Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-000604
UI-2025-000605
UI-2025-000607
UI-2025-000608
UI-2025-000609

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/50534/2024
PA/50536/2024
PA/50539/2024
PA/50538/2024
PA/50537/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 24th of April 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HANSON

Between

MG
Master A
Miss I
Miss J
Miss L
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellants
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DPEARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Mr Thrower, a solicitor with the Jackson Lees Group Limited.
For the Respondent: Dr Ibisi, a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer.

Heard at Manchester Civil Justice Centre on 11 April 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellants are granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellants, likely to lead members of the public to identify them. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The Appellants appeal with permission a decision of the judge of the First-tier Tribunal (‘the Judge’), promulgated following a hearing in Manchester on 21 November 2024, in which the Judge dismissed their appeals but with the following additional text “save for the respondent’s concession in respect of Article 8. This is therefore a ‘status appeal’ perused on the basis that if the Appellants succeed they will be entitled to a more valuable form of leave.
2. The First Appellant is a citizen of Kenyan born in 1971. The remaining Appellants are his children whose appeals are linked. The Judge noted that the First Appellant’s wife, P, is recorded as being a dependent although there was no further reference to her.
3. The First Appellant made a claim for international protection for himself and his children on 20 April 2022, which was refused on 12 December 2023. It was the appeal against that refusal which came before the Judge.
4. The Judge’s findings are set out from [17] of the decision under challenge. The Judge finds delay in claiming protection adversely affected the genuineness of the First Appellant’s fears, noting he entered the UK in October 2014 with a Visa that expired on 11 December 2019.
5. The Second Appellant, A, was born in July 2005, the Third Appellant L in 2010, I in November 2015 and J on 1 June 2012.
6. The basis of the Appellant’s claim is recorded by the Judge at [3] in the following terms:
3. His claim is that his family lands located near the town of Kilifi are wanted by the Mombax Republican Council and he is vulnerable because his parents came from different tribes, the Mijikenda and the Taita -Tareta. He said he was fearful of the Kay Bombo Cartels. It is also suggested he is at risk because he is a Christian. Finally, it is suggested his children are at risk of genital mutilation.
7. In relation to these issues the Judge wites:
21. The country guidance is that the prevalence of mutilation is declining and is against the law.
22. I do not see this as a risk to the appellant’s family given his educated position and the protection of the law. The appellant’s family are now over the age when the procedure is usually carried out. He acknowledges this in respect of his son.
23. My conclusion is that the claim cannot succeed on the basis of genital mutilation. The country information indicates the government has genuinely sought to eliminate this practice. I place reliance upon the Policy and Information note and without repeating its details, it clearly indicates sufficiency of protection.
24. There is an article about the growth of criminal gangs but it is notable it refers to urban areas. There is mention of the Kayan Bombo Raiders attacking police stations. There is mentioned of the use of gangs at election times in Mombasa. There is also reference to ethnic displacement following elections. There is mention of gangs intimidating land occupants so as to sell the land on. There is also reference to police corruption. There is also mention of land disputes and reference to initiatives to regularised land ownership and resettlement of squatters. It refers to the MRC and the suggestions that they are funded by politicians. Al Shabaab have increasing its activities from 2011.
25. The appellant’s family have been off the land for over a decade. It may well be that some of the gangs have taken over the land. If this is so then they would have no sustained interest in pursuing the appellant. I do not see this aspect of the claim engaging the Refugee Convention. I accept over the years there have been threats to his family. However, they were not sufficient to cause either the appellant or his mother to move. There is no medical report the indicates the injury to the appellants arm was likely to be caused by a machete.
26. Faced with the evidence presented I am not satisfied the appellant has a genuinely held fear of harm in relation to the land ownership. He has been fortunate to have had an education and have felt able to leave his home for extended periods to study. There is a police force to which she could seek redress and also the courts to argue ownership.
27. In summary, I do not find a real risk of genital mutilation or of violence because of land ownership. The appellant is in a position to stop his children undergoing mutilation. Regarding his land, there is adequate protection from the organs of state. I am not satisfied the appellant has a genuinely held fear of harm in relation to the land ownership. He has been fortunate to have had an education and have felt able to leave his home for extended periods to study. There is a police force to which he could seek redress and also the courts to argue ownership.
28. In the circumstance it would also be reasonable for the appellant to relocate was in his home country. He has been able to adapt to living in the United Kingdom and has lived in other parts of his home country. As already stated he is highly educated.
29. In making my conclusions I have had regard to the best interests of his children. The best interests of a child are a primary but not paramount consideration. It is likely they have integrated into life in the United Kingdom and are receiving an education and have access to the health service. That is not to say an education and health care would not be available in Kenya as evidenced by their father's achievements. I can see no reason they could not adjust to life in their home country. They are at an age when they can adapt and would be familiar with the culture and customs. They are not British citizens. If returned they would be with both parents and have stability in their family life. The papers on the case management system do not indicate the position in relation to their mother but on the face of it she is linked to her husband's position. No health considerations have been raised.
8. In relation to his human rights claim, the Judge writes at 30:
30. The refusal letter in respect of the main appellant states that the respondent has decided to grant him permission to stay based upon his Article 8 rights as the parent of his children.
9. The Appellants sought permission to appeal which was granted by another judge of the First-tier Tribunal, the operative part of the grant being in the following terms:
2. The grounds assert the judge made a factual error in finding the Appellant’s family had been off the land for over a decade when the Appellant’s evidence was that it was not until November 2020 that the family land was taken by the gangs he fears, and then relying on that error in reaching the conclusion as to the interest those gangs have for the Appellant; failed to consider whether the Appellant’s desire to return to and reclaim his family land would impact on the risk posed to him and whether it impacts on the reasonableness of internal relocation; took a perverse approach to section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc.) Act 2004; erred in their approach to agreed facts including that the Appellant continued to be threatened by gangs after relocation; and failed to give adequate reasons for the conclusion on sufficiency of protection.
3. The judge recorded as fact that the Appellant’s mother remained on the land until her death in November 2020, but also found, and used as part of their reasoning on risk on return, that the family had been off the land for over a decade. This is an arguable error of law material to the outcome of the appeal, because the question of the risk posed by the gangs was determined in part by reference to how long they may have been on the land, and is a central consideration in this appeal.
4. The judge found that had the gangs taken over the land, they would have no interest in pursuing the Appellant, but did not consider whether and how the Appellant’s stated intention to reclaim his land on return would impact on that interest, and therefore on the risk on return. Consideration of that aspect of the Appellant’s evidence is limited to a finding there are “courts to argue ownership.” This is arguably inadequate reasoning on a material issue.
5. The grounds therefore disclose arguable errors of law material to the outcome of the appeal, the other grounds are closely linked to the first two, and so permission is granted on all grounds.
Discussion and analysis
10. In E & R v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] EWCA Civ 49. Carnwath LJ (as he then was) found an error of fact could constitute a separate ground of review. There were four requirements for such a review to succeed:
i. The mistake must be on an existing fact (including mistake as to the availability of evidence on a particular matter);
ii. The fact must be uncontentious;
iii. The claimant must not be responsible for the mistake; and
iv. The mistake must have placed a material part in the tribunal’s reasoning.
11. The first requirement appears to be satisfied if it was the case the family had been forced off the land only from November 2020 rather than the Judge’s finding at [25] that they had been off the land for over a decade.
12. In relation to the second element, the requirement for the fact be uncontentious. Before me Dr Ibisi did not challenge the claimed error of fact which I take therefore as being accepted as being uncontentious.
13. In relation to the third element, the claimant not being responsible for the mistake, if the other two aspects are satisfied there is no evidence the Appellant is responsible for the mistake.
14. In relation to the fourth element, the Judge found that as the gangs had taken over the land they would have no interest in pursuing the Appellant which is a sustainable finding. The evidence shows the Appellant’s family have not faced threats or issues despite still living in the same area of Kenya the Appellant claims he cannot return to. The Appellant has not established that the gang he refers to have significant power or influence within Kenya or why they would be interested in him per se, bearing in mind it has been over 10 years since he left Kenya with no evidence of any threat from any relevant group during this period.
15. It is also of note that in the Appellant’s Initial Contact and Asylum Registration Questionnaire, dated 28 April 2022, at question 4.1 when asked to briefly explain all the reasons why he could not return to Kenya, the First Appellant stated:
I can’t return to Kenya, with my family, because of the fear of my three daughters being subject to Female Genital Mutilation, which is practiced in my community.
My mother passed away two years ago and our ancestral land in Kilifi is the subject of contest, I fear my family and I will be killed to eliminate the chance that anyone else other than ‘them’ will be able to lay claim to the land.
‘They’ are individuals who have colluded with government officials to claim our ancestral land that is supposed to be passed down through generations.
If fear that if we return to Kenya, we will be killed over this land, our lives will be in danger.
16. In his Preliminary Information Questionnaire the First Appellant claimed his fear was from a militia gang called the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) and Kaya Bombo cartels that operate along the Kenyan Coastal counties of Kilifi, Kwale and Mombasa.
17. There is no dispute in relation to the existence of the Mombasa Republican Council which the country information indicates has campaigned for secession of Mombasa state from Kenya. It is therefore a separatist organisation in relation to which land is a key issue, although land has always been a big problem in Kenya as a result of both colonial aspirations and land seizures by Germany and the United Kingdom in the past. There is also evidence of serious violence undertaken by Kaya Bombo in the coastal area, particularly in 1997, often described as politically instigated clashes, in which more than 100 people were killed, women raped, houses torched and businesses looted.
18. Notwithstanding the geographical reference the Judge find the Appellants were able to live in Kenya without credible evidence of a risk of serious harm. The Judge also finds an internal flight option available to the Appellants, which it is reasonable for them to make use of away from their home area where the claimed specific risk arises.
19. The Appellant’s argument is that the Judge did not consider what may happen if he returned to Kenya and tried to seize his land back from the gangs. In his schedule of issues the First Appellant submitted that if he was to return Kenya the militias and cartels would want him dead as he remains a threat to the ancestral land because the land legally belongs to his family.
20. The schedule of issues provided to the First-tier Tribunal in relation to the protection issue posed the question of whether Appellant came within a Convention reason. In relation to that the Appellants in their statement of reasons wrote:
14. R does not consider A has claimed asylum for a convention reason. It is submitted A fears gangs who have attacked the family of A due to their mixed ethnicity and currently illegally occupy the ancestral land in Kilifi of A. It is submitted the state remains deeply divided along ethnic lines (AB, page 174) and the country information demonstrate gangs who work for politicians carry out ethnic cleansing (AB, page 200) and land invasions in Kilifi (AB, pages 138, 185). Furthermore, the enclosed ample country information demonstrates the politicians fund the criminal gangs to carry out their activities (AB, pages 101, 106, 111), including land invasions (AB, pages 100, 101, 113 and 182) and ethnic cleansing (AB, page 111 and 182).
15. Additionally, A fears male circumcision for his son and FGM for his daughters and would remain in constant fear his children would be abducted for male circumcision and FGM, therefore A comes within a convention reason.
21. The Secretary of State’s position is that there is no convention reason. In the Refusal letter it is written at [2]:
Being targeted by a miltia gang does not form a particular social group in Kenya because there are no shared innate or immutable characteristics, they do not have a distinct identity which will be perceived as different in society. Therefore as we have not accepted you are part of a PSG for this reason, this claim would be considered to be a non-convention reason.
Consideration is given to the claim that you are the parent of a child fearing FGM and you are not a woman or a child. This aspect of the claim would fall under PSG as women and girls in fear of FGM form a PSG in Kenya within the meaning of the Refugee Convention because they share an innate characteristic or a common background that cannot be changed, or share a characteristic or belief that is so fundamental to identity or conscience that a person should not be forced to renounce it and have a distinct identity in Kenya because the group is perceived as being different by the surrounding society.
22. There is no need to consider the FGM issues as the Judge’s findings on that point are sustainable.
23. The Appellant challenges the Judge’s findings on the availability of sufficiency of protection and an internal flight option. They are relevant findings for even if persecution/serious harm is made out a person is not entitled to a grant of international protection if the state provides adequate protection and/or they have a reasonable internal flight alternative to another part of the home country where they will not suffer such harm or persecution.
24. The Judge makes a specific finding at [25] that the element of the Appellant’s claim in relation to the land did not engage the Refugee Convention. That is finding within the range of those reasonably open to the Judge on the evidence as Appellant did not establish the matters complained off enabled him to succeed in showing he could satisfy the definition of a Particular Social Group.
25. As the asylum claim was lodged before 28 June 2022, the commencement date for relevant sections of the Nationality and Borders Act 2002 and associated changes to Part 11 of the Immigration Rules, it is was also necessary to consider whether the Appellant is entitled to a grant of Humanitarian Protection in accordance with the guidance set out at version 6.0 Humanitarian protection in asylum claims lodged before 28 June 2022, guidance. This was not considered by the Judge who dismissed the claim to face a real risk of international protection on the facts.
26. To be entitled to a grant of Humanitarian Protection the Appellant has the burden of proving they can meet the criteria set out at paragraph 339C of the Immigration Rules which provided:
339C An asylum applicant will be granted humanitarian protection in United Kingdom if the Secretary of State is satisfied that:
i. they are in the United Kingdom or have arrived at a port of entry in the United Kingdom;
ii. they are not a refugee within the meaning of Article 1 of the 1951 Refugee Convention;
iii. substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the asylum applicant concerned, if returned to the country of origin, would face a real risk of suffering serious harm and is unable, or, owing to such risk, unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country; and
iv. they are not excluded from a grant of humanitarian protection.
339CA. For the purposes of paragraph 339C, serious harm consists of: (i) the death penalty or execution; (ii) unlawful killing; (iii) torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of a person in the country of origin; or (iv) serious and individual threat to a civilian's life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict.
27. It is not disputed the Appellants are in the United Kingdom and in light of the findings that what they fear is not sufficient to satisfy a Convention Reason, taking the claim at its highest, conditions (i) and (ii) of paragraph 339C are satisfied.
28. The issue to be considered in this appeal is whether the Appellant can found a claim for international protection on the basis of something that he proposes to do, when there is no risk to him unless he does anything further.
29. The Secretary of State’s assertion the Appellant faces no real risk for the reason he claims, as the land has already been taken by those who had threatened him to enable them to gain control of the land, is a credible position, especially as it is noted in the refusal that there is news of the Appellant’s mother’s move despite claiming that they were being threatened in the past.
30. It was not made out on the facts, that if the Appellant returns and moves to a different part of Kenya he will suffer serious harm as defined in paragraph 339CA, without more. There is merit in the finding there is insufficient evidence to show the First Appellant’s claim will prevent him from internally locating if he did not return to his home area, even though when he was there the Judge did not find there was sufficient evidence of adverse interest in him.
31. I also note question 20 of the First Appellants Asylum Interview, referred to in the refusal letter, in which the Appellant was asked what he fears would happen to him if returned to Kenya, to which he replied:
“They will kill me in order for them to acquire the land as long as I am alive and they cannot claim the land until I am dead. The only ways to eliminate myself and my family altogether if we were to return back home.”
32. There appears a tension between the Appellant’s claim that the land had been seized some time ago and his claim in his asylum interview which indicates the land had not been seized. Use of the word “acquire” indicates taken/possessed.
33. When discussing this issue with Mr Thrower he referred to the guidance provided by the Court of Appeal in Secretary of State v Ahmed [1999] EWCA Civ 3003 and the judgement of Lord Justice Simon Brown. The issue in that case involved a citizen of Pakistan who was a follower of the Ahmadi faith. Within the determinations the Court considered a number of authorities including Danian v Secretary of State for the Home Department which found that in all asylum cases there was ultimately but a single question, whether there is a serious risk upon return if the applicant will be persecuted for a Convention reason. If there is his entitled to asylum and it matters not whether the risk arises from his own conduct in the UK, however unreasonable. It does not even matter whether he has cynically sought to enhance his prospects of asylum by creating the very risk on which he relies, cases sometimes characterised as involving ‘bad faith’. The Court found that whatever the motive none of it forfeited in applicant’s right refugee status provided it established a well-founded fear of persecution abroad.
34. It is accepted that in HJ (Iran) a person cannot be expected to hide a fundamental aspect of their belief, personality, or being, if the reason they are doing so is to avoid a credible risk of persecution or serious harm.
35. What is consistent in both these decisions is the fact that there is an element which, if it came to the attention of prospective persecuted, will create a risk of persecution for the individual concerned for a Convention reason. In Ahmed it was the question of whether a follower of the Ahmadi faith is entitled to refugee protection on the facts. It was accepted that Mr Ahmed had been persecuted in Pakistan on religious grounds but the challenge arose as it was claimed the Adjudicator had failed to consider the issue of internal flight. It was found Mr Ahmed could not be expected not to express his faith as an Ahmadi in Pakistan, which would give rise to a real risk of persecution.
36. In the current case, the Appellant has failed to establish an element which can be identified as a fundamental aspect of his personality, belief, or as an individual, which will give rise to an act of persecution on return for a Convention reason, and for which the only reason he could avoid such persecution would not be to express or demonstrate such a fundamental belief.
37. It was also not made out before the Judge that if the Appellant returns to Kenya he will not have access to the courts and judicial system to make a claim to recover land that has been taken from him unlawfully. Although the country information speaks of corruption within the judiciary in Kenya, a number of judges and magistrates have been removed and replaced. Although I accept that this does not mean concerns relating to corruption and payment of bribes to secure judgements has gone away completely, but it does not undermine the finding that there is a functioning and accessible judicial system within Kenya available to the First Appellant. The issue of land is enshrined in the constitution in Kenya and orders have been made against those in power, including a previous prime minister, to make payment to a victim following an unlawful seizure of land.
38. The recovery of land typically involves restitution, which is the return of property to its rightful owner. However, in cases where restitution is not feasible, fair and adequate compensation may be an alternative remedy.
39. If the First Appellant chose not to follow proper procedure to go back onto the land with a view to physically enforcing his rights of occupation by violence of any other such means, that will not found a right to international protection as he is creating an environment in his home country which does not otherwise exist. It is settled law that such actions do not entitle an individual to succeed with a claim to Article 3 ECHR or other forms of protection.
40. In relation to the Appellant’s claim that however he seeks to recover his land he fears that this will produce a reaction from those who seized the land, the Judge found there is a sufficiency of protection available to the Appellant from the authorities within Kenya.
41. Mr Thrower submitted that if the Appellant returns to Kenya he will face a real risk as those who seized the land will assume he is coming to take it from them, but such a claim is speculative with no evidential foundation. It will only be if the Appellant takes positive action to recover the land that those who seized the land will become aware of his intention.
42. The scenario therefore appears to be that, hypothetically, the Appellant can be returned to Kenya where he can reasonable internally relocate away from his home area with no evidence of a risk of serious harm on the facts as they currently are. If the Appellant decides to recover his land he claims this will give rise to a real risk of serious harm. The Appellant’s case is that this is a reasonably foreseeable consequence which the Judge was required to deal with, but the Judge did deal with the issue by finding on the evidence insufficient evidence to warrant the appeal being allowed.
43. It is also the case that on the facts the Appellant did not need the land for housing or for the purpose of growing food or to provide an adequate standard of living.
44. Mr Thrower challenges the Judge’s finding in relation to sufficiency protection by reference to the country material before the Judge, but this was clearly considered by the Judge. Attempting to reargue the point does not establish arguable legal error, per se.
45. Whilst it is accepted there is evidence of some corruption within the police in Kenya and abuse by the police service, the evidence before the Judge did not establish that there is no access to legal and practical measures to protect individuals from persecution or serious harm from non-state actors such as those the Appellant claims to fear, particularly in the context of his claim for international protection. It is settled law that when assessing sufficiency of protection it is not about whether it has been demonstrated that all risk will be eliminated, but rather about demonstrating that the state is willing and able to take effective steps to prevent such harm. The evidence before the Judge did not show there is not an effective legal system, a functioning criminal justice system, and mechanism to address threats from state or non-state actors in Kenya, on the specific facts of this appeal.
46. The Judge also specifically finds at [27] that there is adequate protection from the State if the appellant is threatened in relation to his land. That is finding open to the Judge.
47. I find no legal error material to the decision to dismiss the appeal made out in relation to the findings that there is a sufficiency of protection available to the Appellants in Kemya.
48. I also find no material legal error made out in relation to the Judge’s findings that the Appellants have a reasonable internal flight option within Kenya away from their home area.
49. On that basis, as the existence of these means the Appellant cannot succeed with a claim for international protection, the error of fact has not been shown to be material to the decision to dismiss the appeal.
50. The above is relevant to Grounds 1 and 2 which I find do not establish material legal error in the decision under challenge.
51. Ground 3 asserts perversity in relation to the findings in relation to the of genuineness of the fear and applicability of section 8 of the 2004 Act. The Judge deals with the issue of delay in claiming protection, which the chronology above shows is a credible concern, at [17], in which is written:
17. I find the appellant’s delay in claiming reflect adversely on the genuineness of his fear. He accepted in his oral evidence there when he entered the United Kingdom he did not intend to return to Kenya. I do not accept that covid would have prevented him contacting the respondent and intimating a claim. Furthermore, I do not find that the loss of his mother would have prevented him from doing so.
52. The Judge was entitled to consider delay in relation to the genuineness of the claimed fear in accordance with the specific provision of the statute. Whilst the refusal letter states that because of the delay credibility is damaged but not considered damage sufficient to affect the core of the claim, that does not mean the Judge was not able to consider the issue for himself. It is rare that delay in claiming asylum would be sufficient to mean the core of a claim should have no weight placed upon it, but it is a relevant statutory factor.
53. It is also the case that when the determination is read as a whole, the Judge does not dismiss the claim solely as a result of the delay in claiming asylum. It is a relevant finding of the Judge, not challenged in the determination, that the Appellant’s entry to the United Kingdom on a visa in which he would have told the Entry Clearance Officer that he would have intended to return to Kenya was fraudulent, if he never had the intention of going back home. The finding by the Judge that there was no credible explanation for why the claim was not made earlier is a finding within the range reasonably open to the Judge on the evidence.
54. Ground 3 also refers to the Appellant’s claim that he required hospitalisation following a machete attack, but the Judge did not find the injury had been caused as claimed. That is a finding within a range of those open to the Judge on the evidence.
55. In part, the grounds criticise the Judge for not setting out findings in relation to each and every aspect of the evidence, but the Judge was not required to do so. First-tier Tribunal judges are encouraged to write shorter more succinct determinations based upon the issues that are raised. The Judge considered the evidence with the required degree of anxious scrutiny and so would have been aware of the First Appellant’s claim to continually be threatened by the criminal gangs after relocating, but clearly did not accept that this made internal relocation to another part of Kenya unreasonable. The core finding of the Judge that even if the Appellant had experienced harm in his home area in the past it has not been established that the same would occur if he internally relocated away from his home area, is a sustainable finding.
56. Ground 4 asserts failure to give adequate reasons in relation to sufficiency of protection but an informed reader is able to understand why the Judge found there was sufficiency of protection available. Whilst the grounds refer to country information relied upon by the Appellant, that was considered by the Judge in the determination. Attempts to suggest that the Judge should have made a different finding on the basis of that evidence is not sufficient to undermine findings made but is an attempt to reargue the Appellant’s case.
57. I find no material legal error made out in relation to Grounds 3 or 4.
58. A person challenging a decision of a judge of the First-tier Tribunal must have regard to the guidance provided by the Court of Appeal in in Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 462 at [2], Ullah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 201 at [26], and Hamilton v Barrow and Others [2024] EWCA Civ 888 at [30-31]. I have done so.
59. Whilst the style of this particular judge means it is important to read the determination very carefully as a whole and to cross-reference material considered by the Judge, having done so I do not find Appellant has established that the rejection of the claim for international protection as a finding outside the range of those reasonably open to the Judge on the evidence. In particular it has not been shown to be rationally objectionable nor plainly wrong.
60. As noted above the Appellants will not be returned to Kenya in any event as he has the benefit of leave granted pursuant to Article 8 ECHR.
Notice of Decision
61. The First-tier Tribunal has not been shown to have materially erred in law.
62. The determination shall stand.

C J Hanson

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

14 April 2025