Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-000475

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/03622/2024
PA/64796/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 25 April 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE REEDS

Between

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
and

V M
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Diwnycz, Senior Presenting Officer
For the Respondent: VM in person

Heard on 2 April 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant or members of her family. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Secretary of State appeals with permission against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (Judge Moran) (hereinafter referred to as the “Judge”) who allowed VM’s appeal on human rights grounds in a decision promulgated on 16 December 2024.
2. The FtTJ did make an anonymity order, and no grounds were submitted during the hearing for such an order to be discharged. Anonymity is granted because the facts of the appeal involve a protection claim and also she is a victim of trafficking and thus her rights as protected under Article 8 outweigh the right of the public to know her identity as a party to these proceedings, the latter being protected by Article 10 of the ECHR. The anonymity order is detailed above.
3. Although the appellant in these proceedings is the Secretary of State, for convenience I will refer to the Secretary of State for the Home Department as the respondent and to the appellant before the FtT as “the appellant,” thus reflecting their positions before the First-tier Tribunal.
4. The issue raised in this appeal is whether the decision of Judge Moran demonstrates a material error of law in the assessment undertaken of the relevant law and the evidence whereby the Judge dismissed the appeal in the context of her protection claim but allowed the appeal under the Immigration Rules (Article 8 of the ECHR). I remind myself that I can only interfere with a decision of the FtTJ if satisfied that a material error of law is shown in the First-tier Tribunal Judge's decision. What I cannot do is to allow the respondent’s appeal merely because I disagree with the FtTJ’s decision, even if I consider that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal was generous and even if I would not have made that decision myself.
The background:
5. The factual background can be summarised as follows. The appellant is a national of Albania. She has 2 children who are dependent on her claim. She entered the UK unlawfully on 3 April 2021 made a claim for asylum on 27 April 2021. In his decision the FtTJ set out a brief summary of the factual background to the appeal at paragraphs 9-23 of his decision. The respondent refused the claim in a decision taken on 29 November 2023 which led to the appeal before the FtT.
6. In a decision promulgated on 16 December 2024 the FtTJ set out his assessment of the evidence and findings of fact on the appellant’s protection /asylum claim between paragraphs 26-44. The FtTJ conducted a review of the background material relevant to Albania at paragraph 37 and also assessed the appeal by reference to the country guidance decision in TD and AD (Trafficked women) CG [2016] UKUT 92 (IAC). Having undertaken his assessment of the evidence the FtTJ dismissed the appeal on asylum grounds and also on humanitarian protection grounds but allowed the appeal on article 8 grounds having been satisfied that they were very significant obstacles to her integration to Albania ( Paragraph 276ADE(1) (vi) of the Rules as they were).
7. The respondent applied for permission to appeal. Permission was granted by First-tier Tribunal Judge Mulready on 22 January 2025 who stated that:
“The appeal was allowed on grounds the judge was satisfied there would be very significant obstacles to the appellant’s integration in Albania, a conclusion reached without consideration of whether the appellant’s partner will play any role, and having recorded there being no submissions about that when the respondent now asserts the opposite is true. Had the role of the partner been considered it may have made a material difference to the outcome of the reasoning. The grounds therefore do disclose an arguable error of law material to the outcome of the appeal, and so permission is granted.”
8. The hearing took place on 2 April 2025 by way of an oral hearing. The appellant was not represented which was the same as before the First-tier Tribunal and the respondent was represented by Mr Diwnycz, Senior Presenting Officer. At the hearing the appellant was asked if she had returned to the advice centre who had previously provided her with some legal advice for the original appeal and whether she would request more time to be able to take advice in relation to the present appeal. She said that she had been to see them and had done so after the respondent had issued his grounds of appeal. She confirmed that she had all the documents and that she did not wish for any further time but would like the appeal to proceed.
9. There was a court interpreter present for the assistance of the appellant. There were no difficulties encountered with the interpreter understanding the appellant or vice versa. Further, each step of the proceedings was explained to the appellant so that she would understand the court process and she was able to participate in the hearing with the respondent’s arguments being translated to his and being able to take any notes she would wish to so that she would be able to provide his response.
10. I set out below a summary of those submissions and address them when setting out an analysis and conclusions on the grounds of challenge.
11. Mr Diwnycz relied upon the written grounds of challenge and supplemented them with his oral submissions.
12. In this decision, the FTJ has dismissed the appeal under Asylum, Article 3 & Humanitarian Protection in clear findings at paragraphs 41-44 and the findings are not challenged. It is submitted that to allow the appeal on the alternative basis the FTJ has failed to provide adequate reasons or made a material misdirection of in finding there would be very significant obstacles to the appellant’s integration.
13. While the FTJ has reminded himself of the test in Kamara v SSHD [2016] EWCA Civ 813, it is submitted this has not been properly applied to the appellant’s circumstances.
14. It is further submitted in allowing the appeal the FTJ has failed to adequately balance the public interest in effective immigration control with reference to s.117B (2), (3), (4) and (5) and has failed to make any reference to the Public Interest considerations in the remainder of the decision.
15. Despite noting the presence of the father of the appellant’s second child, born in the UK on 21/06/2023 at paragraph 19 of the decision, it is submitted that no further consideration is given to this feature of the appellant’s private life. It is submitted that the FTJ has failed to give regard to the submissions by the attending HO Presenting Officer (HOPO) in this respect.
16. The Respondent further submits the FtTJ has reached contradictory findings on one hand accepting the appellant has not established a well-founded fer of return and would have sufficiency of protection and then later finding a potential “state of significant subjective fear” at [48] (i) sufficient to amount to a very significant obstacle.
17. The FTJ further erroneously finds at [48] (iii) & (v) the appellant would have no family or financial support, despite the well-reasoned submission the father of his second child is highly likely to return with or able to provide support.
18. In his oral submissions, Mr Diwnycz accepted that if the FtTJ was correct in his assessment that there were very significant obstacles to integration, then that fulfilled the relevant Immigration Rule and as a result it was not necessary to consider the public interest considerations.
19. He further submitted that as identified by Judge Mulready, the FtTJ erred in law because whilst the FtTJ noted the likely presence of the father of the appellant’s second child (who been born in the UK in 2023) as set out at paragraph 19 of the decision, the judge failed to give consideration to that important feature of his private life, and it was submitted that the FtTJ had failed to give regard to the submissions made by the presenting officer. Mr Diwnycz referred to the presenting officer’s note (p46). The PO’s notes at the hearing are exhibited at 45 – 49. Mr Diwnycz was asked to assist the Tribunal by setting out what evidence the respondent relied upon before the FtT in respect of the father of the appellant’s second child.
20. Mr Diwnycz referred to the birth certificate setting out the father’s name and that he was he was born in Albania (p136). In her 1st asylum interview on 15 May 2023, the appellant was only asked about her first child (see Q69) but was not asked about any partner and her second child had not been born at the time of that interview. He was not able to show in the cross examination where the appellant was asked about this and submitted that the appellant had not been pressed on that point, but that it was made as a general submission.
21. Turning to the other grounds, Mr Diwnycz pointed to the findings made which led to the decision reached that she was not at risk of serious harm from her father and having made those findings, the FtTJ when allowing the appeal did not give adequate reasons for finding that there are very significant obstacles to her integration.
22. He submitted that the FtTJ misapplied the decision in Kamara and at paragraph 47 had made positive findings against the appellant. The test in Kamara is an objective one. As to paragraph 48 (ii) refers to her as a single mother with 2 illegitimate children but the father of the second child was not taken into account.
23. At the conclusion of the submissions, the appellant was asked if she had understood what had been said and she confirmed that she had understood.
24. The appellant was asked if there was anything that she would like to say about the appeal. She referred to being a single mother with 2 children and that she was in fear of returning to Albania from her father because she left the house and that she had been trafficked, and this had been a very big problem for her.
25. She referred to being emotionally unwell and that she did not know she was pregnant at first and that she had been helped by social services. She said she did not believe that there will be protection for her if she returned to Albania. She said the family had threatened her since the beginning. They were not aware of having 2 children. As to his age she said even if she would not be at risk of re-trafficking they could traffic her daughter. In essence she repeated the same evidence that she had given before the FtTJ.
26. At the conclusion of the hearing I reserved my decision.
Discussion:
27. Before undertaking an assessment of the grounds, I take into account the following matters. First, I must read the decision of the FtTJ sensibly and holistically and exercise appropriate restraint before interfering with it. Secondly, a brief decision does not mean necessarily that it is erroneous in law. Thirdly, what is required in a decision will be case specific and will depend on the nature of the issue (s) in play.
28. I remind myself that I can only interfere with a decision of the FtTJ if satisfied that a material error of law is shown in the First-tier Tribunal Judge's decision. What I cannot do is to allow the respondent’s appeal merely because I disagree with the FtTJ’s decision, even if I consider that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal was generous and even if I would not have made that decision myself. An evaluation of the facts is often a matter of degree upon which different judges can legitimately differ. The appeal court does not carry out a balancing task afresh but must ask whether the decision of the judge was wrong by reason of some identifiable flaw in the FtTJ’s treatment of the question to be decided.
29. When considering the adequacy of reasoning as an error of law, it remains as set out in R (Iran) and others v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 982. At paragraphs 13 – 14 of the judgement of Brook LJ, it was emphasised that reasons must be sufficiently detailed to show the principles on which a decision was made and why the ultimate decision was reached. Reasons need not be elaborate nor is it necessary to address each and every matter which might have had a bearing on the overall decision if those which are material to the reasoning of been articulated. In DPP Law Ltd v Paul Greenberg [2021] EWCA Civ 672, albeit in the context of employment procedures, considered adequacy of reasons as an error of law. At paragraph 57 Popplewell LJ emphasised the need to consider judicial reasons fairly and as a whole without being hypercritical. Restraint is required to read reasons benevolently. “Simple, clear and concise” reasoning was to be encouraged to enable the parties to broadly understand why they had won or lost. Further, it should not be assumed that an element of the evidence which was not expressly discussed was thereby left out of account. While they are made in the context of employment proceedings, they are of relevance to proceedings brought in the immigration and asylum context as they both are jurisdictions in which decisions are made by expert tribunals and the need to give appeals anxious scrutiny.
30. Turning to this particular appeal, the FtTJ had the opportunity to hear the evidence of the appellant at an oral hearing and had the advantage of considering her claim in the context of the country material/objective country evidence submitted on behalf of the respondent in the 2 relevant CPIN’s dealing with issues of domestic violence and the trafficking CPIN dated July 2024. The objective material was referred to in the decision both in the FtTJ’s assessment of the factors relevant to risk on return and the article 8 assessment under the Immigration Rules.
31. The FtTJ set out in his decision that he accepted the evidence the appellant had given “in its entirety” (see paragraph 27 of the decision) and accepted, as did the respondent at the hearing that the appellant had been a victim of trafficking for sexual exploitation ( hereinafter referred to as “VOT” )and had become pregnant as a result of her experiences. The FtTJ also accepted her account that before she left Albania when she disclosed her relationship her family threatened to set her on fire (see paragraph 15). The appellant also had contacted her family during the time of being a VOT and the judge accepted her account that they had not been sympathetic to her but had threatened and disowned her (see paragraph 17).
32. The FtTJ’s assessment of the claim was conducted against the backdrop of that evidence and that she was a VOT undertaken by a man whom she met outside Albania (see paragraph 28). As the profile of the family, the FtTJ found that they are a strict traditional family and had threatened her when disclosing her relationship and confirmed the threats to her. The FtTJ found “it is likely that his anger has increased as a result of further events since he made those threats” and identified the further events as a disclosing that she had been a VOT when seeking support from him in September 2020 and then having 2 children by 2 different men outside marriage. The FtTJ found that it was likely that she would be seen as having brought shame on the family and thus not only was she not likely to receive any support, but she had been disowned by them (see paragraph 29).
33. The FtTJ undertook a careful assessment of risk on return under the Refugee Convention (or in the alternative Humanitarian Protection) and did so by reference to the country materials relied upon by the respondent between paragraphs 32 – 38, and this also included his assessment of the relevant factors set out in the country guidance case of TD and AD. The respondent’s grounds do not challenge that assessment, nor do they seek to argue that the FtTJ’s assessment of the country materials set out between paragraphs 35 – 37 of the decision are in error. The relevance of this is because the FtTJ relied upon that assessment of the country materials and reaching the assessment on whether there are very significant obstacles to integration ( see decision at paragraph 48(i)).
34. The FtTJ set out his conclusions by reference to the country guidance decision at paragraph 38 and also his conclusions on the risk of return. For the reasons set out between paragraphs 40 – 43 the FtTJ concluded that the appellant had not demonstrated that she would be at risk on return. In particular the judge identified that she would not be at risk from her original trafficker as he lived outside Albania (see paragraph 40) and also that she would not be subject to re-trafficking by others given that she would be housed initially in a shelter on return but also because the focus would be likely to be on younger women given the appellant’s age and also because of the presence of 2 children (see paragraph 41). As to the risk from her family, the FtTJ concluded from the evidence that it would be “likely to provoke a lot of hostility and intimidation” from her father and the FtTJ took into account that she had lived with him after he started making serious threats including to set her on fire. Whilst he had not physically harmed her or attempted to, the FtTJ concluded that he was likely to make threats and continue to be hostile to her, but the appellant was not at risk of serious harm. The FtTJ accepted that she would fear that he would seriously harm her. In the alternative the FtTJ found there would be a sufficiency of protection for her from her family and that this was generally available for a VOT in Albania. For the reasons given at paragraph 43 the FtTJ was not satisfied that it had been demonstrated that she would not have sufficient protection from her family (paragraph 44).
35. The grounds seek to challenge the assessment made under the Immigration Rules (Paragraph 276ADE (1) (vi) where the FtTJ concluded that the appellant had demonstrated there would be very significant obstacles to his integration.
36. The grounds submit that the FtTJ failed to give adequate reasons for the decision and that the FtTJ did not properly apply the legal test set out in the decision of Kamara v SSHD [2016] EWCA Civ 813.
37. Having considered the written submissions and those provided by Mr Diwnycz on behalf of the respondent, I have concluded that there is no error of law in the decision based on the grounds as advanced on behalf of the respondent. The FtTJ correctly identified the legal test that was applicable in the decision at paragraph 46 where the FtTJ set out his self-direction as follows, “I therefore consider, based on the facts found, whether there are very significant obstacles. This is an objective test and requires a broad evaluative judgement. I have reminded myself of Kamara v SSHD [2016] EWCA Civ 813”. At paragraph 48 (i) the FtTJ returned to that decision and reminded himself of the objective nature of the test.
38. Insofar as it is argued that the FtTJ failed to apply the test, the respondent argues firstly that the FtTJ erred in law by failing to adequately balance the public interest by applying the section 117B public interest factors ( see paragraphs 8 -10 of the grounds and at paragraph 17) where it submitted that the FtTJ’s finding at paragraph 49 that the “high threshold” of very significant obstacles was met fails to grapple with the public interest tests at s.117B and that the FTJ has failed to apply the “little weight” provisions in their reasoning.
39. There is no error of law on the basis of that submission. The FtTJ addressed this issue at paragraph 45 of his decision and by reference to Paragraph 276ADE (1) (i) of the Rules stating “ if this test is met the private life provisions of the Immigration Rules will be met and the appeal will succeed on article 8 grounds unless there are some other public interest factors not accounted for in the rules that operate against VM. There is no suggestion that there are”.
40. As the FtTJ correctly identified if the test is met under the Rules that Rule is satisfied and there is no reason to undertake a proportionality assessment ( see TZ (Pakistan) and another v SSHD [2018] EWCA, in which it was held, at paragraph 34:
“…where a person satisfies the Rules, whether or not by reference to an article 8 informed requirement, then this will be positively determinative of that person's article 8 appeal, provided their case engages article 8(1), for the very reason that it would then be disproportionate for that person to be removed.”
41. As the FtTJ set out the respondent did not identify any issues of suitability/criminality and as such it was not necessary for the FtTJ to consider this issue along with the public interest considerations. There did not appear to be any issue that that the appellant had established a private life whilst she had been in the UK since her arrival and thus article 8(1) was satisfied. In his oral submissions, Mr Diwnycz accepted that if the FtTJ was correct in his assessment that there were very significant obstacles to integration, then that fulfilled the relevant Immigration Rule and as a result it was not necessary to consider the public interest considerations.
42. The real issue is whether the FtTJ erred in law in the assessment under the Rules.
43. The “ key issue” identified in the respondent’s grounds is that the FtTJ failed to have regard to the likely presence of the father of the appellant’s second child at paragraph 19 of the decision. The written grounds submit that the FTJ has failed to give regard to the submissions made by the attending HO Presenting Officer.
44. There is no dispute that the HOPO noted his submission as made to the judge as follows: “I submitted on TD and AD caselaw and the fact that his partner is Albanian so if dismissed, they would be returning as a family unit.” This is set out in the hearing minute. The record does not appear to set out submissions made on this basis. However any submission made has to be made in the context of the evidence. In other words there must be an evidential foundation for the submission. The record of proceedings annexed to the respondent’s grounds set out the questions asked of the appellant. They do not reflect any questions about her partner and his whereabouts. That is reflected at paragraph 19 of the FtTJ’s decision, “No further information was provided about him. VM did not say that there was any ongoing relationship with him and the respondent did not suggest that his potential return to Albania should be assessed on the basis that he would be providing any kind of support or protection to her.”
45. The FtTJ was correct that there was no information about him. It does not appear from the record of proceedings that any questions were asked of her about her former relationship. Mr Diwnycz was asked to refer the tribunal to any evidence concerning the father of the child but beyond the birth certificate which the FtTJ had referred to, he could not point to any evidence before the FtTJ. The appellant had not been asked questions during the interview because of the date of the interview child had not been born. The record of the hearing does not reflect any questions on this issue. Therefore whilst the short hearing note made by the Presenting officer set out that he said that she could return as a family unit, there was no evidential foundation for that submission and for the FtTJ to positively conclude that the appellant was still in a relationship with the father of her second child or that she could return as a family unit with him. The appellant at this hearing had described her relationship with him as nothing more than a brief relationship and that they do not live together but that he does have contact to that child in the UK. Therefore the respondent’s grounds that the FtTJ was wrong to find that there were very significant obstacles identified by the FtTJ at paragraph 48 (iii) and (v) because she will be returning with a partner as a family unit is not reflected in the evidence. The grounds have not established an error of law based on that ground.
46. As to the adequacy of reasoning or in the alternative that the FtTJ reached contradictory findings, that is also a submission that does not reflect the FtTJ’s careful decision. The assessment made of the issue is not inconsistent with the legal principle set out in Kamara (as cited earlier) and as later explained in the decision of NC v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 1379, Whipple LJ summarised the relevant principles at [25]:
"25. It is not in doubt, based on these authorities, that (i) the decision-maker (or tribunal on appeal) must reach a broad evaluative judgment on the paragraph 276ADE(1)(vi) question (see Kamara at [14]), (ii) that judgment must focus on the obstacles to integration and their significance to the appellant (see Parveen at [9]) and (iii) the test is not subjective, in the sense of being limited to the appellant's own perception of the obstacles to reintegration, but extends to all aspects of the appellant's likely situation on return including objective evidence, and requires consideration of any reasonable step that could be taken to avoid or mitigate the obstacles (see Lal at [36]-[37])."
47. To these principles, Whipple LJ added at [26]:
"The test posed by paragraph 276ADE(1)(vi) is a practical one. Regard must be had to the likely consequences of the obstacles to reintegration which are identified. In a case like this, where the only obstacle identified is the appellant's genuine but unfounded fear, particular care must be taken to assess the ways in which and the extent to which that subjective fear will or might impede re-integration. It cannot simply be assumed that it will. The likely reality for the appellant on resuming his life in his home country must be considered, given his subjective fear, and the availability of support and any other mitigation must be weighed. It is against that background that the judgment on whether the obstacles to reintegration will be very significant must be reached."
48. The test is a practical one with a focus on the likely reality of the appellant’s daily life on return, and if thought they were likely to be significant obstacles reintegration it should be considered whether there are any steps the appellant could take to avoid or mitigate such problems, for example seeking help from family and undertaking a broad evaluative judgement taking into account all relevant evidence, including subjective matters as well as the objective circumstances.
49. In the assessment undertaken although the FtTJ found there was a general sufficiency of protection, the FtTJ was entitled to take into account her subjective fear which was significant for the appellant given her background and lack of connections from other family members and friends where the judge found “she is likely to be in a state of significant fear” and where the judge concluded he could see no reason why the appellant’s fear would “diminish during the time in a shelter”. The judge took into account that she had some fear from her trafficker but that she had more fear of her family especially her father and that “she is likely to face significant hostility and intimidation from them”. Whilst that fell short of a real risk of serious harm, and the FtTJ has regard for the protection available which would reduce the risk the FtTJ accepted the evidence that the appellant did not have confidence in the state’s ability to protect and concluded that “she will be living in a state of significant subjective fear notwithstanding that objectively some protection is available” ( see paragraph 48 (i)). That was the finding open to the FtTJ to make based on the evidence and consistent with the relevant case law.
50. At paragraph 48 (ii) there was no dispute that the appellant would be returning with 2 illegitimate children. The FtTJ referred to the “background evidence which makes clear that this will expose her to significant stigma, as will the background of being a VOT which is reasonably likely to become known to the people around her. She will stand out as a single mothers of 2 illegitimate children… The material referred to at paragraph 37 above is relevant to the question of very significant obstacles to integration”.
51. In this respect, the FtTJ had earlier in his decision undertaken an assessment of the country materials and background evidence that had been relied upon by the respondent. The material was summarised between paragraphs 35 – 38 and by reference to the country guidance decision of TD and AD.
52. The FtTJ set out in the decision the relevant country guidance decision.
53. The FtTJ stated , “33.The respondent addressed me on TD and AD (Trafficked women) CG [2016] UKUT 00092 (IAC). The respondent has not argued that changes since this case was decided are sufficient to not follow the guidance therein. I therefore follow it but also have regard for the developments that have post-dated it as set out in the CPIN.
34. In TD and AD the Upper Tribunal confirmed that much of the guidance given in AM & BM (Trafficked women) Albania CG [2010] UKUT 00080 (IAC) is maintained. The guidance set out by the Tribunal is as follows:
“a) It is not possible to set out a typical profile of trafficked women from Albania: trafficked women come from all areas of the country and from varied social backgrounds.
b) Much of Albanian society is governed by a strict code of honour which not only means that trafficked women would have very considerable difficulty in reintegrating into their home areas on return but also will affect their ability to relocate internally. Those who have children outside marriage are particularly vulnerable. In extreme cases the close relatives of the trafficked woman may refuse to have the trafficked woman’s child return with his and could force his to abandon the child.
c) Some women are lured to leave Albania with false promises of relationships or work. Others may seek out traffickers in order to facilitate their departure from Albania and their establishment in prostitution abroad. Although such women cannot be said to have left Albania against their will, where they have fallen under the control of traffickers for the purpose of exploitation there is likely to be considerable violence within the relationships and a lack of freedom: such women are victims of trafficking.
d) In the past few years the Albanian government has made significant efforts to improve its response to trafficking. This includes widening the scope of legislation, publishing the Standard Operating Procedures, implementing an effective National Referral Mechanism, appointing a new Anti-trafficking Co-ordinator, and providing training to law enforcement officials. There is in general a Horvath standard sufficiency of protection, but it will not be effective in every case. When considering whether or not there is a sufficiency of protection for a victim of trafficking his particular circumstances must be considered.
e) There is now in place a reception and reintegration programme for victims of trafficking. Returning victims of trafficking are able to stay in a shelter on arrival, and in ‘heavy cases’ may be able to stay there for up to 2 years. During this initial period after return victims of trafficking are supported and protected. Unless the individual has particular vulnerabilities such as physical or mental health issues, this option cannot generally be said to be unreasonable; whether it must be determined on a case by case basis.
f) Once asked to leave the shelter a victim of trafficking can live on his own. In doing so she will face significant challenges including, but not limited to, stigma, isolation, financial hardship and uncertainty, a sense of physical insecurity and the subjective fear of being found either by their families or former traffickers. Some women will have the capacity to negotiate these challenges without undue hardship. There will however be victims of trafficking with characteristics, such as mental illness or psychological scarring, for whom living alone in these circumstances would not be reasonable. Whether a particular appellant falls into that category will call for a careful assessment of all the circumstances.
g) Re-trafficking is a reality. Whether that risk exists for an individual claimant will turn in part on the factors that led to the initial trafficking and on his personal circumstances, including his background, age, and his willingness and ability to seek help from the authorities. For a proportion of victims of trafficking, their situations may mean that they are especially vulnerable to re-trafficking or being forced into other exploitative situations.
h) Trafficked women from Albania may well be members of a particular social group on that account alone. Whether they are at risk of persecution on account of such membership and what is they will be able to access sufficiency of protection from the authorities will depend upon their individual circumstances including but not limited to the following:
1) The social status and economic standing of his family
2) The level of education of the victim of trafficking or his family
3) The victim of trafficking’s state of health, particularly his mental health
4) The presence of an illegitimate child
5) The area of origin
6) Age
7) What support network will be available.”
54. The FtTJ set out that he had considered the entirety of the CPIN ( dated July 2024) ( see paragraph 36) and at paragraph 35, set out that “ The country guidance in TD and AD together with the up-to-date background evidence all indicates that some support is available to victims of trafficking in Albania. However, they are also consistent in stating that the support provided by shelters is limited and does not provide a permanent solution for former victims of trafficking. Although the Albanian government has made significant efforts to improve its response to trafficking in recent years, protection may not be effective in every case. “
55. At paragraph 37 the FtTJ set out the following extracts of the CPIN:
“The section on single mothers at 13.2 of the CPIN is particularly relevant to this appeal. I note the following comments within that section that collectively provide strong evidence of the challenges that such women face.
13.2.2 The official from Key Adviser stated, ‘It is very difficult for VOT to make it without family support.’
13.2.3 Officials from Tirana municipality told the Home Office FFT 2022 that ‘… reintegration is extra hard for single mothers as they have more challenges to overcome. It’s actually multi-faceted as in addition they have someone else to care for, financial issues, find a job, child care is an issue when they find a job, who will care for child? Lack of family help, or lack of a family, is an issue also.’
13.2.5 ‘For women victims of violence and VOT it seems impossible to integrate as they don’t have the psychological ability to stay in employment.’
13.2.6 When asked by the Home Office FFT 2022 if women VOT could live independently, according to Ines Leskaj of AWEN, who said, ‘It is difficult, almost impossible for women to live independently without the support of civil societies… There are few job opportunities, poor salaries unable to meet the cost of living. It is not only difficult for single women, but also for children. Social housing programmes are provided by the state, but there are not many opportunities in rural municipalities. The provision of social services to people in general is low.’
13.2.7 Referring to single mothers, the official from Tjeter Vizion told the Home Office FFT 2022 that ‘It is much more difficult to reintegrate these mothers and their children because they are faced with family abandonment as well as societal rejection.’ An official from D&E stated that, with support, ‘… some cases finally live independently but it is a long process. There are financial difficulties, especially for those with children.’
56. That assessment has not been challenged during these proceedings, either in the written grounds or in any oral submissions thus it has not been shown that the assessment was not open to the FtTJ to make on the evidence. The FtTJ was required to apply and consider that assessment of the objective evidence when considering whether there were very significant obstacles to integration as the case law demonstrates. This is consistent with the Respondent’s guidance on Private Life that refers to taking into account relevant country information and attitudes and the country situation and by the standards of the country of return and not the UK. This was applied at paragraph 48 (ii) as set out above and also at paragraph 48 (iii) by reference to the appellant’s absence of any family support and where the judge found that was to the contrary where they are “positively hostile to her”. She had friends but had lost contact with them but in any event the judge found that “their attitude to her in very altered circumstances is reasonably likely to be different. Contacting them also carries a risk of a family becoming aware of where she is. The FtTJ found that the appellant would “reasonably be anxious to avoid this due to the hostility and intimidation that it would expose her to”. At paragraph 48 (iv) the FtTJ properly took into account that she had work experience but identified the problem that she would face of arranging childcare for 2 very young children and also paying for it without family support or any other support and that there would be limited prospects of her practically being able to work whilst the children were very young. The other means of financial support provided by the shelter would be limited in duration and at some point she would have to survive on her own. The respondent does not challenge those findings on the basis that they were not open to the FtTJ on the evidence before the First-tier Tribunal.
57. Whilst the respondent submits that the assessment of paragraph 47 is contradictory, the factors identified there are the findings made by the FtTJ to mitigate the obstacles that the appellant would face on return. The FtTJ referred to the initial residence in a shelter which would involve preparing her for the reintegrating when she leaves, but that it did not involve fully reintegrating into the country and often would not enable a VOT as this appellant is, to reintegrate successfully. This is consistent with the decision in NC (as cited above) and part of the assessment of the likely reality for the appellant on resuming her life, and that her subjective fear and the availability of support and mitigation must be weighed in the balance and against the background evidence. This is the assessment carried out by the FtTJ who set out that she balanced the mitigating factors against the other factors that he had identified before reaching his conclusion at paragraph 49, where he again took into account the test involved a “high threshold to meet” but that in all the circumstances and balancing the factors that he had set out above, was satisfied that the test was met.
58. This assessment was made on its own particular facts as the FtTJ set out within his decision. Not all appeals would meet the relevant test.
59. In conclusion, when analysed, the grounds of challenge are not made out and amount to no more than a disagreement with the decision. When addressing the grounds advanced as to adequacy of reasons, adequacy means no more nor less than that. It is not a counsel of perfection, and it is not necessary to provide “reasons for reasons “. Still less should it provide an opportunity to undertake a qualitative assessment of the reasons to see if they are wanting, perhaps even surprising, on their merits.
60. I remind myself of Sicwebu v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 550 at [49]: "Appeals to this court from the Upper Tribunal are limited to appeals on a point of law: see section 14(1) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007. Absent an error of law, the appeal must be dismissed. Furthermore, as a specialist fact-finding tribunal, this court should not rush to find an error of law in the decision of the tribunal simply where it might have reached a different conclusion on the facts: see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49, [2008] 1 AC 678 at paragraph 30. Appellate restraint should be exercised when the reasons a FtTJ gives for its decision are being examined; it should not be assumed too readily that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out in it. The purpose of the duty to give reasons, is in part, to enable the losing party to know why he or she has lost, and that has been done by the FtTJ in his decision.
61. Having considered the decision reached, and on the basis of the general considerations relevant to assessing the decision of the FtTJ and errors of law, it has not been established that the FtTJ gave inadequate reasons for the decision or that there was any misdirection in law. Consequently for those reasons the appellant has not established that the FtTJ’s decision involved the making of an error on a point of law, therefore the decision shall stand.

Notice of Decision:
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error on a point of law; the decision of the FtTJ shall stand.

15 April 2025

Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds
Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds