Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-000253

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/58051/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

20th June 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE REEDS

Between

A I O
(ANONYMITY ORDER CONTINUED)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Chowdhury, Counsel instructed on behalf of the appellant
For the Respondent : Mr Diwnycz, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at (IAC) on 26 May 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals, with permission, against the determination of the First- Tier Tribunal (Judge Smith) promulgated on 4 November 2024 . By its decision, the Tribunal dismissed the appellant’s appeal on all grounds against the Secretary of State’s decision to refuse his protection and human rights claim.
2. The FtTJ did make an anonymity order, and no grounds were submitted during the hearing for such an order to be discharged. Anonymity is granted because the facts of the appeal involve a protection claim.
3. Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
The background:
4. The factual background can be summarised as follows. The appellant is a national of Nigeria. His immigration history is summarised as follows. On 4th September 2013 the appellant was issued with entry clearance as a visitor valid until 4th September 2023. On 8th March 2016 the Appellant entered the UK. On 8 th March 2016 the appellant’s leave to enter was withdrawn and the Appellant was detained. On 11th March 2016 the appellant submitted an Administrative Review and on 22nd March 2016 the decision was maintained. On 31st March 2016 the appellant submitted a Judicial Review. The Judicial Review was dismissed at hearing on 18th October 2016 and the Court of Appeal dismissed the review on 17th July 2017.
5. On 7th September 2020 the Appellant applied for leave to remain under Family/Private life.
6. The appellant made a claim for asylum on 16 June 2021. The basis of his claim was that in 2011 he began supporting the Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) (AIR 50-51, SCR 3.1). He attended meetings, rallies, and demonstrations (AIR 53). In 2014, he participated in a rally in Abia State which was invaded by the authorities, whilst escaping he was hit behind his ear with a machete which he treated himself at home (AIR 11, 74-75). In 2017, after his arrival in the UK, he began attended rallies with the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB). He formally registered with IPOB in early 2020 (AIR 64). Since 2021, he claimed to have been the Public Relation Officer of IPOB in (UK) (AIR 63, 65-66).
7. If returned to Nigeria, he feared he would be arrested and killed by the Nigeria government and secret agencies because he claimed to be involved in Biafran separatism (AIR 13-16).
8. The human rights application was refused by the respondent on the 13th September 2021 and his human rights claim was refused in decision of FtTJ Ali promulgated on 16 May 2022. His claim for asylum was refused in a decision of the 28 September 2023.
9. In respect of that history, FtTJ Smith made a finding that the human rights claim included details of the factual nexus of his asylum claim indicating they were matters he had raised with his representatives and with the Home Office. FtTJ Smith also noted that the appellant’s asylum claim was lodged in June 2021, which was before Judge Ali provided his decision on the 29th of May 2022 and that his asylum claim could not be considered a response to the rejection of the Human Rights claim which FtTJ Smith found that he was unaware of having as neither the appellant or his representatives had attended the hearing.
10. The reasons given by the respondent for dismissing his asylum claim can be summarised as follows. The respondent accepted that the appellant was a low-level supporter of MASSOB in Nigeria and was a low-level member of IPOB in the UK. The respondent did not accept that the appellant would be of adverse interest to the Nigerian State.
11. In respect of his claim to have been a supporter of MASSOB in Nigeria, it was his own account that he had no specific role within MASSOB, but would attend rallies, meetings, and demonstrations (AIR 53). He had failed to demonstrate how his involvement with MASSOB in Nigeria could have brought him to the adverse attention from the Nigerian State. Despite his claim to have participated in a rally in 2014 in X state (AIR 75), he was unable to specify the date it took place. It was considered reasonable that he could provide sufficient detail of exactly when and where this rally took place given that he claimed he narrowly escaped persecution from the authorities on this occasion.
12. The respondent considered that his claim to be of adverse attention to the Nigerian state was internally inconsistent. He left Nigeria in March 2016, arriving in the United Kingdom on a visit visa (SCR 3.1, VAF). He stated that he was fingerprinted in Nigeria for immigration purposes in 2014, this is the same time he claimed to have narrowly escaped arrest at a MASSOB rally in Abia State in 2014 (AIR 75). Therefore, his claim to be of adverse attention to the Nigerian state is inconsistent with his ability to freely leave Nigeria using his own passport.
13. The respondent considered that his claim to be of adverse attention to the Nigerian state due to his involvement with IPOB and his participation in rallies in the United Kingdom was speculative. He stated that he formally registered with IPOB UK in 2020, and he held the position of Public Relation Officer of the (UK ) Zone (AIR 63-65). This aspect of his claim was consistent with the letter of support submitted as evidence from the Chairman of IPOB UK, however, the respondent considered that he had failed to demonstrate that his role within IPOB UK was of particularly high profile or influence. He stated that he had attended four IPOB demonstrations in the United Kingdom but was unable to verify the dates that he attended these demonstrations (AIR 69-70). He submitted photographs of his attendance at these demonstrations, however the respondent considered that the photographs in isolation did not demonstrate how the Nigerian state would be aware of his involvement with IPOB. His explanation that he ‘thinks’ the pictures will have been circulated to the authorities and secret agencies is considered to be speculative (AIR 77) and he was unable to confirm beyond speculation if he was aware if the Nigerian authorities have a warrant out for his arrest (AIR 76).
14. The appellant did not post about IPOB on social media (AIR 73), and this this is internally inconsistent with his claim to be of adverse attention to the Nigerian state as he had failed to demonstrate with specificity how he could have come to their attention, beyond speculation.
15. In summary the respondent considered that he had failed to demonstrate beyond speculation how his low-level involvement with IPOB in the United Kingdom has brought him to the attention of the authorities in Nigeria, and therefore this aspect of his claim was rejected. It was accepted that if the key material facts of his claim were accepted that there would not be sufficient protection from persecution in Nigeria and he could not relocate within his home country because he feared the state, meaning that neither option would be available to him. The decisions letter also considered his Article 8 claim based on his private life.
16. The appellant appealed the decision dismissing his asylum claim and it came before the FtT on 22 October 2024.
17. In a decision promulgated on 4 November 2024 the FtTJ dismissed his appeal. Following the decision letter further evidence was filed on behalf of the appellant which included evidence from a witness relating to IPOB and an expert report from Professor Aguillar. The FtTJ was also provided with country materials in respect of Nigeria from the respondent contained in 2 reports: The Country policy and information note: separatist groups in the South-East, Nigeria, March 2022 and the Country policy and information note: Nigeria Actors of protection, August 2024.
18. The FtTJ set out the factual basis of his claim at paragraph 6 of his decision as follows.
19. In about 2011 he became involved in the Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) attending meetings, rallies and demonstrations. In 2014 he was injured by elements of the government authorities who “invaded” a demonstration in which he had been participating, receiving machete blows to his chest and the back of his head. He did not report matters to the police or seek hospital treatment but in 2016 he left Nigeria on his own passport on a visit visa to the United Kingdom. He had been a regular visitor to the United Kingdom before it appears that upon arrival here he was detained by the United Kingdom immigration authorities (for reasons unconnected to the appeal) and he did not make an application for asylum instead confirming his intention to return to Nigeria at the end of his visit.
20. The appellant’s case had been that he only joined the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) group in 2017 but before the FtTJ he said that he had secretly worked for IPOB before that time conveying messages and assisting to arrange delivery of humanitarian supplies. He had received information in 2018 from his cousin that agents of the state had been looking for him in their village and he had not mentioned any of these matters before the hearing because they had been secret activities.
21. It was the appellant’s case that since 2017 he has been a formal member of IPOB and is now the Public Relations Officer (PRO) for the (UK) branch of the organisation in the United Kingdom and has arranged and attended various activities in the United Kingdom including rallies/demonstrations for which he has some photographic evidence. On that basis the appellant contends that he would be at risk of persecution if returned to Nigeria because of his membership of the IPOB, which is illegal in Nigeria, and involvement in Biafran separatism which he would continue to pursue upon return.
22. In the alternative the appellant argued that his return to Nigeria would amount to a breach of his article 8 rights because there would be very significant obstacles to his integration in Nigeria or that his return would result in unduly harsh consequences to him or others because, amongst other factors, (a) he has no support network in Nigeria, (b) he has been out of the country for a long period, and (c) he would be ostracised by society in Nigeria because of his connections to IPOB making reintegration exceptionally onerous.
23. The FtTJ set out the position of the respondent and that the respondent accepted that the appellant is who he says he is and was a low-level supporter of MASSOB in Nigeria and a low-level supporter of IPOB in the United Kingdom. However, the respondent does not accept that the appellant is of “adverse interest to the Nigerian State” because, in summary, he had no political profile before he left Nigeria and, even now, has a low-level of involvement such that he does not face a real risk of persecutory treatment upon his return.
24. The respondent also did not accept that the appellant has proved that there would be either very significant difficulties in integration or unduly harsh consequence upon return
25. The FtTJ heard oral evidence from the appellant during the hearing and the submissions made by the advocates on behalf of the respective parties. The FtTJ’s findings of fact are set out between paragraphs 34-62 relating to the asylum claim. Paragraphs 63-66 deal with the article 8 ECHR claim.
26. The FtTJ ‘s findings of fact can be summarised as follows. The FtTJ assessed the issue arising from the respondent’s argument that some of the appellant’s conduct falls under s8 of the Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc) Act 2004 and damaged the appellant’s credibility. The FtTJ concluded that it would not be proper to draw any inference adverse to the appellant from either his failure to attend an asylum interview, or the way in which his “original claim” was brought for the reasons the FtTJ set out at paragraph 36 (a)-(d).
27. However the FtTJ stated that the only issue which would be capable of falling within section 8 of the Act to the appellant’s detriment is the timing of the claim and the timing of his involvement with IPOB ( see paragraph 37).
28. The FtTJ set out his history and that he admits that when he arrived in the United Kingdom in 2016, he intended to return to Nigeria. After his release from detention, he remained in the United Kingdom lawfully under the terms of his visit visa, pursuing the authorities for his wrongful detention, and becoming involved in IPOB from 2017 and joining in 2020.
29. The FtTJ took into account that it was the appellant’s own case is that he did not fear persecution when he arrived in 2016 but that his fears developed as his own involvement increased and the persecutory behaviour of the authorities intensified, including proscribing IPBO as a terrorist organisation in 2017. The appellant also gave evidence that, following his detention, he did not know whether he could trust the United Kingdom authorities because of their own close connection to the Nigerian Government. The FtTJ found at paragraph 39, that “Because it is plausible that the appellant did not have an asylum claim when he arrived in the United Kingdom and because the situation in Nigeria has changed since then, and because his experience of detention may have meant he was cautious about claiming asylum, I have concluded that it would not be proper to draw any adverse interest under section 8 of the Act”.
30. However the FtTJ stated that a necessary part of that finding is that the appellant was not in fear of persecution when he arrived in the United Kingdom which is why he did not claim asylum then. The FtTJ concluded the reason for that was because the appellant was only a low-level supporter of MASSOB with no political profile and no reason to fear any future harm, despite the fact that he had been injured at a rally. The FtTJ concluded, because the appellant’s evidence of being injured at a rally was not challenged, that he should accept that part of his case as proved to the low standard but that does not alter the fact that in 2016 the appellant did not fear persecution.
31. The FtTJ took into account the supporting evidence in letters from those in Nigeria, which had not been tested in evidence and that the appellant was able to leave Nigeria on his own passport and, had he been of interest to the authorities, would have experienced issues in leaving the country. The FtTJ concluded “that he did not is further significant evidence of his lack of profile and minor role” ( see paragraph 41)
32. The FtTJ rejected the appellant’s account of secretly acting for IPOB prior to his arrival in the United Kingdom because he concluded, had he already been involved on “secret missions” including passing sensitive information or being involved in arranging humanitarian aid, it would have been reasonable for him to include those details in the body of his asylum claim rather than mention them for the first time at the hearing before me. The FtTJ stated, “In my judgement, it would have been obvious to the appellant that such details were an important aspect of this overall claim and in particular the importance of his role within IPOB, of his profile in Nigeria, and the risk of future harm he would face, and he would have mentioned those details earlier (either at the stage of his interview or when he prepared his appeal statement) to help prove his case had they been true “ ( see paragraph 42).
33. For the same reason the FtTJ also rejected the appellant’s evidence that as far back as 2018 agents of the state had looked for him, because, the FtTJ concluded, if they had, either: (a) he would have claimed asylum at an earlier stage than he did or (b) it would have been reasonable for him to mention that event before the day of the hearing especially because his case has been well-prepared on his behalf, including by submissions of materials obtained from Nigeria. Furthermore, the appellant gave no credible explanation why that information could not have been mentioned when he was claiming asylum or preparing documents for the hearing or what had changed that meant he felt he was able to provide that information now as opposed to then.
34. At paragraph 44 the FtTJ concluded that the appellant’s evidence on this topic was an attempt to “bolster his claim by falsely claiming both a wider and earlier role in the movement than he in fact has and to claim a profile to attempt to establish he is “of interest” to the authorities which is in issue in his case”.
35. Notwithstanding those adverse findings of fact the FtTJ set out that as the respondent accepts, and despite those credibility findings outlined the FtTJ was satisfied that the appellant is a supporter of IPOB. The FtTJ also accepted that the appellant has a formal role within IPOB, which is supported by the evidence of Mr X and the FtTJ concluded that the appellant is the PRO of the (UK) branch, attends meetings, participates in activities, including being involved in organising rallies some of which he has photographic evidence for from May, June and October 2022 ( see paragraph 45).
36. Between paragraphs 46-47 the FTJ assessed the appellant’s profile and role. He concluded that his role/profile was not “ particularly significant or high profile”.
37. At paragraph 48 the FtTJ therefore concluded that whilst the appellant had proved that he had supported MASSOB in Nigeria, and since 2020 he has been a member of IPOB and has an official role within the (UK) branch the FtTJ did not accept that his role can be described as “significant” and that “In my judgement he is a low-level member and supporter”.
38. The FtTJ also did not accept, even to the lower standard, that the appellant has proved his activities had come to the attention of the authorities or that he has any kind of political profile in Nigeria.
39. However, at paragraph 48 the FtTJ set out that he accepted that those findings were not necessarily determinative of the appellant’s appeal, and the FtTJ went on to assess whether the appellant had demonstrated that he, as a member of IPOB as described above, faces a real risk of persecution upon return, and on the basis as he argued, he would remain active in the work of the IPOB/Biafran separatism.
40. The FtTJ’s assessment of the objective country evidence and the risk of persecution or serious harm was assessed between paragraphs 49-62. In undertaking that assessment the FtTJ took into account all of the evidence including the evidence of the appellant, the witness Mr X and the expert report. The FtTJ took into account the country materials relating to IPOB at paragraph 50. However in relation to the evidence of Mr X the FtTJ set out that he had not been provided with any objective evidence about the persons role in IPOB who the witness had referred to. At paragraph 52, the FtTJ took into account the conclusions set out in the expert report but at paragraph 53 set out his reasoning as to the weight attached to the report. At paragraph 59 the FtTJ set out in detail the lack of evidence in the expert report concerning the current treatment of IPOB members. In particular that it was not specific to the appellant based on general objective material and that there was scant evidence about IPOB. He identified that the report dealt mainly MASSOB (paragraphs 19 – 24) rather than dealing with in any meaningful way IPOB members and their treatment since the group was proscribed in 2017. The FtTJ applied the CPIN at paragraph 55. The FtT J also noted that the Nigerian government was entitled to proscribe activities of parties include elements and support the use of violence although the appellant had not been implicated in such military or violent activity. The FtTJ stated that he had borne in mind that the authorities record had to be scrutinised to ensure the conduct was not disproportionate or persecutory nature (see paragraph 56). At paragraph 57 the FtTJ concluded that there was no evidence that the appellant was of any interest to the authorities or that his activities have all would bring into their attention. The FtTJ took into account the evidence of Mr X who had given evidence that he was not aware of any interest or contact from the Nigerian authorities towards his group and the FtTJ concluded that he was “left with the evidential position that there is no sufficient or reliable evidence of any state interest in the appellant or his activities in the United Kingdom or in general.” The FtTJ found that there was no evidence that his family were involved in IPOB or separatism more widely and no other factors were present to enhance his personal risk.
41. The FtTJ reached his summary at paragraph 60 – 62 as follows:
“60.In summary, it seems to me there is no factual basis set out for the assertions and conclusions in the expert report as to future risk that was provided on behalf of the appellant or sufficient proof that treatment of a disproportionate or persecutory type would apply to him given his limited role. The report principally deals with MASSOB and does not contain any sufficient fact specific information or analysis of the treatment of IPOB members now such as to discharge the burden upon the appellant even when looking at all the evidence in the round.
61. Therefore, whilst I accept the appellant’s membership of IPOB might be a criminal offence, I have no sufficient evidence as to the risk of arrest (especially given my findings about his role above) and insufficient evidence to prove that any arrest and/or prosecution would amount to persecution or serious harm under article 3/the humanitarian protection provisions nor that he would suffer such harm because of any arrest. In making that judgement I have also applied my mind to the CPIN as to the Actors of Protection.
62. Therefore, in my judgement, the appellant has not proved, even to the low standard, that he faces a real risk of persecutory treatment or serious harm even if he were to continue his limited political activities in Nigeria and his claims for asylum and humanitarian protection are refused.”
42. The article 8 claim was addressed between paragraphs 63-65 where reasons were given as to why the appellant could not meet the Rules to demonstrate that there are very significant obstacles to his integration to Nigeria, by taking into account the appellant’s personal circumstances, including his nationality, his education, his previous length of residence in Nigeria, his language skills, his ties and family networks in Nigeria and that he was familiar with customs and culture of Nigeria and was fit for work. The FtTJ rejected the appellant’s evidence that the skills he developed would not be useful to him in Nigeria because the FtTJ found that such skills are likely to be transferable (see paragraph 64). The FtTJ expressly considered the claim made about his political opinions but found that his political opinions were unlikely to mean that he was isolated from society because there are others who shared his views and even if they are not, he could count on the continued support of those in the United Kingdom with whom he can continue to communicate with.
43. The appellant sought permission to appeal the decision. Permission to appeal was refused by the FtT but on renewal was granted by UTJ Sheridan on 13 March 2025. At the hearing before the Upper Tribunal the appellant was represented by Mr Chowdhury and the respondent by Senior Presenting Officer Mr Diwnycz. Mr Chowdhury relied upon the written grounds for permission. There was no Rule 24 response filed on behalf of the respondent. Both advocates provided their oral submissions. I am grateful for the submissions each has provided and shall refer to them in the analysis of the issues raised.
Discussion:
44. It is by now well-established that appropriate restraint should be exercised before interfering with a decision of the tribunal below, which will have read and heard the evidence as a whole and which had the primary task of reaching findings of fact and attributing appropriate weight to relevant considerations: see, for example, UT (Sri Lanka) [2019] EWCA Civ 1095, at [19]-[20] - observations subsequently endorsed in a number of other judgments of the Court of Appeal.
45. The decision in Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464. sets out the constraints to which appellate tribunals and courts are subject in relation to appeals against findings of fact per Lewison LJ who summarised them as follows:
"2. The approach of an appeal court to that kind of appeal is a well-trodden path. It is unnecessary to refer in detail to the many cases that have discussed it; but the following principles are well-settled:
i) An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong.
ii) The adverb 'plainly' does not refer to the degree of confidence felt by the appeal court that it would not have reached the same conclusion as the trial judge. It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appeal court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached.
iii) An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.
iv) The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial judge is not aptly tested by considering whether the judgment presents a balanced account of the evidence. The trial judge must of course consider all the material evidence (although it need not all be discussed in his judgment). The weight which he gives to it is however pre-eminently a matter for him.
v) An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the judge failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the judge's conclusion was rationally insupportable.
vi) Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract."
46. The grounds advanced expressly challenge the decision on the basis of inadequacy of reasoning. As regards the provision of reasons, I take into account that there is a legal duty to give a brief explanation of the conclusions of the central issue on which an appeal is determined and what is said in Shizad (sufficiency of reasons; set aside) [2013] UKUT 85 (IAC) that “reasons need not be extensive if the decision as a whole makes sense, having regard to the material accepted by the FtTJ.” I further observe that the parties are aware of the evidence that has been presented before the FtTJ, both orally and in documentary form.
47. I set out below the written grounds of challenge to the Upper Tribunal.
48. At paragraph 4 of the grounds, it is submitted that the FtTJ unreasonably failed to assess whether the appellant has a genuine fear of persecution on return to his native Nigeria. This ground relies upon the FtTJ’s finding that the Appellant is an IPOB member ( see paragraphs[45] and [61]).
49. Ground 1: Incorrect Assessment of the Appellant’s political profile and credibility.
50. It is submitted that the central reason for the First-tier Tribunal Judge's decision to dismiss the appellant’s claim was the assertion that the appellant had not demonstrated a significant leadership role within the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) and had allegedly failed to establish a genuine threat due to his IPOB membership, past activities, or his sur place political engagement in the UK ( paragraph 5 of the grounds).
51. Paragraph 6 of the grounds submit that the FtTJ erred in evaluating the appellant’s appeal, and that the decision contradicts the respondent’s policy. The respondent acknowledges that IPOB is designated as a terrorist organization by the Nigerian government, and, as such, any active IPOB member would face a real risk of persecution if identified by Nigerian authorities. Consequently, the appeal should succeed on the basis that the appellant was found as an active member of IPOB.
52. The grounds at paragraph 7 cite the CPIN Country Policy and Information Note Nigeria: Separatist groups in the South-East Version 3.0 March 2022 and submits that it supports the claim that any member (CPIN paragraph 9.1.6 records that Governor Wike “directed security agencies and the Chairmen of Local Government Areas to fish out and resolutely deal with any member of IPOB found in any community following the executive order and other legal instruments’’ while paragraph 9.3 details how IPOB members are persecuted and harassed.) of IPOB are at risk. The FTTJ’s conclusion, therefore, is clearly against the Respondent’s CPIN.
53. Paragraph 8 of the grounds submit that the FtTJ identified alleged material discrepancies in the appellant's account of the IPOB membership process, particularly concerning his covert role within the organization. The appellant contends that these discrepancies were trivial and that the FtTJ failed to reasonably consider his sur place activities, which were corroborated by witness testimony at the hearing. Notably, no adverse credibility findings were made against the witness's evidence.
54. Paragraph 9 of the grounds submit that the FtTJ’s conclusion regarding his IPOB leadership role was flawed, as it overlooked significant evidence supporting his membership and active involvement within the organization.
55. Paragraph 10 of the grounds submits that in the alternative that it is not essential that the appellant must be a significant leader of IPOB and that the FtTJ accepted that he served the leadership role he claimed. Further, even if a senior leadership role was not established, the FtTJ erred by overemphasizing this requirement. Given that the appellant was found to be a credible, open, and active member of IPOB in the UK, this association alone places him at risk of persecution upon return to Nigeria. The FtTJ should have applied the lower standard of proof, i.e., a reasonable degree of likelihood of risk.
56. Ground 2: Incorrect Conclusion on the Claimant’s Private Life and Rights under Article 8, ECHR.
57. Paragraph 11 of the grounds submit that the FtTJ erred in assessing his private life and in the Article 8 proportionality exercise under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). As an active IPOB member, the appellant would face significant obstacles to reintegration into Nigerian society, as he would be unable to freely express his political views or safely engage in political activities without the risk of persecution. Therefore, the decision to refuse his appeal disregards the severe impact on his private life and freedom of expression, which are protected under Article 8, ECHR.
58. There are 2 grounds of challenge. Dealing with ground 1, there are 10 paragraphs under the heading “ incorrect assessment of the appellant’s profile and credibility”. In those paragraphs there are a number of issues raised and as a result I intend to consider the issues raised in the grounds and the oral submission that concern issues of credibility.
59. Paragraph 8 of the grounds asserts that the FtTJ identified material discrepancies in the appellant’s account of the IPOB membership process, particularly concerning his covert role within the organisation. The grounds go on to submit that the discrepancies were trivial and that the FtTJ failed to consider his sur place activities which were corroborated by witness testimony at the hearing and that no adverse credibility findings were made against the witnesses evidence.
60. It is difficult to ascertain what this ground is challenging – whether it is the assessment of the credibility of the claim in relation to his earlier activities before his arrival which appears to be related to the reference to “ covert activities” or whether this is a challenge to the assessment of his sur place activities in the UK. There is no reference to the relevant paragraphs in the FtTJ’s decision or any material in the bundle in support of the submission. It was not further explained in any oral submissions made.
61. In so far as it seeks to challenge any factual finding made by the FtTJ as to any conduct whilst in Nigeria, those findings of fact as made by the FtTJ are set out between paragraphs 38- 44. The FtTJ set out his history and that the appellant admitted that when he arrived in the United Kingdom in 2016, he intended to return to Nigeria. After his release from detention, he remained in the United Kingdom lawfully under the terms of his visit visa, pursuing the authorities for his wrongful detention, and becoming involved in IPOB from 2017 and joining in 2020.
62. The FtTJ took into account that it was the appellant’s own case is that he did not fear persecution when he arrived in 2016 but that his fears developed as his own involvement increased and the persecutory behaviour of the authorities intensified, including proscribing IPBO as a terrorist organisation in 2017. The appellant also gave evidence that, following his detention, he did not know whether he could trust the United Kingdom authorities because of their own close connection to the Nigerian Government.
63. The FtTJ found at paragraph 39, that “Because it is plausible that the appellant did not have an asylum claim when he arrived in the United Kingdom and because the situation in Nigeria has changed since then, and because his experience of detention may have meant he was cautious about claiming asylum, I have concluded that it would not be proper to draw any adverse interest under section 8 of the Act”. However the FtTJ stated that a necessary part of that finding is that the appellant was not in fear of persecution when he arrived in the United Kingdom which is why he did not claim asylum then. The FtTJ concluded the reason for that was because the appellant was only a low-level supporter of MASSOB with no political profile and no reason to fear any future harm, despite the fact that he had been injured at a rally. The FtTJ concluded, because the appellant’s evidence of being injured at a rally was not challenged, that he should accept that part of his case as proved to the low standard but that did not alter the fact that in 2016 the appellant did not fear persecution.
64. The FtTJ took into account the supporting evidence in letters from those in Nigeria, which had not been tested in evidence and that the appellant was able to leave Nigeria on his own passport and, had he been of interest to the authorities, would have experienced issues in leaving the country. The FtTJ concluded “that he did not is further significant evidence of his lack of profile and minor role” ( see paragraph 41)
65. The FtTJ rejected the appellant’s account of secretly acting for IPOB prior to his arrival in the United Kingdom because he concluded, had he already been involved on “secret missions” including passing sensitive information or being involved in arranging humanitarian aid, it would have been reasonable for him to include those details in the body of his asylum claim rather than mention them for the first time at the hearing before the FtTJ. The FtTJ stated, “In my judgement, it would have been obvious to the appellant that such details were an important aspect of this overall claim and in particular the importance of his role within IPOB, of his profile in Nigeria, and the risk of future harm he would face, and he would have mentioned those details earlier (either at the stage of his interview or when he prepared his appeal statement) to help prove his case had they been true “ ( see paragraph 42).
66. For the same reason the FtTJ also rejected the appellant’s evidence that as far back as 2018 agents of the state had looked for him, because, the FtTJ concluded, if they had, either: (a) he would have claimed asylum at an earlier stage than he did or (b) it would have been reasonable for him to mention that event before the day of the hearing especially because his case has been well-prepared on his behalf, including by submissions of materials obtained from Nigeria. Furthermore, the appellant gave no credible explanation why that information could not have been mentioned when he was claiming asylum or preparing documents for the hearing or what had changed that meant he felt he was able to provide that information now as opposed to then.
67. At paragraph 44 the FtTJ concluded that the appellant’s evidence on this topic was an attempt to “bolster his claim by falsely claiming both a wider and earlier role in the movement than he in fact has and to claim a profile to attempt to establish he is “of interest” to the authorities which is in issue in his case”.
68. There is no basis to impugn those findings of fact made which were based on the evidence before the FtTJ. It has not been explained why they were in error and in so far as the grounds assert that they were “trivial discrepancies” the FtTJ gave adequate and sustainable reasoning as to why he had found that the appellant had not established the profile he had claimed when in Nigeria and consequently, it was open to the FtTJ to find that the appellant was a low level member of MASSOB with no political profile with no reason to fear any future harm and that his ability to leave Nigeria using his own passport was further indicative and supported the FtTJ’s overall assessment that he lacked any real profile when in Nigeria and had only a minor role and that he was of no interest to the authorities before he left Nigeria ( see assessment and conclusions at paragraphs 39-44).
69. The FtTJ also rejected the appellant’s account that as far back as 2018 agents of the State were looking for him for the reasons given at paragraph 43. The grounds provide no evidential basis to challenge those findings of fact which the FtTJ made by reference to his assessment of the appellant’s evidence and the lack of prior reference to it. Consequently the conclusion at paragraph 44 that the appellant’s evidence on this was an “ attempt to bolster his claim “ by claiming a “wider and earlier role that he in fact has “ and to attempt to establish he is “of interest” was a conclusion reasonably open to him to make on the evidence. Whilst Mr Chowdhury made the general submission that the FtTJ did not make any adverse findings on the appellant’s credibility, however those findings whereby he rejected the appellant’s account as to his role and interest in him whilst in Nigeria were adverse findings.
70. Part of paragraph 8 and paragraph 9 of the grounds can be taken together as they seek to challenge the assessment of the appellant’s sur place activities.
71. Paragraph 8 of the grounds asserts that the FtTJ failed to reasonably consider the appellant’s sur place activities which was corroborated by witness testimony at the hearing. It is said that no adverse credibility findings were made against the witness evidence. Paragraph 9 asserts that the FtTJ’s conclusions regarding his leadership role was flawed as it overlooked significant evidence supporting his membership and active involvement within the organisation.
72. In his oral submissions Mr Chowdhury referred to the appellant’s role as a significant leadership role and that he was the secretary who organised rallies and raised awareness. He later submitted that his leadership position was such that he was on the “radar” of the Nigerian authorities.
73. Mr Diwnycz on behalf of the respondent submitted that whilst the appellant claimed to be the relations officer (PRO) there was no screenshot to show this was referenced in any capacity on any national/international website or that there was any link to him. In respect of the document page 61 (letter from office of the UK national coordinator) Mr Diwnycz submitted that the author of the letter provided his personal email account and that the administrative headquarters were said to be at an address in Germany and that the website address was Radio Biafra and not to any other official website. There was an UK office mentioned. He further submitted that even if the appellant was the PRO that such an appointment did not show that he was the “public persona” of IPOB and that as such it was a nominal title. There was also no evidence to show what he did in relation to the role and that the letter page 61 was insufficient evidence. Accordingly the FtTJ gave clear reasons why he did not accept that the appellant had a leadership role as Mr Chowdhury had submitted.
74. By way of reply Mr Chowdhury submitted that it was not in dispute that he was a PRO and thus had a leadership role.
75. While paragraph 8 of the grounds refers to the activities being corroborated by witness evidence, the grounds do not identify what specific evidence the FtTJ either overlooked or ignored. Similarly at paragraph 9, the submission made that the FtTJ undertook a flawed assessment of his leadership role because it “overlooked significant evidence” also fails to identify what evidence was significant or what was overlooked.
76. The FtTJ’s assessment of the evidence and his factual findings are set out at paragraphs 45-47 of his decision. Notwithstanding the adverse findings of fact set out at paragraph 44 ( relating to events in Nigeria) the FtTJ set out that he was satisfied that the appellant was a supporter of IPOB. The FtTJ also accepted that the appellant has a formal role within IPOB, which is supported by the evidence of Mr X and the FtTJ concluded that the appellant is the PRO of the (UK) branch, attends meetings, participates in activities, including being involved in organising rallies some of which he has photographic evidence for from May, June and October 2022 ( see paragraph 45).
77. However, between paragraphs 46-47 the FTJ assessed the appellant’s profile and role. He concluded that his role/profile was not “ particularly significant or high profile” for the following reasons:
(a) whilst the appellant was able to speak with some authority about the structure of IPOB his evidence demonstrates he is one figure in one regional part of the party in the United Kingdom.
(b) Whilst the appellant said he “is involved” in organising rallies, I have no sufficient evidence to demonstrate the nature of his involvement or role. For instance, I have no emails to demonstrate he is a key player in the rallies or what, in fact, he did as part of his involvement.
(c) I accept that I have some photographs of the demonstrations in 2022 and am prepared to accept that the appellant has attended other demonstrations or rallies before and after, but the photographs do not show that the rallies are particularly significant events.
(d) Moreover, and in my judgement of very significant detriment to the appellant given the burden of proving his case is on him, I have been provided with no social media evidence that the rallies were widely publicised or had any reporting by the media even though the appellant said IPOB had a Facebook account. Indeed, I have no social media evidence at all and have noted that the appellant accepted he has not posted on social media (AIR 73) which appears to me to be unusual given his status as a PRO and I reject the appellant’s evidence that he had not posted on social media due to financial constraints, given (a) his purported connection to IPOB, and (b) the support he has experienced whilst in the United Kingdom.
(e) I have further noted that of the 3 rallies I have photographic evidence for 2 were in the North of England and 1 in London.
(f) Whilst I accept that the objective evidence tends to show that the Nigerian authorities are capable of monitoring such events, and that the media is capable of reporting on them, I have no evidence that occurred in these instances and, in light of the nature of the demonstrations depicted in the photographs and the lack of proof of social media or media coverage, it seems to me I am unable to accept the proposition that there is a real risk that the authorities know of the appellant’s involvement in these activities”.
78. At paragraph 48 the FtTJ therefore concluded that whilst the appellant had proved that he had supported MASSOB in Nigeria, and since 2020 he has been a member of IPOB and has an official role within the (UK) branch the FtTJ did not accept that his role can be described as “significant” and that “In my judgement he is a low-level member and supporter”.
79. The FtTJ therefore gave clear reasons in his decision as to why he concluded on the evidence that the appellant’s role was not particularly significant or high profile and that he was a low-level member or supporter. It has not been demonstrated by the grounds of challenge or the oral submissions made that those findings of fact are either flawed or otherwise contrary to the evidence. As stated above, the grounds fail to identify what significant evidence the FtTJ overlooked. The letter page 61 referred to the appellant being active in IPOB at a national level and attending meetings and events but gave no details of those activities. The evidence of Mr X (see page 46) confirmed that he was a member of IPOB, served as the PRO and attending executive meetings and UK general meetings and rallies but no further details were given in the witness statement. The grounds fail to identify any oral evidence that was given. Accordingly the FtTJ’s overall assessment at paragraph 45 is consistent with the evidence.
80. The FtTJ assessed the evidence, and it was open to him to find that he was one figure in a regional part of the party (i.e. in a town in the UK) as opposed to any national level (see paragraph 46 (a)). As to the role of PRO, whilst the FtTJ accepted that was said to be his role, the FtTJ was entitled to consider what that title actually meant. Mr Diwnycz submitted that the evidence demonstrated it was no more than a nominal role. That was in essence the assessment made by the FtTJ (see para 46 (d)). The FtTJ was entitled to find that in terms of being a public relations officer, he did not post any material on social media, which the FtTJ found to be unusual for someone involved in public relations and also gave reasons for rejecting the appellant’s explanation that it was due to financial constraints. The appellant have a Facebook account but accepted that he had not posted on social media ( see para 46 (d)). The FtTJ considered the evidence which referred to him being involved in organising rallies but in the light of the evidence (letter page 61and the witness evidence) it had not been demonstrated that his assessment made at para 46(b) was not reasonably open to him. The FtTJ found that there was no sufficient evidence to demonstrate the nature of his involvement or role and gave the example that there are no emails to demonstrate that he was a “key player” in organising rallies or what in fact he did as part of that involvement (see paragraph 46 (b)).
81. Whilst the FtTJ accepted that the appellant had attended demonstrations, this was based on the photographs provided from 2022 which the FtTJ assessed. He was entitled to find that they did not show that the rallies were “particularly significant events” ( see para 46 ( c)) and that in light of the burden of proof on the appellant, the FtTJ that he had not been provided with any social media evidence that the rallies were widely publicised or were reported in the media. The 3 rallies evidenced by the photographs showed 2 in the North of England and one in London ( see para 46 ( e)). Those are findings which were reasonably open to the FtTJ to make on the evidence that he was presented with and properly assessed. Consequently the assessment of the appellant’s profile was one that was open to the FtTJ to make.
82. Dealing with an issue raised by Mr Chowdhury in his oral submissions, although not in the grounds, related to his submission that the appellant’s role meant that he was on the “radar“ of the Nigerian authorities and therefore would be at risk on arrival at the airport. Whilst this is an issue not expressly raised in the grounds, it seems to me that it relates to the issue of risk generally and therefore should be considered.
83. As set out above the grounds fail to establish that the assessment made by the FtTJ as to the appellant’s role was flawed. His profile is therefore not a leadership role and the FtTJ did not find that any role of PRO had any particular significance and found on the evidence he was a low-level member or supporter ( see paragraph 47).
84. Mr Diwnycz submitted that there was no evidence that the appellant’s activities in the UK had come to the attention of the authorities in Nigeria and referred to the findings made there were no social media recordings of the events. He also relied upon the evidence set out at paragraph 57 from the appellant’s witness said he was not aware of any interest or contact from the Nigerian state authorities towards his group (of which the appellant is a member).
85. The FtTJ had made a finding in the earlier part of his decision that the appellant was not of any interest to the Nigerian authorities when he left the country and as set out in the earlier findings from paragraphs (38 – 44 ). He therefore found the appellant did not have any profile when he left Nigeria. A risk arising out of surveillance of sur place activities is not necessarily dependent upon any prior interest of the authorities however on the particular facts of this appeal, the FtTJ made a number of findings of fact as to the extent of his sur place activities. The FtTJ assessed the appellant’s activities in the U.K. as low-level and at its highest that he had attended rallies, although no details were given, and attended meetings. The FtTJ found that the rallies/demonstrations had not been shown to be particularly significant events (paragraph 46 (c )), nor had it been shown that they have been widely publicised or reported on by the media (see para 46( d)) nor did the appellant have any social media profile or presence. The FtTJ considered this issue in the light of the objective evidence.
86. Mr Chowdhury identified paragraph 10.5 from the CPIN. It reads as follows: 10.5 Monitoring of 'Biafra' groups in Nigeria and the UK:
10.5.1 The Nigerian Nationality Security Agencies Act established the Nigerian intelligence services responsible detecting and preventing crimes against the state inside and outside of Nigeria (see Country Policy and Information Note: Nigeria - Actors of Protection). There is, however, no information in the sources consulted of the capability, presence and activities of the intelligences services in the UK (see Bibliography).However, this should also be read with 2.4.28 of the 2022 CPIN which states: Open-source material suggests that the Nigerian government may monitor groups it considers a threat in Nigeria and that it may have blocked websites advocating 'Biafran' independence. However, there is no specific information in the sources consulted indicating that the Nigerian government monitors the activities of members of the Nigerian diaspora in the UK, including supporters of 'Biafran' separatist groups (see Separatist groups outside of Nigeria and Bibliography).
87. Whilst the findings of fact made by the FtTJ set out that he accepted that the Nigerian authorities are capable of monitoring events such as rallies and also that the media is capable of reporting on them, the FtTJ found that there was no evidence that it had occurred in the particular circumstances of this appellant. He stated, “ Whilst I accept that the objective evidence tends to show that the Nigerian authorities are capable of monitoring such events, and that the media is capable of reporting on them, I have no evidence that occurred in these instances and, in light of the nature of the demonstrations depicted in the photographs and the lack of proof of social media or media coverage, it seems to me I am unable to accept the proposition that there is a real risk that the authorities know of the appellant’s involvement in these activities” ( see para 46(f )).
88. At paragraph 47, the FtTJ also did not accept, even to the lower standard, that the appellant had proved his activities had come to the attention of the authorities or that he has any kind of political profile in Nigeria. Those findings of fact were made by reference to the objective material but also in the light of this particular appellant’s individual activities and profile. The FtTJ was also entitled to take into account the evidence from the appellant’s own witness that he was not aware of any interest or contact from the Nigerian state authorities towards his group. He did not consider that evidence in isolation but considered in the light of the arguments advanced and as set out at paragraph 57 but was entitled to conclude that, “I am left with the evidential position that there is no sufficient or reliable evidence of any state interest in the appellant or his activities in the United Kingdom or in general.”
89. Mr Chowdhury relied upon the written grounds at paragraph 6, 7 when read with paragraph 10. His oral submission was that the FtTJ erred in law when evaluating the appeal concerning risk on return as it contradicted the respondent’s policy. He submitted that the respondent acknowledged that IPOB was a proscribed organisation and that any IPOB activities would be designated as an act against the state, and in light of his activities there was a real risk of persecution and that he was liable to be arrested by the authorities.
90. In this respect Mr Chowdhury referred the tribunal to paragraph 61 of the FtTJ’s decision. He submitted that the FtTJ accepted that membership of IPOB might be a criminal offence at paragraph 61 and therefore the FtTJ misdirected himself in light of the respondent’s position set out in the CPIN that IPOB is a proscribed organisation.
91. Mr Chowdhury further submitted that paragraph 6 of the written grounds for permission was the “key to the appeal”. It is argued that the FtTJ erred in law as his decision contradicted the respondent’s policy. He submitted that paragraphs 61 and 62 which assessed risk was legally flawed in light of the respondent’s acceptance of his membership of IPOB and therefore the judge was wrong to say that there was no sufficient evidence of risk of arrest. His membership would be considered an offence and therefore an arrestable offence if he expressed political opinion for IPOB. Mr Chowdhury identified the conclusion of paragraph 62 is also being the main error i.e. that the reference that even if he were to continue with limited political activities in Nigeria he would not be at risk. Mr Chowdhury submitted that it was impossible for the appellant to voice his support for IPOB and continue with his leadership position. He submitted that this was totally against the material in the CPIN.
92. Mr Chowdhury relied upon the material in the CPIN 2024 at paragraphs 6.2- 6.22 as follows:
6.2.2 The FH report covering events in 2023 stated: 'Nigerians in the southeast risked arbitrary arrest during the government's campaign against the IPOB's [Indigenous People of Biafra] armed wing, which began in 2021.' [122]
93. And paragraph 6.6.1 6.6 Enforced disappearances
6.6.1 The AI Nigeria annual report for 2022 stated:
'Several men were forcibly disappeared by the authorities in response to the activities of IPOB.
'Sunday Nwafor, Uzonwanne Ejiofor and Wilfred Dike, who had been secretly detained by the military without charge or trial since 27 February 2020, were released on 14 September [2022].
'Government critic Abubakar Idris remained missing since his abduction by suspected state agents in 2019.' [154]
6.6.2 The Media Foundation of West Africa (MFWA), 'a regional independent non- governmental organisation' [155], in an article dated 5 March 2024, reported that Idris, 'popularly known as Dadiyata', was still missing [156].
6.6.3 The AI Nigeria annual report for 2023 stated:
'Maduabuchi Obinwa, aged 22, disappeared after his abduction on 24 April 2022, when security agents from the Awkuzu State Criminal Investigation Department raided his house in Ekwulobia, Anambra state. Obiora Agbasimalo, a governorship candidate, was abducted by gunmen on 18 September 2021 while going to an election campaign outing in Azia town, Anambra state. Sunday Ifedi and Calista Ifedi, a couple, were taken by security operatives from their home in Enugu on 23 November 2021, because of their alleged membership of Indigenous People of Biafra. The fates and whereabouts of all these people remained unknown at the end of the year.' [157]
94. 6.6.4 However, the USSD human rights report of 2023 stated: 'There were no reports of disappearances by or on behalf of government authorities.' [158]
95. Mr Chowdhury relied on paragraph 7 of the grounds where it was submitted that the respondent’s CPIN 2022 supported the claim that any member of IPOB would be at risk on return and as stated at paragraph 6 of the written grounds, the FtTJ’s decision therefore contradicted the respondent’s policy. The grounds rely upon paragraph 9.1.6 to demonstrate that any member of IPOB would be at risk.
96. The CPIN 2022 at paragraph 9.1.6 states as follows:
9.1.6 Whilst not an area in the South East zone, Pulse, a Nigerian news website, published in October 2020 an article concerning Rivers State, an area where Igbo live:
'Governor Nyesom Wike of Rivers has signed an executive order to reinforce the ban on the Indigenous Peoples of Biafra (IPOB) and its activities in the State.
'He made this known in a statement by Mr Kelvin Ebiri, Special Assistant (Media) to the Governor.….
'According to the statement… "the State government is opposed to the presence and activities of the legally-proscribed and anarchic IPOB and whatever it stands for in Rivers State… we have everything against the presence and activities of the legally-proscribed IPOB and whatever that group stands for in Rivers State," the governor warned.
'"This is clearly a terrorist group which existence, creed, mission and activities are strongly denounced even by the Government and peoples of South-Eastern States of the country.
'"I have, therefore, signed the executive order to reinforce the total ban on IPOB and its activities in Rivers State or any part thereof and nothing will stop us from enforcing this ban in its entirety,'' he said.
'The statement also added that Wike also "directed security agencies and the Chairmen of Local Government Areas to fish out and resolutely deal with any member of IPOB found in any community following the executive order and other legal instruments''.' [74]
97. Mr Chowdhury also submits that it is not essential that the appellant must be a significant leader of IPOB and that even if a senior leadership role was not established, the FtTJ erred in law by overemphasising this requirement. In the light of the appellant being found to be a credible, open and active member of IPOB in the UK, this association alone places him at risk of persecution upon return to Nigeria and that the FtTJ should have applied the lower standard of proof. He submitted that the overall position of the respondent in the CPIN is that there is a genuine risk for IPOB members when they return to Nigeria and therefore the FtTJ’s decision is contrary to the material in the CPIN. He submitted that the conclusion on risk is flawed and should be revisited by the Tribunal.
98. Mr Diwnycz on behalf of the respondent submitted that he relied upon the reasoning given by the FtTJ who refused permission. He submitted there was no evidence that this appellant was of particular interest to the Nigerian authorities on the basis that his activities have or would bring him to their attention. He submitted that it was accepted that IPOB was proscribed, and this was set out in the CPIN but that this did not necessarily mean that there was a risk to the appellant, and there was no reason to think that he would go to the police and tell them that he was a member of IPOB. Mr Diwnycz submitted that whilst his credibility was not in issue per se, it was an interpretation as to risk and the FtTJ assessed the issue of risk on the evidence before him.
99. By way of reply Mr Chowdhury submitted that the FtTJ erred in law in the risk assessment and that the fact-finding judge did not dispute his role or his credibility and did not find that his activities made him unsuitable to be recognised as a refugee. The CPIN accepted that all members of IPOB would be at risk and his activities in the UK were recognised by the respondent, therefore the FtTJ misdirected himself by not identifying that the appellant was at risk.
100. At paragraph 48 of his decision the FtTJ referred to his earlier findings of fact and his assessment that the appellant’s role could not be described as significant and was a low-level member and supporter. He also set out that he did not accept, even to the lower standard, that the appellant approved his activities had come to the attention of the authorities that he has any kind of political profile in Nigeria. Notwithstanding those findings the FtTJ accepted that they were not necessarily determinative of the appeal therefore he went on to assess whether the appellant as a member of IPOB as he had found, faced a real risk of persecution upon return.
101. Between paragraph 49 – 62 the FtTJ undertook that risk assessment and did so by reference to the country material in the relevant CPIN’s and the expert report as he stated at paragraph 51. There is no challenge raised either in the written grounds or in the oral submissions that the FtTJ erred in his assessment of the expert report which analysed between paragraph 51 – 53. The FtTJ set out the conclusions of the report at paragraph 52 but gave reasons why he attached less weight to the report stating that there was scant evidence about IPOB and highlighted that the report dealt with the situation in general but mostly dealt with MASSOB between paragraph 19 – 24 and that the report did not deal in any meaningful way with IPOB members in particular all their treatment since the group was proscribed in 2017.
102. The grounds are advanced on behalf the appellant on the basis of the material in the CPIN’s and do not refer to the expert report . I therefore address the points raised by Mr Chowdhury.
103. There is no dispute that the FtTJ took into account the 2 relevant CPIN’s. The FtTJ expressly said so at paragraph 31 and can be seen from his decision by the references made to the content of the CPIN when assessing the issue of risk. What is in dispute is his interpretation of the contents of those CPIN’s. Mr Chowdhury submits that the FtTJ misdirected himself on the issue of risk in his consideration of the CPIN’s. Mr Diwnycz submits that the FtTJ undertook an individualised risk assessment and gave adequate and sustainable reasons for that assessment.
104. Whilst it is submitted that the FtTJ erred in law in evaluating risk on return as his assessment “contradicted the respondent’s policy” ( see paragraph 6 and 7 of the written grounds and oral submissions) that is not supported by the material relied upon.
105. While there is no dispute that IPOB is a proscribed organisation since 2017 as recognised by both the FtT at paragraph 54J and the respondent in the CPIN, there is no policy statement made on behalf the respondent either in the CPIN or otherwise that all members/supporters of IPOB are at risk on return. The grounds rely on a particular paragraph of the CPIN a paragraph 9.1.6 but only cites part of it. The paragraph sets out a report posted on a Nigerian news website about Rivers State and where it was said that an executive order was signed to reinforce the ban on IPOB and its activities in that state. The part relied upon by Mr Chowdhury which is cited in the grounds states that, Wike “directed security agencies and the Chairmen of Local Government Areas to fish out and resolutely deal with any member of IPOB found in any community following the executive order and other legal instruments’’. There is no reference in this particular paragraph of the CPIN in the ASA or that it was expressly relied upon by the appellant’s representatives before the FtTJ. Nonetheless on a reading of this paragraph it does not provide support for the point made in the grounds and by Mr Chowdhury that it indicates all members of IPOB are at risk in Nigeria. That paragraph refers to a particular state; Rivers State which is in the Niger Delta region and not the south-eastern part of Nigeria and is not demonstrated that either the executive order was signed nor how it was implemented. Paragraph 9.1.7 refers to government raiding cities as they search for training camps for the armed wing of the IPOB group. It is not suggested the appellant as any interest or association with the part of the group associated with violence. That is recorded by the FtTJ in the decision at paragraph 54 . The FtTJ also recorded his assessment at paragraph 56 that he took the view that the Nigerian government is entitled to proscribe the activities of parties that include elements that support the use of violence to pursue political ends, albeit the judge stated that “I have borne in mind the appellant is not implicated in military or violent activity and that the Nigerian states record in dealing with such parties and individuals has to be scrutinised with care to ensure that the state conduct is not disproportionate or persecutory in nature” which is reflected in the material in the CPIN (see para 2.4.25).
106. Accordingly it has not been demonstrated by reference to paragraph 9.1.6 that the respondent’s policy was that any member of IPOB would be at risk on return. If there was any such a policy in the CPIN it is that referred to by the FtTJ where he cite paragraph 2.4.23 and 2.4.24 which states,
2.4.23 Where a person is able to demonstrate that because of their links to IPOB they are likely to face prosecution or punishment which is disproportionate to the crime committed or discriminatory; or faces detention in degrading or inhuman conditions or torture then such treatment is likely to amount to persecution (see country policy and information note, Actors of protection and Country Background Note for more information about the criminal justice system, including detention conditions).
2.4.24 Each case will need to be carefully considered on its facts, taking into account the individual's behaviour and actions, previous state interest and conduct of family members.
107. The FtTJ applied an individualised risk assessment. The FtTJ also set out paragraphs 2.4.29 and 2.4.30 that the onus is on the person to demonstrate that they are of interest to the government because of their profile and activities and are a risk of serious harm or prosecution.
108. When undertaking that individualised assessment at paragraph 57, it was open to the FtTJ to find that there was no evidence that the appellant was of particular interest to the authorities or that his activities (meaning his activities in the UK or prior to leaving Nigeria) had or would bring him to their attention. In that assessment the FtTJ the evidence recorded from Mr X that he was not aware of any interest about his group (IPOB UK) consistent with paragraph 2.4.28 and 10.5.1 of the CPIN. At paragraph 58 the FtTJ concluded that there was no evidence that his family were involved in IPOB and separatism more widely and no other factor had been identified which will enhance his personal risk and that he had “no in country profile”.
109. As regards the country materials the FtTJ referred to the of the lack of evidence as to the current treatment of IPOB members as set out at paragraph 59, where the FtTJ identified the lack of evidence which related to, the details or number of arrests, the nature of the allegations, identities of those arrested, on what charges and on what evidence, the detention conditions, the sentences received, the nature of court proceedings, the length of any detention and any rights to bail. The FtTJ reached his summary at paragraph 60 – 62 as follows:
“60.In summary, it seems to me there is no factual basis set out for the assertions and conclusions in the expert report as to future risk that was provided on behalf of the appellant or sufficient proof that treatment of a disproportionate or persecutory type would apply to him given his limited role. The report principally deals with MASSOB and does not contain any sufficient fact specific information or analysis of the treatment of IPOB members now such as to discharge the burden upon the appellant even when looking at all the evidence in the round.
61. Therefore, whilst I accept the appellant’s membership of IPOB might be a criminal offence, I have no sufficient evidence as to the risk of arrest (especially given my findings about his role above) and insufficient evidence to prove that any arrest and/or prosecution would amount to persecution or serious harm under article 3/the humanitarian protection provisions nor that he would suffer such harm because of any arrest. In making that judgement I have also applied my mind to the CPIN as to the Actors of Protection.
62. Therefore, in my judgement, the appellant has not proved, even to the low standard, that he faces a real risk of persecutory treatment or serious harm even if he were to continue his limited political activities in Nigeria and his claims for asylum and humanitarian protection are refused.”
110. It is clear that this was based on the FtTJ’s factual assessment of the appellant’s limited role. At its highest that role whilst he was an organiser in the limited way accepted by the FtTJ in the UK, this was not necessarily the position in Nigeria. The material did not demonstrate that all of those who attend rallies/demonstrations would be subject to arrest and detention. There was material in the CPIN which identified those with a higher profile such as those involved in activities of violence or as a coordinator or those training camps. The FtTJ did not find that the appellant had such a profile nor that he would have such a profile on return. As the FtTJ recorded, the material was out of date and that there was no sufficient evidence of the current treatment of members of IPOB either in the expert report but also in the CPIN’s. Overall the interpretation of the evidence was for the FtTJ to assess on the arguments that he had heard and the material he was directed to. The grounds do not demonstrate that the FtTJ’s assessment was in error or that he misdirected himself.
111. As to ground 2, both advocates agreed that the ground fell to be considered with ground 1. The FtTJ addressed whether there were very significant obstacles to the appellant’s integration to Nigeria and did so by assessing the matters in favour of the appellant as set out at paragraph 63. The FtTJ took into account that the appellant has been in the United Kingdom for over 8 years and accepted that he has likely forged significant social links since being in the United Kingdom, particularly with his brother and become accustomed to life here. He also took into account that supporters of the Biafran movement may face some hostility from some elements of the Nigerian state and membership of IPOB is proscribed. The FtTJ also found that the appellant is a Nigerian National and educated and that having heard the appellant give evidence the FtTJ was satisfied that he is intelligent. He had lived for most of his life in Nigeria. He speaks English and other language(s) spoken in Nigeria. He has worked in Nigeria and had family ties including a son and some other family members in country. The FtTJ was entitled to take into account that the appellant had remained part of the Nigerian diaspora whilst in the UK and was familiar with the culture and customs of Nigeria. The FtTJ assessed that the appellant was fit for work and had no mental health or physical health problems of any material significance or that would impact on his integration or the task of seeking employment. At paragraph 64 the FtTJ addressed the particular arguments advanced on behalf of the appellant but stated that he did not accept the appellant’s evidence that the skills he had developed in the UK would not be useful to in Nigeria because he found that such skills are likely to be transferable between societies and job markets to a certain degree. Contrary to the grounds, the FtTJ also took into account his political opinion but found that his political opinions were unlikely to mean that he is isolated from society because there would be some who share his views count on the continued support of those in the United Kingdom with who we could continue to communicate with and continue his relationships. The judge also concluded that it was likely that his family members in Nigeria would be able to give the appellant some assistance upon return to Nigeria given the cultural obligations that are likely to arise some contact with his cousin ( see paragraph 64).
112. For those reasons it has not been established that the those findings of fact were either not open to the FtTJ to reach or that the FtTJ failed to properly assess whether there were significant obstacles to his integration to Nigeria and his factual assessment is consistent with the decision of Kamara v SSHD [2016] EWCA Civ 813 at paragraph 14, “The idea of "integration" calls for a broad evaluative judgment to be made as to whether the individual will be enough of an insider in terms of understanding how life in the society in that other country is carried on and a capacity to participate in it, so as to have a reasonable opportunity to be accepted there, to be able to operate on a day-to-day basis in that society and to build up within a reasonable time a variety of human relationships to give substance to the individual's private or family life”. That was the assessment that the FtTJ conducted.
113. For those reasons it has not been established that the grounds demonstrate any errors of law in the decision reached by the FtTJ. In conclusion and when properly analysed, the grounds of challenge amount to no more than a disagreement with the decision. Consequently it has not been demonstrated that there were errors of law which vitiated his overall adverse conclusions on the appellant’s credibility, his account and the issue of risk on return as the grounds assert therefore the decision of the FtTJ shall stand.

Notice of Decision:
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error on a point of law; the decision of the FtTJ shall stand.

Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds
Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds
18 June 2025