Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-000560

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/55278/2022
LP/08588/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

18/11/2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE PINDER
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE WALSH

Between

HAA
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms. Sepulveda, Solicitor, Fountain Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms. Simbi, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 26 September 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. By my decision dated 9 July 2025 (a copy of which is appended below) I set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 4 November 2024 refusing the Appellant’s protection claim. We now re-make that decision.
2. We have maintained the Anonymity Order in favour of the Appellant HAA. We consider that on the specific facts of this appeal, the maintenance of the integrity of the United Kingdom’s immigration system, and the Appellant having raised a claim to international protection are such that an Anonymity Order is a justified derogation from the principle of open justice.
Background
3. The Appellant is an Iranian national of Kurdish ethnicity. He arrived in the UK on 5 July 2021 and claimed asylum the same day. He was 17 years of age when he arrived.
4. The essence of the Appellant’s protection claim was that he had a well-founded fear of persecution owing firstly to activities he said he undertook for the KDPI in Iran. Secondly he claimed to be at risk due to his political activism in UK namely attending anti-government protests in front of the Iranian Embassy and posting on Facebook messages critical of the Iranian regime and publicising the demonstrations.
5. The First-tier Tribunal did not find the Appellant’s account of events in Iran to be credible and therefore found that the Appellant would not come to the adverse attention of authorities owing to those activities. Those findings were not challenged on appeal and I preserved those findings.
6. The error of law identified was the FTTJ’s failure to engage with evidence relevant to the assessment of the Appellant’s role in sur place activities, specifically a screenshot of a photograph/video of the Appellant speaking into a microphone at a demonstration. This error was also found to infect the FTTJ’s findings on whether or not the Appellant’s political beliefs were genuinely held.
7. The error of law was material to whether or not the Appellant would be at risk on return to Iran owing to his sur place activities. This was therefore the issue for us to determine at the remaking hearing.
The Hearing
8. This was an in-person hearing at which the Appellant was assisted by a Kurdish Sorani interpreter. The Appellant was tendered as a witness, adopting as his evidence his three witness statements dated 9th February 2022, 15th September 2023, and 17th September 2025. He was cross-examined by Ms. Simbi with re-examination by Ms. Sepulveda.
9. In addition to the Appellant’s oral evidence, we had the benefit of the Appellant’s witness statements, the Composite Bundle from the error of law hearing consisting of 468 pages, the Appellant’s Supplementary Bundle filed on 17th September 2025 consisting of 90 pages and the Appellant’s skeleton argument filed on 25th September 2025.
10. We confirm that in reaching our decision, we have taken into consideration all of the written and oral evidence before us together with the parties’ written and oral submissions, whether or not specific points therein are referred to in our decision.
Issues in Dispute
11. The legal framework for assessing sur place claims of Iranians of Kurdish ethnicity is well established by a long line of authorities: BA (Demonstrators in Britain - risk on return) Iran CG [2011] UKUT 36 (IAC); SSH and HR (illegal exit: failed asylum seeker Iran CG [2016] UKUT 00308 (IAC); HB (Kurds) Iran CG [2018] UKUT 00430; XX (PJAK – sur place activities-Facebook) Iran CG [2022] UKUT 0023.
12. From those authorities and the parties’ submissions, we identify the issues in dispute in this case to be:
a. Whether there is a reasonable degree of likelihood the Appellant would have come to the attention of the Iranian authorities taking into account
i. The level of the Appellant’s “real world” and on-line political activity
ii. The extent to which the Appellant’s activity was or may have been monitored by the Iranian authorities
b. Whether the Appellant’s political activism is motivated by genuinely held political beliefs
The Appellant’s Political Profile
13. As per BA (Headnote 3) the level of a person’s political profile and activism is the starting point for considering the likelihood of an individual coming to the attention of the authorities and the degree of interest the Iranian regime would have in identifying him.
14. BA identified the relevant factors to be considered when assessing the level of a person’s political activism as follows [4 (i]):

can the person be described as a leader; mobiliser (e.g. addressing the crowd), organiser (e.g. leading the chanting); or simply a member of the crowd; if the latter is he active or passive (e.g. does he carry a banner); what is his motive, and is this relevant to the profile he will have in the eyes of the regime?
15. In his oral and written evidence, including exhibited photographs and anti-government Facebook posts, the Appellant sought to demonstrate that he was more than “just a face in the crowd.” The Appellant produced numerous screenshots evidencing his attendance at anti-government demonstrations in front of the Iranian Embassy. In his statement dated 17th September 2025, the Appellant stated that he attended 17 demonstrations between 2021 and 2025, though the majority of the screenshots produced relate to demonstrations in 2024. The Appellant’s evidence was that he posted details of the demonstrations on Facebook to encourage other people to attend and increase the numbers of protesters in front to the embassy.
16. In each of the demonstration screenshots, the Appellant is seen holding anti-government signs. In his oral evidence, he said that save for one sign he printed (but did not design), he had not made the signs himself. Rather, he said the signs had been provided by the organisers who were members of KDPI. He, along with the others attending the protests, would chant anti-government slogans.
17. The Appellant said that at a demonstration on 23rd June 2024 he spoke on a microphone saying things against the government and encouraging people to join the demonstrations. He said by doing this he would have brought himself to the attention of the authorities. He told us this was the only time he had spoken into a microphone at a demonstrations explaining that he was not a good public speaker but he did what he could. The Appellant stated that there was a video of this and confirmed that the screenshot with the microphone icon in the Composite Bundle [CB 284/468] is the video of him speaking. That screenshot shows that the post was “liked” by 246 individuals and received 180 comments. When asked by Ms. Simbi why the screenshot in the Supplementary Bundle [SB 51/90] is dated 28 July, the Appellant stated that he had reposted that photo to demonstrate that he was able to speak freely about the treatment of the Kurdish people by the Iranian government.
18. With respect to his Facebook activism generally, the Appellant produced multiple screenshots of anti-government posts between 2021-2025. The Appellant provided a “Download Your Information” print out dated 16 October 2024 [CB161-CB 233] which confirms that the account was registered on 30 September 2021. The print out contains a list of people who follow the Appellant numbering in excess of 450 individuals [CB 187- CB 190]. The Appellant’s “friends” are listed at [CB 191-CB 233]. The print out also contains a number of uploaded messages between 2021 and 2024 [CB 164 – CB 186] promoting the anti-government demonstrations and/or expressing anti-government views. Many of the messages show that a number of others were tagged into the uploaded posts which also shows on some of the screenshots, (see, eg 19 November 2025 [CB 313]; 2 January 2023 [CB 321]; 25 February 2024 [CB 259]).
19. In his oral evidence the Appellant stated he now has 5000 “friends” on Facebook. He was asked by Ms. Simbi how many “friends” he actually knew to which he responded 7-8, the others had followed him from posts that had been shared by those who share his views. The Appellant said he used Facebook almost exclusively for political purposes and did not have a Facebook account in Iran.
20. As to other forms of political engagement, the Appellant said he did not engage with activities beyond attending demonstrations or posting on Facebook. He did not claim to be an official member of the KDPI. He said that when he went to the KDPI office on one occasion to ask about getting papers, he was refused on the basis of his uncertain immigration status.
Monitoring/Surveillance
21. The Appellant’s evidence was that the demonstrations he attended were subject to regular surveillance by embassy staff. The Appellant relied on a photograph he took when at a demonstration. This photograph depicted embassy staff photographing/videoing the protesters, which the Appellant identified as the screenshot in the Supplementary Bundle dated 27 October recording 89 likes and 101 comments [SB 25/90]. However, the same photograph is seen in screenshots with different dates.
22. Ms. Simbi in her submissions noted that one of the screenshots with the same photograph had been posted by the Appellant on Facebook as apparently relating to a different demonstration on a date, 13 September 2024 [CB 286]. Ms Simbi submitted that this was not a date that the Appellant had mentioned in his witness statement as a demonstration that he had attended on 13 September 2024. She had not, however, challenged the Appellant about this in cross-examination. In light of this, we gave permission for the Appellant to be recalled in order to address this issue. He was asked further questions about this photograph by both Ms. Sepulveda and Ms. Simbi. The Appellant stated that he had in fact attended the demonstration on 13th September and could not remember the exact date he took the photo of the embassy staff but he had reposted it several times. With regards to the dates of the demonstrations included in his witness statement, the Appellant confirmed that all of his Facebook posts show what he did and when.
23. The Appellant said that he had seen embassy staff photographing and videoing the protests several times but only had one picture that he had posted and included in his evidence. This was because other photographs that he had taken were or would not have been of good enough quality, for example, as a result of the position of the sun when he was trying to take the photo causing glare. He also told us that the staff would often attempt to conceal themselves. The Appellant told us that a similar photo, that was included in the same Facebook post alongside his own photograph [CB 249] was taken by his friend.
24. It was argued by Ms. Simbi on behalf of the Respondent that the Appellant’s activities were not likely to attract the adverse attention of the authorities. She submitted that the Appellant had not evidenced any impact generated by the demonstrations. Ms. Simbi accepted that the Appellant had taken a photograph of the embassy staff recording the protests but argued that as there is only one such photograph, little weight should be placed on it as evidence of continual surveillance. She did not accept his Facebook profile placed him high enough on the “social graph” to be of interest to the Iranian authorities.
25. Ms. Sepulveda referred to the “hair trigger” approach of the Iranian authorities to those suspected of being involved in Kurdish political activity or support for Kurdish rights - HB. In that context, Ms. Sepulveda argued, the Appellant is at risk as he has openly expressed his views in support of Kurdish rights by posting on Facebook and attending demonstrations. The objective evidence from the CPIN supports there being a realistic possibility of the Iranians already being aware of his activities which in turn would establish a real risk to him.
Genuineness of the Appellant’s Political Beliefs
26. A returnee who holds genuine political beliefs cannot be expected to lie when being questioned by the Iranian authorities - HB [120] - such questioning being very likely to occur in respect of a person with the Appellant’s characteristics (Kurdish, Sunni, illegal exit, failed asylum seeker from western country). Nor can such a person be expected to delete their Facebook account - XX (Headnote 10). Given the accepted risk of persecution/ill-treatment to those who share the Appellant’s characteristics and espoused political opinion, whether or not the Appellant can be expected to lie about his political beliefs and activism is a critical component of assessing the Appellant’s risk on return.
27. Ms. Sepulveda argued that the genuineness of the Appellant’s political beliefs is well evidenced. She referred us in particular to the Appellant’s statement dated 17 September 2025 [SB 2 -6] in which he states that his political opinion has evolved since being in the UK where information about the treatment of the Kurds is more freely available (paragraph 3). In summary he says that the motivation for his activism is to draw international attention to the discrimination and maltreatment of Kurds in Iran, referring specifically to discrimination in employment, health care, housing, freedom of movement, arbitrary arrest and punishment (paragraphs 11-20). Ms. Sepulveda submitted that the Appellant’s ability to provide this detailed explanation of his motivation is credible evidence that his activism is genuine. The Appellant’s credibility is further evidenced, Ms. Sepulveda submitted, in his ability to answer clearly all questions put to him in a lengthy cross-examination.
28. On behalf of the Respondent, Ms. Simbi submitted that the Appellant’s political beliefs were not genuinely held. Whilst she accepted that there are credible reasons why people may have an adverse opinion of the Iranian authorities, she argued that it does not follow that everyone who does so engages in political activism against the regime genuinely or is making a meaningful difference to that cause. Ms. Simbi urged us to treat the negative credibility findings in relation to the Appellant’s account of activities in Iran as the starting point for assessing the Appellant’s evidence on his sur place activities. She submitted that the manner in which the Appellant posted on Facebook was clearly designed to bolster his claim and not therefore indicative of a genuinely held political belief or opinion. Ms. Simbi argued that the limited activities undertaken by the Appellant (posting on Facebook and attending demonstrations) were not consistent with genuine political engagement. In sum, Ms. Simbi submitted that that the Appellant’s motives were not genuine and he can be therefore expected to delete his Facebook account neutralising any risk arising from his sur place activities.
29. Ms Sepulveda submitted that, even if the Appellant does not hold genuine political beliefs, he remains at risk of persecution on the basis of imputed political opinion. She argued that there is a realistic possibility that the Iranian authorities are already aware of the Appellant, given the surveillance conducted by embassy staff, his own Facebook posts, and his extensive Facebook network. Taking into account the cumulative factors—his identity as a Kurd and a Sunni, his status as a failed asylum seeker from a Western country, and his illegal exit from Iran—she submitted that the Appellant is likely to be subjected to interrogation upon return. Accordingly, the Appellant faces a real risk of persecution or ill-treatment if returned to Iran, either because his beliefs are genuine and he should not be expected to conceal them, or because there is a reasonable likelihood that the Iranian authorities are already aware of his anti-government activities and will be perceived by them as a political dissenter.
Analysis and Conclusions
30. In assessing the Appellant’s evidence and credibility, particularly with regard to his political beliefs, we reject Ms. Simbi’s submission that we can and should treat the negative credibility findings of the First-tier Tribunal as our starting point. The UT decision did not preserve general negative credibility findings of the FTTJ. Furthermore, the UT decision determined that the basis of the error of law, evidence with which the FTTJ did not engage, supported the Appellant’s account and therefore his credibility.
31. In his evidence before us, we found the Appellant to be a compelling and credible witness. He responded to all questions during Ms. Simbi’s properly robust cross-examination with clarity and composure. Notably, the Appellant did not seek to exaggerate or embellish his involvement in real-world political activities. For instance, he candidly stated that he spoke into the microphone only once due to a lack of confidence in public speaking. Similarly, he explained that he took only one photograph of embassy staff and printed a single poster, which he did not design himself.
32. We note that the Appellant created his Facebook account in September 2021—prior to both his asylum screening interview and the Respondent’s refusal of his application. While we have considered the possibility that his initial engagement in demonstrations may have been intended to support his asylum claim, we accept as credible his explanation that his political awareness and his ability to openly express this developed over time while in the UK. This evolution is consistent with his increased activism and his ability to articulate the specific hardships faced by the Kurdish people, which he identifies as the motivation behind his engagement. Consequently, we find the Appellant’s political beliefs to be genuinely held.
33. Even if his beliefs were not genuine, we conclude that he would be at risk on the basis of an imputed political opinion as we have found there is a reasonable degree of likelihood that he has or would come to the attention of the authorities. Our reasons for so finding follow.
34. Firstly, considering the factors set out in BA, we find the Appellant to have been a frequent and active protestor. He has attended a significant number of demonstrations at which he has taken an active part by chanting and holding signs and one occasion speaking into a microphone. On numerous occasions the Appellant has promoted the demonstrations in front of the Iranian Embassy over Facebook, he told us, to increase the numbers attending. We note, for example, the screenshots regarding protests on 25 February 2024 [CB 329] recording 219 likes and 105 comments; 27 July 2024 [CB 283] recording 363 likes and 292 comments; and 28 September 2024 [CB 247-248] recording 200 likes and 200 comments.
35. Secondly, the Appellant’s Facebook posts have attracted a significant number of likes and comments. We referred above to screenshots with likes and comments in excess of 100. There a number of other examples in the Composite Bundle. The post dated 26 May 2024 [CB 276] recording 355 likes and 398 comments appears to record the largest number of likes and comments among them.
36. We note the April 2025 CPIN on Iran – Social Media, Surveillance and sur place activities at 3.1.2 where it sets out criteria for decision makers in determining whether a person’s online presence is likely to bring them to the adverse attention of the authorities:

Whether a person is at real risk of persecution or serious harm from the state depends on, for example:

• the person’s profile
• ethnic origin or religion
• the level and nature of their online activity, and/or
• the size of audience of their online activity
37. In the instant case, the Appellant is of Kurdish ethnicity which is an inherent risk factor HB; he has posted over a 4 year period, those posts being severely critical of the Iranian regime and supportive of Kurdish rights; his audience, measured in posts and comments, is sizeable. These are all factors, we find which heighten the risk that the Appellant has already come, or would come to the adverse attention of the authorities.
38. In XX at [83] it was observed that the interest in Facebook material is reflected in the meaningful interactions a person has with others on Facebook and in the real world:
At one extreme, a person who posts regularly on Facebook, but with few “friends” or followers on Facebook; or even if they have garnered many “friends”; but with few “likes” in relation to their comments; and few other interactions may have attracted little or no publicity at all. At the other extreme, a person with many friends or followers on Facebook, who has attracted many comments and much discussion, and whose activities reflect their prominence and activities in the real world may attract great publicity. A person’s publicity may also be relevant to whether there is a real risk of them being monitored by a state.
39. On the evidence before us, we find that the Appellant falls within the ambit of second category of Facebook activist described in XX, although not at the extreme end.
40. Whilst there remains insufficient evidence to show that the Iranian authorities monitor Facebook on a large scale (XX), the April 2025 CPIN at 10.4 sets out country evidence on cyber-espionage conducted by state-sponsored hackers of activists in Iran and abroad which may include attacking low-level activists [10.4.9, see also below].
41. Thirdly, the Appellant presented unchallenged photographic evidence of Embassy staff photographing/videoing a demonstration he attended, his evidence being that this happened regularly. Whilst Ms. Simbi asked us not to place weight on the photograph taken by the Appellant as there was only one, she did not challenge the authenticity of it. We also accept the Appellant’s evidence that he has seen embassy staff conduct themselves in the same way on other occasions for the reasons we have given at para 31 above. The Appellant’s evidence is also consistent with the country material in the April 2025 CPIN on Iran – Social Media, Surveillance and sur place activities which evidences ongoing surveillance by the Iranian authorities of anti-government protests in Western countries including the UK. We note in particular a report from IranWire dated 20 February 2024 cited at 10.3.7 which states:

Numerous pictures and videos of these gatherings, particularly during the Woman, Life, Freedom protests, were published in both Persian and non-Persian media outside of Iran.
‘However, relying only on these images to identify participants in the gatherings poses significant challenges.
‘Matching these images with the identities of protesters outside Iran is nearly impossible.
‘IranWire has learned that security institutions utilize specialized groups to monitor the Iranian diaspora.
‘These “pseudo-security” groups are tasked with investigating, compiling and documenting the activities of active Iranians beyond the country's borders.
‘Through scrutiny of social media accounts belonging to the Iranian diaspora members, these groups gather evidence of their presence at protest gatherings.
‘This includes photographs, videos, and even content detailing travel arrangements to the protest site, individuals spotted at the gathering, or slogans chanted.’
42. Ms. Simbi’s submission relying on the Appellant’s failure to adduce evidence of his activities being monitored is contrary to the principle clearly set out in MH (Bangladesh) [2025] EWCA Civ 688 at [37], following from YB (Eritrea) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] EWCA Civ 360 at [18] and the subsequent line of authorities:
It can be seen from the cases considered above that the FTT (and the Upper Tribunal if remaking an FTT decision) must not impose an unrealistic evidential burden upon asylum applicants who rely upon sur place activities. It is inherently unlikely that an applicant for asylum will be able to adduce direct evidence of covert surveillance and monitoring by a foreign state. Accordingly, tribunals are not merely entitled, but required, to use their common sense.
43. Given the country evidence as set out above, the Appellant’s own photographic evidence of surveillance by embassy staff, and the extent of the Appellant’s political presence in “real world” activities and online; the clear conclusion that we come to is that there is a reasonable degree of likelihood that the Appellant’s activities have been and/or are being monitored.
44. In sum, we find that the Appellant holds genuine political beliefs critical of the Iranian regime, which if known to the Iranian authorities, would place him at risk of persecution/ill-treatment contrary to the Refugee Convention and Article 3 ECHR. Even if the Appellant’s activism was contrived, his political profile, the extent of his activism, and likelihood of surveillance of his activities is such that it is reasonably likely he has or would come to the attention of the authorities and be perceived as a political dissenter.
45. We therefore conclude that the Appellant has a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of his actual or imputed political beliefs. The issues of sufficiency of protection and internal relocation do not arise since the Appellant’s fear is of the Iranian authorities.
46. The decision of the FtT dated 4 November 2024 did involve the making of a material error of law and has been set aside, pursuant to my decision dated 9 July 2025.
47. We re-make the decision by allowing the Appellant’s appeal against the Respondent Secretary of State’s decision of 11 November 2022 on Refugee Convention and Article 3 human rights grounds

Notice of Decision
The Appellant’s appeal is allowed.

Martha Walsh

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

17 November 2025

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-000560

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/55278/2022

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

…………………………………

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE WALSH

Between

HAA
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr. Nadeem
For the Respondent: Ms. A. Ahmed

Heard at Field House on 23 May 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is an appeal against a decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Shephard (“the judge”), dated 4 November 2024, dismissing the Appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s decision to refuse his application for asylum/humanitarian protection.
2. The Appellant is an Iranian national of Kurdish ethnicity. He arrived in the UK on 5 July 2021, having been assisted by an agent, and claimed asylum the same day. It was not disputed that he was 17 years of age when he arrived.
3. The essence of the Appellant’s claim is that he had assisted in the distribution of leaflets for the KDPI to surrounding villages at night time. Approximately a month after he started this, Iranian authorities went to his house looking for him. He escaped to his uncle’s house where he stayed for 4-5 months before leaving the country. Since being in the UK he claimed to have engaged in political activities attending demonstrations and posting on Facebook against the Iranian authorities. His protection claim was therefore based on the Convention reasons of his ethnicity and actual or imputed political opinion and that it would breach his rights under Article 2 and 3 of the ECHR to remove him to Iran.
First-tier Decision
4. The judge did not find that the Appellant’s credibility was undermined by his traveling through countries in which he could have claimed asylum.
5. Nevertheless [53-67] the judge did not find the Appellant’s account of events in Iran to be credible, identifying inconsistencies in the Appellant’s accounts and taking into account the objective evidence.
6. At [68] – [76] the judge considered the Appellant’s sur place political activities and set out at [77] seven reasons why they did not consider the Appellant’s political beliefs to be genuine.
7. The judge went on to consider at [79-80] the Appellant’s Facebook posts taking into account the Country Guidance in XX (PJAK, sur place activities, Facebook) (CG) [2022] UKUT 00023 finding that it would be reasonable to expect the Appellant to delete the account as his beliefs were not genuine and there was nothing to indicate that he had already come to the attention of the authorities.
8. At [82] the Judge considered SSH and HR (illegal exit: failed asylum seeker) Iran CG [2016] UKUT 00308 but found that there was nothing in the Appellant’s profile that would increase the risk of his being identified on return or discovered to have engaged in any political activity.
9. Consequently the judge found at [88] that the Appellant had not proved that he had a subjective or well-founded fear of persecution by the Iranian authorities for the Convention reasons of this ethnicity as a Kurd and/or his political opinion.
Grounds of Appeal
10. The grounds of appeal can be summarised as follows:
a. The judge failed to apply the Country Guidance in HB (Kurds) Iran [2018] UKUT 00430 (IAC) in assessing the nature of the questions likely to be asked of the Appellant on return and that in disclosing that he participated in political activities, regardless of whether or not his beliefs were genuine, he would be at risk of persecution on the basis of imputed political opinion.

b. The judge failed to provide adequate reasons for not accepting that the Appellant held genuine political beliefs.

c. The judge failed to properly consider the Appellant’s account in the context of HB and the background material in the Appellant’s bundle.
11. There was no challenge to the judge’s findings with respect to the Appellant’s account of his activities in Iran that led to his flight.
12. Permission to appeal was granted by First-tier Tribunal Judge Head on 31 January 2025.
The Hearing
13. This hearing was conducted remotely with both parties attending via CVP.
14. I had before me a bundle consisting of 468 pages. No Rule 15(2A) or Rule 24 notices were filed. Shortly before the hearing Mr. Nadeem sent across a short skeleton argument which Ms. Ahmed confirmed she had had time to consider.
15. As a preliminary matter, Ms. Ahmed raised that at [5] of the decision granting leave to appeal it was considered arguable that the judge failed to provide adequate reasons for finding that there was not a real risk that the Appellant had already been subjected to targeted surveillance by the Iranian state. This, Ms. Ahmed submitted, was not an issue raised in the grounds of appeal.
16. Mr. Nadeem relied on the Grounds of Appeal and his Skeleton Argument. He emphasised, as set out in the skeleton argument, that despite the finding the Appellant was in a higher risk category (his ethnicity, political activity, illegal exit from Iran), the judge failed to properly apply the Country Guidance in HB, that is the “hair trigger approach” of the Iranian authorities toward those of Kurdish ethnicity; failed to consider that imputed political opinion placed the appellant at risk; failed to take account of the principle in SSH that all are questioned on arrival, and misapplied XX (PJAK) as Facebook deletion does not remove the risk.
17. Addressing me on disposal should I allow the appeal, Mr. Nadeem submitted that the matter should be remitted to the First-tier tribunal for a re-hearing given the adverse credibility findings. Ms. Ahmed objected to this as it was her reading of the grounds and skeleton that credibility findings were not challenged in either the grounds or skeleton and thus would be a new matter.
18. Ms. Ahmed confirmed the respondent’s opposition to the appeal. She submitted that the decision is detailed and carefully considered. The Appellant’s challenges, she argued, represent a disagreement with the judge’s findings rather than raising any errors of law. With respect to any adverse credibility findings, Ms. Ahmed submitted that the judge from [54] considered the appellant’s evidence and found his claim to lack credibility. In the event that I allowed the appeal she urged me to direct that the decision is remade with preserved findings as to the Appellant’s credibility as to his account of his experiences in Iran. With respect to the challenge about misapplication of Country Guidance, Ms. Ahmed submitted that the paragraphs relied on by the Appellant, that is, paragraph 8 of the grounds does not assist and with respect to HB Kurds, the Appellant does not include the whole of the relevant guidance and in particular does not refer to Headnote 4 which she submitted does not assist his case. She submitted there is no failure to properly apply the Country Guidance as in XX (PJAK) and referred me to Headnotes 7 and 9. As the judge did not accept the Appellant’s activities were genuinely motivated, the appellant fell into the category of someone who could be expected to close his Facebook account. There is no error as there is a clear application of Country guidance. As to the adequacy of reasons argument, Ms. Ahmed took me to [77] of the decision and the seven reasons why the judge considered the Appellant’s political activity not to be genuine. The Appellant does not specify the subjective evidence to which the judge failed to have regard. In sum, Ms. Ahmed submitted there was no material error.
19. In response, Mr. Nadeem emphasised the principle in RT Zimbabwe that even if the genuineness of his political motivation is disbelieved, the Appellant’s imputed political opinion can be perceived as a threat. He argued that the Appellant’s Facebook presence was public, traceable and persistent and would have been significant in the eyes of the Iranian authorities as he had a total of 1700 friends. Mr. Nadeem attempted to argue that account should be taken of the Appellant’s young age and vulnerability – submitting that if he had been older he would have been able to articulate the genuineness of his political beliefs/engagement more robustly. Ms. Ahmed objected to this submission as a new matter. Mr. Nadeem took us to the Appellant’s skeleton argument before the first tier, [CB43/23] which refers to the UNHCR 2013 document on assessment of credibility. Ms. Ahmed maintained her objection that this was not raised as a ground of appeal against the FTT decision. Mr. Nadeem averred that at [53] the judge did make allowance for the Appellant’s youth in considering his rationale for involvement in the distribution of leaflets in Iran. He submitted the same allowance should have been applied to the Appellant’s sur place activities as well. He urged me to allow the appeal.
Discussion
20. I will deal first with the point Ms. Ahmed raised in relation to [5] of the permission to appeal by First-tier Tribunal Judge Head.
21. That paragraph states:
It is arguable against this background that the judge failed to provide adequate reasons of their finding there was not a real risk that the Appellant had already been subjected to targeted surveillance by the Iranian state and would not be neutralised by the deletion of his social media/Facebook account….
22. In considering this issue I have reminded myself of the Joint Presidential Guidance 2019 No. 1: Permission to appeal to UTIAC which states at [26]:
A judge must not grant permission on a ground which does not feature in the grounds accompanying the application, unless the judge is satisfied that the ground he or she has identified is one which has a strong prospect of success for the original Appellant or for the Secretary of State, where the ground relates to a decision which, if undisturbed, would breach the United Kingdom's international treaty obligations; or (possibly) if the ground relates to an issue of general importance, which the Upper Tribunal needs to address – see AZ (error of law: jurisdiction; PTA practice) Iran [2018] UKUT 245 (IAC).
23. AZ in turn refers to Begum v Social Security Commissioners [2002] EWHC 401 (Admin) in which Baker J (as he was then) says at [20]:
The position is that mere arguability is not the test, a higher hurdle must be surmounted. The point must be obvious; that is one which would have a strong prospect of success were leave to be granted.
24. Ms. Ahmed is correct that the issue as to risk of the Appellant already having been the subject of targeted surveillance is not explicitly raised in the Grounds of Appeal. I do note, however, that it had been a live issue before the FTT as recorded at [39] as it had been submitted that “there was no concrete evidence to say the authorities were aware of the Appellants actions but it is likely given the number of demonstrations he has attendee outside the Iranian embassy.”
25. In any event, as will be seen, I do not determine the appeal on this issue but I do find it does become an obvious point when linked to a more fundamental error in the judge’s engagement with the Appellant’s evidence and relevant authorities.
26. I turn to the Grounds of Appeal. In my judgment, it is the third ground of challenge that is, the judge’s failure to properly consider the appellant’s account in the context of the background evidence, in which a material error is located and it is this error that infects the judge’s analysis of risk.
27. Determining the level of an individual’s sur place political activities is critical in assessing the likelihood of their coming to the adverse attention to Iranian authorities and risk on return BA (Demonstrations in Britian- risk on return) Iran CG [2011] UKUT 36 (IAC).
28. The judge found the Appellant to be a low-level political activist and therefore without a profile incurring higher risk, stating at [81]:
“Overall I find that the Appellant does not have a profile that would put him at greater risk than any other Kurd returning to Iran as a failed asylum seeker. I accept he has attended several demonstrations but have found his role in these was no more than a member of the crowd sometimes holding a small sign with no genuine belief in the cause such that, in the absence of any evidence that his presence was noticed or publicised, no risk will have arisen from this attendance.
29. The evidential basis for this conclusion, is however, missing what I find to be a critical piece of evidence contained in the bundle which was before the judge.
30. At [75] the judge stated this at [75]:
I accept he has attended several [demonstrations] because there are photographs in which he is wearing different clothes on different occasions. They appear mostly in the same place, which I will accept is in the proximity to the Iranian embassy in London, as this has not been challenged. I find there is nothing really to mark him out many of the other attendees and nothing to show he had any particular role in the demonstrations. I cannot see anything to support what the Appellant said about speaking to the crowd or if there is such evidence my attention was not drawn to it (emphasis added).
31. The judge had recorded at [19] that the Appellant said in evidence that he sometimes has a microphone at demonstrations and speaks to the crowd.
32. At [CB 284] and in the bundle before the FTT, there is a Facebook post dated 23 June which appears to relate to a demonstration at the Iranian Embassy on 23 June 2024 and includes a screenshot (which may be of video) appearing to show the Appellant speaking into a microphone surrounded by others. The photo is small so it is not certain where he is, but he appears to be wearing the same clothing in the photo of himself holding an anti-government sign on the pavement. Whilst the Appellant did not appear before me, there is no suggestion either from the decision or the respondent’s bundle that the person in each of the photo screenshots relied upon is anyone other than the Appellant and I therefore approach the evidence on that basis.
33. It appears that the judge failed to have regard to this piece of evidence, or if they did consider it, did not provide reasons for finding it was not relevant to the Appellant’s account of his activities.
34. I find this evidence is obviously relevant to the assessment of the Appellant’s risk profile (Headnote 4 BA) or, in the terms of XX (PJAK), where they fit in the social graph. This is particularly so when taken together with the screenshots/Facebook posts of the Appellant holding a sign at each one of the demonstrations at which he is photographed (rather than ‘sometimes’ as stated by the judge).
35. Part of the analysis of an individual’s position in the social graph must include the risk of targeted surveillance, (XX (PJAK) at [92]). It is important to recall in the context of the judge’s reference at [81] to an absence of evidence of the appellant being noticed that in YB (Eritrea) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] EWCA Civ 360 at [18], recently reaffirmed in MH (Bangladesh) [2025] EWCA Civ 688, it was held that it is unrealistic to expect individuals to provide evidence of having been surveilled. The question to be asked as per [118] of XX (PJAK) is whether the appellant has drawn enough attention to himself for there to be a risk of targeted surveillance and the existence or extent of risk to the appellant following therefrom.
36. In light of the authorities and the evidence of the Appellant speaking in a microphone and taking a more active role in demonstrations, the adequacy of reasons for finding the appellant had not already been subject to target surveillance is an obvious issue.
37. The judge’s determination that the Appellant was not at risk on return was predicated on him having a low-profile without genuine political beliefs. It was on this basis that he applied the Country Guidance in XX (PJAK) finding that the Appellant could be expected to delete his Facebook account neutralising any risk associated with his posts and sur place activities.
38. As that determination was made without regard to relevant evidence available to the judge, I find there to be a material error of law.
39. As indicated above, that error is relevant to the first ground, that is, whether the judge properly applied the Country Guidance in HB. I note that the judge does not cite HB but instead references SSH and HR (illegal exit: failed asylum seeker) Iran CG [2016] UKUT 00308 (IAC) in respect of guidance in which is in fact set out in Headnotes 9 and 10 of HB.
40. With respect to the second ground, the judge does provide extensive reasons for finding that the appellant’s political beliefs are not genuine at [77]. However, one of those factors was that “the photographs provided do not depict the Appellant as anything more than a face in the crowd.” Therefore evidence of the Appellant appearing in a more active role is also relevant to an assessment of the genuineness of his political beliefs.

Notice of Decision
41. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal contains an error of law and is set aside.
42. In considering disposal, I have taken account of the parties’ submissions and the principles in Begum and the Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC). As the challenge and error identified are confined to the appellant’s sur place activities, it is appropriate for the Upper Tribunal to retain jurisdiction and remake the decision.
43. I have considered the representations of the parties and the principles in AB (preserved FtT findings; Wisniewski principles) Iraq [2020] UKUT 00268 (IAC). The judge’s findings in respect of the events in Iran were not challenged. Therefore the findings at [48] – [67] of the FTT decision are preserved.
44. Parties have permission to rely on evidence that was not before the First-tier Tribunal. Any such evidence must be filed with the Upper Tribunal and served on the other party at least 14 days before the resumed hearing.
45. No later than 7 days before the hearing, the appellant must provide to the Upper Tribunal and the respondent any skeleton argument upon which they intend to rely.
46. No later than 3 days before the hearing, the respondent must provide to the Upper Tribunal and the appellant any skeleton argument upon which they intend to rely.
47. No later than 14 days before the hearing, any request for the Upper Tribunal to provide an interpreter is to be made in writing, stating clearly the language and any specific dialect required.

Martha Walsh

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

9 July 2025