Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-000634

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/01281/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 11th November 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BULPITT
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE M HARRIS

Between

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
and

MUHAMMAD IZHAN
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr E Terrell, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
For the Respondent: Mr A Pipe, Counsel instructed by Richard Nelson Solicitors

Heard at Field House on 17 July 2025

DECISION AND REASONS

1. This is the Secretary of State for the Home Department’s appeal against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Iqbal (the Judge) allowing Mr Izhan’s appeal against the refusal of his human rights claim. The context for the appellant’s human rights claim was a decision by the respondent to deport the appellant because he had been convicted of offences of supplying illegal drugs to others and sent to prison for thirty months. The Secretary of State for the Home Department argues that the Judge erred in law when assessing the appellant’s appeal and therefore that her decision should be set aside. Mr Izhan seeks to maintain the decision made by the Judge which he argues is free from legal error.

2. Although it is the Secretary of State for the Home Department who brings this appeal, to avoid confusion we will refer to the parties as they were in the First-tier Tribunal where Mr Izhan was the appellant and the Secretary of State for the Home Department the respondent.

3. Having given this appeal careful consideration we have concluded that the Judge’s decision did not contain an error of law and therefore that it should stand. Parliament has decided that the deportation of foreign criminals is not in the public interest in certain prescribed circumstances. The Judge found that those circumstances applied to the appellant and we have concluded that the Judge did not fall in to error when reaching that conclusion. The full and detailed reasons for our decision follow.

Background

4. The appellant is a Pakistani national who was born in Quetta. He is 22 years old. He came to the United Kingdom with his mother and siblings in 2010 when he was seven years old, having been granted leave to do so to join his father. Whilst in the United Kingdom the appellant and his family have been resident in a city in East Anglia. He attended primary school and secondary school in that city. Whilst the appellant’s family were granted indefinite leave to remain in the United Kingdom and then became British citizens, the appellant’s leave to remain has always been limited. He made a series of in-time applications to extend his leave each of which were granted so that his leave to remain was due to expire on 1 September 2023. On 13 August 2023 he made a further application for leave to remain which had the effect of continuing his lawful residence in the United Kingdom. By the time the respondent made her decision to refuse that application and the appellant’s human rights claim on 11 July 2024 the appellant had had been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for fourteen years. That lawful residence continues now by virtue of section 3C of the Immigration Act 1971.

5. The appellant has committed criminal offences. On 2 September 2015 he was cautioned for possessing a bladed article on school premises and he was additionally excluded from school as a result of the same incident. He received a second caution for the offence of theft from a shop in June 2020. In November 2020, he was given a Referral Order for the offence of theft and on 4 February 2021 he was given a second Referral Order for an offence of battery. Between 21 July 2022 and 2 August 2023 the appellant was involved in “quite a sophisticated business” supplying controlled drugs to others for significant financial gain. He was eventually arrested and pleaded guilty to offences of supplying class A and class B drugs. On 13 March 2024 the appellant was sentenced by His Honour Judge Shaw to serve 30 months imprisonment.

6. On 9 May 2024 the respondent informed the appellant that as a result of his conviction and sentence the respondent intended to deport him to Pakistan. The appellant replied through his solicitors, raising a human rights claim that his deportation would be incompatible with his rights under Article 8 of the Convention on Human Rights to respect for his private and family life. The respondent refused that claim in a decision dated 11 July 2024, refusing his application for further leave to remain and issuing a deportation order at the same time. The appellant appealed against the refusal of his human rights claim to the First-tier Tribunal on the sole permitted ground that the decision was unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998.

Legal Framework

7. Section 6 Human Rights Act 1998 provides that it is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right. Article 8(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) provides for the right to respect for a person’s private and family life, which Article 8(2) says must not be interfered with by a public authority: “except as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic wellbeing of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
8. Part 5A (sections 117A – D) of the Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (the 2002 Act) applies where a Tribunal is required to determine whether a decision made under the Immigration Acts (such as a decision to deport a foreign criminal) would be incompatible with a person’s right to respect for private and family life under Article 8 ECHR. In such a case “the public interest question” is defined as being whether an interference with a person’s right to respect for private and family life is justified under Article 8(2) ECHR (see section 117A(3)). When considering that question, a court or tribunal must have regard in “all cases” to the considerations in section 117B, and in “cases concerning the deportation of foreign criminals” to the considerations in section 117C (section 117A(2)). A foreign criminal is defined in section 117D(2) to include a person who is not British, has been convicted in the United Kingdom of an offence and has been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least 12 months.
9. Section 117B of the 2002 Act provides so far as is relevant to the appellant’s case that the maintenance of immigration control is in the public interest (s117B(1)), that it is in the public interest that those seeking to stay in the United Kingdom are able to speak English and are financially independent (s117B(2) & (3)) and that little weight is to be given to a private life established while a person’s stay in the United Kingdom is precarious (s117B(5))

10. Section 117C(1) identifies that the deportation of foreign criminals is in the public interest, while section 117C(2) says that the more serious the offence committed by a foreign criminal the greater the public interest in the deportation of the criminal. Section 117C(3) provides that the public interest requires the deportation of a foreign criminal who has not been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of four years or more “unless Exception 1 or Exception 2 applies”. It is agreed that Exception 2 does not apply in in this case but the key issue in dispute between the appellant and the respondent was whether Exception 1 applies. Exception 1 is defined in section 117C(4) as follows:
(4) Exception 1 applies where—

(a) C has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of C's life,

(b) C is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom, and

(c) there would be very significant obstacles to C's integration into the country to which C is proposed to be deported.

11. Section 117C(6) provides that the public interest requires the deportation of a foreign criminal sentenced to a period of imprisonment of four years or more unless “there are very compelling circumstances over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2”. In NA (Pakistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] EWCA Civ 662 it was held that s117C(6) also applies to a foreign criminal sentenced to a period of imprisonment of less than four years but who did not meet the requirements of either Exception 1 or 2. The Supreme Court proceeded on the basis that this interpretation was correct in HA (Iraq) and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22 and said at [47] that the effect of this section in such a case was that:
“a full proportionality assessment is required, weighing the interference with the article 8 rights of the potential deportee and his family against the public interest in his deportation. In conducting that assessment the decision maker is required by section 117C(6)…to proceed on the basis that ‘the public interest requires deportation unless there are very compelling circumstances over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2’”

The Judge’s decision

12. The judge heard the appeal at Harmondsworth on 17 December 2024 while the appellant was in immigration detention. The parties agreed at the outset of that hearing (see [13] of the decision)that the issues the Judge had to resolve were:
i. whether the appellant met the requirements of Exception 1 to deportation (in which case his appeal would succeed); and if not
ii. whether there were very compelling circumstances over and above the two Exceptions which outweighed the public interest in his deportation.

13. The Judge heard evidence from the appellant, his parents and one of his younger brothers. She then heard submissions on behalf of the parties before reserving her decision. The Judge issued that decision on 8 January 2025.

14. The Judge started the “findings” section of her decision with consideration of whether the appellant met the requirements of Exception 1, noting at [21] that the respondent conceded that the appellant met the first limb of Exception 1 as he had been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for more than half of his life.

15. The Judge’s consideration of the disputed second limb of Exception 1 – the question of whether the appellant was “socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom” is set out at [22] – [40] of the decision. The Judge begins by identifying that a person’s integration can be broken by criminal offending and imprisonment ([22]) and the importance of upbringing and education in the formation of a person’s social identity, and its importance in the context of cases involving the article 8 rights of persons facing expulsion because of criminal offending ([23] by reference to the judgment of Leggatt LJ in CI (Nigeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 2027).

16. The Judge then records that having arrived in the United Kingdom at the age of 7 the appellant attended primary and secondary school in the same City describing him at [25] as “fully immersed in his school life”. At [26] the Judge records evidence from the appellant’s family members that “supports the fact that he has very much been a part of their family and private life that they have established in the United Kingdom.”

17. Under a sub-heading of “medical evidence", the Judge considers between [27] and [39] medical evidence including a report from consultant psychiatrist Dr Arvin Gupta “insofar as the Appellant’s offending”. At [34] the Judge records Dr Gupta’s diagnosis that the appellant has ADHD and mixed personality disorder as well as mental and behavioural disorder due to the use of cannabinoids and PTSD. The Judge quotes in that paragraph the opinion of Dr Gupta that the combination of facts could make the appellant more vulnerable to engaging in criminal activities whether due to peer influence poor decision making or inability to regulate his impulses or emotions. At [35] and [36] the Judge refers to the appellant’s GP records, including a referral for teen support and ADHD after his expulsion from school and work carried out with the appellant to ensure he was able to integrate into school. At [37] the Judge refers to a claim by the appellant that he was forced to work by a group between 2015-2022 but finds that there is nothing to support that claim, though she find that the appellant “received some peer pressure which encouraged his offending behaviour”. At [38] the Judge records that the appellant’s offending behaviour has resulted from his inability to properly regulate his ADHD and notes the appellant’s evidence that now he was older, with the support of his family he would use other coping mechanisms to cope with his ADHD. At [39] the Judge notes the appellant’s remorse as demonstrated both to the sentencing Judge and to the Judge.

18. The Judge then records at [40] her finding in the light of this evidence, that the appellant is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom:
I find at today’s date the Appellant is young and remorseful states that the time spent in prison has been a turning point for him, his family are now fully aware of his difficulties and I am satisfied that as this is his last chance to prove himself, I am prepared to accept he means to turn his life around. The totality of the evidence before me does demonstrate the Appellant was fully immersed in his life in the UK and therefore socially and culturally integrated since his arrival here. The Appellant was sentenced to 30 months in 2024 of which he will serve half of and I find that on the totality of the facts presented to me, his criminal offending as outlined above and imprisonment have not broken his integration in the UK. He continues to have very strong relationships with his family and note their evidence was consistent as to their relationship with him. Further I note that whilst his girlfriend did not attend, she had provided a statement supported by a number of photographs of the two together over the years which I accord with some weight as demonstrating a relationship between the two.

19. The Judge’s consideration of the disputed third limb of Exception 1 – whether the appellant would face very significant obstacles to integration in Pakistan – is set out at [41] – [47] of her decision. At [44] the Judge records the appellant’s case that the appellant speaks the language [used in Pakistan], that his paternal grandfather and uncle live in Pakistan where his father previously owned the family home but there was talk of this being transferred to his brother, that the maternal side of his family have relocated to Dubai, that the appellant has visited Pakistan on three occasions since leaving in 2010 and that the family in Pakistan did not know about the appellant’s ADHD or his criminality. The Judge then records a finding at the end of the paragraph:
The lack of knowledge of the Appellant’s conditions and history by family in Pakistan, I find make it less likely that he would receive the necessary support to integrate into life in Pakistan fully.

20. At [45] the Judge records Dr Gupta’s opinion that the appellant is “An extremely vulnerable individual who would struggle to cope in the environment in Pakistan and there is high likelihood of significant deterioration in his mental health and engagement in drug related behaviour that will further have a negative impact on his mental health” before noting at [46] that Dr Gupta considered that the appellant was not feigning his condition and that he would need to be referred to secondary care services and would need psycho education and be referred for trauma focused therapy.

21. The Judge then records her conclusion in respect of the third limb to Exception 1 at [47] as follows:
Therefore I find that whilst the Appellant and his family have visited this would not be sufficient for the Appellant to be considered enough of an insider with an understanding of how life in Pakistan was carried on there. The family ties are not particularly strong, as evidenced by the evidence above and certainly given his diagnosis of ADHD, PTSD and vulnerability from his conditions without proper family support he would face very significant obstacles to his integration.

22. The Judge therefore concluded that the appellant met the requirements of Exception 1 and in those circumstances the public interest did not require his deportation. She therefore allowed his appeal, it not being necessary to consider in the alternative whether there were very compelling circumstances over and above the two Exceptions.
The appeal to the Upper Tribunal

23. When granting the respondent permission to appeal against the Judge’s decision Upper Tribunal Judge Mahmood described the grounds of appeal the respondent relied upon as “discursive”. This is an understatement. The grounds do not follow the guidance issued in Rai and DAM (Grounds of Appeal – Limited Grant of Permission) [2025] UKUT 00150 failing to identify clearly and succinctly each point of law by reference to the relevant passage of the Judge’s decision and making brief submissions on each point. Instead a single ground of appeal is relied upon but within that ground it is asserted that the Judge made three errors of law: (i) “Making a perverse or irrational findings on a matter or matters that were material to the outcome”; (ii) Failing to give reasons or any adequate reasons for findings on material matters; (iii) Making a material misdirection of law on any material matter. The lengthy narrative which follows the grounds of appeal includes unhelpful comment on the respondent’s refusal to rely on chance when public safety is at stake.

24. Acknowledging the deficiencies in the written grounds of appeal, Mr Terrell did not pursue an argument made in the narrative of the grounds which as Judge Mahmood noted when granting permission took the Judge’s comment about a “last chance to prove himself” out of context. Neither did Mr Terrell pursue another argument in the narrative of the grounds that Dr Gupta went beyond his expertise. Instead showing his customary skill, Mr Terrell pursued two of the grounds of appeal on which permission was granted – arguing first that the Judge gave inadequate reasons for her conclusions that the appellant was socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom and that he would face very significant obstacles to integration in Pakistan, and second in the alternative, that the Judge’s conclusions on those issues were irrational.

25. Reminding us that the issue is whether the Judge’s decision contains an error of law and not whether the decision can be improved, Mr Pipe argued on behalf of the appellant that there was no lawful basis for interfering with the Judge’s decision. Mr Pipe argued that the Judge gave reasons for her conclusions in respect of the second and third limbs of Exception 1 that were adequate to enable the parties to understand the decision and that the Judge’s conclusion was one which a reasonable Judge could properly reach.

Analysis

26. Given that the respondent no longer pursues the suggestion that the Judge misdirected herself as to the law and the fact that the challenge is to the adequacy of the reasons the Judge gave for her conclusions applying the law and the rationality of those conclusion, we begin our analysis by reminding ourselves of the caution to be exercised by appellate courts in interfering with evaluative decisions of first instance judges.

27. As per the judgment of Lord Justice McCombe in Lowe v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2021] EWCA Civ 62 at [29] which referred to the judgment of Lewison LJ in Farge United Kingdom Ltyd v Chabani United Kingdom Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 5, the reason for such caution can be explained as follows:
29. At [114] – [115], Lewison LJ explained the caution to be exercised by appellate courts in interfering with evaluative decisions of first instance judges. Para. [114] is particularly well known, but para. [115] is also of relevance to the present case. The Lord Justice said this:
"114. Appellate courts have been repeatedly warned, by recent cases at the highest level, not to interfere with findings of fact by trial judges, unless compelled to do so. This applies not only to findings of primary fact, but also to the evaluation of those facts and to inferences to be drawn from them. The best known of these cases are: Biogen Inc v Medeva Plc [1997] R.P.C. 1 ; Piglowska v Piglowski [1999] 1 W.L.R. 1360 ; Datec Electronics Holdings Ltd v United Parcels Service Ltd [2007] UKHL 23; [2007] 1 W.L.R. 1325 ; Re B (A Child) (Care Proceedings) [2013] UKSC 33; [2013] 1 W.L.R. 1911 and most recently and comprehensively McGraddie v McGraddie [2013] UKSC 58; [2013] 1 W.L.R. 2477 . These are all decisions either of the House of Lords or of the Supreme Court. The reasons for this approach are many. They include

i. The expertise of a trial judge is in determining what facts are relevant to the legal issues to be decided, and what those facts are if they are disputed.

ii. The trial is not a dress rehearsal. It is the first and last night of the show.

iii. Duplication of the trial judge's role on appeal is a disproportionate use of the limited resources of an appellate court, and will seldom lead to a different outcome in an individual case.

iv. In making his decisions the trial judge will have regard to the whole of the sea of evidence presented to him, whereas an appellate court will only be island hopping.

v. The atmosphere of the courtroom cannot, in any event, be recreated by reference to documents (including transcripts of evidence).

vi. Thus even if it were possible to duplicate the role of the trial judge, it cannot in practice be done.

115. It is also important to have in mind the role of a judgment given after trial. The primary function of a first instance judge is to find facts and identify the crucial legal points and to advance reasons for deciding them in a particular way. He should give his reasons in sufficient detail to show the parties and, if need be, the Court of Appeal the principles on which he has acted and the reasons that have led him to his decision. They need not be elaborate. There is no duty on a judge, in giving his reasons, to deal with every argument presented by counsel in support of his case. His function is to reach conclusions and give reasons to support his view, not to spell out every matter as if summing up to a jury. Nor need he deal at any length with matters that are not disputed. It is sufficient if what he says shows the basis on which he has acted. These are not controversial observations: see Customs and Excise Commissioners v A [2002] EWCA Civ 1039; [2003] 2 W.L.R. 210 ; Bekoe v Broomes [2005] UKPC 39 ; Argos Ltd v Office of Fair Trading [2006] EWCA Civ 1318; [2006] U.K.C.L.R. 1135 "

30. In this case, the FTT had determined the issues that were before it, being those which were regarded as being central to the question of whether the Appellant had demonstrated the relevant “very significant obstacles”. It was not necessary for the FTT to deal with a case that was not being made by the Respondent. The appeal to the FTT was “the first and last night of the show”, not a “dress rehearsal”.

31. Equally, it is to be recalled that judgments at first instance are necessarily an incomplete impression made upon the judge by the primary evidence. This FTT judge reached the conclusion that he did on the issues raised and he expressed himself succinctly on them. This is what Lord Hoffmann said on the point in the well-known passage of his speech in the House of Lords in Biogen Inc. v Medeva plc [1997] RPC 1 at 45:

“The need for appellate caution in reversing the judge's evaluation of the facts is based upon much more solid grounds than professional courtesy. It is because specific findings of fact, even by the most meticulous judge, are inherently an incomplete statement of the impression which was made upon him by the primary evidence. His expressed findings are always surrounded by a penumbra of imprecision as to emphasis, relative weight, minor qualification and nuance (as Renan said, la vérité est dans une nuance), of which time and language do not permit exact expression, but which may play an important part in the judge's overall evaluation…”.

28. With this in mind, we turn to consider the adequacy of the reasons given by the Judge and the rationality of her conclusions in respect of the second and third limbs of Exception 1 to the public interest in deportation which is where this appeal was won and lost.

Socially and culturally integrated

29. In his judgment in CI (Nigeria), (a judgment which the Judge clearly had at the forefront of her mind as she quoted from it at the beginning of her evaluative assessment of this issue at [23]) Leggatt LJ said at [77] that a Judge considering whether a foreign criminal was socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom:

“should simply have asked whether – having regard to his upbringing, education, employment history, history of criminal offending and imprisonment, relationships with family and friend, lifestyle and other relevant factors – [the appellant] was at the time of the hearing socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom . The judge should not, as he appears a to have done, have treated [the appellant’s] offending and imprisonment as having severed his social and cultural ties with the United Kingdom through its very nature, irrespective of its actual effects on [the appellant’s] relationships and affiliations – and then required him to demonstrate that integrative links had since been ‘re-formed’”

30. The written grounds of appeal in this case, which talk in this context of the Judge pardoning the appellant’s offending, and argue that the appellant has failed to establish that he is “rehabilitated and therefore integrated within the United Kingdom” (our emphasis) suggest the respondent has taken precisely the approach to this question that Leggatt LJ says should not be taken. Sensibly Mr Terrell distanced himself from that approach but argued instead that the Judge had failed to adequately explain her conclusion expressed at [25] that the appellant was fully immersed in his school life and therefore socially and culturally integrated, given the evidence that the Judge later recognised at [32] and [35], that the appellant was expelled from school. Ably though it was made, we cannot accept that submission.

31. At [25] the Judge details a range of evidence of the appellant’s education in the United Kingdom which went beyond simply establishing that the appellant was a pupil at the schools during the material times but also identified that he represented his school at rugby and was nominated as a star pupil as a result, that he earnt awards for his sporting achievements, was nominated by his form tutor for an award and received a certificate of “Epraise”. Mr Terrell was right to point out that this positive evidence of the appellant’s involvement with school life had to be assessed in the context of the appellant’s later expulsion from school, but that was exactly what the Judge did at [32] and [35] of her decision. In those paragraphs the Judge recognised that the appellant was also disruptive, suspended and ultimately expelled from school. The Judge also went on at [36] to identify that the appellant’s expulsion was itself not the end of the matter, but that following that expulsion there was work with the Youth Offending Team to ensure the appellant was able to integrate, including team sessions at the police station. In this way the Judge’s decision demonstrated a comprehensive evaluation of the appellant’s educational upbringing in the United Kingdom and contrary to Mr Terrell’s submissions in our judgment leaves the reader clear about why the Judge has concluded that notwithstanding his problems, the appellant was fully immersed in his school life.

32. The Judge’s assessment of the appellant’s integration into the United Kingdom did not of course stop with consideration of his school life. The Judge recognised at [26] the close family relationships the appellant has with his siblings and parents. The Judge was starkly confronted with that evidence, with all the family at the hearing and ready to give evidence. The Judge noted at [40] that these close relationships had continued to be very strong despite the appellant’s criminality and imprisonment. The Judge also considered as part of her assessment of the appellant’s integration, the appellant’s relationship with his girlfriend, evidenced by photographs and a written statement from the girlfriend, which had also persisted despite the appellant’s imprisonment. This was the opposite of a case like that of AM (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 774 (a case which the written grounds of appeal rely upon) where there was “the complete absence of family life and the absence of any evidence of social or other connections here other than the mere fact of his lawful presence in this country” (see [93] of the judgment of Males LJ).

33. Finally the Judge demonstrably considered the appellant’s criminality when undertaking her assessment of his integration in the United Kingdom. The Judge did this when considering the appellant’s suggestion that the criminality occurred in the context of him suffering from ADHD. Having set out the relevant evidence of Dr Gupta and recognised not only the offending that led to his sentence of imprisonment but also the appellant’s other behaviour that had led to sanctions by both the Courts and the school, the Judge accepted the appellant’s expressed remorse, desire to rebuild his life and to turn his life around. Again, it is evident from this that the Judge took a holistic approach to the appellant’s integration considering not only the criminality that spoke against integration but also the context for that offending which mitigated the suggestion that the appellant was not integrated.

34. Through all these considerations the Judge gives an explanation for her finding that the appellant is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom which in our judgement is unquestionably adequate to enable the parties and this Tribunal to understand why the Judge reached the conclusion she did. Further, in our judgment that conclusion was unquestionably one which the Judge was rationally entitled to reach given the appellant has lived more than two thirds of his life in the same city of the United Kingdom, was educated there and has maintained strong close relationships with his family and friends in the United Kingdom despite his offending. We find no error of law in the Judge’s consideration of the second limb to Exception 1.

Very Significant Obstacles To Integration

35. Whilst again resiling from the more florid parts of the written grounds of appeal, including the criticisms unfairly made of Dr Gupta’s evidence about the appellant’s ability to cope in the environment in Pakistan, Mr Terrell forcefully argued that the Judge’s reasoning for her conclusion that the appellant would face very significant obstacles to integration in Pakistan was inadequate and alternatively that her conclusion was irrational. In doing so Mr Terrell relied on the recent Court of Appeal decision in Secretary of State for the Home Department v Ackom [2025] EWCA Civ 537 where Lady Justice Andrews found at [49] that a First-tier Tribunal Judge considering this same question of whether a foreign criminal would face very significant obstacles to integration in their home country had failed in substance to address whether the obstacles the Judge identified “would prevent or seriously inhibit [the appellant] from integrating into [the home country] (as opposed to making integration difficult or challenging.” Mr Terrell argued that here, the Judge’s reasoning at [44] – [47] of her decision did not indicate that the Judge had asked herself the appropriate question and that it was inadequate to allow the reader to understand why the obstacles the appellant will face reach the high threshold of being “very significant.”

36. At four paragraphs long, we acknowledge that the Judge’s reasoning on this third limb of Exception 1 is comparatively brief in the context of a full and comprehensive decision. We are satisfied however that, as Mr Pipe submitted, those relatively short paragraphs must not be divorced from and need to be read in conjunction with the Judge’s earlier detailed consideration of the medical evidence and especially the evidence of Dr Gupta. The Judge’s conclusion at [47] that the appellant’s diagnosis of ADHD, PTSD and vulnerability mean he will face very significant obstacles to integration is explained for example by the Judge’s earlier consideration at [34] of Dr Gupta’s evidence that the appellant’s ADHD and dysfunctional personality traits could significantly impair his judgement and decision making, might impair his ability to assess situations logically or understand the impact of his actions on others and might make him more vulnerable.

37. At [45] the Judge records the powerful evidence of Dr Gupta that the appellant was an extremely vulnerable individual who would struggle to cope in the environment in Pakistan and there is a high likelihood of significant deterioration in his mental health and engagement in drug related behaviour that will further have a negative impact on his mental health. Having earlier indicated that she found the Dr Gupta’s report to be “of good evidential value providing a reliable assessment of the matters the expert has been asked to comment on” (see [29]), the Judge was bound to give this opinion significant weight when evaluating the extent of the obstacles the appellant would face on return to Pakistan.

38. As well as the medical evidence from Dr Gupta the Judge also considered when assessing the obstacles the appeal would face to integration in Pakistan, the extent of the appellant’s family connections in the country and the support he would receive. At [44] the Judge recognised that the appellant’s paternal grandfather and uncle remain in Pakistan but noted that the lack of knowledge they have about the appellant’s conditions and history mean that it is less likely they could give the appellant the support he needed. This was a finding the Judge made having considered all the evidence and having seen and heard from not just the appellant but also his parents and brother. The Judge was therefore well placed to make an assessment about the extent of the support the appellant would be able to rely upon on return to Pakistan and there is no lawful basis for interfering with the finding of fact made by the Judge.

39. We are satisfied therefore that the Judge adequately explains in her decision that her findings about the obstacles the appellant would in Pakistan are based on the evidence of the appellant’s medical conditions which mean that he is extremely vulnerable and at risk of significant deterioration of his mental health, and also the result of the absence of effective support for him in Pakistan.

40. We recognise that, as per Ackom it was not enough for the Judge to simply identify those factors which led to her conclusion, but that the Judge was required to give adequate explanation for why those factors would prevent or seriously inhibit the appellant from integrating as opposed to making integration difficult or challenging. We also acknowledge that where a judgment is made on an overall evaluation of the circumstances of a case, the conclusion arrived at is not capable of logical demonstration and there is a limit to the reasoning that can be given to justify it (see CI (Nigeria) at [75]). In short it is almost impossible for a Judge to demonstrate logically why obstacles that have been identified are considered to be very significant rather than just significant. Ultimately, we are satisfied that when the decision is read as a whole, the Judge’s explanation of the appellant’s specific mental health challenges, by reference to Dr Gupta’s very pessimistic opinion about his ability to cope in Pakistan, and also the lack of effective support the appellant will receive in Pakistan is sufficient to show that in substance the Judge has considered the correct test. In reaching that conclusion we remind ourselves of all the reasons why appellate courts should be slow to interfere with evaluative assessments of first instances judges as identified at [27] above.

41. We find therefore that the Judge has given adequate reasons for her conclusion that the appellant would face very significant obstacles to integration in Pakistan and that for the reasons given by the Judge that conclusion was a rational one for her to reach.

42. Accordingly we uphold the Judge’s evaluative assessment that in all the circumstances the appellant meets the requirements of Exception 1 to deportation, an exception that Parliament has identified and to which the tribunals must give effect. In these circumstances we uphold the Judge’s decision to allow the appellant’s appeal.

Notice of Decision

The Secretary of State’s appeal is dismissed.

The decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Iqbal did not involve the making of a material error of law and therefore stands.

Luke Bulpitt

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

21 August 2025