Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-000519

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/61069/2023
LP/04211/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

22nd August 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE REEDS

Between

K M
(ANONYMITY ORDER CONTINUED)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Sepulveda, Solicitor advocate instructed on behalf of the appellant
For the Respondent : Ms Young, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at (IAC) on 30 July 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals, with permission, against the determination of the First- Tier Tribunal (Judge Khurram) promulgated on 3 October 2024 . By its decision, the Tribunal dismissed the appellant’s appeal on all grounds against the Secretary of State’s decision to refuse his protection and human rights claim.
2. The FtTJ did make an anonymity order, and no grounds were submitted during the hearing for such an order to be discharged. Anonymity is granted because the facts of the appeal involve a protection claim.
3. Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
The background:
4. The factual background can be summarised as follows. The appellant is a national of Iraq. He entered the UK on 11 November 2021 and made a claim for asylum on 19 November 2021. The factual basis of his claim is taken from the skeleton argument and summarised by the FtTJ between paragraphs 4-8 as follows.
5. The appellant is an Iraqi national from Sulaymaniyah. He lived there together with his mother and siblings (4 sisters and 2 brothers) and worked as a self-employed painter/decorator.
6. In August 2021, he was approached at his shop and later given work at the family home of a girl, TT. During the job, they communicated and became close, initially to check progress of the work moving onto explicit messages and video calls. They slept together whilst he was working at the house on the final day. TT was engaged to someone else at the time and her brother is a captain in the PUK Anti-Terror Department.
7. On 03 October 2021, the couple were discovered by TT’s brother, whilst at a restaurant together. The appellant managed to escape, returned home to grab his passport and money before fleeing to Ibrahim Kalil. Upon arrival he contacted his mother, who informed him that TT’s brother along with the help of her fiancé, had raided their home and beaten them. They wanted to take/kill one of the appellant’s brothers in his place and showed them videos, pictures and messages from TT’s phone. Thereafter the appellant’s brothers disowned and vowed to present him once he was found for the sake of peace.
8. The appellant says that no one has heard from TT since the incident. His mother communicates with him in secret out of fear of being persecuted by his brothers. He fears that on return he will be a victim of honour killing as TT’s brother intends to kill him for dishonouring/ shaming their family
9. The appellant claims to be undocumented without an ID, who cannot redocument within Iraq under the current procedures. The appellant says all his belongings in Iraq were confiscated by TT’s brother during the raid on his home and his passport was taken by the agent.
10. In a decision letter dated 27 October 2023 the respondent refused the application for asylum and leave on human rights grounds. In summary, the credibility of his account was not accepted, and the respondent rejected the appellant’s account of facing adverse attention from TT’s brother and his own family and thus it was not accepted that it would be reasonably likely that the appellant would face persecution or serious harm on return to Iraq. In the circumstances the appellant would be able to return to his home area of Iraq.
11. The appellant appealed the decision, and it came before the FtT on 13 August 2024. In a decision promulgated on 3 October 2024 the FtTJ dismissed his appeal. The FtTJ heard oral evidence from the appellant during the hearing and the submissions made by the advocates on behalf of the respective parties. The FtTJ’s findings of fact are set out between paragraphs 18-25 relating to the asylum claim.
12. The FtTJ summarised the factual findings made at paragraph 21. The FtTJ stated as follows:
“21. I come to an overall conclusion that the appellant has manufactured an asylum claim. I find the entirety of the account relating to the relationship with TT and subsequent adverse attention from her brother to be a fabrication. As such I also find that he remains in contact with his family in Iraq and has not been disowned by them, as the underlying reasons this is claimed to have happened has not been made out and the appellant has not satisfied me otherwise.”
The appeal before the Upper Tribunal:
13. The appellant sought permission to appeal the decision. Permission to appeal was refused by the FtT but on renewal was granted by UTJ Owens on 26 March 2025.
14. At the hearing before the Upper Tribunal the appellant was represented by Ms Sepulveda Solicitor Advocate and the respondent by Senior Presenting Officer Ms Young. Both advocates provided their oral submissions in relation to the issues relevant to this appeal. There was no Rule 24 response filed on behalf of the respondent, but it was confirmed orally that the respondent opposed the appeal.
15. I am grateful to the advocates for the helpful submissions made by each of them and how they have advanced their respective cases. The submissions are contained in the record of proceedings and in the written grounds and l do not rehearse them here but will refer to them as relevant in the analysis of the issues raised.
Discussion:
16. When considering the grounds, I must read the decision of the FtTJ sensibly and holistically and exercise appropriate restraint before interfering with it. Secondly, a brief decision does not mean necessarily that it is erroneous in law. Thirdly, what is required in a decision will be case specific and will depend on the nature of the issue (s) in play.
17. It is by now well-established that appropriate restraint should be exercised before interfering with a decision of the tribunal below, which will have read and heard the evidence as a whole and which had the primary task of reaching findings of fact and attributing appropriate weight to relevant considerations: see, for example, UT (Sri Lanka) [2019] EWCA Civ 1095, at [19]-[20] - observations subsequently endorsed in a number of other judgments of the Court of Appeal.
18. Ms Young in her oral submissions referred the Tribunal to the decision in Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464. She invited the Tribunal to consider the challenges made in the grounds by reference to the principles in that decision which set out the constraints to which appellate tribunals and courts are subject in relation to appeals against findings of fact per Lewison LJ who summarised them as follows:
"2. The approach of an appeal court to that kind of appeal is a well-trodden path. It is unnecessary to refer in detail to the many cases that have discussed it; but the following principles are well-settled:
i) An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong.
ii) The adverb 'plainly' does not refer to the degree of confidence felt by the appeal court that it would not have reached the same conclusion as the trial judge. It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appeal court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached.
iii) An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.
iv) The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial judge is not aptly tested by considering whether the judgment presents a balanced account of the evidence. The trial judge must of course consider all the material evidence (although it need not all be discussed in his judgment). The weight which he gives to it is however pre-eminently a matter for him.
v) An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the judge failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the judge's conclusion was rationally insupportable.
vi) Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract.
19. With those principles in mind, I address the grounds of challenge to the decision of FtTJ Khurram.
20. Whilst the grounds seek to challenge the findings of fact made between paragraphs 20 (a)-(f) and seek to do so by submitting that the FtTJ failed to give adequate reasons ( paragraphs 6-8 and 9 ) and by failing to provide adequate reasons for not accepting the appellant’s explanations ( see grounds which challenge paragraphs 20 ( e) and (f) of the decision and the oral submissions), the decision of the FtTJ should be read as a whole.
21. In her oral submissions, Ms Young submitted that the FtTJ had considered all the evidence and relying on the of Volpi v Volpi ( above), the FtTJ was not required to make specific reference to all the evidence and the fact that he did not does not mean that he had not considered it.
22. When addressing the submissions made by Ms Sepulveda, paragraph 3 makes it clear that the FtTJ was aware of the background of the appeal and the relevant documents which are set out and contained on HMCTS. The FtTJ expressly stated , “although I may not refer specifically to all the documents I have read all of them”. The FtTJ summarised the factual claim taken from the appellant’s skeleton argument between paragraphs 4 and 8 and between paragraphs 12 – 14 set out the issues between the parties including those which were in dispute.
23. Whilst it is submitted that the FtTJ failed to have regard to the appellant’s witness statement when reaching his conclusions, at paragraph 15 the FtTJ referred to having heard the evidence of the appellant who confirmed his witness statements 1/5/2024 and 23/8/23 and that he was cross examined and re-examined. At paragraph 16, the FtTJ made it clear decision taken the submissions into account but also the “oral evidence into account entirely“. At the start of his findings of fact at paragraph 18 the FtTJ stated, “My findings are based on all the evidence, taken in the round and without compartmentalising one or the other…… …..I shall refer to the evidence and submissions so far as necessary to explain my findings and reasons”.
24. Further when setting the grounds in context, the FtTJ identified that in relation to the issues between the parties, “the appellant’s credibility is key to their consideration” and that he considered the account of the appellant “in the context of the country materials and the relevant jurisprudence by both parties contained within the various bundle submitted “ (see paragraph 19).
25. The FtTJ set out his omnibus conclusion at paragraph 20 that having considered the evidence, “I find the appellant not to have been truthful about the core of this narrative account…”, he sets out his findings of fact and at paragraph 21 concluded; “I come to an overall conclusion that the appellant has manufactured an asylum claim. I find the entirety of the account relating to the relationship with TT and subsequent adverse attention from her brother to be a fabrication. As such I also find that he remains in contact with his family in Iraq and has not been disowned by them, as the underlying reasons this is claimed to have happened has not been made out and the appellant has not satisfied me otherwise”.
26. Ms Sepulveda makes the following submissions about paragraph 20(b) of the decision. She submits that the FtTJ failed to provide reasons why the explanations from the appellant did not “come close to satisfying” the FtTJ that he had given a truthful account about the relationship with TT or facing adverse attention. Further the judge failed to provide reasons why the respondent’s criticisms were well-founded ( again by reference to paragraph 20 (b)).
27. In her oral submissions, she referred to the decision letter (p115Cef) which she said provided 3 reasons for rejecting this account; that the respondent did not accept the relationship with TT because of an inconsistency as to whether it was secret when they met in public, the 2nd reason was unclear but appears to relate to the 1st and the 3rd reason referred to an inconsistency as to how he left Iraq. In addition there was an issue of credibility raised applying Section 8 of the 2004 Act. She submits these are the credibility points raised. The respondent’s review (p97Cef bundle 5) placed reliance on the refusal letter and between paragraphs 5 to 7 did not accept the appellant’s account of the relationship with TT but did not give any additional reasons.
28. In summary she submitted that the reasons in the decision letter were limited and brief, that the FtTJ had rejected one of those reasons at paragraph 20 (b) that related to the inconsistency as to how he travelled out of Iraq. (This was based on a mistake in interview where it was said he left by plane) and that the appellant provided a witness statement dated 1/5/24 and the findings made at paragraph 20 (b) were irrational without any further reasoning.
29. When considering the challenges made to paragraph 20 (b) in my view it should be read in context and in light of the paragraphs identified earlier namely paragraphs 3, 15, 16 and 18 which referred to the evidence that the FtTJ plainly had regard to which included the written and oral evidence of the appellant. In fact when looking at some of the factual findings made, the references in those paragraphs are taken from the witness statement dated 1/5/24 of the appellant. By way of example, the FtTJ refers to “the explanation in the statement or during evidence” at paragraph 20 (b) which can only refer to the witness statement, paragraph 20 (c) FtTJ the records “he wanted TT to leave her fiancé so that they could marry” is taken from paragraph 10 of the same witness statement).
30. Further, paragraph 20 (b) should not be read in isolation from the other paragraphs and findings of fact set out within paragraph 20.
31. Whilst the individual points raised in the decision letter were not extensive, it is plain from reading the decision that the respondent had rejected the core of the account that he had conducted a secret relationship with TT in the Kurdistan region of Iraq, in the circumstances as claimed, when TT is at risk of being killed due to a pre-marital affair (see Country Policy and Information Note Iraq: Honour crimes 5.2.21). It. It was made clear that credibility was an issue. The respondent’s review also made it clear that the issue remained live “for the purposes of the hearing” and this would include the appellant’s oral evidence.
32. Whilst the FtTJ accepted the explanation given for the inconsistency as a method of travel, and made reference to the other criticisms, when the paragraph is read as a whole it is tolerably clear that the FtTJ was not solely relying on the decision and the review but also “the explanations in the statement and during evidence” which had led to conclusion that he was not satisfied to a reasonable degree of likelihood that the appellant had been truthful about the relationship or adverse attention thereafter. This is consistent with paragraph 19 where he had already identified that the core part of the appellant’s account was not accepted by the respondent and that the FtTJ had “carefully considered the appellant’s account in the circumstances”, that the appellant’s credibility was a key issue to be considered. This is further consistent with the task of the FtTJ which was to assess all the evidence not just the written evidence but also that given orally and to do so “in the round” as the FtTJ directed himself at paragraph 18 and also at paragraph 20 ( c) where he referred to considering the position “holistically”.
33. When considering paragraph 20 (b) as set out above it should not be read in isolation but in the context of the other factual findings made.
34. Paragraph 6 of the grounds challenges paragraph 20 (a) of the findings of fact.
35. Ms Sepulveda submits that the FtTJ has provided inadequate reasons for not accepting the appellant’s explanation as to why he did not claim asylum in France. She submits that the FtTJ acknowledged that the appellant had explained that he did not know that he was in France, and that he was under the control of strict agents in France, who did not speak his language and who did not usually allow him to ask questions. However the FtTJ had not accepted the explanation given by the appellant based on him being in France for 1 week. It is submitted that without further reasoning, the FtTJ’s finding is irrational, given that one week is arguably not a prolonged period, and that the appellant had provided several reasons as to why he did not claim asylum in France.
36. When considering Section 8 of the 2004 Act, the FtTJ concludes at paragraph 20 (a) that the appellant did not have a reasonable explanation and considers that this damages his credibility. This analysis is only one finding made in the assessment of the appellant's credibility and is, in my judgment, in line with the 2004 Act and the interpretation of it in JT (Cameroon) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] EWCA Civ 878 at [20] where the court of Appeal decided that the explanatory clause in s8(1) which states that "the deciding authority shall take account, as damaging the claimants credibility, of any behaviour to which the section applies" is to be read as either "as potentially damaging the claimants credibility", or "when assessing any damage to the claimants credibility".
37. In so far as it is argued that the FtTJ gave inadequate reasoning, that is not made out. This was a finding of fact open to the FtTJ to make on the evidence before him, and his reasoning was adequate, sustainable and evidence based . The issue had been raised in the decision letter and addressed in the evidence by the appellant which the FtTJ had regard to at paragraph 20(a) however he was not persuaded by that evidence and was entitled to take account of the length of time the appellant had remained in France in reaching that finding. The FtTJ did not infer nor was he saying that the appellant had spent a prolonged period in France but referred to one week which he considered was sufficient a period for him to have made a claim and thus was entitled to reject his explanation.
38. As to the challenges made to paragraphs 20(c), (e) and (f), it is submitted that the FtTJ has provided inadequate reasons, relied on plausibility and failed to assess the appellant’s account.
39. The grounds are not made out. I accept the submission made by Ms Young and as detailed earlier by the reference to Volpi v Volpi ( as cited) that the FtTJ plainly had regard to the evidence and there is no requirement to set out each and every reference in his factual assessment. The lack of specific reference to any particular material did not mean that he had not considered it. The FtTJ consider the evidence “in the round” and also “holistically” ( see paragraphs 18 and 20 ( c )) and having done so was not satisfied the lower standard of proof that the appellant had given a truthful account of his relationship with TT as described and that he had been encountered by her brother in the way claimed.
40. The FtTJ was entitled to consider the credibility of the claim and how the relationship was established in the context of the evidence and TT’s profile as a young woman living with her parents and brother, who had been forcibly engaged to someone by her brother and whether she would have seduced the appellant. The FtTJ set out the appellant’s claim that she was the instigator of the communication, the one taking her clothes off in front of the camera and on the final day of work instigated the event of sleeping with him. It was open to the FtTJ to assess the that account also in the light of the appellant’s evidence of the profile of the TT’s brother who was said to be a captain in the PUK anti-terror department, and to reach the conclusion that it was not reasonably likely that in those circumstances she would have seduced the appellant , or that it was reasonably likely against that background that his claim was true that he wanted TT to leave her fiancé so that they could marry when the first time they decided to meet outside the house was at a restaurant where TT’s brother was also present, “by coincidence“.
41. The finding at paragraph 20 (e) assessed the appellant’s evidence he had been seen by TT’s brother. The FtTJ recorded the appellant’s evidence that he returned home directly from the restaurant following the confrontation with TT’s brother. The house was not raided until 6-7 hours after the confrontation (see Q94;p158), and during that time he took his passport and $20,000 from the house before fleeing to Ibrahim Khalil which was 4- 5 hours away with a friend and that he had spoken to his mother on arrival at Ibrahim Khalil. It was open to the FtTJ to find that it was not reasonably likely that the appellant would not have failed to forewarn his family about what had happened at the restaurant and the gunfire from TT’s brother and that he had spoken to his mother upon arrival at Ibrahim Khalil (some 4 to 5 hours later). The FtTJ in his reasoning stated that the appellant would have been aware of the danger and had ample opportunity to contact them .The FtTJ also did not find credible or reasonably likely that the appellant would have £20,000 cash readily available at the time when he did not intend to flee Iraq, manage to arrange and leave Iraq on the same day as the confrontation had taken place. There is no error of law established in that reasoning; it is adequate and was taken in the context of the factual claim made and against the background of TT’s brother as a captain in the PUK anti-terror department and who had found his sister, an unmarried woman on her own with a male contrary to the social mores of Iraqi society and that the appellant failed entirely to warn his family about what had happened.
42. The finding at paragraph 20 (d) went to the core of the appellant’s claim that the appellant had not evidenced the relationship with TT. The FtTJ correctly identified that whilst corroboration of an account is not required, the FtTJ had identified evidence that was reasonably available but had not been provided nor had the reasons for its lack of provision been properly explained. The FtTJ identified that the appellant had said in September 2023 that he had a picture of the passport and still had evidence of the explicit video calls with TT. The FtTJ found that the appellant had provided a copy of the passport but not provided the video calls. The FtTJ rejected the appellant’s explanation which he had given that the phone had been broken and then it had been fixed and because it was not ready at the time to provide to his representatives with the material.
43. The FtTJ was entitled to take into account that whilst he had described having a phone with TT ‘s video calls and picture of her in her underwear, no application was made to admit any evidence that he claimed to have and as the appellant was able to provide the photo of the passport from the same phone (i.e. on an earlier occasion) the FtTJ did not find his later explanation for its absence to be truthful.
44. The challenge made of that finding in the grounds is that it having being described as “explicit” evidence, the appellant’s evidence may have been of an inappropriate nature for the appellant to produce. However that submission does not accurately reflect the evidence before the FtTJ and does not accord with the explanation given by the appellant. As set out above what had been raised was the evidence of the calls and that the appellant had been able to produce evidence emanating from the same phone but not the video calls. The explanation that it was explicit and thus inappropriate to produce was not the explanation given to the FtTJ. Thus the FtTJ gave further reasons which were evidence based and open to him on the evidence.
45. Paragraph 20 (f) is challenged on the basis that inadequate reasoning was given by the FtTJ. That is not made out. The FtTJ considered the evidence from the appellant about documents and that he had left his ID in Iraq and his passport was taken by the agent in Turkey. The FtTJ properly identified a material inconsistency in his evidence relating to the documents. In his interview (in September 2023) the appellant had stated that he had a CSID upgraded to an INID which was in Kurdistan, and he had left it there because he did not need it ( see Q 36-38 and 40;p148 Cef). However in the appellant’s witness statement 1/5/24, he claimed that all his belongings including his ID had been taken by TT’s brother during the raid. Thus the FtTJ had identified a clear inconsistency in the evidence. The issue was explored in cross examination and the explanation given was that he had not been asked about this during interview or given an opportunity to explain. The FtTJ plainly considered that explanation but gave reasons for rejecting it on the basis that the appellant’s answers were clear in the interview as they had been in the earlier witness statement and that the judge was satisfied that having considered the evidence the appellant had been given the opportunity to explain but not given the explanation he now gave in a later statement. That reasoning is adequate, sustainable and is evidenced-based as when seen in the context of the interview questions at 40 – 42 which read as follows:
Q40: why did you leave these documents in Kurdistan?
A: because I did not need them. I needed only my passport.
Q41: is there any way you would be able to get these documents?
A: I do not think so because I do not have contact with my sisters and brothers. My mother is old cannot deal with it.
Q42: why would you not be able to contact your sister and brothers to get these documents?
A; because of those problems, they do not talk to me anymore.”
46. Consequently, the Ft was entitled to make finding that the “adapting and inconsistent evidence damaged the appellant’s credibility ” . This led to the conclusion paragraph 21 and that the FtTJ came to the “overall conclusion that the appellant had manufactured an asylum claim” and that the judge had found the entirety of the account relating to his relationship with TT and subsequent adverse attention from her brother to be a fabrication. He found he remained in contact with his family in Iraq and had not been disowned by them, as the underlying reasons for the claim not be made out.
47. Between paragraphs 22 – 25, the FtTJ addressed the country guidance decisions relevant to documentation and risk alongside the most recent CPIN reaching the overall conclusion that the appellant’s INID had not been taken during the raid (for the reasons that he had given paragraph 20 (f), that he remains in contact with his family and the relevant document could be provided at the airport upon arrival by his family.
48. Those findings of fact which were made by the FtTJ and when viewed cumulatively were findings of fact which are reasonably open to the FtTJ on the evidence. Ms Sepulveda has advanced the grounds of challenge on the basis of inadequacy of reasons. However adequacy means no more nor less than that. It is not a counsel of perfection. Still less should it provide an opportunity to undertake a qualitative assessment of the reasons to see if they are wanting, perhaps even surprising, on their merits. The purpose of the duty to give reasons, is in part, to enable the losing party to know why he or she has lost, and it is also to enable an appellate court or tribunal to see what the reasons for the decision are so that they can be examined in case there has been an error of approach (see decision of the Court of Appeal in MD (Turkey) v SSHD [2017] EWCA Civ 1958).
49. Having considered the decision reached, the FtTJ was required to consider the evidence that was before the First-tier Tribunal as a whole, and he plainly did so by giving adequate reasons for his decision and did not misdirect himself in law.
50. For those reasons it has not been established that the grounds demonstrate any errors of law in the decision reached by the FtTJ. In conclusion and when properly analysed, the grounds of challenge amount to no more than a disagreement with the decision. Consequently it has not been demonstrated that there were errors of law which vitiated his overall adverse conclusions on the appellant’s credibility, his account and the issue of risk on return as the grounds assert therefore the decision of the FtTJ shall stand.

Notice of Decision:
51. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error on a point of law; the decision of the FtTJ shall stand.

Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds
Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds
6 August 2025