Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-000410

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/62459/2023
LP/07547/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 13th of June 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE JACKSON
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE FROOM

Between

KN
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr P Haywood of Counsel, instructed MK Adams Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr B Hulme, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 15 May 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The Appellant appeals with permission against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Hill promulgated on 21 November 2024, in which the Appellant’s appeal against the decision to refuse his protection and human rights claim dated 16 November 2023 was dismissed.
2. The Appellant is a national of Bangladesh who first entered the United Kingdom on 1 November 2020 as a Tier 4 (General) Student. He claimed asylum based on a fear on return to Bangladesh from the Awami League and the police because he was a supporter and then member of the student wing of Jamaat-e-Islami; had been attacked in February 2020 as such and since he has been in the United Kingdom, has continued to protest against the Awami League both online and by attending protests.
3. The Respondent refused the application the basis that although it was accepted the Appellant had engaged in political activity and been a member of the party claimed; it was not accepted that he had been attacked or threatened by the Awami League. This was based on inconsistencies in the Appellant’s account. In any event, the Appellant’s political involvement was at a low level only and he would not be at risk on return to Bangladesh. For essentially the same reasons he was not entitled to a grant of humanitarian protection. The Appellant’s human rights claim was refused on suitability grounds that he had made a false statement by seeking entry as a student and also on substantive eligibility grounds that he did not have any family in the United Kingdom and did not meet the private life requirements as there were no very significant obstacles to his reintegration in Bangladesh.
4. Judge Hill dismissed the appeal in a decision promulgated on 21 November 2024 on all grounds. A number of findings were made in the Appellant’s favour, including that his claim of political involvement was generally credible; that he had been attacked in Bangladesh and he had attempted to corroborate all of his claim, with reliable documents submitted; that there had been a cyber law complaint made against him in October 2023 and he had undertaken sur place activity. It was not accepted that the Appellant’s home had been attacked as claimed in February 2023. However, despite the positive credibility findings made, overall, the First-tier Tribunal considered that after the fall of Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League government in August 2024, the Appellant’s fear on return to Bangladesh was no longer well-founded, for the following reasons:
“75. I find that the recent regime change means that the CPINs that would normally be relevant are less instructive than would usually be the case, albeit they provide context as identified above, which I accept remains valid and is important. I have had regard to the contents of the two Responses to Information Requests (dated 13/8/24 (updated 2/9/24) and 22/8/24). I note in particular the following from the 22nd August 2024 response:
• the interim government ‘reportedly includes a mix of the main opposition, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), and members affiliated with Jamaat-e-Islami (Jel), while the former ruling Awami League party has no representatives’ [2.1.8]
• ‘Law professor Asif Nazrul, who guided student coordinators during the protests and was vocal against the now-toppled Sheikh Hasina govt, has been given the law ministry, apparently to help the interim govt take legal steps regarding human rights violations and recent killings …’ [2.1.9]
• ‘thousands of detainees and longer-term political prisoners – including some victims of enforced disappearance – have been released. The Inspector General of the Police and head of paramilitary Rapid Action Battalion have been replaced …’ [2.1.11]
76. From the 13th August 2024 Response (updated) I note that on 28th August 2024 the interim government revoked the ban on Jel [2.2.3].
77. Given the deposal of the former government I am not satisfied, despite Mr Karim’s cogent submissions, that the appellant’s fear of persecution remains well-founded, even reminding myself of the low threshold recently reiterated in MAH (supra). My reasons are set out below.
78. Whilst the ‘historic’ objective material demonstrates that the Awami League has supporters within the judiciary and accepting that there might be concerns that underlying loyalties to the former regime could prejudice a trial, there is no evidence that a decision to charge has, in fact, been taken in this case. The allegations are so inherently political and so intrinsically linked to the former regime that I am not satisfied there is a reasonable degree of likelihood that the appellant will in fact now be charged. I am fortified in that view by the fact that the allegations against the appellant have not in the nearly 11-months since they were instituted, resulted in a charge.
79. Furthermore, even if I am wrong on that, the evidence is that the Law Ministry is now to be overseen by law professor Asif Nazrul, whose raison d’etre appears to be addressing human rights violations. As such, were a charged raised I am unpersuaded that the appellant would be subject to a trial process which is unfair such as to amount to persecution. Albeit there may be members of the judiciary with partisan affiliations, they will be functioning within a regime and under leadership which actively deplores the historic repression of free speech and opposition to the Awami League.
80. Regarding the appellant’s sur place activity, given the bold steps taken by the interim government to cancel the prohibition on Jel, I am not satisfied that the appellant’s conduct in opposition from the UK (or indeed, more historically, in Bangladesh) now gives risk to a real risk of persecution by State authorities.
81. As to risk from non-state actors, I have accepted for the reason set out above that the appellant has been subject to adverse attention from local grass-roots activities from the Chhatra League. I further accept that that hostility persisted after his departure to the UK and was directed towards his family. Given his historic commitment to the opposition cause I accept that the appellant will continue to express his political beliefs if returned. It follows that there is a risk the appellant will face hostility in Bangladesh. However, the environment there would appear to have taken a material turn with large numbers taking to the streets to make their opposition to the former Government known. In those circumstances I am not satisfied that the grass-roots activists will behave as they did before, given they can no longer rely upon a culture of impunity emboldened by the support of the Government. I find this issue problematic in the absence of a clear evidential picture in a fast-developing situation but am ultimately unpersuaded that there remains a real risk of hostility of such a level as to meet the threshold of persecution.”
5. Separately, the First-tier Tribunal dismissed the appeal on humanitarian protection grounds on the basis that the instability and unrest in Bangladesh was subsiding and there was no risk of indiscriminate violence. Finally, there was no breach of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights as the Appellant would not face very significant obstacles to reintegration on return.
The appeal
6. The Appellant appeals on five grounds as follows: First, that the First-tier Tribunal materially erred in law in concluding that the Appellant would not be at risk on return to Bangladesh in circumstances where that was contrary to the available evidence and in particular that the Respondent had accepted that there would be no sufficiency of protection available to the Appellant. Secondly, that the First-tier Tribunal materially erred in law in finding that the cyber case against the Appellant was only an investigation and not a prosecution; that as a matter of procedural fairness there were no questions about whether the case had been or would be dropped; and applied too high a threshold when considering the fairness of any trial on the cyber law matters. Thirdly, that the First-tier Tribunal material erred in law in failing to apply paragraph 339K of the Immigration Rules as to past persecution, particularly given the evidence that members of the Awami League were still in positions of authority and could pose a risk to the Appellant. Fourthly, that the First-tier Tribunal erred in law in its conclusions in light of a new export report dated 29 November 2024 – albeit this ground was rightly not pursued before us, save for demonstrating the materiality of other errors. Finally, that the First-tier Tribunal materially erred in law in finding that there would be no very significant obstacles to reintegration in circumstances where the Appellant was still likely to face arrest and detention for the cyber law case against him, even if the charges were ultimately dismissed and in any event, he would face hostility on return to Bangladesh.
7. At the oral hearing, Mr Haywood relied on his skeleton argument which set out the grounds of appeal in some detail. He emphasised the positive credibility findings made by the First-tier Tribunal and that the underlying factual issues were not in dispute. In relation to the first ground of appeal, he submitted that the weight attached to the two Responses to Information Requests should necessarily be less than that given to Country Policy and Information Notes (CPINs) which give a broader and more detailed consideration of relevant issues. These were also only available in the context of an interim government being in place in Bangladesh with uncertainty as to the future.
8. In relation to the second ground of appeal, it was submitted that the First-tier Tribunal had failed to take into account the significance of proceedings having commenced in Bangladesh further to a First Information Report (FIR) and it was not open to the Judge to treat this only as an investigation. In any event, the distinction did not matter because the FIR itself gave a power of arrest, such that the Appellant was likely to be detained and arrested and there was no evidence to suggest the prosecution had been dropped. We asked Mr Haywood for the evidence before the First-tier Tribunal showing that the Appellant had been charged with an offence, to which he stated that this was a different process and an FIR could start a prosecution. In this case, there was evidence that the Appellant’s case was squarely before the court in Bangladesh and he again emphasised that in any event there was a power of arrest and a police force which was still overpacked with supporters from the Awami League government and would not change its spots overnight. Mr Haywood submitted that there was a lack of evidence to a fundamental change in the situation in Bangladesh and the First-tier Tribunal failed to properly analyse the available evidence which did not support a finding that there had been a change in behaviour in grass roots activities and amounted to no more than speculation. The hearing was only four weeks after the fall of Sheikh Hasina’s government, during a fluid situation with an interim government and it was too early to be able to say there had been fundamental change as a result. Overall, it was not rational to conclude that the emergence of a transitional government would remove the risk to the Appellant.
9. In relation to the final ground of appeal, Mr Haywood submitted that the First-tier Tribunal erred in failing to consider the likely hostility to the Appellant as part of the consideration of whether there would be very significant obstacles to reintegration.
10. On behalf of the Home Office, Mr Hulme submitted that overall the findings made by the First-tier Tribunal were reasonably and rationally open to it on the available evidence. In particular, it was open to it to find that there had been a fundamental change in government in Bangladesh and consider the consequences of what flowed from that. It was suggested that the grounds of appeal were simply an attempt to relitigate the appeal rather than identify any error of law.
11. In relation to the characterisation of the cyber law proceedings, Mr Hulme took us to the documents relating to this in the bundle, including the court order dated 31 March 2024, which all referred to the matter as an ‘investigation’, with no reference being made at all to the Appellant being charged with any offence. The change of personnel in charge of the Law Ministry was capable of supporting the finding that there was reform in the system with more of a focus on human rights.
12. In relation to the risk on return, it was open to the First-tier Tribunal to conclude that as non-state actors, members of the Awami League were likely to change their behaviour without the continued backing of the state authorities and government who were no longer in power and to whom state resources would no longer be available. The findings made as to likely consequences of the change of government were ones which reasonably flowed from the evidence available.
Findings and reasons
13. The first ground of appeal fails to identify any error of law in the First-tier Tribunal’s decision and amounts only to disagreement with the weight attached to the evidence and the overall finding as to changes in Bangladesh. As set out in the paragraphs of the decision quoted above, the First-tier Tribunal took into account the CPIN, the significant change in government following the fall of Sheikh Hasina and the interim government not including any representatives from the Awami League; particular individuals who were no longer in place and a new head of the Law Ministry. It was rationally and reasonably open to the First-tier Tribunal on that evidence to find, despite the relatively recent change in government, that there had been significant change in Bangladesh such that the Appellant’s fear on return was no longer well-founded. The findings were properly reached on the basis of the available evidence and not based on any unreasonable speculation.
14. There is no merit at all in the second ground of appeal. The documents before the First-tier Tribunal all consistently referred to the Appellant being under investigation. For example, the court order dated 31 March 2024 referred to the investigation report not having been received and the next date for this to happen being set for 28 May 2024; the court order dated 28 July 2024 stated that the investigation report had not been received and the next date for doing so was 26 September 2024; and the letter dated 15 September 2024 from Mominuzzaman which states that, “Currently, the Hon’ble Court has directed the officer in charge of Chatak Police Station, Sunamganj, to conduct an investigation” and that once the investigation is complete, further legal steps will be taken on the Appellant’s behalf. The First-tier Tribunal could not rationally have found on the evidence anything other than that the proceedings were currently only an investigation. There was no evidence of a charge or anything beyond the investigation stage and no procedural unfairness in not putting this to the Appellant given the clarity of his own documentary evidence on this point as to the stage of proceedings.
15. It is not clear as to whether the Appellant’s case before the First-tier Tribunal was as put orally by Mr Haywood in relation to the power of arrest from an FIR, but in any event, it was rationally open to the First-tier Tribunal to find that given the politically motivated nature of the FIR and change in government, with a new focus in the Law Ministry on human rights; that the investigation was unlikely to progress any further to a charge and for the same reason, there is no basis for considering any real risk of detention and arrest of the Appellant even to the lower standard applicable in protection claims.
16. The third ground of appeal relies on paragraph 339K of the Immigration Rules, that past harm or persecution will be regarded as a serious indication of future harm or persecution unless there are good reasons to believe that such harm will not be repeated. This ground of appeal is closely linked to the first ground of appeal, in that if there was no error of law generally on the findings as to the Appellant no longer being at risk on return to Bangladesh because of the changes occasioned by the change in government (which we have found there was not), then there can be no separate error of law on the third ground. The First-tier Tribunal has given clear and cogent reasons to believe that such harm will not be repeated because of the change of government; such reasons were rationally and lawfully open to it.
17. The fourth ground of appeal was rightly not pursued before us. It could not on any view have been an error of law for the First-tier Tribunal not to have taken into account evidence which did not even exist at the date of its decision, let alone was not before it.
18. The final ground of appeal essentially stands or falls with the others as to the assessment of risk on return. The First-tier Tribunal having lawfully found that the Appellant would not be at risk on return either generally, or specifically because of the cyber law investigation which was likely not to be pursued further and would not face hostility to such a level to meet the threshold of persecution; there was no need to consider these factors which had not been found in the Appellant’s favour as amounting to very significant obstacles to reintegration.
19. Given the rational findings as to the changes in Bangladesh and representation in the interim government from different political parties, including that the Appellant was a supporter and member of; his political profile would not rationally amount to a very significant obstacle to reintegration. There is no error of law on this final ground of appeal.

Notice of Decision

The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of a material error of law. As such it is not necessary to set aside the decision.

The decision to dismiss the appeal is therefore confirmed.

G Jackson

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

6th June 2025