Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-000653

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/52207/2024
LP/10258/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 5 September 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LANDES

Between

A T
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: In person
For the Respondent: Ms Simbi, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 18 August 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant is a national of Tunisia. He arrived in the UK as a visitor and claimed asylum on 11 February 2023 before the expiry of his visit visa. By decision of 24 January 2024 his claim was refused. His appeal was dismissed by a First-Tier Tribunal judge (“the FTJ”) by decision promulgated on 9 November 2024. The Upper Tribunal granted him permission to appeal that decision on three grounds settled by counsel who appeared for him before the FTJ. The appellant is now unrepresented.
2. I continue the anonymity order made by the First-Tier Tribunal. Although the appellant’s asylum claim is not ultimately proceeding, I bear in mind the confidential nature of the material submitted in support of his asylum claim, and the public interest in maintaining public confidence in the asylum system by ensuring vulnerable people are willing to provide candid and complete information in support of their applications. I consider that outweighs the public interest in open justice in this case. The appellant has been accepted by the respondent to be a human rights activist and a protest organiser for Civil Organisation for Human Development and to have been arrested in Tunisia. When giving the respondent the details of his case he also gave them details of his colleagues whom he said were similarly active; no doubt he did so in the belief that the details of his claim would remain confidential so that not only he, but also others would not be put at risk.
3. Ms Simbi had very helpfully informed the appellant and me the day before the hearing that being aware of the appellant's relationship with a British citizen child she planned to concede the appeal in terms of Article 8 ECHR although she was not making any concessions about asylum. She explained that she was taking this course because it would be quicker and more helpful to the appellant than withdrawing the underlying decision so that a new positive decision could be made on Article 8 grounds.
4. We discussed at the hearing with the benefit of an interpreter appearing over CVP for the appellant what the respondent’s concession meant and its implications. I said that I first had to decide whether there was an error of law. If there was an error of law and it came to remaking, then Ms Simbi could concede the Article 8 case. Ms Simbi explained that she was not conceding that the FTJ had made an error of law, but she did not propose to make any submissions about the error of law.
The grounds; discussion and findings
5. The appellant’s case at asylum interview and before the FTJ was that after the collapse of the Tunisian government in July 2021 he felt insecure and unsafe in Tunisia as an activist organising protests. He was arrested and detained from 10 to 22 October 2022 on false charges said to involve money laundering. After payment of a bribe, he was given temporary release before the next court hearing in early January 2023 and managed at his second attempt to leave the country after he organised the payment of a bribe to get through the airport. He said that if he returned to Tunisia he feared the death penalty or being sentenced to life imprisonment.
6. The respondent’s reasons for refusal letter challenged the appellant’s credibility (apart from the matters accepted as set out at paragraph 2 above) and considered in any event that the treatment he feared was prosecution rather than persecution.
7. The FTJ was not satisfied that the appellant feared persecution. His reasons are set out at [21] – [29].
8. Ground 1 relied on three issues which it was said the FTJ failed to consider properly. Firstly that just because the appellant said he did not like to be involved in politics did not mean that the Tunisian authorities would not attribute an anti-regime opinion to him. Secondly that the FTJ did not give reasons why it was not plausible that the appellant would be released on payment of a bribe; the background evidence before him had shown that corruption was rife. Thirdly that when considering that it was not plausible that the appellant would have been able to leave the country through the international airport if the authorities had been interested in him, the FTJ had failed to consider that the appellant was saying that he had paid a bribe; in any event case law was referred to, to the effect that a person’s ability to leave the country on their own passport did not mean that they would not be persecuted upon return.
9. I consider that there is force in ground 1. As the deputy judge said when granting permission, the statement by a person that he does not like to be involved in politics can have a number of meanings. The FTJ simply did not explore what the appellant meant by his statement. As the background material explains, civil society activists in Tunisia are targeted for criticism of the president, the government, or security forces. The appellant had explained how he had organised protests against the government and that part of his case had been accepted by the respondent. The organisation of protests could clearly be seen by the authorities as having a political opinion against the government; indeed the respondent had accepted that the Refugee Convention was potentially engaged.
10. I have considered whether the whole of [21] was simply the FTJ stating his conclusion in advance and the reference to qn 28 was simply a throwaway line. The difficulty is that there was no need for any reference to that question unless it was relevant to the FTJ’s findings, so the FTJ must have considered it to be relevant. The FTJ considering it to be relevant, it was an error to hold it against the appellant as a point undermining his case without further reasons being given referenced to background material and/or any explanation the appellant was asked to give.
11. The FTJ did not explain at all why it was not plausible that the appellant would have been released if the authorities were interested in him, even on payment of a bribe. He did not refer to any background material and I conclude that finding is inadequately reasoned and it did not consider the appellant’s explanation properly. Judges in the Immigration and Asylum Tribunal are well aware through their experience that in some countries it is perfectly possible to obtain release on payment of a bribe. The appellant’s case in any event was not that the bribe enabled him to be released with no consequences, it was that he was released temporarily and required to attend court in January, so that his release might be seen as akin to a grant of bail.
12. I appreciate that the FTJ found that the appellant’s explanation about how he left Tunisia was lacking in credibility, but he found before that, as an additional point, that it was not plausible that the appellant would have been able to leave via an airport if he was of such interest to the authorities. Again, this was not referenced to background material, and I also conclude it was inadequately reasoned for the reasons given in paragraphs 12 and 14 of the grounds and summarised at the end of paragraph 8 above.
13. I also consider that there is some force in ground 2, that the FTJ erred in making adverse findings against the appellant based on his answers in screening interview, although only as to a relatively minor point. The FTJ was clearly generally entitled to place weight on most of the matters he considered undermined the appellant’s credibility as it was in the range of reasonable conclusions open to FTJ to consider they were matters the appellant could have been expected to mention (see [25]). However it is not obvious without further explanation why, bearing in mind the purpose of a screening interview, the FTJ considered that the appellant’s credibility was also undermined by the failure to mention paying a bribe to be released. The relevant question in screening interview asked the appellant to briefly explain all the reasons he could not return to his home country. That he had paid a bribe to be released was not one of the reasons he could not return, it was simply part of the detail of his asylum claim. He was not, in screening interview, expected to elaborate on the detail of the asylum claim.
14. Ground 3 avers that the FTJ erred in his treatment of the documentary evidence because the appellant only needed to show that his documents could be relied upon in the round. I do not consider this ground is made out. The FTJ could have expressed himself better at [28] – [29] but he was not suggesting that the appellant had to positively show that the documents were not a forgery. Judges are to be assumed to be applying legal principles correctly, absent evidence to the contrary. The FTJ reminded himself correctly of Tanveer Ahmed principles which explains that the only relevant question is whether a document is one upon which reliance can properly be placed. Placing reliance on a document means that one has confidence that the information in it is credible and that it comes from the source it is said to come from. I consider that the FTJ was only using “genuine” in that sense and was not in reality suggesting any additional burden on the appellant. The grounds say that the FTJ did not give proper reasons for rejecting the documents but there is nothing in this point; the FTJ explained some contradictions in the documents and then explained that he did not find the appellant credible in the round so he could give the documents limited weight. Those were sufficient reasons for not being satisfied that the documents could not be relied upon.
15. I have considered whether bearing in mind the other adverse credibility findings which have not been attacked or not successfully attacked, the FTJ’s errors I have identified from ground 1 and part of ground 2 could be said to be immaterial but I conclude that they were material. It is often said that credibility is indivisible. When considering matters in the round, the FTJ would have taken into account the matters on which I have concluded he fell into error and looked through that lens at whether he could accept the appellant’s explanations (which of course he rejected). That also would have affected whether in the round he found the documents the appellant produced reliable.
16. Bearing in mind the materiality of the FTJ’s errors, I set aside his decision.
Remaking
17. I explained at the hearing that I found the FTJ made material errors of law, and briefly why.
18. The appellant knowing that Ms Simbi was conceding his human rights claim told me that he wanted to withdraw his asylum claim. I explained to him the difference between asylum leave and human rights leave but he said that now he was in this country and not being removed he felt safe, and he wanted to proceed with his life and support his family as soon as he could. I checked whether he wanted some time to consider or think about taking legal advice, but the appellant wanted everything to be sorted out as soon as it could be. I consented to the withdrawal of that part of the appellant’s case relating to international protection and the associated Articles 2 and 3 ECHR, under rule 17 Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008. I consented to this on the basis that it had been conceded that the appellant’s appeal should be allowed on Article 8 grounds so that the appellant would be receiving leave as a consequence.
19. The appellant’s asylum case having been withdrawn, I proceeded to remake the human rights’ part of the appeal in the Upper Tribunal bearing in mind Ms Simbi’s concession which took account of the additional evidence introduced by the appellant about his child. I checked with Ms Simbi, and she agreed for this purpose that she gave consent to the Tribunal considering the new matter of the appellant’s British citizen child (who was born after the hearing before the FTJ). We noted that the appellant had recently made a separate application to the respondent in respect of his family life. The FTJ had not made findings on the appellant’s family life in the UK; it had not been raised as an issue for him to decide.
20. The appellant having a genuine relationship with his British citizen child, supported by the letter from his partner, family life is engaged. The appellant’s partner and child have no connection with Tunisia other than through the appellant, and the appellant told me his partner has other children from a previous relationship in the UK. Bearing that in mind I consider section 117 B (6) of Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. That section provides that in the case of a person who is not liable to deportation, the public interest does not require the person’s removal where the person has a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a qualifying child and it would not be reasonable to expect the child to leave the UK. The appellant’s child, as a British citizen, is a qualifying child, and it would not be reasonable to expect him to leave the UK. As the appellant satisfies section 117 B (6), his removal would be disproportionate and a breach of Article 8 ECHR.
21. With the respondent’s concession on the point, I therefore on remaking allow the appeal on Article 8 grounds.
Notice of Decision
The judge’s decision contains material errors of law and is set aside.
On remaking, and the respondent having conceded the point on remaking, I allow the appeal on human rights grounds (Article 8 ECHR) only.

A-R Landes

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

19 August 2025