Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-000490

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/58228/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On the 22 April 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BLUNDELL
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BURGHER

Between

MR MOUDUD HASAN
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr A Swain, Counsel, instructed by Novells Legal Practice Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms H Gilmour, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 4 April 2025

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The Appellant is a national of Bangladesh born on 1 March 1973. On 28 January 2022 the Appellant applied for leave to remain in the UK under 276ADE(1)(vi) of the Immigration Rules on the basis of Private Life. By letter dated 26 June 2023 the Home Office refused the application. The Appellant had not been in the United Kingdom for 20 years at the date of application and it was not considered that there were very significant obstacles for his reintegration in Bangladesh.
2. The Appellant appealed on 4 July 2023. By letter dated 16 August 2024 the Home Office informed the Appellant that it maintained its position following review.
3. The Appellant’s appeal was heard by First-tier Tribunal Judge Young Henry (“the judge”) on 29 October 2024. The judge dismissed the Appellant’s appeal for the right to remain under 276ADE(1)(vi) on the Immigration Rules. It was concluded that there were not very significant obstacles for the Appellant’s reintegration to Bangladesh and, following the necessary balancing exercise, that removal would not lead to unjustifiably harsh consequences or a breach Article 8 ECHR. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed in a decision dated 17 November 2024.
4. The Appellant appealed against the judge’s decision on 1 December 2024 and First-tier Tribunal Judge Kudhail granted partial permission to appeal on 30 January 2025.
5. This is the decision of the panel and includes the contributions of both judges.
The Appeal before the judge
6. Insofar as is relevant the judge’s decisions and reasons dated 17 November 2024 stated:
13. It is the appellant’s case that he would face very significant obstacles on his return to Bangladesh given he has no home and no employment to return to. The appellant claims his family in the UK would be unable to financially assist him on return to Bangladesh. The appellant's nephew, brother-in-law, and sister, all confirmed during their evidence that they would not be able or willing to financially support the appellant on return to Bangladesh. His brother-in-law and sister explained that they are happy to share their home and their food with him while in the UK, but they cannot assist financially on return. The appellant’s sister Mrs Begum confirmed that the appellant has not had any recent contact with his wife and 15 year old son. She explained she previously was in contact with her sister-in-law however she has returned to her father's home.

14. Applying a broad evaluative judgment and remembering the high threshold of the test, I do not find the appellant has established that there would be very significant obstacles to his reintegration on return to Bangladesh. The issue is not whether the appellant has made the UK his home and has been welcomed and supported by his family, the issue is whether the appellant has become so estranged from his home country that he would no longer be able to establish a meaningful life there. Although I accept life will not be easy on his return and there will be some hardships, I do not accept that these hardships either individually or cumulatively amount to very significant obstacles.

15. The appellant resided in Bangladesh for the majority of his life. The appellant will have retained a knowledge of the culture and how society works. I do not accept that in his time away from Bangladesh he will have become estranged to life there. I do not accept the appellant has no friends or extended family in Bangladesh. I find any skills or knowledge gained in the UK can be put to good use on return to Bangladesh and assist with the appellant’s re-integration. I find the appellant fails to meet the requirements of paragraph 276ADE(1)(vi) of the immigration rules.

Article 8 balancing exercise

16. Taking into account my findings above:

Although Article 8 (1) is engaged, the rules are not met for the reasons given above. The public interest lies in the maintenance of effective immigration control. To strike a fair balance between the competing public and individual interests involved, I adopt a balance sheet approach:

(a) I weigh the following public interest factors against the appellant:
i. the appellant has made no prior attempt to regularise his stay and so it cannot be said that the delay in enforcement of immigration control is due to the respondent’s lack of action. I do not accept that there is in this case any good reason for a dilution of the strong public interest.
ii. the respondent alleges the appellant has been working illegally in the UK
iii. the appellant required the services of an interpreter for the hearing thus does not speak English
iv. the appellant has made extensive use of the NHS thus has been a burden on the taxpayer

(b) I weigh the appellant’s private life factors in his favour in particular:
i. the appellant’s relationship with his sister, brother-in-law and nephew
ii. the appellant’s mental health condition which requires treatment
iii. the length of the appellant’s stay in the UK since 2009; this has enabled him to form connections in the UK.

Nevertheless, I have regard to the statutory consideration that little weight should be given to a private life established by a person at a time when the person is in the UK unlawfully or their immigration status is precarious. I give little weight to the appellant’s relationship with family in the UK as they were established while he was in the UK unlawfully. I give little weight, following statute to the rest of the appellant’s private life.

17. The appellant has provided medical evidence in support of his claim that he suffers from a mental health condition. I have regard to the medical report prepared by Dr Swede psychologist however, it is dated 12th October 2021 accordingly it does not provide an accurate picture of the appellant's current state of health. I have regard for the GP letters dated in March and October this year confirming that the appellant is on medication and is awaiting therapy.

18. I note the letter prepared by Dr Begum dated 18th October 2024. He describes the appellant as suffering from low mood, anhedonia, poor sleep, being very emotional, overthinking, lacking in concentration, has a poor appetite and is weak and dizzy. I find the appellant has had the benefit of some intervention while in the UK, he is on medication, namely Sertraline 50mg and Zopiclone 3.75mg and is awaiting therapy treatment. I find the appellant can continue to receive treatment on return to Bangladesh given there is a functioning healthcare system in place. I do not find the appellant’s health condition meets either the Article 8 or Article 3 threshold. Neither do I find it amounts to an exceptional circumstance under Gen 3.1 such that the refusal would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for the appellant.

The Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
7. No Rule 24 response was filed or served by the Respondent. However, at the hearing Mr Gilmour for the Respondent made it clear that the appeal was opposed.
8. Ground 1 of the grounds argue that the decision does not state the Judge’s name and has specimen point across it and it was submitted that it is unclear if this decision is a final judgement.
9. Ground 2 argues the judge failed to take into account the Appellant’s medical condition when considering very significant obstacles under the Immigration rules. Mr Swain submitted that there was a failure by the judge to undertake separate analysis of the issues following Kamara v SSHD [2016] EWCA Civ 813 guidance.
10. Ground 3 followed on from the submitted failure to properly assess very significant obstacles. Mr Swain submitted that within the judge’s findings on that issue there is no indication of the judge engaging with the issues of the stigma of mental health in Bangladesh or the accessibility of healthcare in this regard. Mr Swain highlighted the evidence that the judge was referred to, specifically witness statements, Dr Swede’s psychologist report, other medical evidence and the CPIN which are not mentioned in the decision. It was not in dispute that the Appellant was being treated for mental health difficulties and Mr Swain submitted that the evidence clearly demonstrated that there was significant stigma around mental health and cultural and practical barriers to access treatment for mental health in Bangladesh. The judge did not engage with this in the very significant obstacles assessment and provides no evidential basis for the conclusion that the Appellant can continue to receive treatment on return to Bangladesh given there is a functioning healthcare system in place.
11. In summary, Mr Swain submitted that the judge’s decision was unfocussed, lacked care and adequate reasoning on key disputes which amounted to material errors of law.
12. Ms Gilmour submitted that the judge’s name was clearly specified at the bottom of the judgment and with this, and other grounds there was no material error of law.
13. Ms Gilmour submitted that the emphasis on the Appellant’s poor health and inability to concentrate and function was not the way the case was advanced before the judge. In particular, there was no application for the Appellant to be treated as a vulnerable witness when giving evidence. Further, the context was important when considering the gap between the Swede report in 2021 and subsequent more generic GP letters in 2023 and 2024 that the judge considered.
14. As far as reciting relevant evidence, Ms Gilmour submitted that there was no requirement for the judge to mention the detailed evidence that was considered. The judge clearly engages with the full medical position at paragraphs 17 and 18 of the decision deciding not to place weight on the dated Swede report. It was submitted that the judge was entitled to do so.
15. We asked Ms Gilmour whether there was any indication within the judge’s decision that she had engaged with the appellant’s submissions about the stigma attached to mental health problems in Bangladesh. Ms Gilmour submitted that it was important for the decision and reasons to be read in a fair and holistic way. If this was done, it was submitted that there was no significant or material error of law.
The Legal Framework
16. 276ADE(1)(vi) on the Immigration Rules is the applicable framework given the date of application. This was replaced by Appendix Private Life to applications made on or after 20 June 2022. The provisions allow an applicant over 18 who has lived continuously in the UK for less than 20 years to meet the requirements if they can demonstrate very significant obstacles to integration into their home country.
17. When considered very significant obstacles Lord Justice Sales held at paragraph 14 in the case of Kamara v SSHD [2016] EWCA Civ 813 that:
14 “The idea of “integration” calls for a broad evaluative judgment to be made as to whether the individual will be enough of an insider in terms of understanding how life in the society in that other country is carried on and a capacity to participate in it, so as to have a reasonable opportunity to be accepted there, to be able to operate on a day-to-day basis in that society and to build up within a reasonable time a variety of human relationships to give substance to the individual's private or family life."

18. The Upper Tribunal is confined to considering whether there are errors of law in a FtT decision. In R (Iran) & Ors v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 982 Brooke LJ summarises what amounts to an error of law at paragraphs 9 and 10
9. When the court gave this guidance in Subesh, it was aware that it would not be of any relevance to an appellate regime in which appeals were restricted to points of law. It may be convenient to give a brief summary of the points of law that will most frequently be encountered in practice:
i) Making perverse or irrational findings on a matter or matters that were material to the outcome ("material matters");
ii) Failing to give reasons or any adequate reasons for findings on material matters;
iii) Failing to take into account and/or resolve conflicts of fact or opinion on material matters;
iv) Giving weight to immaterial matters;
v) Making a material misdirection of law on any material matter;
vi) Committing or permitting a procedural or other irregularity capable of making a material difference to the outcome or the fairness of the proceedings;
vii) Making a mistake as to a material fact which could be established by objective and uncontentious evidence, where the appellant and/or his advisers were not responsible for the mistake, and where unfairness resulted from the fact that a mistake was made.

10. Each of these grounds for detecting an error of law contain the word "material" (or "immaterial"). Errors of law of which it can be said that they would have made no difference to the outcome do not matter. This need to identify an error of law which would have made a material difference to the outcome…

Conclusion
19. We conclude that the judge failed to properly undertake the specific assessment required by 276ADE(1)(vi) of the Immigration Rules in respect of integration. Whilst the judge refers to the Appellant’s medical condition in her assessment of Article 8 ECHR, for the purposes of the Immigration Rules there was a failure to engage with or assess the impact of his mental health conditions, the stigmatisation of those conditions, and the accessibility of mental health treatment when determining whether there were very significant obstacles for the Appellant to return to Bangladesh. It is clear from the Appeal Skeleton Argument that stigma and accessibility were central issues raised by the Appellant for determination within the very significant obstacles assessment and the judge’s failure to resolve this amounts to a material error of law.
20. We do not consider that is it appropriate to seek to read across the judge’s findings in respect of the Article 8 assessment. Article 8 is a separate and distinct assessment to that required under the Immigration Rules. In any event the judge has failed to outline the evidential basis for the conclusion that the Appellant can continue to receive treatment on return to Bangladesh as the judge concluded that there is a functioning healthcare system in place. This conclusion is inadequately reasoned when considered alongside the Bangladesh CPIN (July 2022) paragraph 10 regarding inadequate Government facilities for treating persons mental disabilities.
21. Whilst not material in itself, the failure of the judge to specify their name in the heading of the decision and reasons and by not removing ‘Specimen’ from the template indicates elements of inattentiveness that support the submission that the judge’s approach to determining the legal issues and factual disputes in this matter amount to material errors of law.
Remaking
22. Given the need for substantial fact-finding and assessment of the Appellant’s medical position relating to the Immigration Rules in particular relating to whether the Appellant is able reintegrate to Bangladesh we consider that it is appropriate to remit this matter to the First-tier Tribunal for a hearing de novo, see, AEB v SSHD [2022] EWCA Civ 1512 and Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC).
Notice of Decision
The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of an error on a point of law.
We set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal.
We remit the case to the First-tier Tribunal at Birmingham to be heard by a judge other than FtT Judge Young Henry with no findings of fact preserved.

Benjimin Burgher

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

8 April 2025