Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-000255
First-tier Tribunal No: EA/53519/2023
LE/03149/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 23 June 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LANE
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE GREER

Between

HAFIZ ABRAR ABBAS
Appellant
and

THE ENTRY CLEARANCE OFFICER
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms A Kaoser, of AK Solicitors Ltd
For the Respondent: Mrs Newton, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard on 2 June 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is the Appellant’s appeal against the Respondent’s decision of 8 May 2023 to refuse his application for an EUSS Family Permit of 13 March 2023. He appeals on the grounds that the Respondent’s decision is not in accordance with the Settlement Scheme Immigration Rules.
2. The matter was previously before Upper Tribunal Judge Kebede. In a written decision promulgated on 1 August 2025 the Upper Tribunal set aside a decision of the First Tier Tribunal dismissing the Appellant’s appeal against the Respondent’s decision. At [8] of the Upper Tribunal’s decision, the Upper Tribunal preserved the finding in respect of the relationship between the Appellant and the Sponsor and directed that the decision should be remade in the Upper Tribunal.
Issues
3. The parties agreed before us that a single issue falls to be determined in this appeal, namely, was the Appellant dependent upon his father on 13th March 2023. The parties agreed that the applicable definition of dependency is that at Annex 1 to Appendix EU Family Permit to the Immigration Rules.
Findings and Reasons
4. Where it has been necessary for us to resolve disputed questions of fact, we have done so by considering the evidence in the round and applying the balance of probabilities. We have taken all of the evidence into account, whether or not expressly referred to below.
5. We preserve the finding of the First-tier Tribunal that the Appellant is the biological son of the Sponsor. The sole question before us is dependency.
6. We accept that the Sponsor has, since at least October 2022, sent regular remittances to the Appellant in Pakistan. The documentary evidence demonstrates continuing transfers broadly in the region of £100 per month. We also accept that the Appellant resides in hostel accommodation in Sahiwal and incurs ordinary living expenses including accommodation, food, clothing, mobile data and transport costs. What is in dispute is whether the Appellant has income other than that which is sent to him by the Sponsor, and whether he has other savings or capital.
7. We find it appropriate to draw an adverse inference from the fact that the Appellant did not give oral evidence in his own appeal. According to the FCDO, Individuals in Pakistan can voluntarily give evidence from Pakistan by video link (either as a witness or when appealing a case) in immigration cases. As Ms Kausar candidly accepted at the hearing before us, the Tribunal the Appellant would have been singularly best placed to give evidence as to his financial circumstances. The explanation for his absence advanced by his advocate, that the Appellant believed that the hearing room was not equipped for live evidence to be called by video, was not a satisfactory one. In the absence of a satisfactory explanation of his failure to give oral evidence, we find it appropriate to attach only limited weight to the Appellant’s witness statement.
8. We find it appropriate to draw an adverse inference from the fact that the Appellant has not provided his bank statements to the Tribunal. Whilst the Appellant provided other documentary evidence about his outgoings, his bank statements would contain the best evidence about the Appellant’s income, expenditure and savings. There is no evidence before the Tribunal that the Appellant lacks access to banking facilities. He does not assert that he is unbanked in his witness statements, and when the matter was raised in evidence the Sponsor was unable to provide any explanation for the absence of bank statements. In those circumstances, we do not accept that the omission is explicable on the basis that such documents do not exist.
9. In her closing submissions, Ms Kausar argued that it was open to the Respondent to make enquiries with the Pakistani tax authorities as to whether the Appellant was registered to pay income tax or recorded as economically inactive. She submitted that, in the absence of such evidence, the Tribunal should draw an inference in the Appellant’s favour. We reject that submission. There is no evidential basis for concluding that the Respondent has access to, or is able to obtain, records held by the Pakistani tax authorities. In any event, the burden of proof rests on the Appellant. It is for him to establish the facts upon which he relies. He is legally represented and was on notice of the relevance of his financial circumstances, including any records bearing on his income or economic activity. Indeed, Ms Kausar indicated that such evidence was available to her, as the Appellant’s solicitor. In those circumstances, we do not accept that the absence of such material assists the Appellant. On the contrary, his failure to adduce available evidence relating to his tax status limits the extent to which we are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt in respect of his current finances.
10. Neither witness was able to explain how the Appellant supported himself during the period in which he was estranged from his family between 2014 and 2022. Whilst we accept that he was not on speaking terms with them during that period, the absence of any inquiry by those witnesses into his financial circumstances at that time reduces the weight we attach to their evidence as to his circumstances now. In our judgment, that omission undermines the reliability of their evidence concerning the Appellant’s financial position.
11. The Appellant’s sister gave evidence that, around 2014, the Appellant was provided with a financial interest in the family home. At the hearing before us, she was unable to say what became of that interest. She could not confirm whether the Appellant continues to own the property, whether it was sold and the proceeds retained, whether it has been let, or whether some other arrangement applies. The Appellant does not address this matter in his written evidence. We regard that omission as significant. It represents a material gap in the evidence concerning the Appellant’s financial circumstances.
12. We do not draw any adverse inference from the fact that the Appellant is described as living at various different addresses on the remittance receipts. We accept the explanation that an individual who lives in a hostel may use the address of a relative as one of convenience and may use a previous address so that it tallies with the address recorded on other identity documents.
13. What is of greater concern is that an October 2022 remittance receipt records the Appellant as a "Salaried Person" (FtT Bundle, Page 613). We do not regard that entry, without more, as establishing that the Appellant was in salaried employment at the time. However, neither witness was able to explain why that description appeared on the document or how the information came to be recorded. Given that the Appellant's financial circumstances lie at the heart of the issue of dependency, and that the Appellant did not give oral evidence, the absence of any explanation for this entry further undermines our ability to assess his financial position at the relevant time and contributes to our overall concerns regarding the reliability and completeness of the evidence relating to his claimed dependency.
14. We have stood back and considered all of the evidence in the round. Having done so, we find that the Appellant has not proved, on balance, that he is dependent upon the sponsor in order to meet his essential living needs. On the one hand, the Appellant did not give live evidence before the Tribunal, despite it being open to him to do so. He did not adduce his bank statements or his tax documents and did not provide a reasonable explanation for his failure to do so. The witnesses that he did call, were unable to assist the Tribunal over the Appellant’s current financial circumstances in Pakistan. On the other hand, the Appellant provided unchallenged evidence that he receives remittances from the Sponsor in the United Kingdom and unchallenged evidence that he has living expenses. Taking all of these considerations into account, we are not satisfied that the Appellant is dependent upon the Sponsor within the definition of Appendix EU Family Permit.
Notice of Decision:
1. The decision of the FtTJ involved the making of an error of law and is set aside.
2. The decision in this appeal is re-made and the appeal is dismissed.

J. Greer

Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Greer