UI-2025-000527

• Status of case: Unreported
• Hearing date: 14 Aug 2025
• Promulgation date: 5 Sep 2025
• Publication date: 23 Sep 2025
• Last updated on: 23 Sep 2025

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-000527


First-tier Tribunal No: HU/60077/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 5th of September 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KEBEDE

Between

MNK
(Anonymity Order made)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr B Hawkin, instructed by Duncan Lewis Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr E Terrell, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 14 August 2025


DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is the re-making of the decision in the appellant’s appeal, following the setting aside, in a decision promulgated on 25 June 2025, of the First-tier Tribunal’s decision which allowed the appeal on Article 8 human rights grounds.
2. The appellant, a national of Pakistan whose date of birth is given as 1 January 1996, made an application for entry clearance on 13 June 2022 to join her partner who had protection status in the UK. She stated in her application that she was the married partner of her sponsor and had married him on 5 June 2011 when aged 15 years and seven months in an arranged marriage in Pakistan. The sponsor had arrived in the UK in May 2016, having left Pakistan in 2012, and had been recognised as a refugee in September 2019 following a successful appeal.
3. The respondent refused the application on 8 August 2023 as she was not satisfied that the appellant was married to her sponsor or that she had formed a relationship prior to him leaving Pakistan in September 2012. The respondent noted that the marriage registration certificate produced by the appellant in support of the claimed marriage was dated 11 October 2021 and was therefore a non-contemporaneous document, that the Nikah Nama she had produced looked as if it had been tampered with, that the appellant was under the minimum age to marry in Pakistan, that the wedding photographs relied upon were undated, and that the evidence in the sponsor’s asylum application and from medical reports and his own statements stated that he was single and that he had not seen the appellant since leaving Pakistan in 2012. The respondent noted that there was evidence showing that the sponsor had returned to Pakistan on 29 July 2021 until 27 November 2021 and had been served with a Cessation Advisory Letter in which it was explained that he was in breach of his protection status, which showed that he had either seen the appellant since 2012 and that the wedding photographs were taken then or that they had not met and that the relationship was therefore not genuine. The respondent considered that the sponsor had had six different written occasions when he could have mentioned being married but he did not, and therefore was not satisfied that the appellant was married to the sponsor. The respondent was not satisfied that the refusal of the appellant’s application would give rise to a breach of Article 8 as there was no evidence of a pre-flight relationship. The respondent accordingly concluded that the appellant could not meet the eligibility requirements of FRP 4.1(a), (b), (c) or (d) and FRP 7.1 of the immigration rules.
4. The appellant appealed against that decision and her appeal came before the First-tier Tribunal on 26 November 2024.
Appeal in the First-tier Tribunal
5. The sponsor gave oral evidence before the judge. He was treated as a vulnerable witness owing to his mental health problems. The judge recorded the evidence of the sponsor that he had travelled to Pakistan for four months from July 2021 in order to see his father who was unwell and who died soon after his arrival, and that he had stayed in hiding during that period as he continued to fear the Taliban and only stayed so long because of the Covid-19 pandemic. The judge noted that the Secretary of State had considered ceasing the sponsor’s refugee status but had decided not to do so. The judge had regard to the appellant’s skeleton argument which argued that the appellant had undergone a genuine marriage with the sponsor on 5 June 2011 and that the documents produced were genuine, that the sponsor’s failure to previously mention his spouse was said to be because he had accepted advice not to mention her as he was told that that may impact on the success of his asylum application, and that the sponsor’s severe mental health problems were exacerbated by the prolonged separation from his wife. The judge noted the medical evidence which confirmed that the sponsor had been diagnosed with PTSD, depression and anxiety.
6. The judge found the sponsor to be an unreliable witness and found his explanation for not having previously mentioned being married, namely because his mother had told him to focus on getting asylum first, to be extremely weak. The judge considered that that, taken together with the concerns about the documentary evidence, led him to conclude that there had not been a pre-flight marriage. The judge had doubts about the reliability of the Nikah Nama because the entry for the appellant’s date of birth had been altered, although on its face the document otherwise looked genuine. Likewise, the judge considered that the marriage registration certificate provided prima facie evidence of a genuine marriage having taken place in June 2011 but was concerned with the fact that the marriage was entered into the official register a decade later in October 2021 and was done so by a registrar who appeared to be a friend of the sponsor and therefore found that he could not give much weight to the document. The judge concluded similarly about a certificate produced by an advocate who was also personally known to the sponsor. The judge considered that the sponsor’s actions in returning to Pakistan in July 2021 after claiming to be at risk on return there undermined his credibility and considered it likely that he went there in order to get married. The judge also found that the sponsor’s previous denial of having returned to Pakistan in 2021 and his repeated claim not to have seen the appellant since 2012 undermined his credibility further. He considered that the wedding photographs could also have been taken in 2021 and were therefore not evidence of a marriage in 2011. The judge concluded that the appellant had failed to demonstrate that she and the sponsor had entered into a marriage contract or had any other form of relationship prior to the sponsor leaving Pakistan in 2012. As such the requirements of paragraph FRP 4.1(b) could not be met and the appellant did not qualify for entry clearance as the pre-flight partner of the sponsor.
7. The judge went on to consider FRP 7.1 of the immigration rules. Whilst he found that the relationship did not go back to 2011 as the appellant and sponsor claimed, and did not know when the relationship actually started, he accepted that the appellant and sponsor were together in 2021 and accepted that there was a genuine and subsisting relationship between them amounting to family life for the purposes of Article 8. The judge then considered proportionality. He noted that there was no evidence of the sponsor’s financial situation but accepted the sponsor’s oral evidence that he received universal credit. He found that the appellant could not, therefore, meet the financial requirements of the immigration rules which would enable her to seek entry clearance to the UK under the partner route in Appendix FM and that, since the sponsor, as a recognised refugee, could not be expected to return to Pakistan, they were unable to live together to enjoy their family life. In light of the sponsor’s mental health issues, which involved a suicide attempt in December 2023, the judge found that that was unjustifiably harsh and that the requirements of paragraph FRP 7.1 were met, so that the refusal of entry clearance to the appellant was disproportionate and in breach of Article 8. The judge accordingly allowed the appeal on human rights grounds, in a decision promulgated on 17 December 2024.
8. The Secretary of State sought, and was granted, permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal.
Appeal in the Upper Tribunal: Error of Law
9. The matter then came before the Upper Tribunal, sitting as a panel (which included myself), on 5 June 2025, to determine whether the First-tier Tribunal Judge had erred in law. In a decision promulgated on 25 June 2025, the Upper Tribunal found as follows:
“14. It is relevant to note, as a starting point, that there has been no challenge to the judge’s finding that there was no pre-flight marriage between the appellant and the sponsor. The appellant did not cross-appeal in that regard and the rule 24 response did not include any such challenge. The judge made detailed and cogently reasoned findings in that regard at [26] to [55] and no issues arise in relation to those findings. It is from [57] of the decision that the concerns about the judge’s findings arise, in relation to his assessment of the nature of the relationship between the appellant and the sponsor, which he found to amount to family life for the purposes of Article 8(1).
15. It is not clear from the decision whether or not the judge accepted that the appellant and sponsor were married. As Mr Hawkin pointed out in his submissions, there were parts of the decision which suggested that he did. At [45] he referred to the likelihood that the appellant’s trip in 2021 was to get married. At [53] he found that the wedding photographs, relied upon as evidence of a wedding in June 2011, could just as easily have been taken in 2021. At [59] he referred to there being a formally registered marriage in Pakistan. However the judge did not actually make a specific finding in that regard. If it was indeed his finding that the appellant and sponsor married in 2021 it is unclear how he reached that conclusion. It seems from his findings at [59] that he was relying upon the marriage registration certificate. However he did not explain how he was able to rely upon the same documents to find that there was a valid marriage in 2021 as those he found to be unreliable in his finding that there was no marriage in June 2011. There were no separate, independent documents suggesting a marriage in 2021, only the documents dated in 2021 which related to the 5 June 2011 marriage and which he had found not to carry much weight. Any reliance upon those documents as support for a marriage in 2021 was therefore unreasonable and perverse, as the respondent properly asserts. Mr Hawkin’s submission was that the judge’s findings were “nuanced” and that he took account of all the matters in the paragraphs already referred to together. However he was unable to point to anything other than speculation in the judge’s finding at [45] that the appellant went to Pakistan in 2021 to get married, when he had never claimed that to be the reason for his trip, and in the finding at [53] that the wedding photographs could have been taken in 2021. Taking all of these concerns together, and considering that it was never the appellant’s claim to have married in 2021 and that the judge at [58] was not even able to ascertain when the relationship started or how long it lasted, we do not accept that he provided a proper basis for concluding that the appellant and sponsor were married, if indeed that was his conclusion.
16. Neither do we consider that the judge made any properly reasoned findings as to why there was a partnership outside marriage for the purposes of paragraph FRP 7.1. Mr Hawkin submitted that the judge’s findings were “nuanced” and that his findings at [57] sufficed, as the respondent did not make submissions on the question of the genuineness of the relationship and there was evidence that the appellant and sponsor had spent time together in 2021 and communicated via WhatsApp. However several points arise from that. Firstly, it is clear that there was no concession by the respondent in that regard. Secondly, the judge did not consider how much time the appellant and sponsor spent together in 2021, and we pointed out to Mr Hawkin that the appellant’s statement of 29 February 2024 at [21] referred to it being only ten days. Thirdly, even if they had spent time together in 2021 and communicated through WhatsApp, the judge did not explain how that would amount to a relationship for the purposes of paragraph FRP 7.1 or family life sufficient to engage Article 8. We note that it was submitted in the rule 24 response that it was not necessary for the appellant to satisfy the definition of partner within the immigration rules for the appeal to succeed as FRP 7.1 applied where an application does not meet the partner requirements under FRP 4.1. That argument is, however misconceived as it ignores the general definition of “partner” in the immigration rules. In any event, the judge has not explained how the limited nature of contact between the appellant and sponsor amounts to family life particularly, as stated above with regard to [58] of the judge’s decision, he was not even able to ascertain when the relationship started or how long it had lasted.
17. We acknowledge that there are references in the medical evidence to the sponsor being lonely and depressed because of his separation from his wife. The judge appeared to accept that on face value without any analysis. Both parties presented views on the medical evidence. Mr Hawkin submitted that it supported the appellant’s account. Ms Kerr’s submission, however, was that the sponsor was contriving a situation whereby his mental health state would enable his wife to obtain a visa and she relied upon pages 131 to 132 to that effect. That was not a matter argued before the judge by the respondent. However neither did the medical evidence form part of the judge’s reasons for concluding that there was a genuine and subsisting relationship between the appellant and sponsor. His reference to the medical evidence was only in assessing proportionality under Article 8(2). In the circumstances we cannot view that evidence as sufficient in itself to justify the judge’s decision on the nature of the relationship, given the other significant concerns discussed above.
18. Taking all these matters into account it seems to us that the judge failed to provide adequate reasons for concluding that the appellant and the sponsor were partners for the purposes of the immigration rules, and for concluding that Article 8 was engaged. The first part of the Secretary of State’s grounds, challenging the judge’s findings on the relationship itself, are therefore made out. In the circumstances there is no need for us to go on to consider the challenge to the judge’s Article 8 proportionality assessment. As Ms Kerr submitted, if the conclusion was that the appellant and sponsor were simply boyfriend and girlfriend who had not lived together for two years, there was no route for entry to the UK under Article 8. The proportionality assessment was therefore tainted by the erroneous findings on the relationship and cannot stand by itself. We therefore set aside the judge’s decision as being materially flawed.
19. As for the onward disposal of the appeal, Ms Kerr asked that the judge’s findings on the pre-flight marriage be preserved but that the decision be re-made on Article 8, whereas Mr Hawkin requested a remittal to the First-tier Tribunal for a de novo hearing with no findings preserved. We can see no reason why the judge’s findings on the pre-flight marriage should not be preserved. As we mentioned above, there was no challenge to those findings and the judge was entitled to make the decision that he did on the evidence before him. That is not to say that the appellant is precluded from applying under Rule 15(2A) to adduce further evidence in that regard, but he will have to persuade the Tribunal that there were good reasons for that evidence not being produced before the First-tier Tribunal. Accordingly, the decision needs to be re-made on Article 8, with the findings made by the First-tier Tribunal on the appellant’s pre-flight marriage from [26] to [55] being preserved. In such circumstances it is appropriate for the case to be retained in the Upper Tribunal.
20. The Secretary of State’s appeal is accordingly allowed. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal Judge is set aside. The decision will be re-made at a resumed hearing in the Upper Tribunal on a date to be notified to the parties, with preserved findings as set out above.”
10. Directions were made as follows:
“Should the parties seek to rely upon any further evidence not previously before the First-tier Tribunal, that evidence shall be filed with the Upper Tribunal and served upon the other party in an indexed, consolidated bundle, together with any relevant application under Rule 15(2A) of the Procedure Rules, no later than 7 days before the date of the resumed hearing.”
Appeal in the Upper Tribunal: Re-making the Decision
11. On 10 July 2025 a Notice of Hearing was sent to the parties, for the resumed hearing listed on 14 August 2025.
Adjournment Request
12. Prior to the hearing the appellant’s solicitors applied, on two occasions, for an adjournment of the hearing in order to apply for an extension of legal aid to enable them to obtain a country expert report and a psychiatric report. The first request, made on 4 August 2025, was refused on 6 August 2025 for the following reasons:
"An adjournment request has been made in relation to the hearing on 14 August 2025, in order to obtain a psychiatric report and country expert report for which legal aid funding has first to be approved. However the appellant’s solicitors have had since 25 June 2025, when the Tribunal’s decision was sent out, to commence the process for obtaining such reports and for advising the Tribunal that further time may be needed, yet have waited until a week before the hearing to make this belated request. It is also relevant that there was never any previous indication of an intention for such reports to be obtained during the discussion, at the hearing on 5 June 2025 in relation to the re-making of the appeal. Further, if such evidence is now considered to be necessary for the re-making of the decision in the appeal, there is no explanation why such reports were not obtained for the previous hearing before the First-tier Tribunal. In addition, it is not clear what is the relevance of such reports when the main issue in the case is the nature of the relationship between the appellant and the sponsor. The adjournment request is therefore refused and the appeal will proceed as listed on 14 August 2025. The Tribunal will agree to extend the time limit for adducing evidence to the end of business of 11 August 2025. “
13. The adjournment request was renewed in a second application made on 7 August 2025 in which an explanation was provided for the timing of the request following the receipt of the Notice of Hearing and as to why no mention was made at the error of law hearing of such reports being necessary. It was also explained that no such reports had been obtained for the previous hearing in the First-tier Tribunal because the sponsor was privately funding the appeal and did not have the financial means to incur the relevant expenses. As to the purpose and relevance of the reports, the following explanation was provided:
“The Respondent wishes to instruct a Country expert to adduce reports as further supporting evidence. The country expert report is important to the Respondent’s appeal, as it will highlight marriage practices in Pakistan, and more importantly comment on the socio-cultural and legal aspects of marriage, documentation, customary practices. This is in conjunction with the Appellant’s argument regarding the marriage documents produced in Pakistan for the Respondent, has been tampered with, is forged and should not hold weight as supporting evidence. Further to this, the Appellant argues that the Sponsor has exaggerated his mental health difficulties, his mental health is speculative and based on assumptions and is no medical report to support the Sponsor’s position. The Sponsor has been diagnosed with depression and PTSD, and is therefore vulnerable. The Sponsor has highlighted on various occasions that the ongoing appeal and separation from his partner is causing his mental health to deteriorate. As this is an ongoing, the Sponsor’s mental health is crucial to the Respondent’s appeal, as it will affect his evidence given at the hearing dated 14 August 2025.”
14. The request was refused again for the following reason:
“The Tribunal does not consider that the renewed adjournment request provides any further information to justify an adjournment of the proceedings. It remains unclear what is the relevance of the proposed expert reports when the main issue in the case is the nature of the relationship between the appellant and the sponsor. The explanation why such reports were not produced for the previous appeal before the FTT is not an adequate one, given that the appellant had the same legal representatives at that time. The fact that the marriage certificate relied upon had been altered was never disputed by the appellant’s representatives and it is not clear how an expert’s report would assist in that regard.”
Hearing on 14 August 2025
Documents
15. For the resumed hearing, the appellant’s representatives relied upon the composite bundle produced for the error of law hearing, which included the appeal bundles before the First-tier Tribunal for both the respondent and the appellant, and a supplemental appeal bundle which included an additional witness statement from the appellant and the sponsor, both addressing the error of law decision, together with the appellant’s medical evidence. I have read all of these documents, including the lengthy medical notes and reports, and have taken all of them into consideration even if not specifically referred to.
Renewed Adjournment Request
16. Mr Hawkin renewed the adjournment request before me, on the same basis as previously. Mr Terrell objected to the adjournment, and I refused the request. In so doing I gave careful consideration to whether the appellant would be prejudiced by the lack of opportunity for a country expert report and psychiatric report to be obtained and produced. I considered the guidance in Nwaigwe (adjournment: fairness) [2014] UKUT 418 and the implications of my decision in terms of fairness. As Mr Hawkin pointed out I did not, in my decision of 25 June 2025, completely shut the door on the issue of a pre-flight marriage, making it clear at [19] of that decision that the First-tier Tribunal’s findings on the matter were preserved but that the appellant was not precluded from making an application under Rule 15(2A) to adduce further evidence in that regard. However I was simply not persuaded by the submissions made on behalf of the applicant that there could be any benefit from such reports.
17. With regard to the country expert report, the intention was for it to address “marriage practices in Pakistan, and … comment on the socio-cultural and legal aspects of marriage, documentation, customary practices.” Yet none of that was in dispute. It was never disputed that the Nikah Nama was not in the usual format. The only concern about the document was that it had clearly been altered in the section giving the appellant’s date of birth. The appellant’s legal representative at the hearing before the First-tier Tribunal did not dispute that it had been altered. The First-tier Tribunal Judge (in findings which, as I pointed out in the error of law decision, had not been challenged by the appellant) accepted that such an alteration would not necessarily lead to any significant doubt that the document was genuine, but considered that it was an accumulation of discrepancies in the evidence as a whole which led to the conclusion that the marriage had not taken place in June 2011. Given that the overriding issue was the credibility of the sponsor’s evidence I did not see how a country expert report could possibly assist. As I raised with Mr Hawkin, the expert report would only potentially assist the appellant if it involved an attendance at the relevant marriage registry in person to check the records, but whilst Mr Hawkin suggested that that could possibly be done, none of the adjournment requests previously made, nor the instructions to the country expert, had suggested that that was what was intended. Neither did I consider that the appellant’s case would be prejudiced by the absence of a psychiatric report given that I already had before me extensive medical notes and reports which referred to his mental health concerns, albeit not up to date. In any event, it was not disputed that the sponsor had mental health problems. The previous medical records had made reference to the sponsor’s mental health being affected by the appellant’s ongoing absence and I was able to consider that evidence. In the circumstances I considered there to be no merit in the adjournment request and the appeal therefore proceeded.
Oral Evidence
18. The sponsor gave oral evidence before me through an interpreter in the Pashto language. The interpreter confirmed that they understood each other and I was entirely satisfied that that was the case. At Mr Hawkin’s request, the sponsor was treated as a vulnerable witness, in accordance with the joint presidential guidance notes for vulnerable persons, and I ensured that he understood the proceedings and was able to request a break at any point if he needed it. As it happened, the oral evidence did not last long and there was no need for a break. I had no reason to believe that the sponsor had any difficulties at the hearing. He clearly understood the questions put to him and was able to answer them.
19. The sponsor adopted his two statements as his evidence in chief and was then cross-examined by Mr Terrell. When asked by Mr Terrell why he had not produced any further WhatsApp screenshots in addition to those produced earlier, which only went up to May 2022, he said that his solicitors had not asked him to. He said that he spoke to his wife on a daily basis and his solicitors had also spoken to her, but he could not produce documents if his solicitors did not ask him for them. Mr Terrell referred the sponsor to the marriage certificate and the alteration in it. The sponsor said that the document was handwritten in Urdu and had not been altered. There was a mistake but that was not there any more as the document was computerised. The sponsor then said that there was no mistake in the document but it was just the Home Office which had said that there was. His wife had managed to obtain a passport and identity card using that document which showed that it was genuine. The sponsor confirmed that the last time he saw his wife was in 2021 when he went back to Pakistan and his father passed away. He did not have anyone in this country who could attest to the genuineness of the relationship as he had no family here and no good friends he could ask. In Pakistan, the mullah and the solicitor had attested and verified the document but the Home Office were still not accepting it.
20. When re-examined by Mr Hawkin, the sponsor said that he spoke to his wife three to four times a day through WhatsApp. She was very upset about the case and so was he. He could not travel with the travel document he had as he could not get a visa. In response to my further enquiries, the sponsor said that he had spoken to a travel agency about going to Dubai but they had said he could not travel there or to Saudi Arabia with his travel document. When I asked the sponsor why he had not applied for his wife to join him here after he obtained refugee status in September 2019, he said that he contacted Duncan Lewis in 2021 but they told him that they could not apply for legal aid for him and then after that there was Covid 19. After he was given refugee status he was waiting to be housed by the council and he was not eligible for legal aid.
Submissions
21. Both parties made submissions.
22. Mr Terrell submitted that the appellant could not succeed under the immigration rules. The First-tier Tribunal’s findings, that there was no pre-flight marriage, were preserved. The appellant could not meet the requirements of paragraph FRP 4.1 of Appendix Family Reunion in regard to pre-flight marriage and she could not meet the relationship requirement in FRP 4.2 of Appendix Family Reunion and RWP 4.1 and 5.1 of Appendix Relationship with Partner. She could not demonstrate that there was a genuine and subsisting relationship for the purposes of RWP 6.2. As for Article 8 outside the immigration rules, the requirements of FRP 7.1 were not met because the appellant could not demonstrate that the refusal of entry clearance resulted in unjustifiably harsh consequences for herself or the sponsor. In any event the appellant did not get that far as she could not meet the partner requirement in FRP 4.1. Mr Terrell submitted that there was no valid marriage. There was no challenge to the findings made by the First-tier Tribunal that the marriage certificate was not a reliable document. It could not be said that there was a marriage in 2021 as no party was asserting that. The wedding photographs only went so far and were missing crucial context. There was no evidence to demonstrate a relationship akin to marriage for the previous two years as the WhatsApp messages were few and only went up to 2022 and there was nothing else. Therefore Article 8 was not even engaged. Mr Terrell submitted that, if I was not with him on the question of a genuine and subsisting relationship, the decision was still not disproportionate given that it was open to the appellant to make a proper application under Appendix FM and tell the truth about the relationship. With regard to the medical evidence, Mr Terrell submitted that it was circumstantial and said nothing about the substance of the relationship.
23. Mr Hawkin submitted that the evidence had to be considered as a whole and the starting point should be the medical evidence and medical issues which should inform how the sponsor’s credibility was assessed. The sponsor had accepted that the marriage certificate contained a mistake but did not accept that it had been altered in a way which was dishonest. There were no credibility issues. The appellant and sponsor continued to communicate by WhatsApp. The previous WhatsApp evidence together with the statements of the appellant and sponsor about their daily communication should be accepted. There was medical evidence showing that the appellant needed her husband. There was clearly ongoing contact. Even if the marriage certificate was not accepted, there was sufficient to show a genuine and subsisting relationship. The medical reports referred repeatedly to the sponsor needing his wife. The photographs showed that there was a marriage ceremony. The appeal should succeed under the immigration rules, but if not, Article 8 was engaged and the decision was disproportionate as the couple could not be together anywhere else.
Analysis
24. The first point I make is that, having now heard the appeal, I have again considered whether the appellant and sponsor were prejudiced by the absence of the requested expert reports. I am in no doubt that the country report would not have assisted the appellant’s case, given that it is the significant credibility concerns from the sponsor’s own evidence, when taken together with the clearly altered marriage certificate, which have led to the conclusions I have reached. I have also considered whether a further psychiatric report would have assisted the appellant’s case, but I simply do not accept that it would. It is not in dispute that the sponsor suffers from mental health problems, that he has previously self-harmed and has been under the care of mental health services. I accept that he is a vulnerable person and I have taken all of that into account when considering and assessing his evidence, but for the reasons I give below I do not consider that his mental health concerns provide an explanation for the nature of the credibility concerns which have arisen in the evidence. Nor would a report from an expert who had not previously been treating the sponsor add anything to the question of the sponsor’s relationship with the appellant. More useful would have been current evidence from the medical professionals already assisting the sponsor, if there were indeed still significant concerns about his mental health in relation to his family reunion application. However there was none.
25. There is nothing in the further evidence before me which would lead me to depart from the findings made by the First-tier Tribunal Judge in regard to the pre-flight marriage. With regard to the marriage certificate, it has clearly been altered and that was accepted by the appellant’s representative at the previous hearing. I accept, as did the First-tier Tribunal Judge, that that in itself is not a reason to find the document not to be genuine, as alterations are not unknown in official documents. However there is otherwise nothing else in the evidence before me which could lead me to conclude that there was a genuine marriage on 5 June 2011 and that that was simply a mistake in an otherwise genuine document. There was no challenge by the appellant to the judge’s findings in that regard, nor to his findings on the other documents referred to at [39] to [42], namely the marriage registration certificate and the certificates and undertaking from the court advocate and registrar. The sponsor’s evidence before me did not go anywhere near addressing the concerns raised by the First-tier Tribunal Judge as to his reliability as a witness. He maintained that there was no mistake in the marriage certificate despite being referred to the altered section of the document, and he did not seek to provide any further explanation for his failure to mention his marriage to the appellant in spite of the repeated opportunities he had to do so over the years.
26. The respondent’s refusal decision and the First-tier Tribunal Judge’s decision both referred in detail to the sponsor’s repeated statements, in his own asylum claim, that he was single, and to the absence of any mention of a marriage in Pakistan prior to him leaving in 2012. Not only did the sponsor maintain his single status with the Home Office but he also made clear statements to the medical professionals who assisted him, that he was single. I have read through the extensive medical reports and note that the appellant was referred in early 2017 to the Zinnia Centre by his GP practice because of his suicidal thoughts relating to previous experiences of torture in Pakistan. He told the psychiatrists whom he saw in the centre that he had never married (page 262 and 266 of the consolidated bundle). His family history given to his GP made no mention of a spouse. In a psychiatric report prepared on the instructions of his solicitors on 11 May 2019 the sponsor told the psychiatrist that he was not married (page 608, paragraph 3.3.9). A country expert report prepared for his asylum claim in March 2019 made no mention of a wife in Pakistan. Indeed, it was not until after making his application for the appellant to join him in the UK, following his trip to Pakistan in 2021, that he made any mention of a wife to the Home Office or to the medical professionals who were assisting him. From that time the medical reports and records referred to his mental health issues being due to being lonely because his wife was abroad and needing someone to care for him, rather than focussing on his previous experiences in Pakistan. As found by the First-tier Tribunal Judge there is no credible explanation from the sponsor as to why he did not mention his marriage to the appellant previously.
27. In the circumstances I do not accept that the appellant and sponsor were married or in a relationship, prior to the sponsor leaving Pakistan. There was nothing in the evidence before me to displace the adverse credibility findings made by the First-tier Tribunal and, having heard from the sponsor myself, I am entirely in agreement with the adverse assessment previously made. I do not accept the wedding photographs as evidence of a marriage in 2011. They are not dated and could have been taken when the sponsor returned to Pakistan in 2021. There is no evidence of communication or contact between the appellant and sponsor prior to that trip. Accordingly the appellant cannot meet the requirements of the immigration rules for family reunion, on the available evidence. The requirements of FRP 4.1 are not met as there was no pre-flight relationship.
28. As to the nature of the relationship subsequently, the First-tier Tribunal Judge believed that the appellant’s trip to Pakistan in 2021 could have been to get married and that the photographs could have been taken at that time. However, given that the appellant and sponsor had never claimed to have been married at that time, that there was no evidence of a marriage at that time and that the marriage certificate relied upon was found to be an unreliable document, there is no basis for concluding that there was a marriage at that time. Indeed it was partly on that basis that the First-tier Tribunal Judge was found to have erred in law in his decision. In the circumstances I do not accept, on the evidence available to me, that the appellant and sponsor are married. The appellant cannot, therefore, meet the definition of a “partner” for the purposes of paragraph RWP 4.1 of Appendix Relationship with Partner.
29. As to whether the appellant and sponsor are in a durable relationship for the purposes of RWP 5.1, there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate that they are. They have not lived together in the two years prior to the application. The sponsor, as a refugee, cannot be expected to return to Pakistan to be with the appellant (despite his previous visit in 2021). Although the sponsor’s evidence in his statement for the family reunion application was that he had not seen the appellant since 2012, he now claims to have spent time with her in Pakistan, but even if that is true it was only ten days by his own evidence and there is no reliable evidence of what happened during that period in terms of their relationship. The sponsor claims that he cannot obtain a visa for a third country where he could meet the appellant, although there is no evidence to support such a contention. Although both parties have provided detailed witness statements about their relationship, the appellant’s evidence has not been, and could not be, tested in cross-examination, for obvious reasons. The sponsor has proved to be an unreliable witness and I cannot place weight upon his statement. I have taken account of his mental health problems but do not accept that those adequately explain or justify the extent of his unreliability. The sponsor’s and appellant’s claims to have been married to each other in 2011 have not been accepted for the reasons already given. The claims as to how they met and how often they communicate cannot, in such circumstances, be accepted at face value. There is limited evidence of communication and contact between them. The limited WhatsApp messages do not provide material support for the existence of a long-standing, genuine and subsisting relationship. There is nothing further by way of evidence of communication since May 2022. The sponsor’s explanation was that his solicitors had not asked for such evidence, but that is not a reasonable explanation as he would have been well aware of the need to demonstrate a genuine and subsisting relationship, as would his solicitors. As Mr Terrell submitted, the wedding photographs are missing a crucial context. They are not dated. They are limited and, for the most part, only show the appellant and sponsor, and could easily have been posed simply for the purposes of the application during the sponsor’s visit to Pakistan in 2021.
30. As for the evidence in the medical reports, I accept that there is reference to the appellant presenting with self-harm and referring to his need for his wife to be with him in the UK. I refer by way of example to page 131 of the consolidated bundle. That letter refers to the appellant being lonely without his wife and needing her as he was not able to wash and cook for himself. Clearly the sponsor is a person who has suffered from mental health concerns for several years, following his experiences in Pakistan, and that is not disputed. He has a history of self-harm for reasons other than those relating to a partner. He is clearly frustrated by the family reunion application being refused. However the evidence says nothing about the substance of the marriage or relationship. It is not evidence of a durable relationship with the appellant. That is particularly when considering the overall credibility concerns which arise in this case. The same can be said of the medical evidence relating to the appellant, which says no more than the appellant needs the care of her husband. The evidence simply does not demonstrate that the appellant and sponsor meet the definition of “partner” for the purposes of FRP 4.2. For all of these reasons the appellant cannot meet the requirements of the immigration rules on the basis of her relationship with the sponsor.
31. As for Article 8, I do not consider that family life has been demonstrated as established between the appellant and sponsor, for the reasons already given. It may be that there is some form of relationship between them but it has not been shown on the evidence before me that that amounts to a durable relationship going beyond that of girlfriend and boyfriend so as to engage Article 8. The evidence is simply not reliable. The requirements of FRP 7.1 are not met as it has not been demonstrated that the decision would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for the appellant or the sponsor. The decision to refuse the appellant’s application has been properly reached on the basis of the lack of reliability and credibility of the available evidence. As Mr Terrell submitted, it is open to the appellant to make a further application on the basis of a truthful account of her relationship with the sponsor. If there has been a marriage at some stage (which the evidence before me does not demonstrate) it is open to the appellant to obtain reliable evidence of that marriage for the purposes of a new application, and to make that application under the appropriate immigration rules. However on the evidence available to me I cannot accept that the appellant has made out her case, either under the immigration rules or on Article 8 grounds.
DECISION
32. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal having been set aside, the decision is re-made by dismissing the appellant’s human rights appeal.


Signed: S Kebede
Upper Tribunal Judge Kebede

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
15 August 2025