UI-2025-000326

• Status of case: Unreported
• Hearing date: 12 Sep 2025
• Promulgation date: 13 Nov 2025
• Publication date: 2 Dec 2025
• Last updated on: 2 Dec 2025

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-000326

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/59460/2023 LP/02619/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 13th of November 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE PINDER

Between

M Z
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr A Slatter, Counsel instructed by Aylish Alexander Solicitors.
For the Respondent: Ms M Gilmour, Senior Presenting Officer.

Heard at Field House on 12 September 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.


DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is the re-making of the decision in the Appellant’s appeal against the Respondent’s refusal of her protection and human rights claims. This follows my and Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Iqbal’s earlier decision to set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (‘the FtT’). The FtT decision dismissed the Appellant’s appeal on protection grounds and was set aside because this contained material errors of law. Judge Iqbal’s and my earlier decision (‘the error of law decision’) is appended to this decision as a separate annex.
2. Following a transfer order, I heard the re-making appeal on my own on 12th September 2025.
3. I have maintained the Anonymity Order in favour of the Appellant. I continue to consider that, on the specific facts of this appeal, the maintenance of the integrity of the United Kingdom’s immigration system and the Appellant having raised a claim to international protection are such that an Anonymity Order is a justified derogation from the principle of open justice.
4. As was recorded at para 24-25 of the error of law decision, the sole issue for me to determine is whether the Appellant faces a risk of trafficking on return and whether there is sufficiency of protection and/or a viable internal relocation option for the Appellant in light of any risk posed by her own family and any findings as to risk on trafficking. The FtT’s findings that the Appellant has been ill-treated by her father but would not face a risk from him (because of sufficiency of protection) nor her former boyfriend were preserved. As were the FtT’s findings on the Appellant’s Article 8 claim, these not having been challenged on appeal.
5. The Respondent’s decision refusing the Appellant’s protection and human rights claim is dated 19th October 2023.
The evidence
6. Prior to the hearing on 12th September 2025, the Appellant filed and served a skeleton argument and two supplementary bundles of evidence. This was in addition to the parties’ composite bundle of evidence of 326 pages, which had been prepared for the error of law hearing.
7. The first supplementary bundle of the Appellant’s (‘SB1’) contained a supplementary witness statement, further medical evidence concerning the Appellant, family photographs and the reproduction of the Appellant’s bundles before the FtT as well as background evidence consisting of the CPIN ‘Actors of Protection’ for Albania of February 2025 and other relevant materials. The second supplementary bundle comprised the Appellant’s medical records. I have given careful consideration to all of the written materials contained in all three bundles and the Appellant’s skeleton argument.
The hearing
8. The Appellant attended the hearing and was called to give oral evidence. She confirmed the truth and accuracy of her witness statements and adopted these as her evidence-in-chief. The Appellant was then cross-examined by Ms Gilmour on behalf of the Respondent. I also asked a couple of questions by way of clarification and there was no re-examination of the Appellant by Mr Slatter. Following the Appellant’s oral evidence, I heard legal submissions from both advocates, after which I confirmed that I would be reserving my decision. I have addressed both parties’ competing evidence and submissions below when setting out my analysis and conclusions.
Findings of fact and Conclusions
9. In reaching the findings of fact and conclusions set out below, I confirm again that I have very carefully considered the evidence as a whole. As I have recorded above and in the earlier error of law decision, there is no longer any material dispute as to the essential factual matrix in this case. This is as a result of the facts that the Respondent accepts and those found by the FtT, which have been preserved. Further details of the relevant factual background as initially claimed by the Appellant in this matter were also recorded at paras 3-5 of the error of law decision and so I do not rehearse this here.
10. The Appellant would be returning to Albania as a single woman with a child, who was born whilst in the UK in March 2022. She has given details of being in a relationship with a British citizen but they are not married and she has not sought to pursue a family life Article 8 ECHR claim as part of her appeal proceedings, whether at first instance or before me.
11. Both parties agreed that I am to consider and apply the country guidance decision of TD and AD (Trafficked women) CG [2016] UKUT 92 (IAC) to the Appellant’s circumstances on return, together with other relevant and available background information and evidence on country conditions in Albania in order to determine, taking into account any particular vulnerabilities, whether she will be at risk on return of serious harm (trafficking) and unable to access sufficiency of protection from the Albanian authorities or safely internally relocate to a different part of Albania.
12. Because the Appellant is not herself a victim of trafficking, having on her account escaped the plans of her former boyfriend to subject her to this in and/or from Italy, the Appellant’s claim does not raise a Refugee Convention reason and therefore does not engage the Refugee Convention. This is because the relevant country guidance on Albania has found that victims of trafficking may form a Particular Social Group, but women more generally or victims of domestic violence do not. The Appellant’s claim however does fall to be considered under Articles 3 and 8 ECHR.
13. I am required to take into consideration any factors relevant and as stipulated under s.8 Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc) Act 2004. Section 8 was invoked by the Respondent as a result of the Appellant not having claimed asylum in Italy and not having awaited the outcome of her asylum claim lodged in Ireland. The Respondent considered that this and the lack of a reasonable explanation from the Appellant engaged s.8 since this amounted to conduct which failed to take advantage of a reasonable opportunity to make an asylum claim or human rights claim while in a safe country (s.8(4)).
14. In light of the aspects of the Appellant’s claim that have been accepted either by the Respondent or the FtT, and which relate to the core of the Appellant’s account as it remains for me to consider, any damage to the credibility of the Appellant’s account arising from the application of s.8 of the 2004 Act does not in fact have much, if any, bearing on the issues that I need to resolve. Neither did Ms Gilmour suggest otherwise. There is otherwise nothing further before me, which requires any additional adverse credibility considerations pursuant to s.8.
15. When assessing the Appellant’s own account and evidence, my starting point is that of the FtT at [16] of the decision, where the Judge stated that “(h)aving seen and heard the appellant’s [sic] give evidence , I found the appellant to be a credible witness at the lower standard of proof. I say this because she gave clear, evidence relating to the key aspects of her claim and answered questions put to her with sufficient detail”.
16. I have reached the same conclusion following the Appellant’s oral evidence before me. Ms Gilmour did not seek to make any submissions critical of the Appellant’s honesty or her account more generally and whether the Appellant is to be believed. I also found the Appellant to have given her oral evidence in a straight forward manner, not seeking to embellish matters in any way.
17. Flowing from the previous finding of the FtT that the Appellant has been physically abused by her father, when he found out about her relationship with her former boyfriend (see [44] of FtT decision), I am satisfied that the Appellant would be returning to Albania without support or the ability to seek support from her family in Albania. I consider therefore that the Appellant’s circumstances on return, when she would be returning alone with a child who was born out of wedlock, are analogous to the vulnerable position of women summarised at sub-paragraph (b) of TD & AD. This states as follows:
“Those who have children outside marriage are particularly vulnerable. In extreme cases the close relatives of the trafficked woman may refuse to have the trafficked woman’s child return with her and could force her to abandon the child.”
Whilst the Appellant has not been trafficked to date, she has a child outside marriage and her close relatives have effectively disowned her.
18. This places her in a vulnerable position increasing the risks of the Appellant being subject to modern slavery on return. The CPIN states at paras 3.1.1-3.1.2 as follows:
3.1.1 Albania is primarily a source country for victims who are trafficked across Europe and the UK. In 2022, the government of Albania and NonGovernmental Organisations (NGOs) identified 110 potential victims/victims. Of these, 61 were potential victims of sex trafficking, 35 were potential victims of forced labour/forced begging, and 14 were potential victims of forced criminality. 80 of the victims were women and girls, 4 were men and 26 were boys (see Trafficking of persons).
3.1.2 Women and girls are usually trafficked for sexual exploitation. Males are mostly trafficked for labour exploitation/criminality (see Trafficking of persons).The majority of traffickers (68% or more) are relatives of their victims, or have close social ties with them (see Traffickers’ profiles and recruitment methods).
19. On the Appellant’s own account, which I accept, she overheard her former boyfriend planning to subject her to modern slavery when in Italy. The Appellant considers, as she stated in her oral evidence before me, that she had been trafficked by her former boyfriend, who had deceived her from Albania - albeit she was able to get away from him.
20. The risk of this happening again and of the Appellant becoming a victim of modern slavery on return is further increased as a result of the Appellant’s vulnerabilities in respect of her health. The Appellant suffers from anxiety and has been prescribed medication to help her address this (see para 17 of her witness statement dated 1st August 2025 and para 21 of her earlier statement dated 22nd February 2024). This is also corroborated by the Appellant’s medical records, which have been disclosed into these proceedings, where ‘anxiety disorder’ and loss of hair is recorded as an ‘active problem’.
21. I do not accept Ms Gilmour’s submissions that the Appellant has either exaggerated her mental health symptoms and needs, or has otherwise engineered these so that these gain more prominence than they would otherwise deserve as part of these proceedings. The Appellant has disclosed her medical records and these record the conditions as set out above as ‘active problems’.
22. An application of the relevant factors to consider from TD & AD lead me to conclude that the Appellant would be vulnerable on return. These include the absence of family support from her family in Albania, her returning as a single mother with a child born out of wedlock with the social stigma that continues to prevail in Albania and her poor mental health. In turn, I consider the same factors to assess whether the Appellant would be to access sufficiency of protection from the authorities, which following TD & AD are also relevant to this issue.
23. Drawing these factors together and addressing these against the Appellant’s likely circumstances on return, I make the following findings:
(i) The social status and economic standing of the Appellant’s family does not fall to be considered since it has already been found that the Appellant was physically abused by her father and she is not likely to be able to look to him and other members of her immediate family in Albania for support. Nor would it be reasonable to expect her to.
(ii) The level of education of the Appellant or her family – the same considerations as set out immediately above apply to the Appellant’s family. The Appellant herself was educated up to secondary school and has not worked in Albania. I consider her circumstances in respect of this factor to increase the Appellant’s vulnerability and not to provide a significant level of protection for her;
(iii) The Appellant’s state of health, particularly her mental health – as addressed above, this in my view increases the Appellant’s vulnerabilities on return and would hinder any ability of hers to seek protection;
(iv) The presence of an illegitimate child – similarly, as addressed above, this in my view increases the Appellant’s vulnerabilities on return and would hinder any ability of hers to seek protection;
(v) The area of origin – the Appellant originates from the North of Albania, which on the relevant country guidance increases her vulnerabilities on return there;
(vi) Age – the Appellant is 26 years old and therefore still of an age that is documented as being vulnerable to trafficking and modern slavery;
(vii) What support network will be available – as addressed above, the Appellant does not have any family support in Albania. However, it is correct that the Appellant has a sister in Italy and she has not demonstrated before me that she would not be able to benefit from financial support from her at least in the short-term on return to Albania.
I also do not accept that the Appellant’s boyfriend in the UK, a British citizen (SB1 p.33), would not be able to provide her support on return again at least in the short term. Mr Slatter submitted that if the Appellant is to return to Albania, this will entail the end of her relationship with him. That may be the case – I am not able to make a finding on this not having had any evidence from her boyfriend or his own circumstances.
24. Having considered the above, I am satisfied that without her sister’s and/or her boyfriend’s support, the Appellant’s vulnerabilities mean that she would face a real risk of being trafficked on return. The difficulty that the Appellant faces is that she has not demonstrated that she would be returning to Albania without any financial and emotional support from her sister and/or her boyfriend. The burden of proof does rest with the Appellant. Considering the Appellant’s own evidence, which is that she has been living with her boyfriend here in the UK for the last 4-5 years, this is indicative of a strong and supportive relationship. In light of this, I am unable to conclude that the support he has provided her and her child for a significant period of time would end as soon as the Appellant is returned to Albania.
25. On this basis, I am satisfied that any fear that the Appellant may have of being trafficked on return as a result of the vulnerabilities considered above would be allayed with the support that is likely to be available to the Appellant from her siblings who live outside of Albania and/ or her boyfriend from the UK.
26. For the same reasons, I do not consider that the Appellant has demonstrated that it would be unreasonable with the same support for her to relocate to Tirana. I accept Ms Gilmour’s submission that she would have access to the necessary health-care services there, which would assist the Appellant with her mental health needs. Neither has the Appellant demonstrated that her health needs and the stigma that this and her status as a single unmarried mother would place her under are so serious or severe that these themselves engage the UK’s obligations under Articles 3 or 8 ECHR.
27. Mr Slatter drew my attention to the fact that whilst found to be objectively unfounded, the Appellant’s subjective fear of her former boyfriend remains. This is also the case with the Appellant’s subjective fear of her father, which whilst accepted was found to be addressed with sufficiency of protection. In this context, Mr Slatter submitted that in line with NC v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 1379 at [26], the likely reality is that this genuine subjective fear will impede the Appellant’s re-integration in Albania by inhibiting her from registering in an area (see also para 15 witness statement dated 1st August 2025) and her willingness to explore work and accommodation opportunities.
28. There is considerable force in this submission but in light of my concerns set out above on the absence of relevant evidence, I am unable to find that the Appellant would be so inhibited. This is because she is likely to be able to benefit from physical, emotional and financial support from her boyfriend and from her sister. In the alternative, any such inhibition and its consequences would be alleviated by the provision of such support.
29. In light of my conclusions above, the Appellant’s appeal against the Respondent’s decision dated 19th October 2025 falls to be dismissed.
Notice of Decision
30. The decision of the FtT dated 13th November 2024 did involve the making of a material error of law and has been set aside, pursuant to the decision of Judges Pinder and Iqbal dated 23rd June 2025, duly annexed to this decision.
31. I re-make the decision by dismissing the Appellant MZ’s appeal against the Respondent Secretary of State’s decision of 19th October 2025.


Sarah Pinder

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

10.11.2025


IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-000326

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/59460/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

23/06/2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE PINDER
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE IQBAL

Between

M Z
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr A Slatter, Counsel instructed by Aylish Alexander Solicitors.
For the Respondent: Mr K Ojo, Senior Presenting Officer.

Heard at Field House on 16 May 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.


DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant appeals the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (‘the FtT/the Judge’). On 13th November 2024, the FtT dismissed the Appellant’s appeal against the Respondent’s decision of 19th October 2023, in which the Respondent refused the Appellant’s protection and human rights claim.
2. We have maintained the Anonymity Order in favour of the Appellant. We consider that, on the specific facts of this appeal, the maintenance of the integrity of the United Kingdom’s immigration system and the Appellant having raised a claim to international protection are such that an Anonymity Order is a justified derogation from the principle of open justice.
Factual and Procedural Background
3. The Appellant is a national of Albania, who is now 25 years old. She left Albania in November 2018 and she is from Koman Shokder, in the Northern part of Albania. Before fleeing Albania, the Appellant had been in a relationship with another man and when her father discovered this relationship, he locked her in a room, physically assaulted her and threatened to kill her. After managing to leave her family home, the Appellant travelled to Tirana with her boyfriend and onward to Italy.
4. After they arrived in Italy, the Appellant overheard her boyfriend speaking to someone else on the telephone about exploiting her. The Appellant did not tell her boyfriend about the conversation she had heard and instead, she left and contacted her sister who lives in Italy and who came to pick her up. From there, the Appellant then left Italy and travelled to the UK via Ireland.
5. Since being in the UK, the Appellant has become pregnant and gave birth to her son in March 2022. She is now in a different relationship with a British citizen, with whom she lives. The Appellant’s protection claim is grounded in her fear of being harmed by her father and her fear of being trafficked, by her previous boyfriend but also more generally. The Appellant appealed to the FtT against the decision of the Respondent and her appeal was heard on 10th October 2024.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal
6. In dismissing the appeal and in so far as is relevant to these proceedings, the Judge’s findings of fact and conclusions include the following:
(a) Having seen and heard the Appellant give evidence, the Judge found that the Appellant’s credibility was not undermined by a lack of detail or by inconsistencies as noted by the Respondent in her refusal decision. The Judge found the Appellant to be a credible witness because she gave clear evidence relating to the key aspects of her claim and answered questions put to her with sufficient detail – [42]-[43];
(b) The Judge accepted that the Appellant’s father had physically abused her when he found out about her relationship. The Judge also took into account the fact that the Appellant is much older now and can make a complaint to the authorities if she returns to Albania and if her father threatens to harm her. In addition, the Appellant has not provided any evidence which shows that her father is in a position to influence the authorities and thus to prevent criminal charges being brought against him should he try to abuse the Appellant on her return to Albania. The Judge considered that there would be sufficient protection for the Appellant in respect of her father and thus, concluded that the Appellant had not shown that she faces a real risk of persecution from her father – [44]-[45];
(c) With regards to the Appellant’s fears of her former boyfriend, the Appellant had not provided any cogent evidence to support her belief that he had intended for her to work as a prostitute. She had not provided any evidence to show that she had been trafficked by him. Furthermore, there was nothing to indicate that the former boyfriend has power and control over the local police or that he has any means of tracking down the Appellant if she returned and went to another area, such as Tirana. There was no evidence to indicate that he is still interested in the Appellant now that a period of six years has passed and the Appellant confirmed that she had had no contact with him since she left Italy. The Judge concluded that the Appellant had not shown that she faces a real risk of persecution from her former boyfriend either – [46]-[47];
(d) Concerning the Appellant’s fears of being trafficked on return more generally, the Judge commented at [48] that the country guidance authority of TD and AD (Trafficked women) CG [2016] UKUT 92 (IAC) “gives guidance in dealing with victims of trafficking and (the Judge has) found the (A)ppellant was not trafficked”. Nevertheless, the Judge went on to consider the Appellant’s individual circumstances against the factors listed in TD and AD (which the Judge listed at [49]) and the Judge’s assessment of these at [50]-[53] can be summarised as follows:
• The Appellant is 25 years old and has an illegitimate child;
• The Appellant has parents in Albania, but it is understandable that she will not turn to them for support in light of her father’s treatment of her, which the Judge accepted;
• The Appellant said that she was educated to secondary school level, had never worked in Albania but did work in the United Kingdom in the food industry and as such, should be able to find employment using the work skills she has acquired;
• The Appellant’s child is attending nursery and would be able to continue his education in Albania where there is a functioning education system;
• There was no reason why the Appellant’s partner cannot continue to support the Appellant when she returns to Albania at least until she is able to find employment;
• The Appellant has provided no evidence relating to her mental health.
(e) The Judge went on to consider background evidence and cited from the CPIN on Albania ‘Human Trafficking’ at [54] finding from this extract at [55] that a victim of trafficking, and a person such as the Appellant as a potential victim of trafficking, will be offered package of support to assist with reintegration, which includes education, vocational training, housing, and mental health counselling.
(f) In addressing the issue of stigma as a single mother, the Judge noted from the background evidence that a communication strategy is being set up to deliver tailored and targeted messages seeking to change harmful, social and gender norms across communities in the four specified regions – [56];
(g) On (re-)trafficking, the Judge also confirmed that she had regard to para 4.5.1 of the CPIN, which states that the State has taken reasonable steps “to prevent the persecution/serious harm of female victims of trafficking by operating an effective legal system for the detection, prosecution and punishment of acts constituting persecution/serious harm, which the person is able to access”. The Judge also noted the Appellant’s age and that she “is more mature than when she left Albania, is aware and alert to the risks of being trafficked and will be able to access the support on offer in Albania to victims of trafficking, or a person in the (A)ppellant’s circumstances”. The Judge concluded that the Appellant was not at risk of being trafficked if she is removed to Albania and she can access the available support and protection to re-establish herself there – [57]-[59].
7. At [62]-[87], the FtT considered the Appellant’s alternative Article 8 ECHR claim on grounds that the Respondent’s decision is a disproportionate interference with her private and family life established in the UK. Taking forward some of the Judge’s findings, the Judge concluded that the Appellant’s partner could return to Albania with her and/or could support her while she returns in order to apply for entry clearance as a partner of a British citizen, so that the Respondent’s decision did not pose a disproportionate interference with her rights under Article 8.
8. Accordingly, the FtT dismissed the Appellant’s appeal on all grounds.
The Appellant’s appeal to the Upper Tribunal
9. The Appellant applied for permission to appeal raising several grounds of appeal against the FtT’s decision and findings, which all effectively go to the same issue, namely whether the Judge conducted a correct assessment of the applicable country guidance and then whether the Judge applied this correctly to the Appellant’s appeal.
10. First, the Appellant argues that the Judge failed to take relevant matters into consideration when applying the relevant country guidance, namely her status as having had a child out of wedlock and whether this made her vulnerable on return (relevant pursuant to the fourth factor listed in TD and AD), her area of origin in Albania (the fifth factor) and the social status and economic standing of the Appellant’s family (the first factor).
11. Second, the Appellant submits that the Judge’s finding at [55] that the Appellant, as a potential victim of trafficking, will be offered package of support to assist with reintegration is contrary to the country guidance and was not supported by the evidence before the Judge. Lastly, that the Judge failed to consider whether the Appellant would encounter any risk upon leaving any shelter accommodation or similar support services, which the Appellant submits the Judge was required to do pursued to paragraph (f) of the head-note in TD and AD.
12. The Upper Tribunal in granting permission to appeal summarised that the Judge relied on a CPIN to inform a finding at [55], but that it was arguable that the CPIN did not support the finding. Thus, the grounds pursued were found to be arguable.
13. In response, the Respondent did not file and serve a Rule 24 reply.
14. At the hearing, both parties’ advocates made further oral submissions on each of the grounds of appeal pursued and Mr Ojo, on behalf of the Respondent, defended the FtT’s decision. We have addressed the Appellant’s written pleadings and the parties’ respective oral submissions in the section below when setting out our analysis and conclusions. At the end of the hearing, we reserved our decision and provide this below with our reasons.
Analysis and conclusions
15. We address all of the grounds pursued by the Appellant together since these effectively all concern how the Judge applied the country guidance of TD and AD, which remains applicable, to the Appellant’s circumstances and appeal.
16. We are satisfied that the Judge has made errors in applying the country guidance contained in TD and AD. Whilst it is correct that the Appellant has not been recognised as, and does not herself claim to be, a victim of trafficking, the country guidance had application in light of the Appellant’s claim to fear trafficking on return. The Judge recognised this at [49]. Whereas the Judge has identified some of the relevant factors to take into consideration pursuant to TD and AD at [50]-[53], we are first satisfied that the Judge fell into error when finding at [55] the following:
“the objective evidence shows that a victim of trafficking and indeed a person such as the appellant, a “potential” victim of trafficking, will be offered package of support to assist with reintegration which includes education, vocational training, housing, and mental health counselling.”
17. The Judge cited extracts from the CPIN at [54] in support of that finding – however, as identified in the Appellant’s grounds of appeal and in the grant of permission to appeal, the report and primary source cited in the CPIN and at [54] is a document from the Albanian authorities. It is not country guidance and is evidence that required evaluation against other competing background evidence, which the Judge did not undertake. This is especially as the CPIN also states very clearly at para 4.5.2 that there are not “very strong grounds supported by cogent evidence” to depart from the findings in TD and AD, an assessment of the person’s individual circumstances is still required, and when considering the factors cited at para 119(h) of TD and AD, a holistic approach should still be taken.
18. Para 119(h) of TD and AD provides as follows (underlined emphasis added, bold emphasis original):
“Trafficked women from Albania may well be members of a particular social group on that account alone. Whether they are at risk of persecution on account of such membership and whether they will be able to access sufficiency of protection from the authorities will depend upon their individual circumstances including but not limited to the following:
1) The social status and economic standing of her family
2) The level of education of the victim of trafficking or her family
3) The victim of trafficking’s state of health, particularly her mental health
4) The presence of an illegitimate child
5) The area of origin
6) Age
7) What support network will be available.”
19. At [55], the Judge appears to find that a package of support to assist reintegration on return is universally offered, and that such a package effectively entails sufficiency of protection. This is not what TD and AD states and as such, we are satisfied that the Judge has fallen into error by mis-applying the country guidance. Further by failing to consider whether the evidence relied upon by the Respondent, and which the Judge took into consideration at [54]-[55], amounted to very strong grounds supported by cogent evidence justifying the Judge to depart from the findings in TD and AD. This also applies to the Judge’s consideration of the CPIN at [57] (which we have summarised at para 6(g) above) when assessing the issue of trafficking more generally.
20. Similarly, the Judge has fallen into the same error at [56] when considering the issue of stigma that arises from the Appellant’s claim of being returned to Albania as a single, unmarried mother of one child. What was required of the Judge was to undertake a holistic assessment of the Appellant’s circumstances and whether these, with any vulnerabilities of the Appellant’s, meant that the Appellant faces a risk of trafficking on return. Whilst the Judge noted that the Appellant did not have any family support in Albania, had been ill-treated by her father and had had a child out of wedlock, the Judge has not in fact assessed whether these factors increase any risks that the Appellant may face on return. This is whether the decision is read as a whole, as per Mr Ojo’s submission, or when looking at the individual issues of risk of trafficking, sufficiency of protection and internal relocation.
21. We also accept that the Judge appears not to have weighed in the balance that the Appellant was from the North of Albania, a relevant consideration as per the country guidance. Whilst this in itself might not have been sufficient an error to interfere with the decision, we are satisfied that coupled with the other errors addressed above, the Judge’s decision does disclose material errors of law. The Judge found the Appellant to be credible and on the whole, the Judge accepted her account of past events. The errors reached by the Judge concern the issues of risk and sufficiency of protection, with the latter also flowing from the Judge’s findings in relation to the Appellant’s father. For these reasons, we are satisfied that these errors have had a material impact on the outcome of this appeal.
22. For completeness, we address here that we are less persuaded with the Appellant’s third ground of appeal. Any risk that may arise from an appellant leaving a shelter is to be assessed following a finding that an appellant is a victim of trafficking, who would be able to access such shelter accommodation. The latter was not a finding reached by the Judge at first instance and so on those findings, we do not consider the Judge to have erred in failing to go on to consider the guidance set out at paras 106, 109, and 111-112 of TD and AD.
23. We are of the view however that the material errors of law made by the Judge as pursued by the Appellant in her first and second grounds of appeal are sufficient and for the reasons above, we are satisfied that the FtT’s decision to dismiss the appeal should be set aside pursuant to s.12(2)(a) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007.
24. We have considered and applied the guidance in para 7 of the Senior President's Practice Statement as well as the guidance in AEB v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] EWCA Civ 1512 and Begum (Remaking or remittal) [2023] UKUT 46 (IAC). We are satisfied that retaining the appeal for re-making in this Tribunal is appropriate considering the limited nature of the remaining fact-finding that is required. The Judge’s findings that the Appellant has been ill-treated by her father but would not face a risk from her former boyfriend are preserved. The Judge’s findings on the Appellant’s Article 8 claim are also preserved, these not having been challenged on appeal.
25. At the next hearing, we will hear the Appellant’s appeal for re-making and determine whether or not she faces a risk of trafficking on return and whether there is sufficiency of protection and/or a viable internal relocation option for the Appellant in light of any risk posed by her own family and any findings as to risk on trafficking.
Notice of Decision
26. The decision of the FtT dated 13th November 2024 contained material errors of law and is set aside.
27. The parties are to have particular regard to the remaining directions:
(a) The Appellant is to file on CE-file and to serve on the Respondent by e-mail at [~] within 28 days of the date on which this decision was sent to the parties any further evidence to address the issues identified at para 25 above. The Appellant is also to confirm by the same date whether she requires an interpreter (and if so, the language preferred) at the next hearing or whether the appeal is to be conducted on submissions-only;
(b) The Appellant is to file on CE-file and to serve on the Respondent by e-mail at [~] a copy of her skeleton argument no less than 14 days before the next hearing;
(c) The Respondent is to file on CE-file and to serve on the Appellant, if so advised, a copy of her skeleton argument no less than 7 days before the next hearing;
(d) The appeal is to be re-listed for re-making, before UTJ Pinder and DUTJ Iqbal, with a time estimate of three hours, on the first available date in accordance with the timescales set out above and with Appellant Counsel’s availability.


Sarah Pinder

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber


11.06.2025