Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-000585

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/60349/2023
LP/07918/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 26th January 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE McCARTHY

Between

AAMW
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mrs E Atas
For the Respondent: Mr A Tan

Heard at Field House on 19 January 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, [the appellant] is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. Permission to appeal was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Sheridan on 22 April 2025.
2. It is appropriate to take ground 5 regarding unfairness in the proceedings first because if the hearing was unfair, then the findings cannot stand. The primacy of ground 5 is evident in Judge Sheridan’s grant of permission.
3. On 2 July 2025, directions were given for the audio recording of the hearing to be obtained and made available to the parties. The response from the First-tier Tribunal was that the hearing had not been recorded for technical reasons. The Respondent was directed to provide the Presenting Officer’s notes of hearing, which I have considered alongside Counsel’s notes of the hearing, which were provided with the application for permission.
4. At the Error of Law hearing, Mr Tan confirmed that Counsel’s notes of hearing were not challenged. As a result, I have not needed to consider the accuracy of those notes, and they stand as evidence of the questions asked by the judge and the answers given by the Appellant and his uncle.
5. Having considered the available evidence, and after listening to Mr Tan and Ms Atas, I have decided there was no procedural unfairness and reject ground 5.
6. I acknowledge that the judge asked more questions of the Appellant and his uncle than were asked by the Presenting Officer. I accept that those questions went further than the Presenting Officer’s cross examinations of the witnesses. However, the questions were all on point and arose from the evidence as a whole, including the written statements. As the judge was being asked to adjudicate on those matters, it was necessary and essential that she clarified any points where she had doubts.
7. Although I cannot comment on the way in which the judge asked her questions as there is no audio recording, the written record does not indicate that they were confrontational or argumentative. Furthermore, Counsel at the hearing did not seek to challenge the judge’s approach or to ask further questions of the Appellant or his uncle after her questions. This fact reinforces my conclusion that the questions were not put in an objectionable manner.
8. Turning to whether the questions were fair and just, I recognise they were straightforward in that they sought clarification of parts of the Appellant’s claim. Contrary to what is alleged, I do not see that they raised new issues. All of the questions stem from the Appellant’s evidence, both written and oral. The fact the Presenting Officer decided not to question those points did not fetter the judge’s ability to do so. Although generally adversarial in nature, the Tribunal has an inquisitorial role to ensure nothing material is overlooked. On appeal, a judge stands in the shoes of the decision maker and is not merely deciding which party’s arguments to prefer.
9. This conclusion takes me to the other grounds. Before I examine them individually, I mention that because the judge’s questioning was fair and just, she was entitled to rely on the answers when assessing the evidence in the round.
10. Ms Atas and Mr Tan took ground 3 to be part of ground 1 and I do the same. They did so presumably because contrary to the allegation made, the judge does not specifically say that the Appellant’s cousin was not killed. At paragraph 43 of the decision, she points out that she has limited documentary evidence about the killing and nothing from official sources. At paragraph 53, the judge considers whether the cousin was killed but is equivocal and considers the possibilities. The remaining issue in ground 3 relates to whether adequate reasons were provided, which is why it ties in with the other grounds.
11. Grounds 1 and 4 each raises whether the judge gave adequate reasons for her findings of fact and can be taken together. It is not necessary for me to deal with each issue raised as the following is sufficient to explain why the judge’s decision is infected with legal error such that it must be set aside with no findings preserved.
12. Central to the Appellant’s case is his reliance on four documents, namely a Protection Request, a Disowning Announcement, a Tribunal Congregation Council letter, and a Capital’s Mayor. The Appellant’s country expert examined these documents and believed them to be authentic. The judge considered the expert report in paragraphs 43 to 51 of her decision., in which she recorded the expert’s conclusions about the documents. The judge does not, however, explain why she rejects the expert’s conclusions other than because she does not believe the Appellant’s accounts. That is insufficient reasoning because the expert considered objective factors when determining whether the documents were reliable, on which no findings have been made.
13. The documents were central to the Appellant’s case. If they are reliable, then they are evidence that his cousin was killed and that he was disowned by his tribe and would not have protection on return. The failure to make cogent findings about the reliability of the documents undermines the judge’s findings, which cannot be upheld.
14. I mention ground 2 for completeness. There is nothing before me to indicate that the document relied on (which is referenced in a footnote in the Respondent’s reasons for refusal letter of 31 October 2023) was ever mentioned in the appeal or drawn to the judge’s attention. If the Appellant or those representing him in the First-tier Tribunal were silent on that document, it is somewhat contrived to rely on it in this application, irrespective of its potential relevance. I do not find the judge erred by failing to consider the document.
15. However, this does not affect my conclusion regarding grounds 1 and 4, which are upheld. The consequence of my findings is that the appeal must be returned to the First-tier Tribunal for a fresh hearing on all matters. Nothing is preserved from the appealed decision.

Notice of Decision

The decision contains legal error and is set aside.
The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal with the following directions.

Directions

1. The appeal is to be determined afresh as no findings are preserved.
2. The appeal is to be heard by a judge other than Judge Beg.
3. The First-tier Tribunal can (and probably will) provide further case management directions.

Judge John McCarthy

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
20 January 2026