Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case Nos: UI-2025-000635

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/58363/2023
LP/08402/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 11th November 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KEBEDE

Between

SJ
(Anonymity Order made)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr C Holmes, instructed by Broudie Jackson Canter
For the Respondent: Dr Ibisi, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Manchester Civil Justice Centre on 24 October 2025

DECISION AND REASONS

1. This is the re-making of the decision in the appellant’s appeal, following the setting aside of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal which dismissed the appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s decision to refuse her asylum and human rights claim.

2. The background to this case is as follows.

3. The appellant is a national of Namibia of the Herero tribe, born in February 1989. She arrived in the UK by air on 16 May 2019, having left Namibia the previous day, and claimed asylum on arrival. Her claim was refused on 13 September 2019 and she appealed against that decision.

4. The appellant’s claim can be summarised as follows. When she was 19 years of age her family told her that she was to marry to an older cousin, but she refused. She fled to Windhoek on several occasions to escape her family but they always brought her back. They were angry with her for dishonouring them and disrespecting the Herero traditions. She had a relationship with a Herero man in Windhoek who was violent towards her and she reported him to the police but they did not do anything and she ended up back with her family. In 2011 she fled to Canada with the help of a school friend who lived there. She had a relationship with another Namibian national in Canada and had a daughter. She claimed asylum in Canada but her claim was refused. She then returned to Namibia in 2014, by which time her mother had passed away and her cousin had married someone else. Her uncle, grandmother and sisters wanted her thrown out of the family because she had dishonoured them, but her father wanted her to remain and look after him, her daughter and her two younger brothers. Her uncle took over the family decisions from her father when her father was too old and ill and he demanded that she contributed financially to the family. Her uncle forced her into prostitution in order to provide for her family. She used the money to pay for food and for her brother’s school fees. She became pregnant and had another child in 2015. In 2018 she approached the police but they refused to help her. She also approached the Herero Traditional Authority for protection but they would not intervene. Her father died in August 2018. In order to support her younger brother in his education the appellant borrowed some money from two men in Windhoek who sexually exploited her. She then decided to stop prostituting herself and was unable to pay the men back. The men were threatening her and she therefore fled the country with the help of her brother. She feared being killed by the men, or forced back into prostitution, if she returned. She also fears her family in Namibia because she disobeyed them by rejecting the arranged marriage.

5. The respondent, in refusing the appellant’s claim, accepted that she was forced into prostitution and that she had been a victim of gender-based violence, but considered that she was not at risk on return as there was a sufficiency of protection available to her from the Namibian authorities and that she could also safely and reasonably relocate to another part of the country.

6. The appellant appealed against that decision. Her appeal was heard by a First-tier Tribunal Judge on 29 October 2024. The appeal proceeded by way of submissions only, as the appellant did not give oral evidence. The judge had before him an appeal bundle containing a statement from the appellant, the appellant’s medical notes and a medico-legal report from Dr Suneetha Kovvuri, a Consultant Forensic Psychiatrist, and background country reports, as well as the respondent’s appeal bundle. The judge accepted that the appellant was a member of a particular social group but concluded, on the basis of the background evidence, that there was adequate state protection available to her and that she was also able to relocate to another area of Namibia where her family did not live and where she would not be known. In so doing, the judge gave weight to the respondent’s CPIN ‘Namibia: Women fearing gender based violence’ version 1.0 September 2021, finding that much of the country evidence relied upon by the appellant was out of date. The judge noted that the police had not taken the appellant’s complaints seriously on one occasion in the past, but concluded that state protection had advanced since then and that she could approach the police for protection. The judge considered that the appellant was therefore at no risk on return to Namibia. The judge noted that the appellant had mental health issues but considered that she could access adequate medical care in Namibia. The judge found that the appellant’s removal would not breach Article 3 or 8 and he accordingly dismissed the appeal on all grounds, in a decision promulgated on 9 November 2024.

7. The appellant sought permission to appeal the judge’s decision on three grounds. Firstly, that the judge had erred by treating the respondent’s policy position in the CPIN as evidence; secondly, that the judge had proceeded under a mistake of fact as to the age of the background evidence upon which she relied; and thirdly, that the judge had failed to give adequate reasons as to why her case on protection and relocation was to be rejected.

8. Permission was refused in the First-tier Tribunal, but was subsequently granted in the Upper Tribunal on a renewed application.

9. The matter then came before me at a hearing for the error of law issue to be determined, on 9 September 2025. Ms Newton conceded that the second and third grounds identified an error of law in the judge’s decision and that the decision therefore had to be re-made on the issues of sufficiency of protection and internal relocation. Accordingly, in a decision promulgated on 26 September 2025, I set aside the judge’s decision, on that limited basis, as follows:

“8. Mr Holmes made his submissions, expanding upon the grounds. With regard to the first ground, he submitted that the judge had treated the respondent’s policy position in the CPIN report as determinative of the appeal and had failed to distinguish between policy and evidence, treating the CPIN as evidence whereas the sections quoted consisted of advice to decision-makers. With regard to the second ground, Mr Holmes submitted that the judge was wrong to say that the country evidence relied upon by the appellant was old, when in fact a number of items in the country evidence from the appellant were contemporaneous with the CPIN or post-dated it. As for the third ground, Mr Holmes submitted that the judge’s findings on protection and internal relocation were not properly reasoned and that there was next to no engagement with the relevant evidence. The judge did not explain how or why state protection had advanced since the appellant reported to the police herself, he did not address paragraph 339K of the immigration rules in regard to past persecution being indicative of a future risk, he did not engage with the appellant’s vulnerability or status as a lone woman with two young daughters when considering internal relocation and he failed to consider the appellant’s evidence that she had previously tried to relocate but had always been brought back by her family.

9. Ms Newton accepted that the judge had erred in law, in particular with regard to the second and third grounds which were interlinked, by failing to give proper consideration to the background country evidence relied upon by the appellant, much of which was contemporaneous with or post-dated the CPIN. Although she did not accept that there was merit in the first ground, she agreed that the decision had to be re-made on the issues of sufficiency of protection and internal relocation.

10. Given Ms Newton’s concession, there is no need for me to give any extended reasoning. I accept that the judge erred as submitted in the grounds and as agreed by Ms Newton. The judge simply dismissed the background country evidence on the basis that it was outdated, without engaging with it, whereas in fact much of it was recent and post-dated the CPIN and ought to have been addressed. The judge’s findings on sufficiency of protection were limited to those at [27] which were clearly inadequate and did not address how or why state protection had moved on. The findings on internal relocation did not engage with the appellant’s circumstances, including in particular her past history and vulnerability, and did not take account of the appellant’s claim to have previously attempted relocation only to be found and brought home by her family.

11.The second and third grounds are accordingly made out. The judge’s findings on sufficiency of protection and internal relocation, which were in fact the only issues before him, are set aside and must be re-made. The respondent has accepted that the appellant was forced into prostitution and was a victim of gender-based violence and that remains the position. The judge’s finding that the Refugee Convention was engaged on the basis of the appellant’s membership of a particular social group is also preserved. A further hearing will therefore be listed in the Upper Tribunal to determine the issues of sufficiency of protection and internal relocation, with directions given below.”

10. The matter was then listed for a resumed hearing on 24 October 2025 and came before me for the decision to be re-made.

Hearing for the Re-making of the Decision

11. The appellant produced a supplementary bundle for the hearing containing additional country information reports. The appeal proceeded on the basis of submissions only.

12. Mr Holmes relied upon three key documents, namely the skeleton argument, the appellant’s witness statement and the medico-legal report from Dr Kovvuri, all of which were before the First-tier Tribunal. He submitted that the key question was not so much whether there was sufficiency of protection available generally in Namibia, but whether it would be available for this appellant. Mr Holmes relied upon the psychiatric evidence which referred to the intensity of the appellant’s subjective fear on return to Namibia, which would impact upon the way she would react in Namibia and would prevent her from seeking support there. He relied upon the appellant’s evidence of attempts in the past to seek protection without success, and also upon the appellant’s claim that the authorities would not involve themselves in family matters. He submitted that the position would remain the same if the appellant were to seek protection now, and he took me through the background evidence referring to reports of discrimination and stigmatisation of single women, to the treatment of sex workers by the police and to the lack of effective protection in relation to gender-based violence, both in the appellant’s background evidence and the Home Office Country Policy and Information Note (CPIN) ‘Namibia: Women fearing gender-based violence (September 2021), 15 September 2021’. Mr Holmes submitted that on the basis of that evidence there was nothing to show that anything had changed since the appellant had previously approached the police and been rebuffed and that there was no adequate state protection available for the appellant on return to Namibia.

13. With regard to internal relocation, Mr Holmes submitted that it would be unreasonable to expect the appellant to relocate to another part of Namibia, given her own vulnerability and considering her personal and family circumstances. He submitted that she would be returning as a single mother with two relatively young children and that establishing contact with her brother or the Herero community on return would act as a conduit through which she could be found. There was also a risk that she would fall into exploitation as previously. Mr Holemes relied upon paragraph 339K of the immigration rules in submitting that past persecution or serious harm was a serious indicator of a future risk. Mr Holmes relied upon the four diagnoses made in relation to the appellant’s mental health, namely severe PTSD, anxiety, hopelessness and depression, and he submitted that it was difficult to see how she could address these and obtain treatment if she still remained in fear in Namibia. She was vulnerable and would always be looking over her shoulder. There were no protective factors as her father had died and her siblings would not be able to assist her.

14. Dr Ibisi submitted that there was a sufficiency of protection and an internal flight alternative available to the appellant. She submitted that the appellant feared non-state actors and there was no evidence that they had any power or influence over the authorities. The appellant was educated and had transferable skills and she could find employment. It would not be unduly harsh to expect her to relocate to another part of the country. There was no evidence that her family had any ongoing interest in locating her. Although she had sought help in the past, state protection had advanced since then and she could approach the police. She could relocate to an area where her family did not live and she could access medical care. The appeal should be dismissed.

15. Mr Holmes did not seek to reply.

Analysis and Discussion

16. The first-tier Tribunal Judge was found to have erred in his decision on the grounds that he simply dismissed the background country evidence as outdated without properly engaging with it. I have therefore had full and careful regard to the background evidence, in relation to the issues of the appellant’s ability to access health support and to access state protection. I do so in the context of the appellant’s claim to have been forced into prostitution and to have been subjected to gender-based violence having been accepted. Indeed there has been no challenge to the credibility of the appellant’s account and I proceed on the basis that it is a genuine and reliable account of her experiences in Namibia and of her reasons for leaving that country.

17. It was Mr Holmes’ submission that the appellant’s past experience of seeking protection from the police was indicative of the inability of the authorities to provide protection for gender-based violence and its attitude towards sex workers, as consistent with the background country evidence. However it is relevant to consider the circumstances surrounding the appellant’s past attempts to seek protection. According to the evidence in her statement at [20], the first such occasion would have been between 2008 (when she turned 19 years of age) and 2011 (when she went to Canada) and when she said that she reported the violence from her then partner to the police, the second occasion (referred to at [56]) was around 2018 when she reported the exploitation by her uncle and other men to the police and they refused to assist, and the third occasion (referred to at [85]) was when her brother reported the threats of the two men from whom she had borrowed money. It is of relevance that the first two occasions were many years ago and pre-dated the changes in legislation and attempts to improve the situation in relation to gender-based violence, and further that they involved domestic and family issues in which, according to the country information, the police were more reluctant to become involved. As for the final occasion, the appellant’s evidence in that regard ([85] of her statement) is vague, provides no details of the number or nature of the approaches made by the men to her brother, aside from some detail at [87], and in any event shows that the police took the matter seriously and took a statement from her brother. The appellant stated that the police did not do anything. However it is only the appellant’s view that the police did nothing, and in any event there could have been any number of reasons why they were not able to intervene at that point, such as a lack of evidence. The appellant’s evidence was that she did not report the two men to the police herself. It seems to me that those past experiences are not sufficient in themselves to demonstrate the police were unwilling to assist in circumstances where there was a threat to life, particularly outside of a domestic or family setting.

18. As to the question of current risk to the appellant, I accept that, given the role of the traditional authority in Namibian culture, and given the role her uncle played in the Herero Traditional Authority in Okauua, she may well have difficulty in accessing protection against her uncle if she were to return to her home area. I also accept that she would be vulnerable to being found by the men she fears if she was to return to her home village. However, on the limited evidence before me, I am not persuaded that that same risk would apply if the appellant relocated to another area of the country.

19. It is no longer the case that the appellant is part of the family unit. The circumstances under which she found herself previously do not apply to the extent that her family members would have any interest in seeking her out or pursuing her in another part of the country. Her previous experiences with her uncle were a result of him insisting that she provide financial support for the family and financing her own expenses and those of her children and brother. However there is no reason why that responsibility would continue to arise at the current time, some six years since she left. Further, whilst it may have been the case, as Mr Holmes submitted, that the appellant was previously found and brought back to her home area from Windhoek when she had tried to live away from her family, those events took place prior to her leaving Namibia for Canada in 2011, 14 years ago, in order for her to marry her cousin, a matter which is now of no relevance. Although the appellant referred, in her statement at [121] to [125] and [138], to a risk of her family finding out where she was if she returned to Namibia and to her being at risk owing to having dishonoured them, there is nothing in her evidence to suggest that her brother is aware of any ongoing adverse interest in her, or threats from, her family members. In the circumstances I do not accept that the appellant would be at direct risk of harm from her family if she were to return to Namibia and live in a different area of the country.

20. As for the two men whom the appellant claims continue to threaten her, I do not consider it plausible, given the passage of time, that they would continue to be making efforts to locate her to the extent that they would be aware if she re-entered the country. There is no reason why they would know that she had returned to the country. In any event, I do not accept that the country evidence supports a claim that the police would be unable or unwilling to provide some protection if the men found and approached and threatened her. The appellant’s own evidence was that she did not report them to the police previously and, as mentioned above, the evidence of her brother’s report to the police was particularly uninformative.

21. Dr Ibisi’s submission was that there is state protection available to protect women from gender-based violence, and that the appellant could therefore access protection against those men should they find her. Dr Ibisi relied upon the September 2021 CPIN report, at paragraph 2.5.3, in that respect, which states that:

“The government operates a generally effective criminal justice system, including the Namibian Police Force and an independent judiciary. GBV protection units are present across all 14 regions staffed with police, social workers, legal advisors, and medical personnel to handle and investigate cases, and provide services to victims and their families. Police services and magistrates' courts are reportedly available throughout the country, including in small towns although access may be more difficult for rural and San women (a generally marginalised community)…”

22. Indeed I note that the CPIN also states, at paragraph 2.4.5, that:

“… Of reported GBV incidents, the government demonstrates a serious effort to arrest, prosecute and convict perpetrators, although the prosecution and conviction of rape cases has been affected by limited police capacity and victim withdrawal. The courts generally enforced sentences of those convicted of GBV and examples of deterrent sentences in domestic caselaw, and public comments made by members of the judiciary, demonstrate the seriousness with which the courts view gender-based offending.”

and at paragraph 2.5.7:

“The state has taken reasonable steps to prevent GBV by operating an effective legal system for the detection, prosecution and punishment of acts constituting persecution or serious 181 134 harm, which is accessible to women and girls. In general, therefore, the state is willing and able to provide effective protection.”

23. In summary, the evidence in the CPIN demonstrates that there have been significant efforts made by the government to provide protection to victims and potential victims of gender-based violence, albeit that there are flaws in the system caused by lack of funding and other such issues.

24. The appellant’s skeleton argument produced for the First-tier Tribunal refers, at [32] to [34], to background country evidence on gender-based violence, which paints a more dismal picture. It is the case that much of that evidence dates back several years, to 2012, as the First-tier Tribunal found in their decision. I have therefore focussed upon the more recent evidence and the parts of the evidence relied upon by Mr Holmes in his submissions, including the report of the ‘Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Human Rights Committee: Concluding observations on the third periodic report of Namibia (Advance unedited version), 28 March 2024’ which, at page 270 of the consolidated bundle refers to the concerns of the Committee about the low level of reporting of gender-based violence and the low numbers of prosecutions and convictions, as well as the under-resourcing of gender-based violence protection units and shelters, and at page 272 to the reports of members of the police detaining and raping sex workers. I have also had regard to the report of the ‘Institute for Public Policy Research, House of Democracy,, Namibia: The NGO Report To the UN Human Rights Committee, 140th Session (Civil society's responses to the list of issues), 05 February 2024’ at page 280 of the consolidated bundle and to the reference therein, at page 288, to the high number of cases of gender-based violence and to the system meant to assist victims being broken. I have considered the further reports referred to by Mr Holmes which provide similar information but which I do not intend to refer to specifically. All of these reports raise a level of concern about the effectiveness of the legal systems put in place to protect victims of gender-based violence. Having said that, the more recent reports in the appellant’s supplementary bundle provide evidence of a police officer being prosecuted for domestic violence, in a report from April 2024 (page 9), and evidence of police attempting to provide assistance to a victim of domestic violence (page 12).

25. Clearly there is evidence supporting either party’s view, but ultimately it seems to me that there are systems in place to assist and protect victims and potential victims of gender-based violence in Namibia and that, whilst there may be flaws in those systems, it cannot be said that there is an absence of adequate state protection in Namibia.

26. Nevertheless, as Mr Holmes submitted, the issue of internal relocation involves not only a question of direct risk of harm, but also the question of reasonableness of relocation. The appellant may be able to demonstrate that it would not be reasonable to expect her to relocate to another part of the country or that relocation would be unduly harsh. The CPIN provides guidance at section 2.6 in that regard, stating at paragraph 2.6.3:

“In general, there are parts of the country, such as (but not limited to) Windhoek, where a woman, including a single woman or one with children to support, would not face persecution or serious harm and could reasonably relocate to. This will be more likely to be viable if the woman can access accommodation and support networks, or is educated, skilled or wealthy enough to be able to support herself. Where a woman may seek to access a government or NGO shelter, decision makers must not only have regard to the availability and accessibility of shelters/centres but also to the situation the woman may reasonably and foreseeably face after she leaves such centres.”

27. In this appellant’s case, in response to the question of whether the appellant would be able to “access accommodation and support networks, or was educated, skilled or wealthy enough to be able to support herself”, it is relevant to consider that she is an accepted victim of gender-based violence who was forced into prosecution in Namibia and who cannot return to her home village, who has faced violence at the hands of her own family, in particular her uncle, and was forced into prostitution by her uncle as well as by men to whom she owed money who were threatening to kill her, and had no source of financial support when she was living in the country other than through prostitution. She would be returning to Namibia as a single mother of two young children with no means of support. Aside from her brothers, her entire family has rejected her as having dishonoured them, and the only support she would be able to find on return to Namibia would be from one brother, N, who according to the unchallenged evidence provided to the consultant forensic psychiatrist, Dr Kovvuri, in her report of 12 July 2024 at paragraph 8.4, has no money and lives with another family. She would therefore have no accommodation to return to. Although the country reports refer to shelters and gender-based violence protection units being available to women, it is clear from those reports that access is limited. I refer in that regard to the report of the ‘Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Human Rights Committee: Concluding observations on the third periodic report of Namibia (Advance unedited version), 28 March 2024’ at section 12 (page 271 of the consolidated bundle) “reports of significant under-resourcing of gender-based violence protection units and shelters, including limited opening hours and a lack of appropriately trained staff”, and the report of the ‘Institute for Public Policy Research, House of Democracy, Namibia: The NGO Report To the UN Human Rights Committee, 140th Session (Civil society's responses to the list of issues), 05 February 2024’ at section 18 (page 288). Access to such shelters and units is, in any event, short-term, and there is no evidence to suggest that the appellant would have recourse to other forms of support when leaving the shelter.

28. The appellant’s ability to support herself would also be limited by having two children to look after, albeit that they are currently supported by her ex-partner and her brother, and given her limited level of education and lack of qualifications and employment skills. The country evidence suggests that the appellant would find it difficult to find employment in order to support herself and her children. I refer to the report of the ‘Office of the Ombudsman Namibia, Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 01 February 2021’ at page 326 of the consolidated bundle, in that regard: “Namibia is still faced with a huge unemployment problem, especially among the youth...” Of particular importance, in terms of an ability to support herself and her children, is the appellant’s mental health state. As Mr Holmes submitted, the appellant is a vulnerable woman who is referred to in a letter dated 20 February 2024 from Bolton Talking Therapies (page 170 of the consolidated bundle) as having experienced significant trauma.

29. According to the report from Dr Kovvuri, dated 12 July 2024, following her independent psychiatric assessment, the appellant suffers from PTSD, anxiety and depression and has a history of attempted suicide whilst in Namibia. Dr Kovvuri provided specific details of the latter at section 8.2 of her report. At section 10, Dr Kovvuri referred to the appellant’s scores on the relevant tests undertaken, placing her in the clinical range of severe concern that she was suffering with symptoms of PTSD, and showing that she had clinical levels of symptoms associated with anxiety in the severe range, with scores indicative of severe levels of hopelessness and depression. At 11.3.5 Dr Kovvuri stated that the appellant’s “reluctance to consider the option of moving back to Namibia and expression of intense fear of being assaulted again by the abusers, is not allowing her to think rationally beyond the point of her abuse. These discussions increase her anxiety, enhance her low mood and increase risk to self. She was unable to contemplate the thought of returning to any part of Namibia due to fear of being assaulted.” Dr Kovvuri made clear at section 11.3.9 of her report that she did not believe the appellant was feigning or exaggerating her symptoms. She considered that there would be a deterioration in the appellant’s mental health if her claim was refused and she considered that her trauma symptoms would increase in severity. At sections 11.3.11 and 11.3.12, Dr Kovvuri referred to the appellant’s fear of being located if she returned to Namibia and forced back into sex trafficking.

30. In the light of all those factors, and given the intensity of the appellant’s subjective fear as apparent from Dr Kovvuri’s report, it seems to me that, irrespective of whether there would be treatment available in Namibia for her physical and mental health, it would be unreasonable to expect the appellant to return to the country of her trauma and relocate to another part of the country where she has no support system and where she would find it difficult to re-establish herself. Although, as discussed above, there would be some level of state protection available to her to address any direct risk of harm, that would not address the wider issues she would encounter without proper means of support. I therefore do not accept that internal relocation is a viable option available to the appellant and I conclude that requiring her to undertake such an option would put her at risk of further exploitation. In the circumstances, whilst I do not accept that the appellant would necessarily be at direct risk from her family or from those who had previously exploited her, if she were to move to another part of Namibia, I do accept that it would be unduly harsh to expect her to relocate to another area where she has no support system, in order to avoid such harm. For that reason I accept that the appellant succeeds in her appeal under the Refugee Convention.

31. For the same reasons, and in any event, I find that there would be very significant obstacles to the appellant’s integration into Namibia. I do not intend to set out those reasons again but simply rely on those set out above in relation to the question of the reasonableness of internal relocation. I conclude that the appellant’s removal from the UK would therefore be in breach of Appendix Private Life, and that the public interest in her removal is accordingly outweighed by her particular circumstances. The appellant’s removal to Namibia would accordingly be disproportionate to the legitimate aim of maintaining an effective immigration control and contrary to her Article 8 human rights.

32. The appellant’s appeal is therefore allowed on asylum and Article 8 human rights grounds.

DECISION

33. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal having been set aside, the decision is re-made by allowing the appellant’s asylum and human rights appeal.

Signed: S Kebede
Upper Tribunal Judge Kebede

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

4 November 2025