Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-000296
UI-2025-000297

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/00403/2024
PA/00693/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

10TH June 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE CANAVAN

Between

M M
First appellant
K M
Second Appellant
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)

and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Z. Nasim, instructed by Lamptons Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms S. Lecointe, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 28 May 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellants are granted anonymity because the cases involve protection claims. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellants, likely to lead members of the public to identify them. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellants appealed the respondent’s decisions dated 02 and 17 January 2024 to refuse their protection and human rights claims.
2. First-tier Tribunal Judge Shiner (‘the judge’) dismissed their appeals in a decision sent on 27 November 2024. The judge summarised the basis of the appellants’ claims based on their witness statements, oral evidence, and other documentary evidence [20]-[21]. At [23] the judge made clear that he had considered the expert evidence ‘and documents (said to be) complaints made to the police’ by the first appellant’s former business partner, ‘H’ [23].
3. The judge then considered the psychiatric report prepared by Dr Kashmiri in respect of the second appellant. He accepted the doctor’s diagnosis of major depressive disorder, anxiety, and her opinion that the second appellant met the diagnostic criteria for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) [27]. However, the judge noted that the psychiatrist had not taken into account the likelihood that the second appellant would be given support by her parents if she returned to Pakistan. He noted that the appellant did not argue that there would be a breach of the European Convention on medical grounds alone.
4. The judge summarised the conclusions of the country expert, Dr Wali [28]-[32]. He accepted that the Tehreek-e-Labbaik (TLP) might have reach across Pakistan. However, he noted that the expert was unable to identify ‘H’ and his son, ‘S’ as leading members of the TLP. The expert’s opinion was also predicated on an acceptance of the account taken at its highest. The judge went on to summarise what other evidence might suggest that they had links to the TLP, but concluded that there were discrepancies in the evidence given by the appellants [33].
5. Having summarised the key elements of the evidence before him, the judge went on to make findings in relation to that evidence. The judge recorded that it was the first appellant’s oral evidence that their neighbour ‘T’ told him that H had been to their house and that it was T ‘who informed him of the police arrest warrant’. He noted that when asked why he had not obtained a witness statement from T, the first appellant said that he was no longer in contact with him. The judge noted that this conflicted with the evidence in a letter dated 12 September 2023 from a lawyer, F, which referred to the appellants’ case being brought to her attention by T. This also conflicted with the evidence given by the first appellant in his witness statement, where he said that he had instructed the lawyer himself. The first appellant also told the judge that it was T who sent a copy of the ‘police complaint’ dated 09 October 2020 by WhatsApp and then sent it in the post. The first appellant said that when the police came they gave T a copy of the complaint [34]. Based on this conflicting evidence the judge found the first appellant’s account of how he obtained the documents to be implausible. He also found that it was improbable that T would have been given a ‘copy of the warrant without a broad context as to why the police would do so, or country information as to such a practice of service or notice on an unrelated person.’ [35].
6. For similar reasons, the judge placed little weight on the evidence from the lawyer, F. The lawyer referred to a complaint dated 09 October 2020 but did not say whether she had obtained it from an official source. The judge found that it was reasonable to infer that the lawyer received the information about the complaint either directly from the appellants or indirectly from T [36]. The second appellant told the judge that she had not contacted the lawyer, which conflicted with the content of the letter. These concerns caused the judge to doubt the content of the letter from the lawyer, which was given little weight [36].
7. It was not in issue that the first appellant had a business dispute with H. The judge was satisfied that the appellants’ evidence on this issue was consistent. He also accepted that the appellants had been consistent in their evidence that a marriage was due to be arranged between the second appellant and S. The judge concluded that the engagement was cancelled ‘in light of the breakdown of the business’. He also found that it was plausible that there might have been some hostility between the second appellant and S following the breakdown of those arrangements [37].
8. However, the judge was not satisfied that the appellants had produced sufficient reliable evidence to show that S threatened to blackmail the second appellant with faked photographs. He noted that the second appellant had said in interview that the faked photographs were sent to the first appellant. Despite this evidence, there were no copies of the threatening messages. The judge did not accept the second appellant’s claim that she had deleted the threats from her phone and that her phone was stolen. It was not plausible that neither appellant was able to recover copies of any of the threats from ‘personal communication apps’. The judge also found that the second appellant’s account of the blackmail and other threats made by S lacked detail ‘as to the words used, times and circumstances in which they were stated or sent.’ He found that this undermined this aspect of the claim [38].
9. The judge went on to consider the evidence relating to the appellants’ claim that H made a false complaint to the police. The appellants produced a copy of a ‘letter of complaint’ said to be from H and his son S. However, the letter did not particularise the abusive and derogatory words that were said to have been used by the second appellant to H and his family. The judge also placed less weight on this evidence because it was said that the letter came to the appellants through T. The judge had doubts as to how he would have been able to obtain a copy of a complaint made to the police, especially in light of the first appellant’s evidence that T was reluctant to assist because he was fearful of the TLP [39].
10. The judge drew his findings together in this final paragraph:
’40. I consider all of this evidence in the round. I find that the Appellants have failed to show that there is a connection between Mr [H] and his family and the TLP. Consequently the Appellants have failed to show that they are at risk from the TLP. and (sic) I judge the wider community in Pakistan. They have failed to show that Mr [H] has any influence amongst the wider Pakistan community and so they will not be at risk from the community upon return. Having regard to all of the evidence I reject the evidence of the arrest warrant and Mr [H’s] statement. The Appellants have failed to prove to thelower (sic) standard rhthat (sic) they are genuine documents. I am drawn to conclude that the Appellants have sought to use the business and relationship dispute between them as factual basis to claim asylum by conflating that dispute to a claimed fear from the TLP, police and the community. I cannot find upon all of the evidence, and for the same reasons, that Mr [H] presents any risk to the Appellants. For all of those reasons I reject the Appellants claim as being at risk from the TLP, Mr [H], Mr [S], the community and the police. I add that the Second Appellant will not be returning to Pakistan as a lone women (sic) because she will have the support of the First Appellant.’ [my emphasis]
11. The appellants applied for permission to appeal the First-tier Tribunal decision on the following grounds:
(i) The First-tier Tribunal erred in fact and law when finding that documents relating to a complaint made to the police by the person that they fear were ‘not genuine’.
(ii) The First-tier Tribunal erred in failing to take into account material evidence given by the second appellant in interview when assessing the credibility of their account that that H and S are influential members of TLP.
(iii) The First-tier Tribunal failed to give adequate consideration to the psychiatric report relating to the second appellant in assessing the overall credibility of her account..
12. I have considered the First-tier Tribunal decision, the documentation that was before the First-tier Tribunal, the grounds of appeal, and the submissions made at the hearing, before coming to a decision in this appeal. It is not necessary to summarise the oral submissions because they are a matter of record, but I will refer to any relevant arguments in my decision.
13. The Supreme Court in HA (Iraq) v SSHD [2022] UKSC 22 reiterated that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist tribunal. In particular, judges of the specialist tribunal are best placed to make factual findings. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v SSHD [2007] UKHL 49 and KM v SSHD [2021] EWCA Civ 693. Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account: see MA (Somalia) v SSHD [2020] UKSC 49. When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out: see R (Jones) v FTT (SEC) [2013] UKSC 19. I have kept these considerations in mind when coming to my decision.
Decision and reasons
Ground 1 – documents
14. The first ground argues that the judge erred in finding that the documents produced in support of the appellants’ claim that H had made a complaint to the police were ‘not genuine’. In doing so, he failed to apply the correct burden and standard of proof relating to a finding of false documentation.
15. The documents produced in support of this aspect of the claim were:
(i) A letter in English from an Advocate of the High Court (‘F’) dated 12 September 2023, which was accompanied by a copy of her Bar Association Identity Card (but no proof of sending) (‘the advocate’s letter). The advocate stated that the case was brought to her attention by the first appellant’s neighbour, T. Subsequently, the second appellant contacted her asking for attested copies of the case;
(ii) A photocopy of a paper page (indicated by the hole punches on the left) of what appears to be a print-out or cut-out (but not a screenshot) entitled ‘Online Complaint Information’ dated 09 October 2020 (‘the online complaint’). The document was said to be ‘Attested’ by a Commissioner for Oaths in Lahore who signed but did not date it. The document was also accompanied by a translation;
(iii) A photocopy of a paper page (again indicated by hole punches on the right) of a document which is translated with the title ‘With holding Dairy # IT-10/9/2020-6229’ (sic) (‘the complaint letter’). The Urdu version of this document does not appear to contain this numbering at the top though. It is addressed to the Police Station in Iqbal Town, Lahore and takes the form of a letter to the police from S complaining of threats made by the second appellant on 29 November 2020. I note that this might be an error in the translation because the version of the document in Urdu gives the date as ’29-09-2020’, which would make more sense given the date the complaint was said to have been made.
16. I accept that the respondent’s decision letter did not make a specific allegation of forgery. However, nor did it accept the documents produced to support the appellants’ claim. The respondent made clear that the documents should be given ‘little weight’. The respondent could not verify their authenticity because they were not original documents. The respondent also found that the documents also gave ‘vastly different accounts’.
17. I find that it was within a range of reasonable responses to the evidence for the judge to find that the content of the advocate’s letter dated 12 September 2023, well after the complaint that was said to have been made in 2020, contrasted with the evidence given by the appellants.
18. The first appellant initially told the judge that he was the one who instructed the lawyer in Lahore. Most likely when the content of the advocate’s letter was put to him in cross-examination, he then said that it was T who took the case to the advocate on his behalf. It was also open to the judge to find that the first appellant’s claim that T was reluctant to assist because he feared the members of the TLP appeared to be inconsistent with the evidence which indicated that he was the person who approached the advocate in Lahore in 2023. The first appellant also claimed that it was T who sent the documents to him by WhatsApp and then sent it in the post. No evidence was produced to support this assertion. In her statement, the second appellant also said that T was the person who contacted the advocate in Lahore. However, contrary to what was said in the advocate’s letter, the second appellant told the judge that she did not have any contact with the advocate.
19. I find that nothing significant seems to turn on what appears to be the judge’s interchangeable use of the term ‘police arrest warrant’ [34] and ‘complaint letter’ [39]. The appellants themselves don’t appear to suggest that an arrest warrant has been issued. Although the term is not used by the appellants, what they described was the First Information Report (FIR) process used in Pakistan where an initial complaint is made to the police. The FIR then informs the investigation process, which may or may not be followed by an arrest warrant.
20. I note that Dr Wali, who prepared the expert country report, is a Senior Lecturer in Religious Studies. He was not asked to comment on the authenticity of the documents, perhaps because his experience did not suggest any expertise in the law and legal processes in Pakistan. On the face of the complaint made in 2020, no overt allegation of blasphemy was identified in the Online Complaint Form. The offence category was recorded as: ‘Other Crime’. The key allegations made in the complaint letter were of harassment and threats to kill. The complaint letter only made an oblique allegation that the second appellant was ‘a wicked girl’ who had ‘illicit relations with different boys’ and that she ‘abused the complainant’s faith by using derogatory words’. By the time it was described by the advocate, 3 years later, this was elevated to an allegation of blasphemy. Given that both appellants admitted to having heated arguments with H (first appellant’s statement at [16]) and S (second appellant’s statement at [15]) it was open to the judge to find that there was very little detail about what was said, either in their statements, or in the letter of complaint.
21. In assessing what weight could be placed on the documents relating to the police complaint, it was also open to the judge to find that the advocate’s letter did not explain how the copies had been obtained. That, and the first appellant’s evidence that the documents were sent to him by T, caused the judge to question how a neighbour would be able to obtain these documents. These were all findings that were reasonable and open to the judge to make on the evidence.
22. It is clear from a full reading of the decision that the judge had a series of concerns about inconsistent and implausible aspects of the evidence, which undermined the credibility of the appellants’ account and the reliability of the documents produced in support of this aspect of their claim. His findings relating to the advocate’s letter made clear that he gave ‘little weight’ to it [36]. This was consistent with the approach taken by the respondent in the decision letter relating to the second appellant.
23. I accept that the term ‘not genuine’ used in the judge’s concluding paragraph might give rise to some misunderstanding. However, there is a distinction between a finding that documents are not reliable as evidence and a formal finding that documents are false.
24. The first scenario might form part of an overall credibility assessment, concluding that documents are unreliable and cannot be given weight. In protection claims made before 28 June 2022, the overall burden of proof is on an appellant to show that their account, and the evidence they rely on, is reliable to the low standard of proof i.e. a reasonable degree of likelihood.
25. The second scenario relates to a more serious allegation relating to a positive act of dishonesty on the part of an appellant: see A v SSHD [2010] EWCA Civ 773. Because of the serious nature of such an allegation, the burden would shift to the person who makes the allegation to show that the appellant had dishonestly produced false or fraudulent documents. Cogent evidence would be required to a higher standard of proof i.e. the balance of probabilities.
26. In this case, no formal allegation of fraud or forgery was made by the respondent. Nor did the judge make any finding of positive dishonesty. I accept that the wording used in [40] is rather loose and was inadvisable given the approach that the judge had actually taken to his assessment of the evidence. However, when the decision is read as a whole, in my assessment it does not disclose a material error of law. It is clear that the judge conducted an exercise in assessing the credibility and reliability of the documents produced in support of the claim. He was finding that they could be given little weight as evidence to support the appellants’ account rather than making a formal finding that they were more likely than not to be false documents.
Ground 2 - interview
27. The second ground argues that, contrary to the judge’s findings at [33] of the decision, the second appellant had provided information about why she thought S was a member of TLP when she was interviewed.
28. The examples given in the grounds from the first asylum interview were that TLP ‘are very strong over there’ (qu.9 AIR1); ‘they have got a very close relationship.. with thereek Leebaik and that party work under them’ (qu.10 AIR1); and ‘they have got very strong relationship with TL party’ (qu.15 AIR1). In the second asylum interview she said ‘…my fiancé belongs to Tehreek-e-Labbaik..’ (qu.2 AIR2); ‘… he was my fiancé, I knew he was working within the party…’ (qu.11 AIR 2); ‘… his father was a leader and he was working for him…’ (qu.12 AIR2); ‘His influence in the party was very high, everyone listened to him and if they disobeyed him he would tell this jamaat…’; and ‘No I do not have evidence other than what he has told me.’ (qu.15 AIR2).
29. In my assessment, the second ground amounts to no more than a disagreement with the judge’s findings. Nothing in the evidence highlighted in the grounds goes any higher than bare statements made by the second appellant that her fiancé, S, was an influential member of the TLP. At [33] the judge referred to some of the answers the second appellant gave in interview. It is not arguable that it was outside a range of reasonable responses to the evidence for him to conclude that the evidence was not sufficiently detailed to show how the appellants knew that H and S were influential members of the TLP. Contrary to what was submitted at the hearing before the Upper Tribunal, it is clear that the judge did take into account whether the second appellant’s mental health might affect her evidence at the end of [33] before making this finding.
30. There is nothing to suggest that the judge had not taken into account the evidence given by the second appellant in her witness statement. Even if he had made specific reference to the explanation that she provided at [43] of the statement (that she was in a controlling relationship and only later came to understand that her fiancé’s references to his membership of a ‘jamaat’ was to membership of the TLP), it was still open to the judge to find that neither the second appellant nor her father had been able to provide adequate evidence to explain how or why they knew that H and S were influential members of the TLP.
Ground 3 – psychiatric evidence
31. The third ground largely repeats the same point made in the second ground about the second appellant’s mental health. The second appellant was treated as a vulnerable witness. This informs the conduct of the hearing and does not compel any particular conclusions about the credibility of the evidence given by a vulnerable witness. Beyond the existence of the diagnosis made by Dr Kashmiri, the third ground fails to particularise how or why the fact that the second appellant suffers from major depressive disorder, anxiety, and fulfils the diagnostic criteria for PTSD might affect her evidence.
32. Dr Kashmiri’s report is dated 24 March 2024. Dr Kashmiri based her diagnosis on the information provided by the second appellant. Dr Kashmiri recorded that the second appellant is in a constant state of worry and anxiety. At times she is confused, especially when she was engaged in overthinking. It was said that she sometimes has difficulty with her memory. The examples given were that she might forget to take her medication or if she has had a meal. The second appellant complained of recurrent headaches ‘associated with excessive overthinking/obsessive thinking’. Elsewhere in the report she was reported to have poor concentration and is easily distracted. Some of these difficulties are issues that might be common to many people to a greater or lesser degree.
33. Nothing in the second appellant’s statement dated 19 September 2024 suggested that, in general terms, she found it difficult to recall the detail of events clearly. The only mention of her mental health seems to be at [35] of her statement, where she accepted that there was a discrepancy between what was recorded in the Personal Information Questionnaire (PIQ) as to the reason why the relationship broke down i.e. that S had a relationship with other girls and was involved in ‘bad activities’ (qu.3(b) PIQ) as opposed to business problems between their fathers (qu.6 AIR2). Even then, the key explanation for the discrepancy is that her friend helped her to complete the PIQ because she was unwell at the time. In other words, it is suggested that it was an error in her friend’s understanding of the situation. In that statement, the second appellant responded to various matters raised in the decision letter, but did not suggest that her mental health might have affected her answers in interview, despite what had been recorded in Dr Kashmiri’s report.
34. It is clear from the decision that the judge had in mind the evidence relating to the second appellant’s vulnerability throughout. The judge made reference to the Joint President Guidance Note and treated her as a vulnerable witness. He monitored how she was presenting throughout the hearing but noted that she appeared to have no difficulty in understanding the questions and had no other concerns about her ability to engage with the process [19]. The judge considered and summarised the content of Dr Kashmiri’s report [27]. The judge considered whether the second appellant’s health issues might have affected her ability to give evidence when he made findings about the lack of detail given regarding H and S’s links to the TLP [33]. He noted that the second appellant’s evidence had been consistent in relation to other aspects of the claim [37].
35. The main reasons why the appeal was dismissed was (i) the lack of detail given by both appellants relating to H and S’s claimed links with the TLP [33]; (ii) the lack of supporting evidence of threats that were said to have been made by electronic methods of communication [38]; and (iii) the implausible and conflicting nature of the evidence given by both appellants about the FIR that was said to have been lodged with the police in 2020, which even if the evidence was taken at its highest, had not been taken any further by 2023 when the advocate’s letter was prepared [34]-[36] [39]. Only the last of those involved considering discrepancies in the evidence, but nothing in Dr Kashmiri’s report or the second appellant’s witness statement seemed to put forward her mental health as a potential explanation. Other discrepancies related to her father’s evidence. For these reasons, I find that the second ground fails to particularise any errors in the judge’s assessment of the credibility of the second appellant’s account.
36. For the reasons given above, I conclude that the First-tier Tribunal decision did not involve the making of an error on a point of law.
Notice of Decision
The First-tier Tribunal decision did not involve the making of an error on a point of law
The First-tier Tribunal decision shall stand

M. Canavan
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

02 June 2025