Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-000396
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/56569/2023
LP/06205/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 24 July 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE NORTON-TAYLOR
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HOSHI

Between

SB
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation

For the Appellant: Mr Raza, Counsel, instructed by Fairmont Law Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr Parvar, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 19 June 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the anonymity order made by the First-tier Tribunal shall continue in force. No-one shall publish or reveal any information that is likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant, including his name or address. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. This appeal first came before us for an error of law hearing on 28 March 2025. By an error of law decision issued on 24 April 2025, we found that the First-tier Tribunal’s decision on the Appellant’s appeal contained material errors of law. We set aside §§37-40 and the first sentence of §53 of the First-tier Tribunal’s decision. We retained the appeal in the Upper Tribunal, with the decision to be remade following a further hearing.
2. This is the remaking decision following that further hearing, which took place on 29 June 2025.
The circumstances of the appeal
3. The circumstances of the Appellant’s appeal were summarised at §§5-14 of our error of law decision. So that this may be read as a stand-alone decision, that summary is repeated below. It is then brought up to date.
a. The Appellant is a national of North Macedonia now aged 24.
b. The Appellant was born and brought up in Haraqin in the Skopje region of North Macedonia. His family comprised his parents, his older brother and his two younger sisters. Although both of his parents were ethnic Albanians, his mother was a Christian and his father was a Muslim. Consequently, his father’s family never accepted the marriage and were antagonistic towards the Appellant’s family throughout his childhood. At some point during his childhood, the Appellant’s parents separated – his mother and his younger sisters moved to Pristina, Kosovo and the Appellant and his older brother remained with his father in Haraqin.
c. When the Appellant was aged around 15 or 16, his father died. Shortly thereafter, his father’s family attended at the Appellant’s family home, beat the Appellant and his brother, and told them that they must leave or they would be killed – their apparent intention was to misappropriate the Appellant’s family home. The Appellant and his brother did as they were told. They left Haraqin and joined their mother and younger sisters in Pristina. All five family members then travelled together to Albania, before separating. The Appellant made his way to the United Kingdom (‘UK’) alone.
d. The Appellant arrived in the UK on an unknown date. Shortly after his arrival, he encountered a gang of ethnic Albanian organised criminals in Birmingham and was forced by them to work in a cannabis factory in Coventry. He was rescued by the police and, because he was still a child, placed in the care of local authority social services. Initially, he was accommodated in Coventry and then, at his request because of the proximity of his accommodation to the cannabis factory, in Nuneaton.
e. The Appellant was referred to the National Referral Mechanism (‘NRM’) as a potential victim of modern slavery on 30 November 2018. He received a positive reasonable grounds decision on 6 December 2018. On 10 January 2019, the Appellant made his protection and human rights claim, on the basis of the risk from his father’s family.
f. In August 2020, the Appellant was tracked-down by the same gang of organised criminals in Nuneaton and forced by them to work in a cannabis factory in Doncaster. On this occasion, they said that they would harm his family if he did not work for them, and correctly told him his mother’s address in Albania, his sisters’ address in Sweden and his brother’s address in Germany to demonstrate to him their ability to do so. Again, the Appellant was rescued by the police. Initially, he was accommodated by a charity in Stafford. He then moved to London to reduce the risk of being tracked-down by the gang again.
g. On 11 October 2020, the Appellant was referred to the NRM as a potential victim of modern slavery for a second time, in connection with his second encounter with the gang. The two referrals were consolidated, and the Appellant received a positive conclusive grounds decision on 20 January 2023.
4. By a decision dated 9 September 2023, the Respondent refused the Appellant’s protection and human rights claim. The decision may be summarised as follows:
a. The Respondent did not accept that the Appellant’s claim engaged the Refugee Convention – rather, it concerned a land dispute with his father’s family.
b. The Respondent accepted the credibility of the Appellant’s claimed identity and nationality; that the Appellant’s mother was a Christian and his father was a Muslim; and that the Appellant’s father’s family took the family home upon the Appellant’s father’s passing and threatened the Appellant and his family. We note that, having made these concessions, the Respondent did not dispute any specific aspect of the Appellant’s claimed factual account – though she did say that his credibility was damaged pursuant to section 8 Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 because he had failed to claim asylum in Belgium.
c. The Respondent said that the Appellant would not be at risk of persecution on return because the Refugee Convention was not engaged (the decision letter was silent on whether he would be at risk of serious harm on return). Further, he would have a sufficiency of protection against any risks and could internally relocate to avoid any risks. For these reasons, the claim was refused on Refugee Convention, Humanitarian Protection and Article 3 ECHR grounds.
d. The claim was also refused on Article 8 ECHR grounds. The Appellant did not meet the requirements of the Immigration Rules and there were no compelling circumstances justifying a grant of leave to remain.
5. The Appellant filed an appeal against the Respondent’s decision. On 28 March 2025, he filed an Appeal Skeleton Argument in which he raised a further head of claim, namely a risk of reprisals / re-trafficking on return to North Macedonia by ethnic Albanian criminal gangs (i.e. a risk of reprisals / re-trafficking by his original traffickers or a risk of re-trafficking by other traffickers).
6. The Respondent filed a review on 13 May 2025. It may be summarised as follows:
a. The Respondent consented to the Appellant raising his further head of claim as a new matter and accepted the credibility of his claim to have been a victim of modern slavery as claimed, in line with the positive conclusive grounds decision. However, she said that the Appellant had not adduced credible evidence to show that he and his family had ever been threatened by ethnic Albanian organised criminal gangs in North Macedonia and continued to rely on section 8 Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004.
b. The decision was maintained on protection grounds. The Respondent said that the Appellant would not be at risk on return from his father’s family, his original traffickers or other traffickers. Further, he would have a sufficiency of protection against any risks and could internally relocate to avoid any risks. We note that the review was silent on whether the Refugee Convention was engaged by the new head of claim.
c. The decision was also maintained on Article 8 ECHR grounds.
7. The appeal came before Judge Courtney on 22 November 2024. By a decision dated 11 December 2024, she dismissed the appeal. Her decision may be summarised as follows:
a. She granted the Appellant’s application to be treated as a vulnerable witness, in light of the fact that he was a victim of modern slavery (§4).
b. She found that the Appellant’s credibility was not damaged pursuant to section 8 Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 because he was a child when he passed through Belgium and “in any event, the fundamental credibility of his account has been accepted by the Respondent” (§27).
c. She found that neither limb of the Appellant’s protection claim engaged the Refugee Convention, i.e. neither the land dispute limb nor the risk of reprisals / re-trafficking limb (§§28-33).
d. She accepted that the Appellant would be at real risk of serious harm from his father’s family in his home area (§§34-36).
e. She did not accept that the Appellant would be at real risk, anywhere in North Macedonia, of either reprisals or re-trafficking by his original traffickers (§§37-40, 53) or re-trafficking by other traffickers (§§52-53). We note that, in finding that the Appellant would not be at risk from his original traffickers, she rejected the credibility of the Appellant’s claim that they had correctly told him his family’s addresses in Albania, Sweden and Germany (§39).
f. She found that the Appellant would not have a sufficiency of protection against the risks he would face in his home area from his father’s family (§§41-44). We note that she did not consider the issue of sufficiency of protection in respect of the alleged risks from the Appellant’s original traffickers or other traffickers.
g. She considered the safety and reasonableness of internal relocation by reference to Bitola, which is the second largest city in North Macedonia and around 170km from the Appellant’s home area (§47). She considered internal relocation to Bitola to be safe, by reference to the risks from the Appellant’s father’s family (§§49-51), his original traffickers (§53) and other traffickers (§§52-53). She considered internal relocation to Bitola to be reasonable, even taking into account that the Appellant has no ties there and mental health problems (§§54-60).
h. In respect of Article 8 ECHR, she found that the Appellant did not meet the requirements of the Immigration Rules (§§62-66) and there were no compelling circumstances justifying a grant of leave to remain (§§67-73).
8. The Appellant filed an application to the First-tier Tribunal for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal. The application raised two grounds of appeal, as follows:
a. Ground 1: Judge Courtney failed to take account of material matters in finding that there would be no risk from the Appellant’s father’s family in Bitola and in rejecting the Appellant’s account in respect of the risk from his original traffickers.
b. Ground 2: Judge Courtney failed to take account of material matters in assessing the reasonableness of internal relocation and whether there would be very significant obstacles to integration for the purposes of Article 8 ECHR.
9. We note that there was no challenge to Judge Courtney’s finding that the Refugee Convention was not engaged.
10. Judge Dainty granted the permission application on limited grounds on 28 January 2025. She granted permission on the ‘risk from traffickers’ element of Ground 1 as follows: “Ground 1 is just arguable as to the judge failing to consider the analogous Albanian authorities as to the east of word of mouth spreading back to the traffickers and more generally to give sufficient reasons as regards risks of re-trafficking” (§5). Permission was refused on the ‘risk from family’ element of Ground 1 and the entirety of Ground 2
11. The Respondent filed a rule 24 response on 30 January 2025, opposing the appeal.
12. The Appellant filed an application to the Upper Tribunal for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal, on the grounds on which permission had been refused by Judge Dainty. Judge Norton-Taylor refused permission on those grounds on 11 March 2025.
13. As a result, at the 28 March 2025 error of law hearing, the appeal was advanced on a narrow basis, namely that Judge Courtney erred in law in rejecting the credibility of the Appellant’s claim that his original traffickers had correctly told him his family’s addresses in Albania, Sweden and Germany. In our error of law decision issued on 24 April 2025, we concluded that she had so erred on the following basis:
a. In rejecting the credibility of this element of the Appellant’s account because of the absence of “any putative mechanism whereby the gang could have found out this information” (§39 of her decision), Judge Courtney failed to take into account material matters, namely the Albanian country guidance cases AM and BM (Trafficked women) Albania CG [2010] UKUT 80 (IAC) and BF (Tirana – gay men) Albania CG [2019] UKUT 93 (IAC). These cases, which were placed before her, offered a potential plausible mechanism by which the traffickers found out the Appellant’s family’s addresses – i.e. via the very strong family and other social connections by which ethnic Albanians live, whether they are living inside or outside of Albania (§24 of our error of law decision).
b. Judge Courtney’s rejection of the credibility of this element of the Appellant’s factual account was inadequately reasoned. Her operative reasons were that there was no “putative mechanism” by which the Appellant’s original traffickers might have discovered his family’s addresses and there had no reprisals against his family in the four years since his most recent rescue in any event (§39 of her decision). We did not consider those two reasons to be sufficient, in particular in circumstances where this was the only element of the Appellant’s factual account that was in dispute, the Respondent had accepted that the Appellant was a victim of modern slavery on the balance of probabilities, and Judge Courtney had found that his credibility was not damaged by section 8 Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 (§25 of our error of law decision).
14. We retained the appeal in the Upper Tribunal for remaking, in particular because the factual and legal issues that remained to be decided on remaking were very narrow indeed. At §29, we delineated those issues as follows:
“[T]he appeal remains live on Humanitarian Protection and Article 3 ECHR grounds only and the disputed issues are: (1) the credibility of the Appellant’s claim that his original traffickers correctly told him his family’s addresses in Albania, Sweden and Germany; (2) whether the Appellant would be at real risk of serious harm on return to his home area from his original traffickers; (3) whether the Appellant would have a sufficiency of protection against any real risk from his original traffickers; and (4) whether the Appellant could safely relocate to Bitola to avoid any real risk from his original traffickers.”
15. On 28 May 2025, the Appellant’s representatives made an application for permission to rely on new evidence relevant to arguments the Appellant apparently intended to make under Article 8 ECHR, in particular concerning his relationship with his British citizen partner. On 3 June 2025, the remaking hearing was listed for 19 June 2025. On 5 June 2025, the Appellant’s representatives filed an adjournment application, on the basis that they required further time to prepare the Appellant’s new evidence. On the same day, 5 June 2025, Judge Norton-Taylor refused the adjournment application, on the basis that the Appellant’s representatives had had and would have a fair opportunity to prepare for the hearing. He admitted the new evidence, though he noted that if it gave rise to a ‘new matter’ under section 85 Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, the Respondent would have an opportunity to address this in advance of, or at, the 19 June 2025 hearing.
16. On 9 June 2025, the Appellant filed a skeleton argument drafted by his solicitors seeking to make both Article 8 ECHR and Article 3 ECHR health claim arguments. On 16 June 2024, the Appellant filed a bundle of documents to support the Article 8 ECHR arguments – notably, witness statements and documents concerning his relationship with his British citizen partner. We note that these documents raised issues that went beyond the scope of the appeal as set out at §29 of our error of law decision (see §14, above) and yet the legal basis on which the Appellant was seeking to do this was not explained. Further, the documents were filed significantly beyond the deadline set in the case management directions that were included in our error of law decision and yet no explanation for the lateness was provided and no application to extend time was made.
Remaking hearing
17. At the outset of the hearing, we asked Mr Raza which if any of his solicitors’ new issues, going beyond the identified scope of the appeal, he intended to pursue. Helpfully, he confirmed that the only new issues that he intended to pursue was the Appellant’s relationship with his British citizen partner and accepted that this was a ‘new matter’ that he could raise only if the Respondent gave her consent. Having taken instructions, Mr Parvar confirmed that the Respondent did not consent to the relationship being raised as a ‘new matter’. On that basis, Mr Raza accepted that he could not raise the issue and confirmed that the live issues were those identified at §29 of our error of law decision only (see §14, above).
18. The issues to be decided on remaking were therefore:
a. Issue 1: the credibility of the Appellant’s claim that his original traffickers correctly told him his family’s addresses in Albania, Sweden and Germany.
b. Issue 2: whether the Appellant would be at real risk of serious harm on return to his home area from his original traffickers.
c. Issue 3: whether the Appellant would have a sufficiency of protection against any real risk from his original traffickers.
d. Issue 4: whether the Appellant could safely relocate to Bitola to avoid any real risk from his original traffickers.
19. The representatives agreed that all of the documentation before the Tribunal was contained in a single bundle filed by the Appellant’s representatives in advance of the error of law hearing, of 291 pages.
20. We treated the Appellant as a vulnerable witness, in light of the fact that the Respondent has accepted that he is a victim of modern slavery.
21. Mr Raza called the Appellant to provide oral evidence in English. He adopted his two witness statements. There was no supplementary examination-in-chief. Mr Parvar cross-examined the Appellant, exploring the credibility of his claim that his original traffickers correctly told him his family’s addresses in Albania, Sweden and Germany. Mr Raza re-examined the Appellant briefly.
22. We heard submission from Mr Parvar. He relied on the Respondent’s 9 September 2023 decision letter and 13 May 2025 review (to the extent that they remained relevant to the live issues), and made further oral submissions which we summarise as follows:
a. Issue 1: Mr Parvar submitted that the Appellant’s credibility was materially damaged because: (i) he had failed to adduce corroborative witness evidence from the family members in question; (ii) his evidence had been inconsistent, in that when he was asked about the issue in his third asylum interview at question 95-96 he said that the traffickers told him the addresses of his family members in Albania and Sweden, but he did not mention Germany; and (iii) it was implausible that the traffickers would have been able to ascertain his family’s addresses in Sweden and Germany, because they would need to be extremely powerful and influential to do so given the strength of democracy and law enforcement in these counties.
b. Issue 2: based on his submission (iii) in the preceding sub-paragraph, Mr Parvar accepted that, if we were to find the Appellant was credible on this issue, then the traffickers were powerful and influential criminals with a wide reach. Nevertheless, he submitted that the Appellant would not be at risk on return to his home area (or anywhere else in the country, including Bitola) because almost five years had passed since he last had any contact with the traffickers and they had not sought to contact his family during that period either.
c. Issue 3: Mr Parvar submitted that the Appellant would have a sufficiency of protection in his home area (and everywhere else in the country, including Bitola) because the police force in North Macedonia was a functioning one.
d. Issue 4: in respect of the safety of internal relocation to Bitola, Mr Parvar submitted that this issue would stand or fall with the issues of risk on return to and sufficiency of protection in the Appellant’s home area, because the Appellant was either at risk from his traffickers throughout the country or not at risk from them anywhere in the country.
23. We heard submissions from Mr Raza, which we summarise as follows:
a. Issue 1: Mr Raza invited us to find that the Appellant was credible on this narrow issue because: (i) the lower standard of proof applied; (ii) the remainder of his factual account had been accepted by the Respondent to the lower standard; (iii) his claim to be a victim of slavery had been accepted by the Respondent to the balance of probabilities standard; and (iv) the Albania country guidance cases AM and BM (in particular at §181) and BF (in particular at §186) offer a potential plausible mechanism by which the traffickers found out his family’s addresses – i.e. via the very strong family and other social connections by which ethnic Albanians live, whether they are living inside or outside of Albania.
b. Issue 2: Mr Raza submitted that if we found the Appellant to be credible on this narrow issue then we should also find that he would be at risk on return to his home area (and everywhere else in the country, including Bitola) because: (i) the traffickers are extremely powerful and influential; (ii) the Albania country guidance cases AM and BM and BF offer a potential mechanism by which the traffickers could trace him, because the public domain country evidence before the Tribunal demonstrated that Albania neighbours North Macedonia and ethnic Albanian traffickers are prevalent in North Macedonia; (iii) the traffickers had shown a significant degree of commitment by targeting the Appellant twice in the UK; and (iv) the passage of time alone should not satisfy the Tribunal that return to North Macedonia would be safe – there could be many potential reasons that the traffickers have not targeted the Appellant in the UK, and yet might do so if he were to return to North Macedonia.
c. Issue 3: Mr Raza submitted that the public domain country evidence before the Tribunal demonstrated that this particular Appellant would not have a sufficiency of protection.
d. Issue 4: like Mr Parvar, Mr Raza submitted that this issue of the safety of internal relocation to Bitola would stand or fall with the issues of risk on return to and sufficiency of protection in the Appellant’s home area, because the Appellant was either at risk from his traffickers throughout the country or not at risk from them anywhere in the country.
24. At the conclusion of the hearing, we reserved our decision.
Findings and reasoning
25. We remind ourselves that the lower standard of proof applies in protection claims and appeals (certainly in ones such as this one, which concern Humanitarian Protection and Article 3 ECHR, to which the provisions of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 do not apply).
26. Under the Refugee Convention, a claimant must show “a reasonable degree of likelihood” that they would be persecuted for a Convention reason if they were to return to their own country: R v SSHD, ex p. Sivakumaran [1987] UKHL 1, [1988] AC 958, per Lord Keith at 994. Even a 10% chance that a claimant would face persecution for a Convention reason may be sufficient to satisfy this test: MAH (Egypt) v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 216, [2023] Imm AR 713, per Singh LJ at §52.
27. Under Article 3 ECHR (and Humanitarian Protection), a claimant must show that there is a real risk that they would be subjected to serious harm. That equates to the same lower standard of proof as applies under the Refugee Convention: Kacaj (Article 3, Standard of Proof, Non-State Actors) Albania* [2001] UKIAT 18, [2002] Imm AR 213, per Collins J at §39.
Issue 1: the credibility of the Appellant’s claim that his original traffickers correctly told him his family’s addresses in Albania, Sweden and Germany
28. We are satisfied that the Appellant has established to the lower standard the credibility of his claim that his original traffickers correctly told him his family’s addresses in Albania, Sweden and Germany. That is for the following reasons:
a. The respondent accepts all aspects of the Appellant’s claimed factual account to the lower standard, except this one. This concession is an important factor to which we give very significant weight in the Appellant’s favour in the overall assessment of the credibility of his account.
b. Indeed, the Respondent has accepted that the Appellant is a victim of modern slavery as claimed to the balance of probabilities standard. Again, this concession is an important factor to which we give very significant weight in the Appellant’s favour in the overall assessment of the credibility of his account.
c. We found the Appellant to be an impressive witness. He answered all of the questions put to him in a clear and concise manner, and he did not seek to embellish or bolster his account in any way. For example, he accepted straightforwardly that he had not had any further issues with the traffickers since his second rescue in 2020 and that his family had never had any issues with them. Mr Parvar did not seek to take any adverse credibility points arising from the Appellant’s oral evidence. We give these matters significant weight in the Appellant’s favour in the overall assessment of the credibility of his account.
d. We do not accept Mr Parvar’s submission that the Appellant’s credibility is undermined by his failure to mention Germany as well as Albania and Sweden in his third asylum interview. In essence, the Appellant’s explanation for this was that he found the interviews extremely arduous and distressing and so he may occasionally have missed out certain details. In light of his vulnerability, and in circumstances where this was his third asylum interview, we have no hesitation in accepting this explanation which we consider to be an entirely plausible one. We give little weight to this purported inconsistency in our overall assessment of the credibility of the Appellant’s account.
e. We do not accept Mr Parvar’s submission that it is implausible that the traffickers would have been able to ascertain the Appellant’s family’s addresses in Sweden and Germany. We remind ourselves that “[i]nherent probability, which may be helpful in many domestic cases, can be a dangerous, even a wholly inappropriate, factor to rely on in some asylum cases”: HK v SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 1037, per Neuberger LJ (as he then was) at §29. We do not consider that it would be safe for us to give weight in our credibility assessment to the purported implausibility of this element of the Appellant’s account. Further, and in any event, we do not accept that this aspect of the Appellant’s account is inherently improbable. On the contrary, we accept Mr Raza’s submission that the Albania country guidance cases AM and BM and BF offer a potentially plausible mechanism by which the traffickers found out the Appellant’s family’s addresses – i.e. via the very strong family and other social connections by which ethnic Albanians live, whether they are living inside or outside of Albania. We give little weight to this purported implausibility in our overall assessment of the credibility of the Appellant’s account.
f. It is not clear whether the Respondent is still relying on section 8 Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 because the Appellant failed to claim asylum in Belgium. To the extent that she is, we accept that this conduct engages section 8. However, we remind ourselves that such conduct is only potentially damaging to an appellant’s credibility: JT (Cameroon) v SSHD [2008] EWCA Civ 878, [2009] WLR 1411, per Laws LJ at §24. We agree with Judge Courtney (and note that this element of her decision has not been challenged) – this conduct should not count against the Appellant because he was a child at the time. We give little weight to this conduct in our overall assessment of the credibility of the Appellant’s account.
g. We do accept Mr Parvar’s submission that the Appellant’s credibility is undermined by his failure to adduce corroborative witness evidence from the family members in question. We remind ourselves that there is no general duty to corroborate in the protection context (Karakas v SSHD [1998] EWCA Civ 961), though a decision-maker is entitled to find the absence of corroboration to be damaging to a claimant’s credibility where such corroboration is reasonably available to them in the UK (TK (Burundi) v SSHD [2009] EWCA Civ 40). The Appellant remains in contact with his family and so we consider that some of form of corroboration from them was reasonably available to him. That said, at best, this evidence would have confirmed that they lived in the countries in question. None of them have ever had any dealings whatsoever with the traffickers and so their evidence would have been of limited probative value in any event. Therefore, we give the absence of this evidence only limited weight against the Appellant in the overall assessment of the credibility of his account. As such, and because it is the only factor materially weighing against him, it does not outweigh the factors weighing in his favour.
29. Having accepted the credibility of this element of the Appellant’s factual account, we make a specific factual finding that the Appellant’s original traffickers correctly told him his family’s addresses in Albania, Sweden and Germany, in order to demonstrate to him their ability to harm them. We note that Mr Parvar accepted that this means that the traffickers were powerful and influential criminals with a wide reach.
Issue 2: whether the Appellant would be at real risk of serious harm on return to his home area from his original traffickers
30. We are satisfied that the Appellant has established to the lower standard that he would face a real risk of serious harm on return to his home area – i.e. Haraqin in the Skopje region of North Macedonia – in the form of re-trafficking by his original traffickers.
31. That is for the following reasons:
a. Although there is relatively limited public domain country evidence before us, we consider it to be of a high quality and that it supports the Appellant’s case as follows:
i. 15 June 2023, US Department of State, ‘Trafficking in Persons Report 2023: North Macedonia’:
“The Government of North Macedonia does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts to do so. The government demonstrated overall increasing efforts compared with the previous reporting period, considering the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, if any, on its anti-trafficking capacity; therefore North Macedonia remained on Tier 2. These efforts included increasing overall law enforcements efforts, including investigating, prosecuting, and convicting more traffickers. The government established the Operational Team for Identification of Trafficking Victims (OTITV) to officially recognize potential victims and assist in coordinating victim care. The government adopted the Law on Compensation of Victims of Violent Crime, which provided trafficking victims the right to compensation and increased resources to the NGO-run shelter for trafficking victims (the shelter). However, the government did not meet the minimum standards in several key areas. The government identified significantly fewer victims and the Organized Crime and Corruption Prosecution Office (OCCPO) did not have sufficient resources to handle all cases under its jurisdiction. Some district prosecutors did not report potential trafficking cases to OCCPO and used lesser crimes to prosecute traffickers. While the government increased funding to the shelter, this covered only a small percentage of the shelter’s operating expenses. Similarly, the government did not allocate funding to mobile teams that identify most potential victims each year, despite past commitments to do so. Local police and some border agents did not consistently screen for trafficking indicators and, as a result, authorities likely deported some unidentified trafficking victims without referral to appropriate services or safeguards to prevent retrafficking. The national rapporteur lacked the authority, resources, and legal mandate to systematically monitor and evaluate anti-trafficking efforts.”
“Local police officers lacked an understanding of trafficking and did not consistently notify the task force of potential trafficking cases.”
“Government and civil society actors continued to raise concerns some government agencies lacked policies and mechanisms to ensure proactive identification efforts. For example, local police did not consistently screen for indicators during law enforcement actions on casinos, nightclubs, and bars. Similarly, border agents did not consistently screen for trafficking indicators at border crossings … .”
“The government, the shelter, and NGOs provided officially recognized and potential victims with protection and assistance, including food, clothing, medical assistance, psycho-social support, legal assistance, and reintegration services; [however,] [t]he government did not provide specialized assistance for adult male victims.”
“Due to a lack of consistent screening efforts, authorities likely arrested [and] detained … some unidentified trafficking victims.”
“As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in North Macedonia, and traffickers exploit victims from North Macedonia abroad … Citizens of North Macedonia … are exploited for sex trafficking and forced labor in construction and agricultural sectors in Southern, Central, and Western Europe.”
“Officials and observers continued to report low-ranking police officers may be complicit in trafficking, including hiding evidence, accepting bribes, changing patrol routes to benefit perpetrators, tipping off perpetrators before raids, or direct involvement in organized crime.” [Emphasis supplied]
ii. 26 September 2023, Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, ‘2023 Global Organized Crime Index – North Macedonia’:
“Criminal networks play a prominent role in the North Macedonian criminal landscape and participate in many illicit markets, such as drug and arms trafficking and migrant smuggling. While some criminal networks operate on a transnational level, others only operate locally. Many networks are formed along ethnic lines and are predominantly hierarchically structured. Collusion with state-embedded actors ensures continuity for these criminal groups and their operations. This is indicative of persistent corruption across state structures.”
“There is a reasonably high level of foreign-national criminal actor collaboration in North Macedonian criminal markets, especially from bordering countries such as Serbia, Albania, Kosovo, Greece and Bulgaria, as well as Turkey.” [Emphasis supplied]
iii. 30 September 2022, Belgrade Centre for Security Policy, ‘Little Black Book of Organized Crime Groups in Western Balkans’ (the following excerpt appears in the North Macedonia section):
“In 2021, 2/3 of detected OCG [organised criminal group] members were of Albanian background, while 1/3 were Macedonian.” [Emphasis supplied]
b. In summary, the public domain country evidence above shows that human trafficking is prevalent in North Macedonia, international criminal actors operate there, two-thirds of detected organised criminal group members are ethnic Albanians, the government is not meeting minimum standards to eliminate trafficking in several key areas, the government does not support adult male victims of trafficking, and rogue state actors collude with organised criminals in the perpetration of trafficking.
c. Mr Parvar accepted that, if we were to find the Appellant to be credible in the disputed element of his factual account (as we have done), then the Appellant’s original traffickers were powerful and influential criminals with a wide reach. This is an important concession. It makes it far more likely that they would: (i) have a presence or contacts in North Macedonia; (ii) have the will and means to trace him on return there; and (iii) be operating there with impunity, in collusion with corrupt law enforcement officials.
d. We do not accept Mr Parvar’s submission that the Appellant would not be at risk on return because almost five years have passed since he last had any contact with the traffickers and they have not sought to contact his family during that period either. There are obvious potential reasons why they might not have targeted him again in the UK – for example, because the Appellant made himself harder to trace by moving to London after his second rescue. Similarly, there are obvious potential reasons why they might not have sought to contact his family. It is one thing for traffickers to threaten an individual with reprisals against their family in order to maintain control over them. It is quite another thing for traffickers actually to pursue such reprisals after the individual has escaped them – to do so would appear to be a risky and costly enterprise with no significant benefit to the traffickers. By contrast, if the Appellant were to return to North Macedonia, the factors that protect him in the UK may well fall away, making him vulnerable to being traced, e.g. via the very strong family and other social connections by which ethnic Albanians live, whether they are living inside or outside of Albania (see AM and BM and BF). And, unlike in pursuing reprisals against his family, the original traffickers would have a strong motivation for trafficking him for a third time – i.e. potentially substantial illicit gains.
e. We consider that the Appellant would be particularly vulnerable to re-trafficking by his original traffickers, both because he is a vulnerable individual by virtue of previously having been trafficked on two occasions (as Judge Courtney noted at §56 of her decision, there is unchallenged evidence that he is receiving counselling to deal with that trauma) and because he would have no family support on return to North Macedonia (indeed, he would need also to contend with the established real risk of being subjected to serious harm by his father’s family). These factors could lead to him entering riskier situations.
Issue 3: whether the Appellant would have a sufficiency of protection against any real risk from his original traffickers
32. Where a claimant has established a risk of ill-treatment from non-state actors in their home area, they must also establish that the state is unwilling or unable to take reasonable steps to prevent the ill-treatment by operating an effective legal system for the detection, prosecution and punishment of such acts (see generally Horvath v SSHD [2000] UKHL 37, [2001] 1 AC 489).
33. We are satisfied that the Appellant has established that the state would be unable and/or unwilling to provide him with effective protection. We do not accept Mr Parvar’s submission that the police force in North Macedonia is a functioning one, certainly in so far as it would operate in respect of the risks faced by this particular Appellant. On the contrary, on the basis of the public domain country evidence summarised at §31, above, we are satisfied that the government is not meeting minimum standards to eliminate trafficking in several key areas, the government does not support adult male victims of trafficking, and rogue state actors collude with organised criminals in the perpetration of trafficking. In our view, reasonable steps are not being taken to provide a sufficiency of protection to victims of trafficking with the Appellant’s particular profile, i.e. a vulnerable adult male of Albanian ethnicity who has twice previously been trafficked by powerful and influential criminals with a wide reach.
Issue 4: whether the Appellant could safely relocate to Bitola to avoid any real risk from his original traffickers
34. In respect of the safety of relocation to Bitola, we are in agreement with the parties that this issue stands or falls with the issues of risk on return to and sufficiency of protection in the Appellant’s home area. Our findings in respect of those issues apply throughout North Macedonia, a small country with a low population, meaning that the Appellant would also be at risk on return to Bitola and would not have a sufficiency of protection there. Therefore, he could not safely relocate to Bitola.
Conclusion on Humanitarian Protection and Article 3 ECHR
35. On the basis of our findings above, we allow the appellant’s appeal on Humanitarian Protection and Article 3 ECHR grounds.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal is remade by allowing the appeal on Humanitarian Protection and Article 3 ECHR grounds only.

B. Hoshi

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

17 July 2025