Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-000224

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/52661/2023
LP/02314/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 16th of May 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BRUCE
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SILLS

Between

LK (GEORGIA)
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Brackaj, Iris Law Firm
For the Respondent: Mr Diwnycz, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Phoenix House (Bradford) on 7 May 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant appeals, with permission, against the decision of the FTT Judge dated 10 November 2024 (the Decision).
Anonymity Direction
2. We have decided to make an anonymity direction because the importance of facilitating the discharge of the obligations of the United Kingdom under the Refugee Convention in the circumstances of this case outweighs the principle of open justice.
Factual Background
3. The Appellant is a Georgian national, born in 1984. He arrived in the UK on 2 April 2019 and claimed asylum the same day. The basis of the asylum claim is that he claims to be at risk of persecution by the state as the secret services wanted him to work as an informant but he refused to do so. The Respondent summarised his claim in the decision under appeal as follows:
‘You told us that:
• You are a national of Georgia
• You are a Muslim
• In 2017 you were taken from an airport in Georgia and made to sign documents by state actors, the documents stated that you now worked for them.
• On the 25th of August two men came to you again and had taken you to their place of work where they detained, beat and tortured you.
• In 2019 you were taken again by the special forces to Kura river and tortured.
• You started and proceeded with a court case against the special forces as your wife and son were not allowed to enter Georgia, the court case was lost.
• You left Georgia and attempted to enter Turkey but you were refused entry.
• You then left Georgia in 2019 with help from an agent and came to the UK.
Future Fear
• On return to Georgia you fear you will be killed by the security services in Georgia because you refused to co-operate with them and were detained by them as a result [sic].’
4. The Respondent refused the application on 13 April 2023 on the basis that the Appellant’s account was not credible. The Appellant appealed and his appeal was dismissed by the FTT Judge. In assessing the Appellant’s claims, the FTT Judge found that the core of the Appellant’s account was not supported by documentary or other evidence [54]. The background evidence did not support the contention that Georgia is a country in which the authorities will arbitrarily detain and torture people to force them to act as informants [57]. The FTT Judge found the Appellant’s account of his journey to the UK not to be credible and that under s8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004, this damaged his credibility.
5. In reaching his conclusions, the FTT Judge found:
‘There is little in the background evidence which would suggest that Georgia is a country in which such conduct as the appellant alleges occurs. The expert report does not assist much in that regard. It is also based on the premise that what the appellant is saying is the truth [70]’
The documents and articles relied upon by the Appellant did not assist his claim as they did not report he was detained and tortured. The Appellant’s account of his journey to the UK and the circumstances in which he claimed asylum damaged his credibility. The FTT Judge found the Appellant’s account was fabricated and dismissed the appeal.
6. The Appellant applied to the FTT for permission to appeal to the UT acting in person. The FTT refused permission on 9 December 2024. The Appellant, this time represented, renewed the application. In granting permission, the UT categorised the grounds as follows:
a. There was unlawful assessment of credibility.
b. There was unlawful assessment of expert evidence.
c. There was unlawful assessment of documents, at [71] to [72] of the decision.
7. The UT judge found all three grounds to be arguable, in particular highlighting that it was arguable that the FTT Judge had failed to adequately assess the expert country report.
The Hearing
8. Mr Diwyncz for the Respondent confirmed that the appeal was opposed. We heard submissions from the representatives. In the course of the hearing, we were able to access the Respondent’s bundle before the FTT which had not been included in the UT bundle. We reserved our decision.
Findings
9. We consider the appeal as framed in the grant of permission and deal with the second ground identified first. We are satisfied that the assessment of the expert evidence was unlawful. It is not in dispute that the expert was a suitably qualified expert. The FTT Judge makes a number of criticisms of the report at [51-53] of the Decision as follows:
‘51. To support the contention that the appellant might have been recruited by the secret services to be a spy it reports one instance. There was a man called Chataev who was a terrorist. He was responsible for various terrorist attacks and was eventually killed. After his death a political party in Georgia suggested that he might have been recruited by the Georgian authorities as a double agent. On that basis the expert says that the appellant’s account of the attempts by the security services to recruit him may be correct.
52. It is sparse evidence upon which to base that opinion. There is no way of telling where the evidence about this man came from and how reliable it is. The expert can otherwise not point to a single instance of a person being forcibly detained by the secret services and tortured for this reason.
53. A fundamental problem with the country expert report is that the expert accepts the appellant’s account in its totality. She concludes that he would be exposed to risk if he returned to Georgia because of that. She does not comment upon what the risk would be if the appellant’s account is not correct’
10. We do not consider that these criticisms of the report are sustainable on a fair reading of the expert report of Dr Lorusso. At [36-46], the report recounts difficulties faced by the Muslim population of Georgia. Then, in a section entitled ‘Informants’, the report notes that in August 2021 a TV channel reported state security services spying on clergy and that the systematic surveillance of religious leaders became a matter of public knowledge. The report highlights the difficulties obtaining information about the operations of the security services. The report then goes on to report the case of Alhmet Chataev, a Chechen terrorist wanted by Russia, was recruited by the Georgia secret service and employed in various operations. So, the report does not rely on a single instance. In relation to Alhmet Chataev, three different sources are cited. It is also not right to say that the expert relies on this one instance to say that the Appellant’s account may be correct. The expert reaches her conclusion on the plausibility of the Appellant’s account at [83] of the report taking into account a number of different factors. We also note that the opinion of the expert is consistent with the extract of the USSD Country Report on Human Rights Practices in Georgia 2023, cited in the FTT appeal skeleton argument, which despite direction from the Practice Direction of the Immigration and Asylum Chamber of the First-tier Tribunal dated 1 November 2024 to the contrary, the FTT Judge refused to consider on the basis that the whole report had not been provided.
11. We find that the statements at [53] of the Decision that a “fundamental problem of the expert report is that the expert accepts the appellant’s account in its totality”, and at [70], that it is “premised on what the appellant is saying being the truth”, is to misrepresent the report and to fail to appreciate the role performed by the expert. At [83] of the report, the expert offered her opinion as to the plausibility of the Appellant’s account. That was properly within the expert’s remit. That assessment, we suggest, was the main purpose of the report, and the part of relevance to the credibility assessment upon which the appeal turned. That assessment is plainly not premised on the Appellant’s account being true. The opinions offered in relation to risk on return at [84-89] of the report are offered on the basis that the Appellant’s account is found to be credible but we do not consider that the expert can be criticised for this. It is not clear in any event whether this was disputed by the Respondent.
12. For these reasons, we find that the FTT Judge’s assessment of the expert evidence was inadequate. The error was clearly material as the FTT Judge repeatedly finds that the Appellant’s account runs counter to the country evidence, impermissibly disregarding the country expert’s opinion that the account was plausible. Moreover, this finding was a central part of the FTT Judge’s analysis, which focused on lack of supporting background evidence. The decision also addresses the Appellant’s journey to the UK, and the circumstances in which he claimed asylum, but nowhere does it scrutinise the central evidence in the case, that is the Appellant’s account of the events which he claims led to his flight from Georgia. We therefore find that the decision contains a material error of law and we set that aside. In view of this finding, it is not necessary to consider the other two grounds of appeal.
13. We have considered whether to retain the appeal in the UT or remit the matter to the FTT bearing in mind paragraph 7 of the relevant Practice Direction. While the Appellant was not denied a fair hearing before the FTT, the extent of the factual findings required mean it is appropriate to remit the matter to the FTT.

Notice of Decision
The decision of the FTT contains a material error of law and is set aside.
The appeal is remitted to the FTT to be heard by a different FTT Judge.

Directions
1. By 6 June 2025, the Appellant should submit and additional evidence he wishes to rely upon in support of his appeal. This should include any evidence Freedom from Torture or any other medical evidence.
2. The appeal should be listed for the first available date from 20 June 2025 at either Newcastle or Bradford hearing centre, whichever can accommodate the appeal sooner.

Judge Sills

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

8 May 2025