Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-000595

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/65810/2023
LP/04690/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

3rd November 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KAMARA

Between

MM
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms S Ferguson, counsel instructed by Giga Legal
For the Respondent: Ms N Kerr, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 14 October 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. This decision should be read in conjunction with the decision issued on 18 June 2025 in which the Upper Tribunal found that the First-tier Tribunal had erred in law.
2. The First-tier Tribunal decision was set aside, albeit there were preserved findings in relation to the protection claim and Appendix FM. The scope of this remaking hearing, as set out at [65] of the error of law decision, is as follows:
The remaking will focus on whether there would be very significant obstacles to the appellant’s re-integration in the Philippines and the assessment of the appellant’s Article 8 claim.
Anonymity
3. I have continued the anonymity order in place. I have considered the public interest in open justice, but conclude that it is outweighed by the importance of the need for confidentiality in a case such as this where the appellant is a victim of sexual assault.
Factual Background
4. The appellant is a national of the Philippines now aged in her mid-fifties. She entered the United Kingdom with leave to enter as a student in 2009 and unsuccessfully sought to extend her leave with a series of unsuccessful applications. A previous appeal was dismissed on 26 August 2021 in which the appellant relied upon a relationship with her current partner and her employment as a carer. The appellant then made a protection claim based on being a victim of sexual assault. That claim, which was refused on 4 December 2023, is the subject of this appeal.
5. Following the error of law hearing, this matter was listed for a remaking hearing to take place on 28 July 2025.
6. The appellant applied for an adjournment in the following term:
Adjournment Request – Medical Grounds 15 July 2025
The Appellant is currently undergoing treatment for significant mental health difficulties and is not in a position to participate effectively in the preparation or presentation of the remaking hearing which she wishes to attend. She attended her GP in June 2025, where she was diagnosed with mental health issues and prescribed a course of medication to be taken over a one-month period. She is due to return for a medical review later in July 2025.
As a result of her current mental state and ongoing treatment, the Appellant has experienced difficulties engaging with legal instructions and reviewing evidence in a meaningful or sustained manner. She is not fit to participate in the appeal process at this time, and we submit that to proceed in these circumstances would affect her right to a fair hearing and the overriding objective in Rule 2 of the 2008 Procedure Rules, which requires the Tribunal to deal with cases fairly and justly.
We have provided the appellant’s confirmation of GP appointment and review along with the medication she is currently taking. We respectfully submit that the mental health history and current treatment of the appellant justify the grant of a short adjournment for a period of four weeks until the Appellant is medically reviewed and stabilised to effectively participate in the preparation and the proceedings. She is not presently in a position to engage meaningfully with the preparation of her appeal or to provide the necessary instructions or witness information for the submission of further evidence.
7. Upper Tribunal Judge Hoffman adjourned the appeal while expressing, ‘some concerns that the limited evidence provided does not necessarily show that the appellant’s mental health condition is so serious that it is preventing her from engaging with her appeal.’ He also remarked that the Tribunal would expect to see more detailed evidence regarding the state of the appellant’s mental health for the hearing.
The remaking hearing
8. The matter comes before the Upper Tribunal to re-make the decision of the First-tier Tribunal. A bundle was previously submitted by the appellant containing, inter alia, the core documents in the appeal, including the appellant’s and respondent’s bundles before the First-tier Tribunal.
9. In response to the notice of hearing served on 16 September 2025, an email from the appellant’s representatives dated 30 September 2025, stated the following:
Further to the Upper Tribunal Judge’s directions in relation to the resumed hearing, this email is to inform the Tribunal that the Appellant and the witness will not be attending the hearing. The Appellant will instead be represented by Counsel on the day of the hearing.
We have also submitted a Rule15(2A) application on behalf of the Appellant on 14/08/2025 via the e-filing service.
10. The appellant’s representatives also served an additional bundle which included a witness statement from the appellant signed on 12 August 2025, an unsigned letter dated 23 July 2025 from a medical practice stating that the appellant recently reported that she had been the victim of a sexual assault many years ago in the Philippines and a prescription issued by the same practice for Mirtazapine, commencing 23 July 2025.
11. The hearing was attended by representatives for both parties as above. Both representatives made submissions and the conclusions below reflect those arguments and submissions where necessary. Ms Ferguson relied upon her skeleton argument. She accepted that the appellant would not be stigmatised in the Philippines owing to the sexual assault, emphasising that the appellant would undergo a psychological burden in returning to her country without her partner. Ms Ferguson added that the appellant’s fear of further attacks was capable of being a factor which could amount to very significant obstacles to integration. Ms Ferguson accepted that Chikwamba did not apply as in the decision letter the respondent had given other reasons for refusing to grant the appellant leave to remain. As for Article 8 in general, she argued that the difficulties the appellant would experience in returning to the Philippines were sufficient to tip the balance in her favour and she should not be expected to return even temporarily.
12. Ms Kerr asked me to draw a negative inference from fact the appellant was not in attendance and therefore her evidence could not be tested. She pointed out that there was no medical report to support the appellant’s claim that she could not talk about this incident. Ms Kerr argued that mental health issues had been raised as the central plank of case yet no expert report for any condition or diagnosis had been provided. In addressing very significant obstacles, Ms Kerr emphasised that the appellant lived in the Philippines until aged 36, was educated there, is in contact with her family, it was a functioning democracy, with a large English speaking community and employment opportunities.
13. In reply Ms Ferguson accepted that it was unlikely that the appellant would have been cross-examined about the assault and she had no instructions as to why the partner had not attended the hearing.
Discussion
14. As indicated by the error of law decision, the focus of this remaking is on whether there would be very significant obstacles to the appellant’s re-integration in the Philippines and the assessment of the appellant’s Article 8 claim.
15. The following findings of fact regarding the appellant’s protection claim are preserved and were set out at paragraphs [15] to [25] of the decision and reasons of the First-tier Tribunal:
15. The starting point for my determination, in accordance with the principles set down in Devaseelan [2002] UKIAT 00702, is the relatively recent 26th August 2021 decision of FTT Judge Stedman. The Judge concluded, materially, that:
(i) The Appellant could not succeed on the basis that there would be very significant obstacles to her reintegration to the Philippines. She would be returning to the country where she had lived most of her life, where she spoke the language and where she had built up a good working history. (paragraph 32)
(ii) The Appellant’s relationship with her partner was not subsisting; it constituted a friendship with some romantic history. Talk of marriage did not arise from a genuine desire for long-term commitment, but out of the assistance it would provide the Appellant with her desire to remain in the UK. (paragraph 45).
16. Given that there is no dispute that the Appellant was raped in 2007, the first question to determine is whether the Appellant’s account of being at continued risk on return to the Philippines, from the neighbour who raped her, should be accepted. That account is premised upon him having continued interest in her and his having sufficient influence, both in military and police circles, such that the Appellant would not be able to access state protection.
17. In considering the credibility of the Appellant’s account, I remind myself of the guidance given by Singh LJ in the case of MAH (Egypt) v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 216. I also bear in mind the Appellant’s account of suffering from trauma and anxiety in light of what happened, albeit there is no medical evidence before me to suggest that the Appellant has any underlying mental health problems.
18. I have concluded that, even applying the applicable lower standard of proof, the Appellant has failed to demonstrate that she would be at real risk of ill treatment on return. I have reached that conclusion for four reasons.
19. First, the Appellant has repeatedly said, in evidence, that her family members in the Philippines know nothing about the sexual assault that she suffered at the hands of her neighbour. She has placed weight upon the fact that they cannot know about it, as it would place them in danger from her neighbour. That account was, however, flatly contradicted in evidence by her husband who said that her father was aware of what had happened and had spoken to him about it. No explanation as to that inconsistency was provided by the Appellant.
20. Second, the Appellant’s former representatives, Richard Nelson LLP provided a detailed 8th November 2023 letter in support of her claim. In it they referred to the Appellant’s neighbour as being the prominent member of a local gang, who continued to threaten the Appellant and pursue her until she left the Philippines. The letter continued to rely on the danger posed by gangs in the Philippines in support of the claim that the Appellant would be at risk on return. There was no reference in the letter to the neighbour, himself, having connections to the military or police. The contents of the letter were put to the Appellant. She stated that the reference to gangs in the letter was actually meant to refer to friends. In my judgment the Appellant has failed to adequately explain a very significant contradiction in the account provided in support of her protection claim. In evidence before me, and in the witness statements drafted by the same firm of solicitors, no mention was made of the Appellant fearing from gangs in the Philippines, or indeed the friends of the neighbour. The Appellant’s suggestion that gangs should be read as meaning friends simply makes no sense. The purpose of the reference to gangs was to identify a source of danger to the Appellant on return, with reference to explicit country information. If the word friends were replaced, it would not explain why the Appellant would face a risk on return, particularly given the absence of any reference to police or military connections.
21. Third, the Appellant made no reference to the basis of her protection claim in any of the multiple applications that she made whilst in the UK. She said, in evidence, that she did not want her family to know about what had happened. When it was pointed out to her that they would not find out what she had said in a protection claim, she then said that she did not know that she could get humanitarian protection in the UK. In my judgment that explanation is simply not credible. The Appellant has been in the UK for an extended period of time, speaks English and has made multiple applications for leave to remain. The last application, which led to the 2021 determination, resulted in her being represented by counsel. In such circumstances, it is highly implausible to suggest that she was unaware that a protection claim could be made in the UK. In my judgment, the Appellant’s failure to make any reference to being at risk on return to the Philippines at any earlier date lends strong support to the conclusion that she does not genuinely fear ill treatment from her neighbour on return.
22. Fourth, it follows that I have not accepted the Appellant’s account of continued risk from her neighbour in the Philippines. I do not accept her claim that he would still wish to target her on return, some 17 years after the rape. I further do not accept that he has the police or military connections that are claimed such that, even if he wished to target the Appellant, she would not be able to seek protection from the authorities.
23. In light of my conclusion that the Appellant would not be at real risk from her neighbour on return it is not necessary for me to reach any conclusions about internal relocation.
24. I further note that it is not suggested that the Appellant would be at risk for any other reason other than from her former neighbour.
25. In those circumstances, the Appellant’s protection claim must fail.
16. The preserved findings relating to Appendix FM at [27] to 33] of the decision and reasons are as follows.
27. The Appellant firstly relies on her relationship with her now husband. Whilst the previous determination concluded that the couple were not in a genuine and subsisting relationship, time has now passed. The couple are now married. The Respondent no longer contests the relationship. There is equally no dispute that the Appellant’s husband earns more than the £18,600 maintenance threshold, or that the Appellant has the requisite degree of English.
28. The only question in dispute is whether, in light of the Appellant’s overstaying, paragraph EX1(b) Appendix FM can be satisfied. The Appellant needs to show that there would be insurmountable obstacles to family life with her partner continuing outside the UK. Insurmountable obstacles are defined as: “the very significant difficulties which would be faced by the applicant or their partner in continuing their family life together outside the UK and which could not be overcome or would entail very serious hardship for the applicant or their partner.”
29. The insurmountable obstacles test sets a high bar and cannot be met by simply asserting that a husband and wife would prefer to live together in the United Kingdom, R(Kaur) v SSHD [2018] EWCA Civ 1423 at [56]. In my judgment, the Appellant has failed to demonstrate, on the balance of probabilities, that the insurmountable obstacles test has been met. I have reached that conclusion for three reasons.
30. First, the Appellant would face no problems reintegrating to the Philippines herself. I rely on the previous findings of the 2021 determination in that regard. Whilst a further three years have passed, there is no suggestion that, for example, the Appellant is no longer in contact with her family in the Philippines. In my judgment the Appellant could return and find employment in the Philippines, as well as relying on the support of her family members. It is material that I have concluded that the Appellant would not be at risk from her neighbour on return. In those circumstances the Appellant could return and live in close proximity to her family who could additionally provide her with support.
31. Second, whilst I entirely appreciate that the Appellant’s husband has no ties to the Philippines and does not speak the language, he could rely on the Appellant and her family’s support to integrate into the country. Financial support would be provided by the Appellant being able to obtain employment. I further note that in evidence the Appellant accepted that as a car mechanic, her husband could obtain employment in the Philippines, albeit only in urban areas and not in the countryside. There is nothing before me to suggest that the Appellant and her husband would have to live in the countryside.
32. Third, the Appellant’s husband has not identified any particular personal circumstances which would necessitate him remaining in the UK. Of course, he is a British citizen and has an established life in the UK. At the same time, however, it is not suggested that he has any family members in the UK who are dependent upon him and whose welfare would be impacted if he were to travel to the Philippines.
33. It follows that I have concluded that the Appellant is not able to satisfy the requirements of Appendix FM Rules, as regards her relationship with her husband.
17. As indicated above, the findings in relation to the appellant’s protection claim include that she is not at risk from the perpetrator of the assault, that she does not genuinely fear for her safety and that her partner’s evidence was that her family already knew about the matter. Those findings undermine the appellant’s current claim that she is too afraid to return to the Philippines. The appellant has provided a detailed account of the effect on her mental state of this crime. Yet that account has not been tested by cross-examination owing to the appellant’s non-attendance at the hearing. No explanation was provided by her solicitors for the decision to proceed by way of submissions only and one is left to infer that the appellant is reluctant to talk about her circumstances. Yet she was able to give evidence before the First-tier Tribunal which included discussion of the sexual assault. There is no evidence to indicate that the appellant is unable to give evidence. There is no medical report and the GP letter only states what the appellant has told the practice. That letter is unsigned. It is not in dispute that the appellant has been prescribed medication for her mental state as of July 2025. That prescription does not, without considerably more, indicate that the appellant is unable to provide oral evidence. There is also no updated statement from the appellant’s partner and he did not attend either.
18. The appellant would be returning to a country where she spent the majority of her life, where she speaks the language and has close family members with whom she remains in contact. As found by the First-tier Tribunal, she is not at risk of persecution or a breach of her Article 3 rights. The First-tier Tribunal also found that there were no insurmountable obstacles to family life taking place in the Philippines, noting the absence of detailed evidence as to the personal circumstances of the appellant’s partner, other than he is a mechanic.
19. The appellant’s case does not come close to meeting the threshold set out in Kamara [2016] EWCA Civ 813. There is very little reliable evidence as to the appellant’s current mental state. The evidence that exists is insufficient, even when considered with the remainder of the appellant’s circumstances, to amount to very significant obstacles to her reintegration in the Philippines.
20. Turning to the remainder of the Article 8 claim, it is the case that the appellant remained in the United Kingdom without leave, having initially entered for a temporary purpose in 2009. She entered the relationship with her partner when she was unlawfully present. The appellant is unable to meet the partner requirements of the Rules owing to her immigration status and Ex.1 does not apply given the preserved findings of the First-tier Tribunal. There was no further evidence adduced before the Upper Tribunal as to the circumstances of the appellant’s partner. There is very little to add to the appellant’s side of the balance. She speaks English and has lived in the United Kingdom for over fifteen years but most of that has been without leave. The appellant is dependent upon her partner and as such she is unlikely to be a financial burden upon the state. She has formed a relationship with a partner however that is deserving of little weight as the appellant was in the United Kingdom unlawfully at the time. She has been the victim of a sexual assault which took place in the Philippines in 2007 but is not receiving any therapy or much in the way of medical treatment in the United Kingdom. I am told that the appellant would be able to leave to remain as a partner as she meets the Rules other than that she is an overstayer. Yet, the appellant’s application was not refused on the narrow basis that she should return to the Philippines to seek entry clearance, applying Butt [2025] EWCA Civ 89. Accordingly, Chikwamba is of no assistance here.
21. The decision to refuse the appellant’s human rights claim does not result in unjustifiably harsh consequences and is proportionate. The appellant’s circumstances are outweighed by the need for effective immigration control.
Notice of Decision
The appeal is dismissed on human rights grounds.

T Kamara

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

22 October 2025

NOTIFICATION OF APPEAL RIGHTS
1. A person seeking permission to appeal against this decision must make a written application to the Upper Tribunal. Any such application must be received by the Upper Tribunal within the appropriate period after this decision was sent to the person making the application. The appropriate period varies, as follows, according to the location of the individual and the way in which the Upper Tribunal’s decision was sent:
2. Where the person who appealed to the First-tier Tribunal is in the United Kingdom at the time that the application for permission to appeal is made, and is not in detention under the Immigration Acts, the appropriate period is 12 working days (10 working days, if the notice of decision is sent electronically).
3. Where the person making the application is in detention under the Immigration Acts, the appropriate period is 7 working days (5 working days, if the notice of decision is sent electronically).
4. Where the person who appealed to the First-tier Tribunal is outside the United Kingdom at the time that the application for permission to appeal is made, the appropriate period is 38 days (10 working days, if the notice of decision is sent electronically).
5. A “working day” means any day except a Saturday or a Sunday, Christmas Day, Good Friday or a bank holiday.
6. The date when the decision is “sent’ is that appearing on the covering letter or covering email