Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-000335

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/62995/2023
IA/00997/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 13 November 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE DEAKIN

Between

JB
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Heeps, Solicitor, instructed by McGlashan Mackay Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr Mullen, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at George House, Edinburgh on 8 September 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
A. Introduction
1. JB appeals, with the permission of Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Haria, against the decision of First-tier Judge McGrade to dismiss his appeal against the Secretary of State’s refusal of his protection claim.
2. JB is a Georgian national. The basis of his claim for protection can be summarised as follows: JB states that his father was murdered in 2005. He alleges that, as that murder was not properly investigated by the Georgian authorities, he and his mother carried out their own investigation into his father’s death. JB claims that in 2007, around 2 years after these investigations, he was kidnapped. He suspects the police were responsible for this. JB claims that he was threatened, mistreated, and held in a house. He states that he was warned not to continue his investigation into his father’s death. JB claims that he was released but did not report his kidnapping to the police. He states that he then went into hiding for 8-12 months. JB travelled to the United Kingdom in October 2008 on the basis of a student visa. JB claimed asylum on 15 March 2019. His claim was refused by the Secretary of State on 21 November 2023.
3. JB advanced four grounds of appeal. I will address them each in turn.
B. Ground 1: Failure to allow the Appellant to Comment
4. At para. 8 of his determination the Judge noted that the “Appellant has lodged a number of documents with English translations in support of his contention that his father… was murdered in 2005 and that only a limited number of people were brought to justice for his murder.” At para. 9 the Judge went on to find as follows:
I have some concerns regarding the weight to be attached to the documents provided by the Appellant. Firstly, there are some inconsistencies in the documents as some speak of Appellant’s father being assaulted (p121, and 131- 2), others that he was assaulted with a dense and blunt object resulting in death (p134) and others again that he was shot dead (p115). Secondly, the Appellant has accepted that the original application that he submitted for entry clearance as a student in 2008 contained information and documentation that was false. I do not accept that the Appellant would not have been aware of this at the time. The Appellant is clearly willing and able to access and present high quality false documents. Thirdly, the delay of over more than 10 years in claiming asylum damages his credibility.
5. Mr Heeps argued on behalf of JB that (i) there was nothing in the Secretary of State’s material that should have put JB on notice that the documents were to be called into question (ii) the Judge did not raise his concerns with the parties, thus denying JB a fair opportunity to comment on the documentary evidence and (iii) given that it was JB’s case that the Georgian authorities had failed to carry out adequate investigations into JB’s father’s murder, the fact of discrepancies in the documentary material did not necessarily undermine his case at all. Mr Mullen, for the Secretary of State, accepted that the Judge had not put his concerns about inconsistencies in the evidence to the parties
6. I do not accept his submission that the Judge was not obliged to do so as the evidence concerned matters outside JB’s knowledge and there was no reason to consider that JB could usefully comment on the material. It is a fundamental principle that parties should have a fair opportunity to address significant points that are to be taken against them. Neither JB, nor those representing him, were given that opportunity in this case. I accordingly find the Judge to have erred in law.
7. I note further that, in assessing the weight to be given to the material, the Judge also relied on JB’s acceptance that he had relied on false documentation in support of his visa application in order to infer that JB was “…clearly willing and able to access and present high quality false documents…”. Neither Mr Heeps nor Mr Mullen were able to point to any such acceptance or, indeed, the documents referred to. I do not accept Mr Mullen’s tentative suggestion that the Judge’s conclusion could have been inferred from para. 13 of JB’s witness statement. In my judgment this provides further support for JB’s submission that the Judge erred in failing to raise with the parties his concerns about the weight to be afforded to this material.
8. Was that error material to the outcome of the case? To the extent the material in issue went to the question of whether or not JB’s father was, in fact, murdered, the error was not material as the Judge found that element of JB’s case to have been made out. However, in my view the material in question was relevant to more than that narrow point.
9. First, the Judge noted at para. 8 that the material in issue was relied on to support the Appellant’s claim that only a limited number of people had been brought to justice for his father’s murder. Whether or not this is true seems to me be to be capable of bearing on the plausibility of JB’s claim more generally and properly establishing the weight to be given to the material itself is relevant to this exercise.
10. Second, at least one of the documents in issue (see p.433 of the Composite Bundle) suggests that a potentially relevant police officer was involved in serious criminal conduct (including kidnapping). As such, the weight to be afforded to this material bears on the veracity of JB’s claim as a whole.
11. Third, I accept Mr Heeps submission that, given the extent to which the Judge’s findings turned on JB’s credibility, the suggestion at paras. 8-9 of his determination that JB had presented unreliable documents to the Tribunal infected the decision as a whole.
12. In sum, therefore, I find that the Judge failed to afford JB or his representative a fair opportunity to address his concerns about the weight to be afforded to JB’s material and that this constituted a material error of law.
13. In light of that finding I can take JB’s further grounds more quickly.
C. Ground 2: Error in Approach the Country Expert
14. At para. 11 the Judge explained that, while he was “…willing to attach weight to his opinion…”, the degree of weight was undermined by the fact that the country expert had only been provided with JB’s substantive interview transcript and Home Office refusal letter and not been provided with additional relevant material. JB argued that the Judged erred in his approach as the country expert had, in fact, been provided with a copy of the Home Office bundle. JB argued that the Judge should have put his concerns about the limited material before the expert to JB so as to enable him to address the point.
15. I do not accept JB’s submissions on this ground. The country expert recorded in terms that he had “read” the substantive interview transcript and the Home Office refusal letter. He did not mention the Home Office bundle. In my judgment the Judge was entitled to rely on the Country Expert’s express statement as to what he had taken into account. Mr Heeps was unable to cite any authority to the contrary and he, properly, did not pursue Ground 2 with any vigour. I find that Ground 2 discloses no error of law.
16. Mr Heeps went on to suggest that the Judge’s reasoning with respect to the country expert report was not sufficiently detailed. However, Mr Heeps accepted that this amounted to a new ground of appeal, he decided not to apply to amend his grounds, and I do not consider this issue further in this determination.
D. Ground 3: Irrational Approach to Medical Evidence
17. At paras. 12-13 of his determination, the Judge noted that he had been provided with “two very detailed reports” from a medical expert. The Judge noted further that, in her first report, the medical expert expressed the view that “the Appellant meets the DSM-5 diagnostic criteria for post-traumatic stress disorder, major depressive disorder and adjustment disorder with anxiety. She attributes these conditions to the Appellant’s father’s murder and his detention in 2007” and that this conclusion was sustained in the medical expert’s second report. The Judge then went on to conclude at para. 21 as follows:
I have accepted to the lower standard of proof that the Appellant’s father was murdered. I have also accepted that he has been diagnosed as suffering from PTSD, which may be connected to his father’s death. I accept that he may benefit from trauma informed psychological therapy. However, there is no information before me to suggest that it will not be possible for this to happen in Georgia.
18. JB argued that it was not rationally open to the Judge to accept the Medical Expert’s findings as to JB’s mental health conditions but to reject the Medical Expert’s explanation of the causes of those conditions. JB argued further or alternatively that the Judge erred in failing to explain the basis of his conclusion.
19. In my judgment there is force in JB’s submissions on Ground 3. The Judge was, plainly, not bound by the factual premises which underlay the Medical Expert’s conclusions. Those factual findings were, however, integral to the expert’s opinion and, in my view the Judge was required to explain the basis on which he considered that JB could have developed the medical conditions it was accepted he had developed absent the alleged mistreatment. The Judge did not do so. Mr Mullen’s suggested that JB could have developed these conditions in the extended period between the murder of his father and the date of the medical report. This may explain the point. But it is not clear from the judgment that that this was the basis for the Judge’s decision nor that such a finding would be rationally open to the Judge without further evidence. In my judgment the Judge’s failure to give reasons leaves the basis of his finding on a key point in issue uncertain and constitutes a material error of law. In my judgment Ground 3 is made out.
E. Ground 4: Failure to take mother’s grant of asylum into account
20. JB argued that the Judge erred in failing to take into account a material matter, namely the fact that JB’s mother had made a protection claim in Italy. Mr Heeps explained that while this point had not been referred to directly in the Appeal Skeleton Argument, the relevance of the new evidence relating to JB’s mother had been explained when Mr Heeps applied on the morning of the hearing for it to be adduced and addressed again in submissions going to the conduct of the police in Georgia. Mr Heeps submitted further that the evidence was consistent with the points made at para. 20 of JB’s witness statement.
21. Mr Mullen argued that the evidence in support of JB’s mother’s protection claim was minimal, that it was “astonishing”, if JB had intended to rely on the point, he failed to adduce evidence from his mother, and that it was difficult to see what, if any, persuasive effect the evidence relating to JB’s mother could have had.
22. In my judgment there is force in Mr Mullen’s submissions. The documents now relied on do not explain the basis for JB’s mother’s application and do not, in my judgment, add more than minimal support to JB’s central claim. It is, in general, not necessary for Judges to rehearse every detail or issue raised in case (Budhathoki (reasons for decisions) [2014] UKUT 00341 (IAC), per Haddon-Cave LJ) and, in my judgment, the Judge’s failure to address JB’s mother’s asylum claim does not constitute an error of law.
F. Conclusion
23. I find that the Judge erred in law when dismissing JB’s appeal against the Secretary of State’s refusal of his protection claim. I find those errors to have impacted the decision as a whole. I accordingly set the decision aside and preserve no findings of fact. Given that the errors in question go to the fairness of the proceedings I consider it appropriate for this matter to be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for rehearing.
24. Finally, Mr Heeps invited me to maintain the anonymity order. Mr Mullen submitted that anonymity was not necessary in this case. I accept Mr Mullen’s submission that it is desirable for justice to be open. However, given the nature of the claim, the evidence relied on, and the risk of identifying children and taking into account the fact that evidence was provided in confidence to the Secretary of State, I direct that the anonymity order be maintained.

Notice of Decision
• An anonymity order is made in terms set out at the head of this determination.
• The decision of First-tier Judge McGrade is set aside.
• The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for rehearing by a different judge.
• No factual findings are preserved.

Andrew Deakin

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

23 September 2025