing skills to stabilise affect and manage stress”: [8.4]. Nor is there any evidence of exaggeration. In his detailed account of the examination of 19 September 2025, for example, Dr Al-Taiar describes the appellant’s behaviour as “socially appropriate at all times” [10.1], and his responses as “relevant, goal-directed, and fluent, with no pressure of speech, thought blocking, or evidence of formal thought disorder”: [10.2]. The appellant is recorded as denying any thoughts of self-harm [10.4] and his mental state is assessed as “stable” [10.8].
51. I find that Dr Al-Taiar’s conclusions are well-reasoned. They are based on the application of recognised diagnostic criteria to the account of the appellant’s personal history, as set out by the appellant and his family members in their statements and essentially unchallenged. This approach can be seen, for example, at [5.3], in which he applies a specific paragraph of the ICD-11 (International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems) to the appellant’s account of childhood sexual abuse and at [6.4], where he specifically finds that the appellant’s account of his difficulties in maintaining intimate relationships in adulthood is consistent with recognised “relational sequelae of early trauma”. Similarly, he sets out how the appellant’s personal history and behaviour during the assessment were consistent with specific details of the diagnostic criteria in the IDC-11: [11.1]-[11.7]. He does not accept the appellant’s concerns about return to Portugal at face value, but instead assesses them as “consistent with his psychiatric formulation” [9.4] and with psychiatric knowledge about PTSD [11.27]. Similarly, he links the appellant’s description of his emotional reaction to incarceration to “core features of both depression and complex PTSD”: [11.15].
52. I find that the respondent’s criticisms of Dr Al-Taiar’s diagnosis of complex PTSD are misconceived. The respondent raises no specific criticisms of Dr Al-Taiar’s qualifications as an expert, nor with his methodology (other than his failure to take into account the FTT determination and Dr Gupta’s report). The appellant’s account of the traumatic events that are at the heart of the diagnosis (family separation and subsequent prolonged sexual abuse in childhood) was accepted by Dr Gupta and, implicitly, by the sentencing judge, who referred to Dr Gupta’s description of his “traumatic upbringing”. Nor has it been challenged by the respondent at any time.
53. Mr Terrell does not set out any personal expertise that qualifies him to assess the consistency of specific behaviours with a diagnosis of PTSD. Nor, in the absence of personal expertise, does he rely on any independent professional sources in support of his proposed alternative diagnoses. He merely asserts, without expertise of his own and without supporting evidence (expert or otherwise), that certain specific behaviours could be viewed in a different light.
54. Moreover, as noted above, Dr Al-Taiar explains his diagnosis with reference to a detailed personal history, covering roughly three decades and describing patterns of behaviour with his family, his intimate partners, and at work. Mr Terrell has extracted two specific behaviours from this detailed portrait and argued that each, viewed in isolation, could be found not to support a diagnosis of complex PTSD. I prefer Dr Al-Taiar’s methodology, which is to view the appellant’s patterns of behaviour over time, and with reference to well-established and internationally recognised diagnostic criteria.
55. I find, however, that there is some force to the respondent’s criticism of Dr Al-Taiar’s view that the appellant would be retraumatised by returning to the “geographical context” in which he had experienced sustained sexual abuse as a child. I recognise that the concern that return to Portugal would be retraumatising was not speculative, but rather was based on his medical expertise:
“For an individual with complex PTSD, re-exposure to the setting of abuse is recognised as a potent trigger for intrusive memories, heightened arousal, and emotional dysregulation.”: [11.27]
Nonetheless, this statement is nothing more than a summary of expert opinion about what may happen to “an individual with complex PTSD”. I consider that in deciding whether something that may generally happen to “an individual” was likely to happen to this appellant, the fact of his regular visits to Portugal was sufficiently relevant that it had to be considered.
56. Dr Al-Taiar responded to this criticism at [5.6] of his addendum report by distinguishing past visits, which were “holiday visits undertaken in the presence of family”, from the likely experience of deportation. The latter would not only be “involuntary and permanent”, but the appellant (as was also found by the FTT) would be without family support. He would experience feelings of “[l]ack of agency, loss of attachment anchors, [and] re-exposure to trauma-associated cues” which would “substantially heighten the risk of destabilisation”: [5.16]
57. Although it would have been better if Dr Al-Taiar had addressed the appellant’s visits to Portugal in his initial report, I am satisfied that they have been adequately addressed when the two reports are read together. Even in the first report, Dr Al-Taiar’s concerns about the appellant’s removal to Portugal were not based primarily on return to “geographical context” of the abuse, but more on the similarities between the past and future familial context. As summarised at [11.24]:
“Separation from his immediate family, whether by deportation or long-term exclusion, would have severe and destabilising consequences for [the appellant’s] mental health. His psychiatric disorders, recurrent depression, generalised anxiety disorder, and complex PTSD, are closely tied to themes of abandonment, loss, and self-blame. Forced removal would echo the circumstances of his early childhood, when he was separated from his parents while they settled in the UK, a period during which he was subjected to sustained sexual abuse by relatives. Clinically, the risk of retraumatisation in this context is high: deportation would recreate the conditions of isolation and dislocation under which his trauma first occurred, magnifying feelings of helplessness and guilt.”
The return to the “geographical context” of the abuse is mentioned briefly afterwards, and “in addition”: [11.27].
58. As to Dr Al-Taiar’s failure to take into account the FTT’s finding that the appellant is “fluent in Portuguese”, I find that his description of the appellant’s command of Portuguese is nuanced, detailed, and not inconsistent with this far briefer finding of the FTT. Dr Al-Taiar notes that the appellant “retains the ability speak Portuguese” but “his proficiency is weaker than in English, which is his dominant language for thought, communication and daily life.” Elsewhere, he describes the appellant’s “functional Portuguese, although serviceable” as “considerably weaker than his English, which has been his dominant language since childhood.” This is entirely consistent with the detailed evidence of the appellant’s education that is before me. As early as 1993, school reports describe his efforts to “master the English language” and note that he “now writes all his work in English instead of Portuguese”. In secondary school, he studied English and French, but not Portuguese.
59. Finally, with regard to the failure to engage with Dr Gupta’s report, I agree with what Dr Al-Taiar says in his addendum report. There is nothing in Dr Gupta’s report that undermines Dr Al-Taiar’s conclusions. Both doctors’ reports are broadly consistent with regard to the appellant’s history of trauma and its psychiatric sequelae. Where the two reports differ is as to their timing and, more significantly, the questions they address. As set out above, Dr Gupta was asked to comment on the appellant’s fitness to plead and stand trial, whether he was legally “insane” at the time of the offence and whether a hospital order was an appropriate mechanism for case disposal. He was not asked to make a specific diagnosis with reference to the ISM-11, and he did not do so, but the respondent has not pointed to anything in his report inconsistent with a diagnosis of complex PTSD. In his response, moreover, Dr Al-Taiar has pointed to specific symptoms described by Dr Gupta that are consistent with a PTSD diagnosis.
60. I therefore conclude that I should put considerable weight on Dr Al-Taiar’s report and I accept his diagnosis and conclusions as more likely than not to be accurate.
61. Dr Al-Taiar has diagnosed the appellant as suffering from recurrent depressive disorder (ICD-11 classification 6A71), generalised anxiety disorder (ICD-11 classification 6B00), and complex post-traumatic stress disorder (ICD-11 classification 6B41) ([11.1]) and expressed the opinion that the interplay of these conditions “significantly reduces his resilience and capacity to cope with stress.”: [11.10] There is also a clinically significant interplay between his mental and physical ill health, in particular hypertension. The section of the report entitled “Impact of Current Mental and medical Health Conditions” concludes at [11.12]:
“The cumulative effect of these combined conditions is substantial. They impair his emotional wellbeing, leaving him prone to guilt, hopelessness, and diminished motivation. They interfere with his daily functioning, limiting his ability to concentrate, sustain energy, and manage routine tasks without difficulty. They also reduce his psychological resilience, meaning that he requires consistent family support and structured environments to maintain stability.”
Rehabilitation
62. I find that the respondent’s decision is not based on the risk that the appellant will reoffend. In the decision of 31 May 2024, the respondent set out the Judge’s sentencing remarks at length. She then noted the serious impact that the offence had had on the two cashiers, as described in those remarks.
63. The respondent’s identification of the public interest in deportation began with generally applicable principles:
“The Secretary of State is of the opinion that, in a case of automatic deportation, full account must be taken of the strong public interest in removing foreign citizens convicted of serious offences, which lies not only in the prevention of further offences on the part of the individual concerned, but in deterring others from committing them in the first place. Deportation of foreign criminals expresses society’s condemnation of serious criminal activity and promotes public confidence in the treatment of foreign citizens who have committed them.
“Furthermore, the public interest in deportation of those who commit serious crimes goes well beyond depriving the offender in question from the chance to re-offend in this country: it extends to deterring and preventing serious crime generally and to upholding public abhorrence of such offending.”
64. With regard to this particular appellant, she concluded:
“Your offence is one which was noted as serious by the sentencing Judge, and it is contended that its nature and seriousness make deportation appropriate as a mark of public disapproval and the protection of public order by the deterrent effect on others.”
65. In a separate section of the refusal decision entitled “Rehabilitation”, the respondent wrote,
“You have stated that you are very remorseful, and this was also accepted by sentencing judge. We do accept that you are remorseful. However, it is not considered that the fact that you might be rehabilitated outweighs the public interest in your removal given the seriousness of your offence.”
66. When the letter is read as a whole, it is clear that the public interests in deportation identified by the respondent in this case were primarily, if not exclusively, deterrence, expressing public abhorrence and upholding public confidence in the immigration system. The protection of the public against future harm played little or no role, on the particular facts of this case.
67. In his submissions before me, Mr Terrell described the appellant’s offence as “obviously a one-off” and confirmed that it was accepted that the risk of reoffending was low. He argued, however, that the “potential risk” posed by the appellant was nonetheless high because of the nature of his offence. As set out in his skeleton argument, “if he were to reoffend, the harm would be more than trivial”. This is not an argument that reoffending is likely.
68. The other evidence before me all supports a finding that the appellant is unlikely to reoffend. As set out in the Judge’s sentencing remarks, the appellant’s offence was “out of character”. At the time of the offence, he was 40 years old and had no previous convictions or cautions.
69. As reflected in the sentencing judge’s remarks, the appellant took full responsibility for his offence as soon as he was approached by the police. In his letter to the court prior to sentencing, he wrote that there was “no excuse” for the crime and that he “held no one accountable but myself”. He apologised to the cashiers for the “nightmare” he had put them through, to the witnesses to the crime, to his family and to his partner at the time. As reflected in Dr Gupta’s report and in the sentencing remarks, he did not seek to avoid criminal responsibility for his actions on the grounds of mental ill health.
70. The multiple courses that the appellant has completed in prison provide some further evidence of his rehabilitation. Some teach employment skills (such as Food Safety and Hygiene, or Introduction to Engineering and Manufacturing Industries), while others aim to address the causes of criminal offending (such as Emotional Regulation, Victim Awareness/Empathy, Understanding the Restorative Justice Process, and Understanding and Handling Conflict). In a post-programme report for a Restorative Justice course, he was marked “Excellent” in the categories of “Acceptance of responsibility for crime”, “Acknowledgment of the impact of crime”, and “Understanding of Restorative Justice principles”. The assessment sheet from a “Facing up to Conflict” course begins with the introductory comment, “Well done, this is an excellent piece of work”.
71. The weight that can be put on these courses is limited, given the obvious differences between living in a constrained, custodial environment and living in the community after release. Nonetheless, I put some weight on them as indicating the appellant’s current commitment to addressing the causes of his reoffending and to supporting himself through employment after his release.
72. Finally, Dr Al-Taiar has considered the appellant’s prison records alongside the appellant’s account of his time in prison and concluded that:
“8.4 Taken together, this pattern of functioning evidences:
• sustained motivation to change;
• an ability to engage positively with structured environments;
• capacity for pro-social roles and responsibilities;
• insight into the importance of psychological and physical self-care; and
• demonstrable progress in developing skills to stabilise affect and manage stress.”
73. He also found that the appellant “demonstrated good insight into his circumstances, mental health, and the consequences of his offending.”
74. I put weight on these conclusions, particularly give Dr Al-Taiar’s specific expertise in forensic psychiatry.
75. I have reminded myself about the need to be cautious before making findings about rehabilitation: see, e.g.: HA (Iraq) at [58]. I nonetheless find on the basis of this evidence that the likelihood that the appellant will reoffend is low; indeed, the respondent does not say otherwise.
The appellant’s relationship with his family
76. I make my findings of fact about the appellant’s relationship with his family based on the witness statements of the appellant and his family and the psychiatric reports of Dr Gupta and Dr Al-Taiar. I have given my reasons above for putting weight on the medical reports. I find I can put weight on what is said on the witness statements because they are internally consistent and consistent with each other and with the psychiatric reports. Moreover, the respondent has not challenged them, and the FTT’s preserved findings of fact contain multiple references to positive indicators of the credibility of the witnesses before it.
77. I find that the appellant has an exceptionally strong relationship with his parents. He never established his own home. His relationship with his parents has been characterised by consistent mutual support over prolonged periods of time. He describes in his witness statement making several career changes in order to help care for his father, and both he and his parents describe the multiple ways in which he offered his parents practical support in their daily lives prior to his imprisonment. His father, in turn, describes his and his wife’s longstanding concern about whether their son was “able to fully support himself financially”.
78. In addition to this mutual practical support, the evidence suggests that the appellant and his parents chose to spend their free time together; the appellant, for example, joined his father’s sports club and says in his statement that they ate together as a family every Sunday. The appellant told Dr Al-Taiar that spending time with his family was “the most important anchor in his life.”
79. Since his imprisonment, the appellant’s parents or his brother speak to him by telephone multiple times day, and they visit every week, sometimes bringing other friends and family with them. The appellant has moved between prisons multiple times, and some of these visits have required hours of travel in each direction. His brother has found potential employment for him on his release.
80. In Dr Al-Taiar’s opinion, the appellant’s family “are central to his identity and emotional stability” and he is “profoundly reliant on his family, both emotionally and practically, and this has been a defining feature of his adult life.”: [11.18] His dependency on his family had increased during his incarceration, and their “sustained involvement” through multiple daily phone calls and weekly visits had acted “as an anchor that prevented further deterioration” in his mental health: [11.21]. His family plays “an irreplaceable role in his stability, wellbeing, and rehabilitation.”: [11.22]
81. The appellant does not say that his relationship with his parents rises to the level of “family life” as defined for article 8 purposes. I find, however, that it is an exceptionally close relationship, based on long-term cohabitation, mutual practical support before his imprisonment and ongoing psychological and practical support to the appellant from his parents and his brother since then. As also noted by Dr Al-Taiar, the importance of the appellant’s relationship with his parents is enhanced by his inability to sustain intimate relationships outside the family.
The consequences for the appellant of deportation to Portugal
82. The appellant has strong cultural and linguistic ties to Portugal. He speaks Portuguese, has visited the country often and his most recent ex-partner owned property there. These obviously point towards the appellant’s ability to reintegrate into Portugal. Portugal is, in addition, presumably a country where life is “not so different” from in the UK.
83. The appellant would also be likely to have access to welfare benefits available to all Portuguese citizens, as outlined in the European Commission document, Your social security rights in Portugal. He would not be eligible for unemployment benefits, as he would not meet the minimum qualifying period of 180 days paid employment in an EU Member State during the preceding 12 months (or for self-employed workers, 360 or 720 days of social security contributions paid during the preceding 24 or 48 months). However, I find that he would be likely to be eligible for Social Integration Income, on the condition that he signed an “Integration Contract” and registered with the local Job Centre. I further find that it is likely that his parents and brother would provide him with financial support. I note that the appellant does not say otherwise.
84. The evidence before me also demonstrates the appellant’s resilience and adaptability in the past. His school reports document his capacity for integrating into a foreign culture; in 1993, he was still working hard to “master the English language”, but two years later he had been elected class representative and he attained two As and two Bs in his A-levels in 2002. As an adult, he moved jobs multiple times, but he was consistently employed in responsible positions until he set up his own business. Mr Terrell is right to describe this work history as evidence of the appellant’s adaptability and resilience, a view shared by Dr Al-Taiar.
85. All of these factors point towards the appellant’s ability to reintegrate in Portugal, although it is important to remember that everything the appellant accomplished in the UK he accomplished while living with and being emotionally or practically supported by his parents, as detailed above. Moreover, whatever his resilience in the past, by the time of his offence, he was accepted by the sentencing judge to be extremely vulnerable, and Dr Al-Taiar’s report establishes that he continues to be seriously mentally unwell. It would therefore be wrong to assume that his previous success in adapting to a new environment and finding work can simply be repeated.
86. Weighing heavily against the appellant’s ability to reintegrate in Portugal is his mental ill health, the details of the trauma underlying it, and the consequent centrality of the appellant’s relationship to his parents in his ability to function.
87. Dr Al-Taiar expresses the opinion that the appellant’s separation from his family as a result of deportation to Portugal would have “severe and destabilising consequences” for his mental health. In the first place, this is because it was after his parents relocation to the UK without him that he began to be subjected to sexual abuse and his psychiatric disorders “are closely tied to themes of abandonment, loss and self-blame”. Deportation would therefore “recreate the conditions of isolation and dislocation under which his trauma first occurred.”: [11.24]
88. Secondly, the appellant’s parents and brother “remain his sole and vital support network”, and this would be “sever[ed]” by deportation:
“11.26 The likely outcome would be social isolation, loss of protective factors, and deterioration of his psychiatric conditions, with relapse into severe depression, exacerbated anxiety, and functional decline. […].
89. Overall:
“11.37 Clinically, the likely consequences of removal are severe. His current disorders, recurrent depression, generalised anxiety disorder, and complex PTSD, are all exacerbated by uncertainty, abandonment, and loss of protective structures. Deportation would dismantle the stabilising influence of his daily family contact, leaving him socially isolated and unsupported. It would also return him to the geographical setting of his childhood abuse [….]
“11.38 The overall anticipated outcome is a sharp deterioration in his mental health, characterised by social isolation, escalation of depressive and anxiety symptoms, and significant functional decline. His clinical profile suggests that he would struggle to establish even the basic structures of independent living in Portugal [….]”
90. I find that if the appellant’s mental health were to deteriorate in this way, it would constitute a very significant obstacle to his reintegration. I consider it highly relevant here that the symptoms of the appellant’s mental ill health have directly impaired his potential for building relationships with other people. According to Dr Gupta, he carried “perceived and anticipated feelings of rejection and abandonment” as well as “mistrust in people” and his deep “significant interpersonal difficulties” “often led to misunderstandings, arguments and falling out with people.” Dr Al-Taiar, similarly, describes “a tendency to sabotage relationships” (Report of 25.11.2025 at [6.4] and [11.10]), “patterns of over-accommodation and self-sabotage in intimate relationships, reliance on family as his only stable support, and difficulty sustaining trust outside that circle.”: [11.4.3] In other words, in his particular case, it is not just that his mental ill health would deteriorate following his deportation, but also that the particular symptoms that he experiences as a result of his mental health are of a kind that would directly undermine his ability to “build up within a reasonable time a variety of human relationships to give substance to his private or family life.”: Kamara at [14].
91. I consider that the seriousness of the appellant’s mental ill health, its likely deterioration as a result of his deportation and its effects on his ability to function and in particular to form and sustain relationships outside his family would create very significant obstacles to his reintegration in Portugal.
92. The next issue to consider is whether there are any reasonable steps that could be taken to avoid or mitigate this obstacle. It is a preserved finding that the appellant would have no support from extended family in Portugal. No doubt he could continue to speak to his parents and brother by telephone, but weekly, in-person visits would not be realistic. Given the seriousness of his mental ill health, his history of living with his parents throughout his adult life, and the various reasons that deportation to Portugal would be psychologically destabilising, I find that ongoing phone calls alone would provide some mitigation, but that it would be limited.
93. As a Portuguese citizen, the appellant would be entitled to health care provided through the National Health Service (SNS). Care is “usually” free, subject to co-payments and charges. The appellant has not submitted any evidence to suggest that the mental health care offered through the SNS is, in general, inadequate or inaccessible. I find, however, that potential access to the SNS would offer only limited mitigation for this particular appellant. Dr Gupta’s view was that the appellant needed treatment “in a supportive and validating environment”; this would not be present immediately upon his return to Portugal. Dr Al-Taiar’s view is that following deportation, the appellant’s mental health would deteriorate to the point that he would “struggle to establish even the basic structures of independent living in Portugal”. The appellant now attends group therapy in prison, but otherwise he has not sought support from professionals with regard to his mental health. His difficulty trusting anyone outside his family has been noted above. I find on the basis of the medical evidence about this particular appellant, he would be unlikely to access mental health treatment through the SNS.
94. For these reasons, I find that there would be very significant obstacles to the appellant’s reintegration in Portugal.
Applying the scheme established by Parliament to the appellant
95. It is accepted that the appellant’s status in the UK has always been lawful and that he speaks English fluently, such that neither section 117B(1) nor section 117B(2) weighs against him. They are neutral factors.
96. I have carefully considered whether the appellant is likely to be economically independent in the future; although the respondent has not raised this as an issue, I am required by section 117B to have regard to it. The appellant’s education, his employment history, the numerous vocational courses he has taken in prison and the support that his parents and his brother can be expected to continue to provide after his release all point towards his future economic independence. On the other hand, at the time of his offence, he had defaulted on a COVID-19 Bounce Back Loan in the amount of £50,000. On balance, I find that the appellant would be more likely than not to be financially independent if he remained in the UK with the support of his family following his release. This debt is clearly attributable to the appellant having established a business, and then to the effects of COVID-19 on that business, both of which were atypical events. I therefore conclude that section 117B(3) does not weigh against the appellant. This is also a neutral factor.
97. The appellant entered the UK as a European citizen and the child of European citizens who were exercising their treaty rights as workers. He retained that status until he was 21 years of age, after which he began exercising his treaty rights as a worker in his own right. His status was initially dependent to some degree on his parents’ employment, and then on his own employment, and therefore I assume for the purposes of this decision that it should be considered precarious.
98. This changed by operation of law on 30 April 2006, when the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations came into effect. Regulation 15 provided that a person who had exercised treaty rights in the UK for a continuous period of five years automatically obtained a permanent right of residence, while paragraph 6 of Schedule 4 provided for periods of residence prior to 30 April 2006 to be taken into account.
99. By 30 April 2006, the appellant had already been resident in the UK as a worker or the child of a worker for a continuous period of more than five years and he therefore obtained a permanent right of residence on that date. His status from that point onwards was as at least as secure as that of someone who had been granted indefinite leave to remain under the Immigration Rules. He subsequently was granted indefinite leave to remain under the EU Settlement Scheme. For at least 17 years prior to his offence, therefore, his status was not precarious and I am not required to put little weight on his private life for that reason. See: Rhuppiah v SSHD [2018] UKSC 58.
100. It is accepted that the appellant has lived in the UK lawfully for most of his life and that he is social and culturally integrated, pursuant to section 117C(4)(a)-(b). I have found above that there would be very significant obstacles to his reintegration in Portugal (section 117C(4)(c)). I therefore conclude that Exception 1 is met.
101. I next turn to the other factors identified in HA (Iraq) as relevant to whether section 117C(6) is met.
102. The appellant’s offence was a very serious one, and this weighs heavily against him.
103. The public interest in deterrence weighs against him, as does the public interest in maintaining public confidence in immigration system. See: Zulfiqar v SSHD [2022] EWCA Civ 492 at [44].
104. I consider it to be a matter of significance – and I am permitted to do so by HA (Iraq), as set out above – that the appellant is rehabilitated and the risk of reoffending is low. This means that one of the key components of the public interest in his removal is not present in this case.
105. I also consider it relevant that the appellant committed his single offence at a time when he was, in the words of the sentencing judge, “an extremely vulnerable individual”. This cannot diminish the seriousness of the offence, but it is a mitigating factor, as recognised by the sentencing judge at the time.
106. Rehabilitation looks forward, to the risk of further offending. I consider that it is not double-counting also to look backwards, and to count in the appellant’s favour that he committed his offence at the age of 40, and that in his previous 31 years of residence in the UK he had not committed any criminal offences.
107. I put some, limited, weight on the young age at which the appellant arrived in the UK, in accordance with Sanambar v SSHD [2021] UKSC 30 and the Strasbourg caselaw cited therein.
108. Finally, I take into account the exceptional strength of the appellant’s relationship with his parents. Taken together with his decades of residence from a young age, I consider that this is an indication that he has established an exceptionally strong private life in the UK. As noted above, I am not required to place little weight on this private life, because for 17 years prior to the appellant’s offence, his immigration status was not precarious.
109. For these reasons, I find that the appellant meets the statutory exception set out at Section 117C(6).

Notice of Decision
The appeal is allowed.


E. Ruddick
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

2 February 2026