Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-000368
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/51630/2024
LP/03534/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 17 August 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LODATO

Between

A
(ANONYMITY ORDERED)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Unrepresented
For the Respondent: Ms Rushforth, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Cardiff Civil Justice Centre on 23 July 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction and Background
1. I have decided to maintain the anonymity order originally made in these proceedings by the First-tier Tribunal (‘the FtT’) because the underlying claim involves international protection issues in that the appellant claims to fear persecution or serious harm on return to Botswana. In reaching this decision, I am mindful of the fundamental principle of open justice, but I am satisfied, taking the appellant’s case at its highest for these purposes, that the potential grave risks outweigh the rights of the public to know of her identity.
2. The appellant appeals with permission against the decision, dated 19 November 2024, of a judge of the FtT (‘the judge’) to dismiss the appeal on international protection and human rights grounds.
3. The appeal arose in the context of the appellant's claim to fear persecution or serious harm from her uncle who had subjected her to serious abuse in the past.
Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
4. After permission to appeal was refused in the FtT, the appellant renewed her application for permission to the Upper Tribunal. In her grounds of appeal to the Upper Tribunal, it was suggested that the judge had not properly considered whether sufficiency of protection was available to her or whether she could reasonably internally relocate. In granting permission, a judge of the Upper Tribunal noted inaccuracies in the FtT decision, but the main reason why the matter was permitted to proceed was set out at [3]:
It was common ground before the First-tier Tribunal that the Appellant had been a victim of prolonged physical and sexual abuse by her uncle. The First-tier Tribunal accepted that the police had taken no action when the Appellant reported her uncle to them [§49(4)]. It is arguable that, in light of the police’s previous response, the Tribunal was required to give more cogent reasons for its conclusion that there would be sufficiency of protection for the Appellant on return.
5. At the error of law hearing, I heard oral submissions from both parties. The appellant was unrepresented and appeared by video link from her home. I admitted the appellant’s skeleton argument provided shortly before the hearing. I address any submissions of significance in the discussion section below.
Discussion
6. In MN (Vietnam) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWCA Civ 485, the Court of Appeal set out the principles which should guide the analysis of whether judicial reasons are lawfully adequate. Between [34] and [36], Dove LJ drew together the leading authorities:
[34] […] The question which then arises is by what standard those reasons are to be judged in order to determine whether or not they are legally adequate. Whilst given in a different public law context, the observations of Lord Brown of Eaton under Heywood in South Bucks County Council v Porter (No 2) [2004] UKHL 33; [2004] 1 WLR 1953 at paragraph 36 provide an important statement of principle applicable in the current context:
“36. The reasons for a decision must be intelligible and they must be adequate. They must enable the reader to understand why the matter was decided as it was and what conclusions were reached on the “principal controversial issues”, disclosing how any issue of law or fact was resolved. Reasons can be briefly stated, the degree of particularity required depending entirely on the nature of the issues falling for decision. The reasoning must not give rise to a substantial doubt as to whether the decision-maker erred in law, for example by misunderstanding some relevant policy or some other important matter or by failing to reach a rational decision on relevant grounds. But such adverse inference will not readily be drawn. The reasons need refer only to the main issues in dispute, not to every material consideration…Decision letters must be read in a straightforward manner, recognising that they are addressed to parties well aware of the issues involved and the arguments advanced. A reasons challenge will only succeed if the party aggrieved can satisfy the court that he has genuinely been substantially prejudiced by the failure to provide an adequately reasoned decision.”
[35] Accompanying these principles, it is also necessary to observe that the decision, in this case the FtTIAC determination, must be read as a whole and in context. Part of that context is that examining the determination’s reasons should be approached and undertaken purposefully, with the object of obtaining an understanding of the decision and its basis. It should not be read or construed in a manner more appropriate to a contract or statute. It requires what Lord Bingham MR described as a “straightforward down to earth reading” of the determination which seeks to identify whether there is “room for genuine as opposed to forensic doubt” as to what has been decided and why (see Clarke Homes Limited v Secretary of State for the Environment and East Staffordshire District Council [1993] 66 P&CR 263).
[36] This approach to the standard of reasons required as a matter of law can be set in the general understanding of approaches to appeals in respect of tribunals within the Immigration and Asylum Chamber provided by Lord Hamblen at paragraph 72 of HA (Iraq) v SSHD [2022] 1 WLR 3784; [2022] UKSC 22:
“72. It is well established that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist fact finding tribunal. In particular:
(i) They alone are the judges of the facts. Their decisions should be respected unless it is quite clear that they have misdirected themselves in law. It is probable that in understanding and applying the law in their specialised field the tribunal will have got it right. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] AC 678 per Baroness Hale of Richmond at para 30.
(ii) Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account: see MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] 2 All ER 65, para 45 per Sir John Dyson JSC.
(iii) When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out: see R (Jones) v First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) [2013] 2 AC 48, para 25 per Lord Hope of Craighead DPSC.”
7. In addition to the above statements of principle, the Upper Tribunal’s jurisdiction to decide whether an FTT decision involved a material error of law was recently considered by the Court of Appeal in Ullah v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 201; [2024] 1 W.L.R. 4055. At [26], Green LJ summarised the applicable principles (I have not reproduced those principles which are reflected above in MN (Vietnam) to similar effect):  
[26] Sections 11 and 12 of the TCEA 2007 restrict the UT's jurisdiction to errors of law. It is settled that:  
[…]
(iv)  The issues for decision and the basis upon which the FTT reaches its decision on those issues may be set out directly or by inference: see UT (Sri Lanka) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 1095 at [27];  
(v)  Judges sitting in the FTT are to be taken to be aware of the relevant authorities and to be seeking to apply them. There is no need for them to be referred to specifically, unless it was clear from their language that they had failed to do so: see AA (Nigeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] 4 WLR 145 at para 34;  
(vi)  It is of the nature of assessment that different tribunals, without illegality or irrationality, may reach different conclusions on the same case. The mere fact that one tribunal has reached what might appear to be an unusually generous view of the facts does not mean that it has made an error of law: see R (MM (Lebanon)) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] 1 WLR 771 at para 107.  
8. As alluded to above, the central argument raised by the appellant against the lawfulness of the judge’s decision was that he had not fully explained why it was found that sufficiency of protection existed given the inaction of the authorities to a complaint she made in 2016.
9. Between [36] and [41], the judge gave detailed consideration to the background evidence touching on the prevalence of gender-based violence (‘GBV’) and sufficiency of protection in Botswana. A part of the 2022 US State Department report was highlighted in which it was noted that authorities enforce laws against rape and that NGOs were utilised to offer victims support. The judge also considered background information relied upon by the appellant which also supported the proposition that sufficient protection was generally available. Attention turned to the appellant’s narrative evidence on the topic between [45] - [46], [49 (3)-(6)] and [51]-[53]:
The appellant's account that the police took no action when she reported that her uncle was sexually abusing her is also inconsistent with the background information. In asylum interview, the appellant said that she assumed her uncle had bribed them to take no action. However, in her witness statement, for the first time she claims that he is a man of power and influence in the community and the police did not want to get involved with someone they considered so important. If her uncle was a man of power and influence, it is reasonable to expect to have mentioned this in her AI.
In oral evidence the appellant claimed to have been unaware of any shelters for victim so GBV in Botswana. However, she then said was aware of one shelter were women in ‘abusive situations’ go but claimed that she did not know what they do. Her claimed ignorance does not appear consistent with the background information. I take into account that she is educated and had access to the media and news reports relating to government action regarding GBV. She accepted that her uncle did not prevent her seeing her friends. She said her friends, including friends from University, knew her uncle was abusing her. It is reasonable to infer that they would also be sources of information regarding shelters and other steps taken by the government to address GBV.
[…]
3) Equally, applying the lower standard of proof I do not accept the appellant has shown that her uncle was able to find her in Namibia because he has power and influence. If he is a man of power influence, it is reasonable to expect that have mentioned this in the SI and/or in her AI, where she was specifically asked how he was able to find her.
4) Applying the lower standard of proof, I accept the appellant reported the abuse at her local police station but no action was taken. Why this happened is not clear. For the reasons already given I do not find the appellant has shown this is because her uncle is a man of power and influence. Given the information regarding the emphasis the authorities in Botswana are now putting on protecting victims of GBV, it is unlikely the police would have taken no action because allegations of sexual abuse are not taken seriously. However, in any organisation there will be individuals who do not do their jobs properly. This may explain the inaction in the appellant case. Equally, although the background evidence does not suggest there is systemic or widespread corruption in the police force, it is likely bribery can occur in individual instances. This too could explain the inaction in the appellant's case.
5) I accept that the appellant will have been demoralised by the lack of action taken by the police and may have informed her decision to seek protection in the UK rather than Botswana.
6) For the reasons given at paragraph 45 above, applying the lower standard of proof, I do not accept the appellant was unaware of shelters and other resources for victim is a GBV in Botswana. Her lack of candour about this is consistent with a wish to embellish your account and to explain why she preferred to seek protection in the UK rather than in Botswana.
[…]
I have accepted that the police in her local area did not take action when she reported her uncle. However, in her SI, the appellant said that happened in 2016. The background evidence shows that since then there have been significant changes in the approach taken by the authorities to GBV. Given the passage of time and the brand [sic] information regarding the attitude of the authorities to GBV, even applying lower standard of proof, I find it likely the police in the appellant's home area would take action against her uncle and offer her protection. Given that her previous complaint was made eight years ago, it is reasonable to infer that the chances of the same people who fail to take action in 2016 would also be involved in a complaint made now, are negligible. Alternatively, there was nothing to suggest the appellant would not have the option of reporting her uncle to the police outside her local area. Where the chances of anyone involved in the 2016 dealing with her parrot complaint would be even more remote.
Furthermore, applying the lower standard of proof, I find the background information shows that advice and assistance would be available both from the authorities and NGOs in Botswana. It is open to the appellant to seek refuge in a shelter where she would be able to access advice and assistance in reporting her uncle to the police.
In reaching these conclusions I take into account the appellant's evidence that she has friends in Botswana who are aware that her uncle has abused and who have previously offered to let her stay with them in order to assist her to get away from him. It is reasonable to infer that similar offers of assistance will still be available to her. This too would be a protective factor for the appellant. She has confirmed that she is still in touch with her friends in Botswana. I note she says they were able to send her the letter showing that she attended hospital in 2020, when she says she was pregnant the second time by her uncle.
10. The judicial analysis copied above fully assessed the sufficiency of protection point both from an objective standpoint and by carefully considering the appellant's experience of police inaction in 2016. The judge did not accept, for entirely lawful reasons founded on the evidence, that it had been shown that her uncle was an influential figure or that he had bribed the police. It was entirely appropriate for the judge to note the extensive passage of time and how present policing and protective conditions strongly weighed in favour of sufficient protection being available on return even if there was a policing failure in 2016. Only the most strained reading of these reasons could result in any uncertainty as to why the judge reached the conclusions he did. The appellant may well disagree with these findings, and would no doubt attach greater weight to the police failure to act upon the 2016 complaint, but these were plainly matters of weight and judgement for the judge to decide. The reasons going to this aspect of the appeal were clearly lawfully adequate.
11. The reality is that the conclusion reached on sufficiency of protection was a complete answer to the asylum and humanitarian protection grounds of appeal. Once it was concluded that sufficient protection was available, the appeal simply could not succeed. It is therefore unnecessary to consider the points taken against the internal relocation findings in as much depth as my consideration of the sufficiency of protection challenge. However, even if there were drafting mistakes in the decision, these do not undermine the substance of the entirely cogent reasons provided for concluding that it would be reasonable for the appellant to relocate. She plainly has skills she can use to find work and integrate in a new location in Botswana. The judge fully considered, at [54], her argument that she could not work in her former profession as a tailor because she would be unable to advertise her services without potentially alerting her uncle. However, it was found to be equally open to her to pursue a different line of work.
12. The appellant’s skeleton argument amounted to a rehearsal of all the reasons it was claimed she ought to be permitted to remain in the UK on international protection and human rights grounds. As an unrepresented party, I do not criticise her for attempting to put her case in this way, but these points had limited connection to the grounds of appeal which attracted permission.
13. The grounds of appeal do not disclose errors of law. I dismiss the appeal.

Notice of Decision
The decision did not involve errors of law and I dismiss the appeal.

P Lodato

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

30 July 2026