Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-000463

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/61186/2023
LH/05691/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 11th of September 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RASTOGI

Between

Sanjit Gurung
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

Entry Clearance Officer
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr J. Dingley, Counsel instructed by Everest Law Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr P. Lawson, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 22 July 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant appeals, with permission, the decision of a judge of the First-tier Tribunal (“the judge”) dated 23 August 2024 (“the decision”) in which she dismissed the appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s decision of 25 August 2023 to refuse his application to enter the United Kingdom for settlement. The appeal arose in the context of the appellant being the son of a former Gurka soldier, Hari Bhadur Gurung (“the sponsor”).
2. The error of law hearing took place before me. I was provided with a 115 page hearing bundle. Mr Dingley also invited me to access the skeleton argument prepared on behalf of the appellant (“ASA”) for the hearing before the First-tier Tribunal. Following submissions on the error of law issue, I indicated that I found an error of law in the judge’s decision and canvassed the parties’ views on disposal. Mr Lawson felt there would be further facts which may need to be found but Mr Dingley was concerned about the impact of delay. There was no interpreter so he realised that if the appeal were to proceed later in the day, it would have to be without the benefit of any further evidence. I allowed time for him to take instructions and, having done so, Mr Dingley, invited me to re-hear the appeal which I did having heard further submissions from both representatives. It was accepted that no oral evidence would be heard. At the end of the hearing, I reserved my decision which I now give together with my reasons for it.
The Judge’s Decision
3. The judge noted that the appellant was not claiming to meet the requirements of the adult dependent relative rules nor that he fell within the terms of the respondent’s discretionary policy, therefore his claim was limited to whether the respondent’s decision breached his Article 8 rights under the European Convention of Human Rights [6]. The judge noted that the respondent did not accept the existence of a family life under Article 8(1), and that was the primary basis for the refusal of his application. At [23], the judge identified the issues in the case as follows:

(a) is there a family life between A and his sponsor in the United Kingdom; and
(b) are there any factors justifying interference, above and beyond the maintenance of effective immigration control.
4. Having set out Article 8 at [26] the judge set out a summary of the established caselaw on the engagement of Article 8 in relation to adult family members [27]-[30] and then in relation to historic injustice cases. At [36] the judge specifically noted the following:
“I have to consider if there is in this appeal real, or effective or committed support from the Sponsor to the Appellant (Rai v ECO [2017] EWCA Civ 320) and this is a disjunctive test.”
5. At [37] the judge said she found the sponsor an honest witness.
6. At [38] the judge said this:
“I turn firstly to the issue of financial support. The fact that I deal with finances first does not mean that I treat finances and emotional dependence as separate tests. I deal with them in order and will them tie my reasoning together under the relevant test.”
7. The judge noted the sponsor’s evidence that he sends money to the appellant and his unmarried sister with whom the appellant lives in Nepal [39] and that they live in a house which the sponsor owns adjacent to a small piece of land he also owns. The corn that is grown there is not enough to yield sufficient income for the appellant and his sister [41]. He does not send money to his other married daughters as the cultural expectation is only that he supports his unmarried children. The judge accepted all this evidence [44] but also found the appellant could support himself by travelling to India to work [43] and found at [44]:
“even if this financial support of adult children occurs this is to be expected in Nepali culture, so it does not mean in and of itself that family life exists”.
8. The judge then turned to emotional dependency which she expressed is ‘exceedingly difficult’ to assess [45]. The judge noted that the appellant has some contact with other of his relatives in Nepal (sisters, uncles and aunts) [46]; that he has been apart from his sponsor for 13 years and the sponsor has only returned to Nepal 4-5 times during that period although she accepted it was harder for him to do so now given his age and health issues; she noted the appellant is in good medical health [47]. She noted the sponsor’s evidence that he gets on better with the appellant and the other unmarried sister as they are single albeit he also speaks to the others [48].
9. At [49] the judge accepted the above but did not find the contact between them to amount to “emotional support”. She then said this at [49]-[51]:
“49. …The majority of adult children call their parents from abroad to check on them and keep in contact. The Sponsor has his wife with him, so she is not alone in the UK and has her support. The Appellant I find is now has a firmly established family life of many years standing with his sibling, Puspha, and they are now the family unit.
50. I have no doubt that they all miss each other as is normal when adult families live apart, but they have been apart from their parents for many years. I had nothing before me to suggest that Appellant had any personal issues that would lead him to need greater support than any other person of their age living away from their parents.
51. Having heard the evidence of the Sponsor and considering all of the rest of the evidence before me I do not find that there is family life here or that there is real, effective and committed financial and emotional support in this appeal.”
10. Therefore, having not found Article 8(1) to be engaged the judge did not proceed to consider the proportionality of the respondent’s decision, although she noted at [53] the lack of a poor immigration history or criminality.
The Grounds of Appeal
11. The original Grounds of Appeal raised the following Grounds:
Ground 1: Improperly discounting evidence of “real, effective or committed” support engaging Article 8(1) family life on the basis it is a cultural expectation (particularly with reference to [44] of the judge’s decision) and setting too high a threshold and looking for features of exceptionality;
Ground 2: Failure to consider relevant evidence of emotional ties between A and his UK-settled parent, particularly at [47]-[50] of the decision, including a failure to consider the support from the appellant to his sponsor and the circumstances of the separation between them.
12. Permission was refused by First-tier Tribunal Judge Khurram in a decision dated 7 January 2025 and on which Mr Lawson relied in order to oppose the appeal. In summary, Judge Khurram found the grounds to amount to a disagreement with the decision and noted the judge gave sustainable reasons that finances alone are not sufficient to amount to a family life and that the judge does not need to deal with every point. On 26 March 2025, Upper Tribunal Judge Owens granted permission as it is arguable that the judge misdirected herself in law by finding that financial support does not alone constitute family life because that is to be expected in Nepali culture and that, for the reasons given in ground 2, the judge arguably failed to take into account evidence of emotional support or to give reasons why she rejected it.
13. In the renewal grounds (on which Mr Dingley expressly relied) it was argued that Judge Khurram had missed the point and has not addressed the point raised in Ground 1 as to the misapplication of the law in Huang v SSHD [2007] UKHL 11 [18] as to the ‘prevailing cultural tradition’; that the weight of the caselaw shows there is no test for exceptionality and the engagement of Article 8 (1) is relatively low. In summary, the criticism made of the judge in Ground 1 is that she set the bar too high when deciding if the appellant had shown an Article 8(1) family life exists.
14. As to Ground 2, the renewal grounds effectively repeat the challenges made within the original grounds.
15. Mr Dingley expanded the factors underlining the grounds of appeal. In general terms, he relied on the caselaw identified at para. 5 of the appellant’s skeleton argument before the judge. He further submitted that the concept of family life is a broad one ([63] Singh v Entry Clearance officer, New Delhi [2004] EWCA Civ 1075) and to reiterate that what is required is “real or effective or committed support” (Rai v Entry Clearance officer, New Delhi [2017] EWCA Civ 320); that it is not necessary to evaluate the reasons for dependency and it is not always necessary to exclude from Article 8(1) someone who also has family ties with another.
16. With that in mind, with reference to Ground 1, he submitted the judge had gone beyond what was required and was looking for something else. He argued that rather than ‘cultural norms’ pointing away from family life, they should have been treated as pointing toward it, so the judge was wrong at [44] in the way she dealt with those, as she was at [50] when she looked at ‘need’ rather than the substance of what was before her. Mr Dingley submitted the judge had taken into account irrelevant considerations such as the fact that the appellant could potentially find a job [41].
17. As to Ground 2, he relied on [38]-[42] of Rai to reiterate the points raised in the original grounds, namely that the judge adopted too narrow a focus in her analysis and did not consider family life from the perspective of the sponsor, the reasons for separation and the barriers to contact being more regular. He further submitted that at [49] it appeared as if the judge was drawing a comparison with [24] of Singh v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] EWCA Civ 630 as to the appellant being independent of the family due to his enjoyment of a family life with his unmarried sister. He submitted that if this was the judge’s intention, further reasoning would be required, particularly because the appellant’s unmarried sister is broadly in the same position as him and the family life is not with others outside of that unit such as a wife and child.
18. Mr Lawson submitted that it was clear from the judge’s decision that she did not consider financial support in isolation. He submitted the evidence revealed that visits were irregular over a long period of separation; there is some family life between the appellant and his unmarried sister and the judge carefully considered the evidence of emotional support at [45]-[51] and gave sustainable reasons for her finding that it was not made out. Overall, the judge properly and adequately considered all matters and arrived at a decision open to her on that evidence.
Legal Framework
19. Although Article 1 appears to limit the jurisdiction of the ECHR to those within the territory of the member state, as the concept of family life is not a divisible one, it is accepted that Article 8 can be engaged where only one member of the family is within the territory of the member state (see for example [16] and [19] of Abbas v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] EWCA Civ 1393).
20. However, as to whether it is engaged in cases of adult family members, the leading authority is Kugathas v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] EWCA Civ 31 as further discussed and explained in Rai.
21. Rai was a Gurkha case. From [17], the uncontroversial legal principles were set out and these include the well-known citation at [17]:
“17. In Kugathas v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] EWCA Civ 31, Sedley L.J. said (in paragraph 17 of his judgment) that "if dependency is read down as meaning "support", in the personal sense, and if one adds, echoing the Strasbourg jurisprudence, "real" or "committed" or "effective" to the word "support", then it represents … the irreducible minimum of what family life implies"
18. To that can be added that there is no presumption of family life and no requirement on the appellant to demonstrate exceptionality. A fact-sensitive evaluation is required.
19. The Court in Rai also observed Patel and others v Entry Clearance Officer, Mumbai [2010] EWCA Civ 17. Of particular note there and in this appeal is what Sedley L.J. said at [14]:
"You can set out to compensate for a historical wrong, but you cannot reverse the passage of time. Many of these children have now grown up and embarked on lives of their own. Where this has happened, the bonds which constitute family life will no longer be there, and art. 8 will have no purchase. But what may constitute an extant family life falls well short of what constitutes dependency, and a good many adult children – including children on whom the parents themselves are now reliant - may still have a family life with parents who are now settled here not by leave or by force of circumstance but by long-delayed right. ".
20. At [19] the court further noted [45] of R. (on the application of Gurung and others) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] EWCA Civ 8 in which Lord Dyson LR said:
“In some instances an adult child (particularly if he does not have a partner or children of his own) may establish that he has a family life with his parents. It all depends on the facts".
21. The primary focus should be on the “real existence in practice of close personal ties” Singh v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] EWCA Civ 630 [20]. At [24] therein, it was observed:
"The love and affection between an adult and his parents or siblings will not of itself justify a finding of a family life. There has to be something more. A young adult living with his parents or siblings will normally have a family life to be respected under Article 8. A child enjoying a family life with his parents does not suddenly cease to have a family life at midnight as he turns 18 years of age. On the other hand, a young adult living independently of his parents may well not have a family life for the purposes of Article 8."
22. Generally, the threshold for engagement is a low one (AG (Eritrea) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 11.
23. Whilst the general position in human rights cases is that judges are to consider whether or not family life exists at the date of the hearing, in cases such as these it is also necessary to consider whether or not family life existed at the time the parents left Nepal for the UK and then to consider whether it “endured beyond it, notwithstanding their having left Nepal when they did” (see [39] Rai).
24. The headnote of Ghising and others (Ghurkhas/BOCs: historic wrong; weight) [2013] UKUT 567 (IAC) says:
“(1) In finding that the weight to be accorded to the historic wrong in Ghurkha ex-servicemen cases was not to be regarded as less than that to be accorded the historic wrong suffered by British Overseas citizens, the Court of Appeal in Gurung and others [2013] EWCA Civ 8 did not hold that, in either Gurkha or BOC cases, the effect of the historic wrong is to reverse or otherwise alter the burden of proof that applies in Article 8 proportionality assessments.
(2) When an Appellant has shown that there is family/private life and the decision made by the Respondent amounts to an interference with it, the burden lies with the Respondent to show that a decision to remove is proportionate (although Appellants will, in practice, bear the responsibility of adducing evidence that lies within their remit and about which the Respondent may be unaware).
(3) What concerned the Court in Gurung and others was not the burden of proof but, rather, the issue of weight in a proportionality assessment. The Court held that, as in the case of BOCs, the historic wrong suffered by Gurkha ex-servicemen should be given substantial weight.
(4) Accordingly, where it is found that Article 8 is engaged and, but for the historic wrong, the Appellant would have been settled in the UK long ago, this will ordinarily determine the outcome of the Article 8 proportionality assessment in an Appellant’s favour, where the matters relied on by the Secretary of State/ entry clearance officer consist solely of the public interest in maintaining a firm immigration policy.
(5) It can therefore be seen that Appellants in Gurkha (and BOC) cases will not necessarily succeed, even though (i) their family life engages Article 8(1); and (ii) the evidence shows they would have come to the United Kingdom with their father, but for the injustice that prevented the latter from settling here earlier. If the Respondent can point to matters over and above the public interest in maintaining a firm immigration policy, which argue in favour of removal or the refusal of leave to enter, these matters must be given appropriate weight in the balance in the Respondent’s favour. Thus, a bad immigration history and/or criminal behaviour may still be sufficient to outweigh the powerful factors bearing on the Appellant’s side of the balance.”
Error of Law – Discussion and Conclusions
25. In arriving at my decision I kept in mind the principles set out at [26] of Ullah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 201. In summary, the First-tier Tribunal (FTT) is a specialist fact-finding tribunal, assumed to know the relevant authorities and the Upper Tribunal should not rush to find an error of law because it might have reached a different conclusion, expressed itself differently or because there appears to be an unusually generous view of the facts; the Upper Tribunal should be slow to infer that the FTT has not taken a relevant point just because it is not expressly mentioned; judicial restraint should be exercised when considering the FTT’s reasoning and the FTT is not required to set out every step of its reasoning nor directly set out the issues for decision or the basis of its decision on those issues which may also be done by inference.
26. I indicated at the hearing that I was satisfied there was an error of law in the judge’s decision. I arrived at that decision for the following reasons.
27. It is abundantly clear from the above exposition of the case law that what is required is a fact-sensitive analysis. Context here is important and the context of the appeal before the judge was a Gurkha case. Of course that was a matter not lost on the Judge. She quite correctly set out the applicable case law. It was the degree to which, if at all, she lost sight of that in her assessment of whether or not Article 8 was engaged.
28. I find there to be force in the appellant’s submission that the prevailing cultural traditions are a relevant factor when considering the engagement of Article 8. The often cited passage from Lord Bingham at [18] of Huang v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 11 says:
“Human beings are social animals. They depend on others. Their family, or extended family, is the group on which most people heavily depend, socially, emotionally and often financially. There comes a point at which, for some, prolonged and unavoidable separation from this group seriously inhibits their ability to live full and fulfilling lives. Matters such as age, health and vulnerability of the applicant, the closeness and previous history of the family, the applicant’s dependence on the financial support of the family, the prevailing cultural tradition and the conditions in the country of origin may all be relevant”.
29. Following on from that, it is also relevant to consider the situation in which the separation of the appellant from his family arose (Patel applies (see [9] above).
30. It is important not to lose sight of the extent to which the evidence on which the appellant relied was accepted. On the basis of the sponsor’s evidence, the judge made certain findings of fact. Those findings included the sending of money to the appellant and his unmarried sister on which they relied (in the absence of sufficient alternative income) [42] and that the appellant lives in a house and farms land the sponsor owns [41]. In oral evidence, the sponsor said that although he spoke to all his children in Nepal, he is closer to the appellant and his sister as they are single [48]. The judge found the sponsor to be honest [37].
31. Furthermore, whilst the judge did not say so in terms, the evidence before her (in the form of the appellant’s witness statement) was that the appellant (aged 44 at the date of the hearing before the judge) was unmarried and had never been married (HB27) and he had lived in the sponsor’s house(s) throughout his life (HB25/26) and with his mother and the sponsor (save for when his father working away in India) until they left Nepal for the UK in 2011. He lives with his unmarried sister and has done throughout his life. The family could not afford to apply for the appellant to settle until 2023 and they could not afford, even then, to apply for both the appellant and his sister. More regular contact is difficult because of the sponsor’s technical deficiencies, funds and poor health [HB25-28] The appellant’s evidence was corroborated by the sponsor in his witness statement (HB29-33).
32. In light of the accepted facts, it is clear that the evidence before the judge revealed that, at the point the sponsor left the UK, family life was existing as it had done throughout the appellant’s life, including by way of financial dependency. The primary supervening factor was the departure from Nepal of the sponsor which he only did to pursue a right long since denied to him. Read properly, the evidence before the judge at the point of the sponsor’s departure from Nepal was of a family unit consisting of the sponsor and his late wife, the appellant and the appellant’s sister. At the point of the hearing before the judge, the appellant’s mother had died and the sponsor had remarried, but otherwise, nothing about the family’s factual matrix had changed.
33. When read in this way, I am satisfied that there were features of the judge’s decision which revealed an error in her approach to the evidence and which, ultimately was likely to have infected her application of the test to be applied, namely whether there was real or effective or committed support such that Article 8(1) was engaged. Those features are set out below.
34. Firstly, given the evidence before her as I have set out, I am satisfied the judge failed to properly consider the cultural context in this appeal which involves considering whether family life existed when the parents left Nepal and had endured beyond it, notwithstanding their having left”. The judge found at [49] that the appellant ‘now’ to be in an established family life with his sister as if that is a new event which potentially disrupted family life which hitherto had existed between the appellant and sponsor without considering if this was, in fact, evidence that the family life already in existence endured. Rather, the judge appeared to be categorising this as the type of case contemplated at [14] of Patel where Sedley LJ said:
“You can set out to compensate for a historical wrong, but you cannot reverse the passage of time. Many of these children have now grown up and embarked on lives of their own. Where this has happened, the bonds which constitute family life will no longer be there and art.8 will have no purchase”.
35. Whilst the judge did not express herself in those terms, that is the inference to be drawn from her comments at [49] and, in my judgment, was not open to her on the evidence before her. At the very least it required an explanation as to why the existence of a family life with the sister meant that there was not a family life between the appellant and the sponsor.
36. Secondly, the judge appeared at [43] to require a dependency of necessity rather than acknowledging that dependence of choice does not preclude the engagement of Article 8(1) if there is “real” or “effective” or “committed” support. Here there was no doubt that, at the date of the hearing before the judge, there was real financial support given to the appellant by the sponsor in the ways set out above and which the judge accepted. It is no answer to this to say the appellant ‘could’ get a job. Even if he were to do so, that does not mean to say he would necessarily no longer derive financial support from his father in the form of accommodation in the sponsor’s home or top up financial support. It is speculative to say otherwise.
37. Thirdly, at [44] (see [7] above) in my judgment, the judge downplayed the significance to be attached to the cultural context of this appeal and used it as a factor pointing away from family life rather than pointing towards it. I find there to be force in Mr Dingley’s submissions that this was in fact a factor that should have been considered as a reason to support the existence of a family life, particularly when considering the duration and committed nature of the financial support.
38. Fourthly, the judge appeared to be impermissibly requiring features of exceptionality. In his submissions to me, Mr Dingley pointed to the judge’s comments at [49] and [50]. Whilst I accept that the overall guidance in Kugathas refers to a requirement for “additional elements of dependency” beyond the “normal emotional ties” that exist between a parent and an adult child, which on its face appears to require some form of comparator, that is to ignore the gloss put on this phrase both in Kugathas itself and, as later confirmed in Rai and the string of cases which followed, that what is required is “real” or “committed” or “effective” support, which does not require that. In considering this test, the cultural context remains material as does the consideration of the support not just for the appellant from the sponsor but vice versa.
39. Taken together I am satisfied that these features call into question the safety of the judge’s finding at [51] that “I do not find there is a family life here or that there is real, effective and committed financial and emotional support in this appeal”. I should add that the judge’s phraseology here does not reflect the jurisprudence. This was not a matter raised in the grounds or submissions nor one I have taken into consideration in deciding whether the judge fell into error on a point of law. To have done so risks elevating form over substance and it is the latter on which I have focused. However, I take the view that the wording used does, in fact, reflect what I have found to have been an error in the judge’s approach to the correct legal test.
40. For these reasons, I find both Grounds 1 and 2 to be made out. Taken together, these errors evidently influenced the judge’s ultimate conclusion that Article 8(1) is not engaged. The decision is to be set aside and is to be remade preserving the judge’s findings of fact on all matters, including as to the sponsor’s honesty, save the ultimate findings as to the extent of support and dependency and whether they are sufficient to amount to real or committed or effective support such as to engage Article 8(1) in this appeal.
41. Turning to the remaking, without repeating what is said above, in light of the accepted facts, those found by the judge or the otherwise unchallenged evidence, I am satisfied that the appellant has lived as a family unit with his father, mother and sister since his childhood and that continued into his maturity and still subsisted at the time the sponsor left Nepal. At that time it was characterised by cohabitation, financial and emotional support. There is no evidence that the appellant had developed an independent life of his own through marriage, children or financial independence.
42. That situation continues to date, save the departure of the sponsor from Nepal to take up his right to settle in the UK as a former Gurkha, a step he would have taken earlier had he the chance and then the funding to do so. That means the appellant would have been born here. Likewise, I am satisfied the appellant’s application to join his father here would have been made earlier but for difficulties with raising sufficient funds. When they were able to do so, the application was made. In the meantime, the sponsor has continued to send money to both his unmarried children, as is the cultural expectation. It is illuminating that one of the sponsor’s primary concerns is that something will happen to him before the appellant is settled and financially independent, and then the appellant would be left without proper support (see [10] of his witness statement). That sentiment reinforces the Nepali culture of unmarried children remaining the responsibility of the parent and which illuminates the ties between them. That financial support has taken place for many years and amounts to effective and committed financial support. Albeit dependency is not in fact required, in my judgment, it does amount to financial dependency as the appellant relies on this support to meet his essential needs as demonstrated by the breakdown of his income and expenses at [16] of his witness statement. I am further satisfied that the appellant and sponsor remain in regular contact albeit not as frequently as would be the case were the sponsor more technically literate. As the judge found, the trips back to Nepal have been less regular than they might have been through a combination of funding and health limitations on the sponsor’s part. This was the primary factor on which Mr Lawson relied to submit that there was a lack of emotional support in this appeal. However, I find that to overlook important aspects, in particular the sponsor’s evidence which the judge noted at [48], namely that he is closer to the appellant and his sister with whom the appellant lives as they are single, a matter reflecting the cultural traditions and which are a relevant factor to consider in the establishment of an Article 8 family life (para [18] Huang applies). The sponsor and appellant’s evidence is one of concern about the sponsor’s health conditions and his increased need for support.
43. For these reasons, I am satisfied that the family life which the sponsor and the appellant enjoyed at the date the sponsor left Nepal continues notwithstanding the time they have now lived apart. I am satisfied that there is real or effective or committed support between them which indicates something more than the normal emotional ties. I find that support to be in the form not just of the appellant’s financial dependency upon his father, but by the fact that the family unit within which the appellant has always existed remains all but intact, save for cohabitation. The close, personal ties that have always existed between the appellant, his father and sister continue to exist and the appellant has not established a family or other life independent of those relationships. It is not to the sponsor that the appellant turns when he requires emotional support, as per the sponsor’s evidence at [9] of his witness statement. Whilst it is right to say the sponsor has his wife in the UK from whom he can also derive support, his unchallenged evidence was that he remains close with the appellant and his sister, and it is clear from his evidence that he still views himself as responsible for them notwithstanding their age and the separation. This situation is entirely consistent with the cultural context.
44. As family life continues here, and in light of my findings and the respondent’s concession that there is nothing by way of criminality or a poor immigration history on which she relies to justify refusing entry clearance and in light of the historic injustice in Gurkha cases, I am satisfied that the existence of a family life is sufficient in this case to render the respondent’s decision disproportionate (Ghising applies).
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of an error of law justifying setting aside the decision.
The appeal is remade and it is allowed.

SJ Rastogi
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

30 August 2025