Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-000218

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/53149/2023
LP/01794/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

18th June 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HILLS

Between

MAS
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Miss E Rutherford, instructed by Rodman Pearce Solicitors Ltd
For the Respondent: Ms L Clewly, Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 30 May 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction

1. The appellant is a male citizen of Iraq of mixed Arabic and Kurdish ethnicity, who appealed to the First Tier Tribunal (FtT) against the Respondent’s decision dated 10 May 2023 to refuse his protection claim made on 27 September 2020.

2. The basis of the appellant’s claim is that he cannot return to Iraq as he fears he is at risk of an honour killing from the family of a woman with whom he had an extra-marital relationship (IY). He claims that IY’s father is a powerful person with connections to the Iraqi government.

3. The FtT Judge (FtTJ) dismissed the appellant’s claim on asylum and humanitarian protection grounds in a decision dated 25 November 2024. He found that the appellant is not a member of a particular social group within the meaning of the Refugee Convention, that his account was not credible and that he does not face a real risk of suffering serious harm in Iraq. The appellant appeals that decision to the Upper Tribunal.

Grounds of Appeal

4. The appellant relies on five grounds of appeal, namely that the FtTJ:

(i) misapplied the Refugee Convention, specifically that the finding that he did not fall within a particular social group was inconsistent with established principles;
(ii) failed to properly consider the expert evidence;
(iii) made errors in the credibility assessment;
(iv) placed over-reliance on Section 8 findings;
(v) made speculative findings on documentation and internal relocation.

5. Grounds 1, 2 and 3 are closely connected so I will deal with them together. My findings in relation to Grounds 4 and 5 follow.

Discussion and Findings

Grounds 1, 2 and 3

6. The FtTJ said at [13] that he had taken into account the objective evidence which lends some support to the appellant’s account in certain respects. He went on to find that although the appellant shared a common background that cannot be changed with others (i.e. he is a male potential victim of an honour crime), that group did not have a distinct identity. The FtTJ said this is due to the differing notions of male and female honour, the patriarchal nature of society and a lack of evidence to suggest that male potential victims of honour crimes are perceived as being different by the surrounding society. At [14] he found that although a male in that situation may be at risk of serious harm, this was not a generalised risk.

7. The appellant argues this analysis holds him to a higher evidential threshold than required and, as a result, that the FtTJ erred in concluding that he did not meet the criteria for particular social group under the Refugee Convention.

8. The appellant made his asylum claim in 2020. The Upper Tribunal held in DH (Particular Social Group: Mental Health) Afghanistan [2020] UKUT 223 (IAC) that the test for particular social group is a disjunctive one. A particular social group existed on the basis of either an innate or common characteristic of fundamental importance or social perception, rather than requiring both. The appellant therefore only needed to meet one of those two criteria and the FtTJ has erred in the test he applied.

9. I asked Ms Clewly if she agreed the FtTJ had made an error of law. While she did not concede this point, she did agree that the question was whether or not any error was material. To assess that, it is necessary to consider the points raised in relation to Grounds 2 and 3, namely the expert evidence and the credibility assessment.

10. In relation to Ground 2, the appellant argues the FtTJ failed to properly consider the expert evidence and dismissed it as providing only limited support. He says that despite the report providing clear, specific and compelling evidence in relation to honour killings the FtTJ appeared to give uncritical preference to the CPIN, which offers generalised country information.

11. At [15] the FtTJ notes:

“I have considered the expert report produced by Dr Kaveh Ghobadi dated 23 December 2023. Taken as a whole I do not consider it takes the position any further than that already established by the objective evidence, and if and to the extent that it is at odds with the objective evidence then I find that I prefer the objective evidence because I consider that the expert would, despite his experience in Kurdish studies, not necessarily have the reach that is available in the composition of a CPIN. The report lends some support to the general position that there may be males targeted by a female’s family in an act of revenge and so it assists to a limited extent with plausibility, and I do weigh this in favour of the Appellant’s account, but it cannot help me with the assessment of credibility of the Appellant specifically.”

12. Miss Rutherford submitted that while the CPIN provided general information, the expert report provides specific information about the appellant. She said it was obtained precisely to address the gaps in the CPIN in relation to male victims of honour killings and the FtTJ needed to factor that evidence into the credibility assessment as a whole.

13. Ms Clewly submitted that the FtTJ gave the expert evidence the appropriate weight. She said that he did not specifically favour it over the CPIN, rather that he considered the expert report and found that it did not take “the position any further than that already established by the objective evidence.”

14. The relevant CPIN is titled “Country policy and information note: Iraq Blood feuds, honour crimes and tribal violence, Iraq, July, 2024.” Paragraph 3.2.5 of that CPIN notes:

“Available evidence indicates that males involved in premarital or extramarital relationships with a female may be targeted by the female’s family in acts of revenge. There have been cases where a male has been killed. However, there is limited data and evidence regarding the prevalence of such incidents (see Honour crimes against men). As such, it does not amount to a generalised risk. The onus is on the person to demonstrate otherwise.”

15. The FtTJ said at [14] that there is limited data and evidence about honour-based crimes against men. Paragraph 2.3.5 from the CPIN supports that and concludes there is no generalised risk. It then says that “the onus is on the person to demonstrate otherwise.” I agree with Miss Rutherford that that is what the appellant was seeking to do with the expert report, which relevantly identifies specific cases of honour-based violence towards men, for example at paras 31 and 35-38. The FtTJ does not explain what he means by the “limited reach” of the expert report, however that language suggests that it has impacted the weight he has given to the expert report, without reasons for the approach being given. I find that the FtTJ has erred in his approach to the expert evidence.

16. The appellant further submits that the FtTJ made a number of material errors in the credibility assessment under Ground 3. He argues that although the FtTJ acknowledged “broad consistency” in his evidence at [16], the FtTJ proceeded to reject his account based on perceived inconsistencies outlined at [17(a)-(f)].

17. In that paragraph the FtTJ said that there are elements of the appellant’s account which are “inconsistent, incoherent or so implausible as to be incapable of belief.” He provided a number of examples and it is worth setting those out in full alongside the submissions made by the parties on each point.

18. At [17(a)], the FtTJ found:

“(a) The Appellant has been unable to give details of the tribe that he says that IY belonged to and says that he was unaware of her father’s power and influence before he began the relationship, only finding this out later from IY and his friend Karvan. Whilst it is understandable that the Appellant may not have known about IY’s father at the commencement of his relationship, in view of his account of events after IY had married and then been forced to return to her family home, it is surprising that he does not know much about her father’s rank, power and influence, although it is precisely his evidence (see paragraph 6 of his witness statement for the appeal) that he does not know. It is also not credible that he had the relationship that he describes with IY and yet did not come to know more about her father’s role.”

19. The appellant argues that the relationship was secretive and in a conservative society like Iraq it was plausible that such matters would not have been openly discussed. Miss Rutherford noted that the appellant knew basic details about IY’s family. Ms Clewly submitted that it was open to the FtTJ to make this finding and noted that he had taken the conservative nature of Iraqi society into account when considering the context of the evidence at [15].

20. At [17(b)], the FtTJ found:

“(b) It has been the Appellant’s account that he did not meet with IY’s family, but when they shot him outside his own home, he recognised IY’s father and brother from photographs that he had seen at IY’s home. I find that this is not credible as, on the one hand he says that IY only gave him general information, but on the other he says he saw photographs which must have been sufficiently close or detailed for him then to be able to recognise the individuals in a moment of heightened anxiety which I consider is far-fetched, even bearing in mind the cultural context of the importance of ‘honour’.”

21. The appellant argued that his explanation that he could recognise IY’s relatives through photos in her home was plausible and that the FtTJ’s dismissal of that was speculative. Miss Rutherford submitted that the explanation given was clear. Ms Clewly submitted that the FtTJ provided clear reasons for his finding.

22. At [17(c)], the FtTJ found:

“(c) The Appellant’s account of what happened at the hospital, and who he told what in relation to who had attacked him is confusing. On the one hand, the Appellant has said that he was afraid to tell the authorities about who had attacked him, because IY’s father was an influential man; on the other hand he also says that he was prepared to tell “an ordinary man” (this was the Appellant’s evidence before me) at the hospital about his assailant’s identity because this was not to the government or the authorities. He said he did this “just for the sake of investigation”. I find that it is surprising that, if he feared IY’s father in the manner claimed, he would have told anyone about his identity, as he would have wanted to ensure that the authorities could not find out.”

23. The appellant argued that his varying accounts of what he told hospital staff reflected his fear of retaliation and possible confusion at the time, and that any inconsistencies do not undermine the overall credibility of his account especially given the low standard of proof. Miss Rutherford submitted that the inconsistencies were, in any event, minor. Ms Clewly submitted that it was reasonable for the FtTJ to find that it was inconsistent that the appellant would tell an ordinary person about the attack given his account of events and that this was one of a number of inconsistencies noted by the FtTJ.

24. At [17(d)], the FtTJ found:

“(d) The Appellant claims – without, as recorded above, knowing any details – that IY’s father is an influential man and was thus able to find him in France, but this does not explain why, if the influence was such that this was possible in France, the Appellant was not found by IY’s father for the year and half that he was living in Baghdad.”

25. The appellant argued that the FtTJ failed to consider that he was actively in hiding while in Baghdad, minimising his visibility and movements. In contrast, his visibility was greater in France, where he was not in hiding. Miss Rutherford further submitted that the appellant left Baghdad when his location was identified. Ms Clewly submitted that the FtTJ’s point was that if IY’s father had the power claimed then it was inconsistent he could not find the appellant in Iraq. In the alternative, she submitted that this was not material.

26. At [17(e)], the FtTJ found:

“(e) I find that the Appellant’s medical notes from his GP do not establish that he was shot in his shoulder, but only that he had a historic shoulder injury. The Appellant claims that this was down to an interpretation issue, but the medical notes generally suggest that the Appellant has had regular assistance from his GP and various methods, including in person and telephone interpreters and friends have been used to facilitate communication, and I consider it likely that if a shooting had been described to the GP this would have been recorded in the notes.”

27. The appellant argued that he explained that language and interpretation barriers could have led to inaccuracies in his medical notes. Miss Rutherford noted that the X-Ray Report dated 15 December 2023 refers to a “traumatic injury” to the appellant’s shoulder. Ms Clewly submitted that the FtTJ didn’t accept the interpretation issues explanation and that the notes were based on regular contact between the appellant and his GP. She submitted that “traumatic injury” did not equate to a gunshot wound.

28. At [17(f)], the FtTJ found:

“(f) Section 8 In relation to his claim that his father was killed in 2005 by the Shia militia, the Appellant’s account is extremely vague and lacking in detail. It is also confused as to whether in fact it was Shia militia or Al Shabaab that were responsible for his death. I accept that his father died, but there is no reliable evidence before me to demonstrate that the Appellant has had any personal problems with the Shia militia. I find that the Appellant’s claim that he is unable to return to Heet as the Shia militia may believe that he wishes to avenge his father’s death is speculative only.”

29. The appellant argued that any gaps in his account could reasonably be attributed to the passage of time and his limited access to information. Miss Rutherford emphasised that the appellant’s father had died in 2005 when he was 9 years old. She said that he was not present at the time his father was killed and had limited information provided to him by his mother. Ms Clewly submitted that the FtTJ didn’t find that the appellant was confused, rather that he was “extremely vague and lacking in detail,” along with the other adverse credibility findings in [17].

30. The FtTJ has carefully considered each point in the credibility assessment and explained his reasons for not accepting aspects of the appellant’s account. I am mindful that he was in the best position to assess the appellant’s evidence and credibility, and that any decision to divert from his findings should not be taken lightly. I do, however, consider that the error in not applying the correct legal test coupled with the flawed approach to the expert evidence casts sufficient doubt on the overall approach to the credibility assessment such that the decision of the FtTJ should be set aside.

Grounds 4 and 5

31. The appellant argues under Ground 4 that the FtTJ relied at [18] on Section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc) Act 2004 to diminish his credibility due to his failure to claim asylum in Denmark, and that the FtTJ failed to engage with his explanation that he was under the control of an agent and unaware of his options during his journey.

32. Ms Clewly submitted that this was just one factor taken into account by the FtTJ and that it did not dominate the overall credibility assessment. She noted that it comes in the FtTJ’s decision after the credibility findings at [17] and submitted that it was further damage to the appellant’s credibility rather than impacting the earlier findings.

33. At [19] the FtTJ describes his adverse credibility findings as “determinative,” and then goes on to say “I further weigh against the appellant his section 8 conduct.” While I agree with Ms Clewly’s assessment that this therefore appears to have been an additional factor which the FtTJ considered, I would have expected him to deal directly with the evidence in relation to the control exerted by the agent while the appellant was in Denmark.

34. The appellant also argues under Ground 5 that the finding that he could obtain his CSID from family members or the authorities in Baghdad is tainted by the errors in the credibility findings. Further, that it disregards country guidance which highlights the difficulties faced in obtaining such documentation.

35. He further argues that the finding that he could safely relocate to Baghdad ignored the risks posed by the family seeking to harm him and the socio-economic challenges he would face as a Kurdish returnee without a support network.

36. Miss Rutherford submitted that the findings in relation to the appellant’s credibility impact these findings. She further submitted that the FtTJ did not take into account the challenges with redocumentation, in particular that the appellant would have to provide fingerprints as part of that process.

37. Ms Clewly submitted it was open to the FtTJ to make these findings and it was consistent with the country guidance. She said the FtTJ gave clear reasons about why the documents were with the appellant’s family and made alternate findings in relation to obtaining a replacement CSID or INID, whichever is required.

38. While Grounds 4 and 5 are weaker, it is difficult to separate them out from the credibility assessment and the findings I have made in relation to Grounds 1, 2 and 3. As such, the decision of the FtTJ should be set aside.

Disposal

39. The decision of the FtT is vitiated for the reasons outlined above. I set aside the decision of the FtT. I have considered whether to retain the case in the Upper Tribunal or remit it to the FtT and have concluded that remittal is appropriate because it will require a fresh fact-finding exercise and credibility assessment to be undertaken by the judge. I have considered whether any of the judge’s findings can be preserved however given the nature of the error of law that is not possible.

Notice of Decision

The decision of the FtT is set aside as it involved an error of law. No findings are preserved.

Directions to the First-tier Tribunal

1. The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal (Birmingham);
2. The remitted appeal shall not be conducted by First-tier Tribunal Judge Jones;
3. The anonymity direction is maintained.

N Hills

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Dated: 13 June 2025