Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-000656

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/64708/2023
LP/08837/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 25 July 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE REEDS

Between

A S (Iraq)
(ANONYMITY ORDER continued)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mrs Johnrose, instructed on behalf of the appellant
For the Respondent: Mr Diwnycz, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard on 9 July 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals, with permission, against the determination of the First-tier Tribunal (Judge McCall) promulgated on 25 November 2024. By its decision, the Tribunal dismissed the appellant’s appeal on all grounds against the Secretary of State’s decision dated 24 November 2023 to refuse his protection and human rights claim.
2. The FtTJ did make an anonymity order, and no grounds were submitted during the hearing for such an order to be discharged. Anonymity is granted because the facts of the appeal involve a protection claim and that his rights protected under Article 8 outweigh the right of the public to know his identity as a party to these proceedings, the latter being protected by Article 10 of the ECHR. The anonymity order is detailed above.
The background:
3. The factual background is summarised in the documents and is taken from various sources of evidence as follows. The appellant is a national of Iraq. He claimed that in September 2020 when working with the sheep 3 members of ISIS came on motorbikes and kidnapped him for a ransom to be paid by his father. He had been taken to an underground shelter where he was blindfolded. He claimed that the men made a telephone call in front of him telling his father that he had been detained and his father needed to pay a ransom for his release. The appellant claimed that he was handcuffed and were only removed when he went to eat and his ankles were tied with rope. He said a fight had broken out and that usually somebody had guarded him but as fighting had broken out he was left alone and he used the time to undo the ropes and then escaped through a ventilation opening. He ran into the early hours of the morning, found a main road and waved down a driver and told him to take him to his maternal uncle’s home which was 40 minutes’ drive away from his village. His maternal uncle knew that he had been kidnapped as he had spoken to his parents. The appellant remained with his maternal uncle until November 2020. He further claimed that he was told by his maternal uncle that ISIS attacked his village, his parents were killed, and his brother was badly injured. As ISIS knew about his family and had targeted him to be kidnapped, his uncle told him it was not safe and made arrangements for him to leave Iraq via an agent. The agent took a photograph of him and provided him with a passport. He flew from an unknown airport and the passport was taken from him. He was detained at the airport for 2 days and was then released where the agent put him in a lorry and arrived in the United Kingdom on 16 January 2021.
4. The appellant’ claim for asylum was refused by the respondent in her decision letter dated 24 November 2023. Beyond accepting the appellant’s nationality and ethnicity as a Kurd, and that he had left Iraq illegally, the respondent set out a number of credibility issues in respect of the factual account of what had occurred in Iraq. Thus his claim was refused.
5. The appeal came before the FtTJ and in a decision promulgated on 25 November 2024, the FtTJ dismissed the appeal having rejected his account that he had been credible in his claim to have been at risk in Iraq on the factual basis as claimed. The FtTJ set out his findings of fact between paragraphs 13-42 and concluded that having taken all the evidence the round he did not accept the appellant was abducted as claimed nor that his village was attacked, his parents killed, and his brother injured. The FtTJ found that the appellant failed to explain what prevented him from attempting to contact his maternal uncle in Iraq despite having the opportunity to do so and reached the conclusion that he was in contact with his family members in Iraq including his parents (who did not accept had been killed), his maternal uncle and brother. The FtTJ found that the appellant could return to his home area where he was not at risk and that the appellant was not credible with regard to his claim that he did not have his documents and found that they were in the possession of family members in Iraq and that they could meet the appellant at Baghdad airport with his documents or in the alternative could send them to him in the UK. The judge was satisfied on the evidence that the appellant was not credible and fabricated his account of events of being kidnapped and that his family members were killed or injured. He concluded that he was satisfied that he held a valid CSID card and that he had access to them to via his family in Iraq.
6. He therefore dismissed the appeal.
7. The appellant applied for permission to appeal the decision. Permission to was refused by FtTJ Parkes on 29 January 2025 but on renewal was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Hirst on 4 April 2025.
The hearing before the Upper Tribunal:
8. The hearing took place on 9 July 2025. The appellant was represented by Mrs Johnrose, of Counsel and the respondent by Mr Diwnycz, Senior Presenting Officer. This hearing was conducted as a hybrid hearing, and Mrs Johnrose appeared before the tribunal by way of video hearing and Mr Diwnycz was present at the hearing centre. Whist there were some initial problems with the remote link, they were addressed by the staff and a change of device by Mrs Johnrose. Following this there were no difficulties encountered in hearing the submissions made by each of the advocates. Both were able to provide their oral submissions to the tribunal at the hearing. I am grateful to both advocates for their submissions.
9. Mrs Johnrose indicated that she relied upon the grounds of challenge and Mr Diwnycz, Senior Presenting Officer, referred to the reply provided to the grounds of appeal under Rule 24 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 dated 23 April 2025.
10. Dealing with the grounds, Ms Johnrose relied upon the written grounds and her oral submissions as summarised below.
11. Ground 1 is headed “Unfairness”. The grounds submit that the FtTJ states at paragraph 30 of the decision, it records the finding …”Miss Keegan argues it is not credible that the appellant was able to be specific about the date of his arrival in the UK, 16th January 2021, yet he could not remember the date his parents were killed or the date he was told they were killed. I do find merit in that submission”.
12. Mrs Johnrose submitted that FtTJ is relying unfairly on a peripheral issue that does not impact the core of his claim to reject his appeal and that the appellant had the benefit of Home Office documents to record the date he arrived in the UK and therefore he is able to review this information. She submitted that to then make the finding that it is not accepted that the appellant’s parents were killed based on this peripheral issue is unfair. In her oral submissions she submitted that it was unfair to expect him to know such details when the appellant had stated that he never saw them again and had heard from his maternal uncle that they had been killed.
13. The grounds also seek to challenge paragraph 28 of the decision as another example of the FtTJ adopting an unfair approach.
14. Mrs Johnrose submitted that the appellant’s solicitors had sent a letter to the respondent dated 30 June 2021 with amendments ( see page 34 Cef) and had amended the date. She submitted that the amendment to the date undermined the finding made at paragraph 28. In her oral submissions , Mrs Johnrose submitted that the FtTJ referred to the letter ( see paragraph 19) but made no reference to it and rejected the response and that the FtTJ was required to assess the evidence, and this was an unfair approach. The respondent had not reviewed this in September 2024 and the FtTJ adopted the same unfair approach.
15. Dealing with the second ground, which relates to the issue of documentation and contact with family relatives, Mrs Johnrose submitted that at paragraph 1.7 of the SI (page 34 in the solicitors letter) sets out that “the appellant instructs us that he had documents in Iraq but never had to use them, so they were looked after by his parents. His parents were killed and has no idea where the documents are”. She submitted that the objective evidence is that ISIS were active in the area as the FtTJ accepted and if he was kidnapped it is reasonably likely that the appellant would not be in possession with his documents after his kidnap.
16. The written grounds submit that the FtTJ has accepted that the appellant is from a disputed territory and that Daesh were active in the area where the appellant is from between September 2020 and November 2020 and in fact remain active ( at paragraphs 20). This finding has not been given its due weight in the FtTJ’s assessment of the appellant’s credibility.
17. It is submitted in the grounds that the positive findings made by the FtTJ, on key aspects of the appellant’s case, have not been give fair weighting when considered against the alleged negative findings.
18. The grounds refer to paragraph 33 and that the FtTJ accepts the respondent’s submissions that it is not credible that the appellant has lost contact with family members in Iraq and the FtTJ finds that he is in contact with his parents, his maternal uncle and his brother. However, the appellant has explained that he has no means to contact his maternal uncle (see WS 38). The grounds submit that the FtTJ notes at paragraph 32 that the appellant stated in the hearing that he could not establish contact with his maternal uncle. If the appellant has no means to contact his maternal uncle and no way to establish contact he has no further information to provide. He cannot contact his maternal uncle. The FtTJ has accepted that the appellant is from a contested area where Daesh remain active. Under these circumstances it is not implausible that there has been considerable displacement in the area and that the appellant’s maternal uncle has been displaced along with many others and the loss of contact is not incredible. The FtTJ has placed an unfair expectation on the appellant to create evidence where none exists in relation to his inability to make contact with this maternal uncle.
19. In her oral submissions it was submitted that if the FtTJ accepted he had been kidnapped by ISIS and had no access to mobile phone and fled illegally, how could he maintain contact with his family members? His evidence was the only contact he had was with the agent’s phone to call his maternal uncle.
20. She further submitted that the FtTJ erred in law by relying on his on unfairness on credibility and to allow that unfairness to affect his decision on documentation.
21. As to documentation the written grounds at paragraph 7 submit that the appellant has consistently stated that he has no documentation. The respondent accepts that the appellant is not in possession of his documentation in the UK. The appellant will be returned to Baghdad. It is submitted that there is no evidence that the appellant is in contact with any family member and in any event the only family member the appellant has mentioned is his maternal uncle. The Judge’s finding that the appellant is in contact with his family members is not based on any evidence.
22. It is further submitted that the appellant cannot rely on his maternal uncle for assistance with his documentation, even if he could make contact, since the registration system in Iraq is patrilineal ( see SMO & KSP (Civil status documentation; article 15) Iraq CG at paragraph 14).
23. A further point not in the grounds was raised by Mrs Johnrose. She submitted that it was unclear on what authority it is said that the family can meet him at the airport.
24. Paragraph 8 of the written grounds submits that the FtTJ’s “imbalanced and unfair weighting” of the credibility findings are material to the outcome of the appeal, as the FtTJ’s findings have led to the conclusion that the appellant is not credible and in contact with family and amounts to an error of law.
25. At the conclusion of her oral submissions Mrs Johnrose wanted to raise 2 other issues of unfairness not in the grounds. There had been no application to amend the grounds (dated December 2024) nor any prior notice to the tribunal or the other party. She was asked what they were, and she submitted that they related to the finding at paragraph 24 and” use of thread” and that it indicated a highly unfair approach as there was no difference between a thread and a rope. The other point related to paragraph 25 and that it was an unfair finding as there was nothing in the witness statement to say father had been killed prior. His evidence was at paragraph 11 (p30Cef)
26. Mrs Johnrose submitted that the decision should be set aside as a result of the errors of law.
27. Mr Diwnycz relied upon the Rule 24 response. The respondent opposes the appellant’s appeal. In summary, it is submitted that the FtTJ directed himself appropriately.
28. It is further submitted that for a Tribunal to adequately assess the ability of an appellant to re-document himself the Tribunal must be in possession of the facts. In this case the FtTJ found that the appellant was not telling the truth and as such it was clearly open for the FtTJ to find that the appellant has access to his documents and that there would be no need for him to re-document himself on return.
29. As the assessment of credibility, it is submitted that the fact the FtTJ rejected some of the respondents criticisms of the appellant’s credibility cannot possibly lead to a conclusion that he was therefore not entitled to make the other negative credibility findings he did. The FtTJ has given cogent and valid reasons for rejecting the credibility of the appellant, the majority of which are not actually challenged in the grounds, and as such the grounds amount to simple disagreement.
30. In his oral submissions, he addressed the 2 points not raised in the grounds but had been the subject of oral submissions by Mrs Johnrose. In particular that there was no unfairness – here the difference was between a rope / thread and handcuffs and there was an inconsistency identified. He submitted that there was no reasons why his family members could meet him in Baghdad and meet him at the airport with his documents. There was no unfairness in that finding,
31. Mrs Johnrose submitted in reply that if the FtTJ was unfair in his reliance on points made in his assessment of credibility , the decision as a whole would be flawed and would affect the findings made as to documentation.
Discussion:
32. Before undertaking an assessment of the grounds, it is necessary to set out the following matters. First, I must read the decision of the FtTJ sensibly and holistically and exercise appropriate restraint before interfering with it. Secondly, a brief decision does not mean necessarily that it is erroneous in law. Thirdly, what is required in a decision will be case specific and will depend on the nature of the issue (s) in play.
33. As the issues in this appeal relate to challenges brought against findings of fact on credibility made by the FtTJ, I also remind myself of the decision in Volpi v Volpi ( supra) when reviewing a first instance judge's findings of fact as per Lewison LJ as follows:

"2. The approach of an appeal court to that kind of appeal is a well-trodden path. It is unnecessary to refer in detail to the many cases that have discussed it; but the following principles are well-settled:
(i)An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong.
ii) The adverb 'plainly' does not refer to the degree of confidence felt by the appeal court that it would not have reached the same conclusion as the trial judge. It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appeal court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached.
iii) An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.
iv) The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial judge is not aptly tested by considering whether the judgment presents a balanced account of the evidence. The trial judge must of course consider all the material evidence (although it need not all be discussed in his judgment). The weight which he gives to it is however pre-eminently a matter for him.
v) An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the judge failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the judge's conclusion was rationally insupportable.
vi) Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract.
34. The written grounds of challenge and the oral submissions made by Mrs Johnrose seek to challenge the assessment of credibility made by the FtTJ in his decision. It is further submitted that the FtTJ adopted an unfair approach when assessing the evidence (see paragraph 3 of the written grounds and oral submissions) and that the FtTJ did not fairly weigh the findings he made in his assessment of the evidence overall.
35. When addressing the submission advanced on behalf of the appellant that the FtTJ erred in law by failing to give fair weight to positive findings made, it is necessary to consider that submission in its context.
36. There is nothing unfair in a FtTJ accepting some parts of an appellant’s account but not other parts of his account. This was an appeal where credibility was a key issue, as raised both in the decision letter, the ASA and the respondent’s review. In this context the FtTJ was entitled to assess and analyse the evidence in light of the submissions made concerning issues of credibility and as made by both advocates. The FtTJ had, in his decision between paragraphs 14 – 19, carefully set out a summary of the credibility points which had arisen, not only from the written documentation but also the appellant’s oral evidence and was entitled to consider them when reaching his decision.
37. There is nothing unfair in a FtTJ making findings of fact some of which are in favour of an appellant and others that are not in his favour. When applied to this particular appeal the FtTJ undertook a careful analysis of the evidence whereby he accepted some of the credibility points raised were not such as to find the account given as being generally implausible but plainly found that there were other factual findings adverse to the appellant which he placed more weight upon when reaching his overall assessment.
38. By reference to the decision, at paragraph 20 he accepted the general background material that Daesh was active at the time of the incident in September to November 2020. At paragraph 21 the FtTJ found that there was nothing implausible in the appellant being able to provide a limited description of the shelter (see paragraph 21) and that the appellant’s explanation as to how his captors did not see him escape was not generally implausible (see paragraph 22). However the FtTJ went on to assess other aspects of his factual claim which he found to be either inconsistent, implausible and lacking in credibility as set out in his decision between paragraphs 23 –36 and 42. As the respondent submits, the fact that the FtTJ rejected some of the respondent’s criticisms of the appellant’s credibility does not lead to the conclusion that the FtTJ was not entitled to make the other negative credibility findings that he did.
39. It is also of significance many of the credibility findings made by the FtTJ are not challenged in the grounds. Those identified are at paragraphs 28, 30 and 32 and 33. At the hearing Mrs Johnrose sought to widen the grounds by challenging paragraphs 24 and 25. Those paragraphs are not challenged in the written grounds and there had been no application made to amend the grounds since they were submitted in December 2024, since permission had been granted or even prior or at the hearing. Notwithstanding that lack of procedural rigour, those submissions have been taken into account given the assertion made as to unfairness. It is also right to observe that factual findings made by a judge should not be seen or viewed in isolation, but that the decision of a FtTJ should be viewed by reading the decision as a whole.
40. Notwithstanding the submissions made on behalf of the appellant for the reasons that I shall go on to set out, the grounds which seek to challenge the decision on the basis of an unfair approach to credibility is without merit.
41. The FtTJ made careful and reasoned findings which were evidence based on the factual claim advanced on behalf the appellant, he made findings of fact that were entirely open to him on the evidence, and reached his overall conclusions that having a taken “all the evidence in the round” he did not accept that the appellant was abducted as he claimed, or that his village was attacked his parents killed and his brother injured. He found that the appellant was not a credible witness and had fabricated his account of being kidnapped and his family members been killed or injured. He was satisfied that the appellant held a valid CSID card that he had access to through his family who found remained in Iraq and with whom he had contact with.
42. The grounds seek to challenge specific paragraphs of the decision (but not all the factual findings on credibility as noted in the preceding paragraphs). There is no challenge in the grounds to paragraph 23 where the FtTJ undertook an analysis of his claimed escape.
43. The challenge raised to paragraph 24 made on the basis that that the judge was unfair because there was no difference between a thread and a rope is not made out and the submission amounts to no more than a disagreement with the factual assessment made of the appellant’s evidence, not only his written evidence but the oral evidence that he gave. The FtTJ made the following finding:

“24. At the hearing the Appellant was asked how were his hands bound during his detention and he stated, “with a thread”. He was asked how his legs were tied, and he replied, “the same way with a piece of thread”. At paragraph 15 of his statement he states, “I was left handcuffed, and the cuffs were only removed to eat. My ankles were tied with rope”. The Appellant adopted that statement as his evidence in chief and I find his oral evidence is inconsistent with that. This is not the first time the Appellant has been inconsistent on this matter as to how he was restrained, as his pre asylum interview questionnaire [page 916] and the AIR Q64 itself show. If the Appellant is being truthful, I would expect him to be consistent on core issues. I find this damages his credibility”.
44. The FtTJ gave adequate and sustainable evidence-based reasons for finding that the appellant had been inconsistent in his account of the detention and how he was restrained. The FtTJ identified that in the pre-asylum interview (p485Cef) the appellant said he was “left handcuffed and the cuffs were only removed to eat. My ankles were tied with rope”. In interview (Q64) the appellant stated it was not handcuffs but there are ropes bound around his hand and feet (p503cef) and the witness statement paragraph 15, stated that he was left handcuffed and the cuffs were only removed to eat and that his ankles were tied with rope. This was plainly in issue during the hearing and the FtTJ was entitled to take into account the appellant’s answers in cross examination as to how his hands were bound during detention; he said, “with a thread” and when asked how his legs were tied, he stated “the same way with a piece of thread”. The FtTJ was entitled to find that the appellant’s evidence was inconsistent with the other evidence given previously both in the questionnaire and in the interview itself.
45. There have been no previous challenge made to paragraph 25 in the written grounds. It was challenged at the hearing on the basis that the judge adopted an unfair approach because the appellant’s evidence as set out at paragraph 11 was that the captors had his father’s phone number.
46. Paragraph 25 reads as follows:

“The Respondent argues it is not credible the Appellant does not know the amount he was being ransomed for because he claims the telephone call made by his captors about the ransom was made in his presence. At the hearing the Appellant stated that he heard no mention of the amount during the call that he observed and that he believes this was not the only call made. I have carefully considered paragraph 11 of the statement adopted by the Appellant in his evidence in chief and that is not what he says. In his statement he says that during the phone call his captors had told his father they had detained him, which they would not need to do if they had already made a call prior to this one. He also states in that call they demanded a ransom and told him the consequences of not paying the ransom. I do therefore find merit in the Respondent’s argument, and I find the Appellant is not being consistent on this matter.”
47. There is no unfairness demonstrated by the finding of fact made. The FtTJ was entitled to assess the evidence concerning the core part of his account of being kidnapped and on his evidence it had occurred because ISIS wanted money ( see AQ p485Cef and Q 56 of interview that they had brought him there for money. Contrary to the submission made, the finding was based on the evidence before the FtTJ. The judge found that the appellant’s account was not consistent concerning the calls made by the captors. The FtTJ was entitled to consider the appellant’s witness statement (paragraph 11 ) with his oral evidence as set out at paragraph 25. There was cross examination about why he did not know the amount of ransom money, (when there had been a telephone call being made to his father in front of him) and the FtTJ recorded his evidence that he claimed that he did not hear any mention of the amount and believes that it was the only call made. The FtTJ did consider paragraph 11 where he stated that during the call his captors told his father that they had detained him which they would not need to do if he had already made a call prior to this one. The point raised that the captors had the father’s telephone number neither undermines or demonstrates any unfairness in the finding made at paragraph 25.
48. It is of note that neither the grounds nor the oral submissions make any challenge to the recording of the oral evidence in the decision or assert that it was incorrectly stated by the FtTJ.
49. The finding of fact made at paragraph 26 is not challenged. This finding relates to the appellant’s evidence about taking hostages and the circumstances of the family. Paragraph 27 is similarly not challenged in the grounds.
50. The grounds seek to challenge paragraph 28. It is submitted that when relying on pargarph 3.1 of the screening interview the FtTJ failed to take account of the changes made in the letter sent in June 2021 by the legal representatives ( see page 34Cef). Whilst Mrs Johnrose submits that the FtTJ adopted an “unfair approach” because he failed to take into account the letter and rejected matters in that letter, I do not consider that that is demonstrated. Firstly the FtTJ expressly set out at paragraph 19 that he had “noted” that the legal representatives sent a letter dated 30 June 2021 and that “I have taken the letter into account in considering the evidence”. Furthermore in the letter reference was made to the passport the appellant had used to leave Iraq and that he did not know it was genuine ( see page 35Cf). The evidence relating to the passport and whether it was genuine or not was an issue that the FtTJ resolved at paragraph 34 and thus demonstrates that the judge clearly had regard to the representations given in the letter.
51. The point the FtTJ was making at paragraph 28 was that the appellant had given an inconsistent account. The SI paragraph 3.1 (p473Cef) stated, “I have problems with ISIS they killed my family I only have one brother left. They killed some of my family in September 2020”. The letter states: “our clients brother was injured when his family was attacked, and he has no further news about his brother. His family was attacked by ISIS in November 2020.” The FtTJ was not in error in pointing to an inconsistency and the response was still inconsistent. It stated that his family were attacked by ISIS in November 2020 whereas the screening interview stated that he had problems with ISIS and they killed his family. It also said they killed “some of my family in 2020.” The FtTJ properly identified there was an inconsistency not only the date, but in the account as given.
52. Paragraph 29 of the findings of fact are not challenged in the grounds; it relates to the lack of credibility in the appellant’s account of his claim to have remained unmolested without interest by ISIS for a period of over a month at the home of his maternal uncle. The FtTJ found that that was not consistent with his account of having escaped from ISIS and their interest in him. That was a finding that was reasonably open to the FtTJ to make the evidence.
53. Dealing with the challenge to paragraph 30, it is necessary to set out the whole of that paragraph. It reads as follows:

“The Appellant was asked at the hearing what was the date his parents were killed and he stated November 2020. He was asked to be more specific, and he stated he did not know the actual date. He was asked what date did his uncle inform him of his parents’ deaths and he stated he did not know the exact date that he was told. He was asked where did his brother go after being wounded and he stated that he went to their maternal uncle’s house where the Appellant had been staying. He explained he arrived there after the Appellant had left the property. He was asked what information did his uncle provide about his brother and he replied, “He said he had been wounded severely”.
At Q79 AIR when asked about how he had found out about the attack on his village he replied that his uncle had told him his parents had been martyred and that his brother “at the moment was unaccounted for”.
I find the Appellant’s accounts are inconsistent regarding his brother. Miss Keegan argues it is not credible that the Appellant was able to be specific about the date of his arrival in the UK, 16th January 2021, yet he could not remember the date his parents were killed or the date he was told they were killed. I do find merit in that submission.”
54. There is no merit to the grounds (paragraph 7) or the oral submissions which seek to challenge paragraph 30. There is nothing unfair in the FtTJ’s assessment of the evidence in that paragraph. He was entitled to take into account the oral evidence of the appellant elicited during cross examination and this related to a core part of his account and the claimed killing of his parents. This was relevant not only to his account of events in Iraq and the issue of documentation which he claimed was left with his parents, and which he stated he could not access as they are dead, and the house had been burnt down.
55. The appellant was not able to provide any date for the death of his parents beyond giving “November 2020” and when pressed to be more specific gave no further evidence. The appellant’s case was that he had been told of his family’s demise by his maternal uncle. It is plain from paragraph 30 that this claim was explored during oral evidence, and he was asked what date his uncle informed him of his parents death but could not answer that question either. It was open to the FtTJ to rely on the appellant’s failure to be able to provide any specific evidence about the death of his parents in light of the importance of that in the factual account given. Contrary to the grounds the FtTJ was entitled to find that the appellant was able to be specific about other dates such as the date of arrival in the UK but could not remember the date of his parents or even the date that he was told of their deaths by his maternal uncle with whom he lived for a significant period before he left Iraq. This is not a peripheral issue as the grounds assert that went to the core of the factual account as to the events that took place why he could not return to his family home and why he was not in contact with his family.
56. Nor is there any unfairness demonstrated. The FtTJ was plainly entitled to consider the oral evidence given by the appellant in light of the factual account given and there was no unfairness in expecting the appellant to be able to provide more specific evidence on this issue in the light of the appellant’s witness statement setting out that his maternal uncle had told him of their deaths. It was not just the time or date of their deaths, but that the appellant could provide no specific evidence of when his maternal uncle told him.
57. There is also no unfairness in the FtTJ making such a finding. Whilst it is submitted that the appellant had the benefit of a Home Office record about the date of entry, the appellant himself had given that date when asked in an interview in 2021 when asked to outline his journey and date of arrival. He stated “ the agent put me in a lorry, and I came to the UK. I arrived in the UK on 16/1/21”.
58. The ground also ignores that the FtTJ made other factual findings at paragraph 30 upon a core issue relating to events in Iraq. Questions were elicited in cross examination about his brother and was asked where his brother had gone after he was wounded. The appellant is recorded as saying he went to their maternal uncle where he was staying and that he had arrived after the appellant had left the property. When asked what information provided about his brother he stated, “he said he had been wounded severely”. It was open to the FtTJ to find that the appellant was inconsistent in his account in the oral evidence as recounted above and the account given in 2023 as set out a question 79 in the interview, where it was stated that his uncle had told him that his parents had been martyred and that his brother “at the moment was unaccounted for” was a clear inconsistency in the evidence as identified by the FtTJ.
59. Dealing with the grounds that relate to the issue of contact with family members and the issue of documentation, I am satisfied that those grounds do not establish that either the findings were not open to the to the FtTJ to make on the evidence before him nor has it been established that there was any unfair approach taken by the FtTJ.
60. At paragraph 32 the FtTJ assessed the claim that the appellant had no contact with his uncle or brother since his arrival in the UK. Again it is plain from reading paragraph 32 that this was an issue explored during oral evidence. The FtTJ expressly recorded that he had had the benefit of hearing the appellant give oral evidence before him and that he was satisfied that the appellant was being evasive in the evidence that he gave as demonstrated in his responses to the questions put about contact with family. The FtTJ then set out why he had reached that view by setting out the questions and the answers given. The judge recorded that the appellant did not answer the questions and also recorded that there was no re-examination to clarify this. The submissions advanced on behalf of the appellant are no more than a disagreement with the factual findings made by the FtTJ which were open to him on the evidence.
61. The findings of fact should not be viewed in isolation from the findings made by the FtTJ in the earlier part of his analysis of the evidence. The earlier findings about events in Iraq were of relevance to the claimed loss of contact and also the issue of documentation. Not because the FtTJ had found that he fabricated an account because the FtTJ had expressly rejected, with evidence based reasons, his factual account that he had been kidnapped, his family members killed or injured and that the family home had burned down. The general objective material that ISIS were active in the area between September and November 2020, does not outweigh those findings made by the FtTJ and he plainly took that into account when reaching his overall assessment of the evidence, and that when properly analysed the appellant’s account was inconsistent, lacked credibility in the core aspects of the claim and he was not found to be a credible or truthful witness. The weight given to the findings of fact made was a matter for the FtTJ to determine having taken into account those matters which weighed in his favour and against him.
62. The appellant given an account that he had a CSID in Iraq ( see Q24), which he had renewed in 2017 (Q51) and that it was with his parents in Iraq. Whilst he claimed his parents were killed and the house destroyed and therefore the documents were not available, the FtTJ rejected the account given as to the events in Iraq for the evidence based reasons he gave. The FtTJ and found that he had fabricated this account and was entitled to find when assessing the evidence as a whole that the appellant still had his CSID in Iraq which was with his family members ( see findings of fact made at paragraph 32, 33, 42).
63. Mrs Johnrose sought to challenge the finding made by the FtTJ that the appellant’s family members could meet him at the airport. This was not a matter raised in the grounds however it is not a ground that is made out in any event. The respondent plainly relied upon this in the review ( see p515cef) and the FtTJ addressed this at paragraph 42 acknowledging that the place of return would be to Baghdad but that he was satisfied on his evidential analysis that that the appellant was not credible in his claim that the CSID had been destroyed in a fire and was therefore satisfied that the document existed and that it was possible for family members in Iraq, who were not dead, to meet him at the airport. In any event the submission made ignores the alternative finding made by the FtTJ that he was also satisfied that he was in contact with those relatives and that he would be able to send any documents they had to him in the UK.
64. Paragraph 7 of the grounds does not establish any error of law based on the country guidance. On the factual findings made by the FtTJ, which were open to him and were evidence based, the appellant does not need to rely on his maternal uncle to redocument him. Nor does the citation of paragraph 14 of SMO set out in the grounds demonstrate that the findings made were not open to him. That paragraph refers to replacement CSID’s and the recall of the family book information. As the judge found as a fact that he had a document available to him which could either be sent to him in the UK or could be provided by his family relatives on arrival at Baghdad, there was no requirement for him to re-document.
65. In summary, I remind myself of the need for appropriate restraint before interfering with the decision of the FTT, particularly where the judge below was heard and assessed a range of evidential sources relating to the reliability of an account. Not every evidential issue need be specifically addressed and there is no requirement to provide reasons for reasons. The FtTJ had regard to the evidence before him and gave adequate reasons to why he did not believe the appellant had no family in Iraq with whom he was in contact with or could so contact and that he would have access to his documents.
66. While the grounds seek to impugn the FtTJ’s’ findings of fact as unfair, having considered the points raised about the credibility findings that is not the case. The overall findings of fact made by the judge were reasonably open to him to make on the evidence and were sustainable findings and that the FtTJ engaged with the evidence and undertook a fair assessment of credibility, assessing factors both in favour and against the appellant and made the findings he did when reaching his overall conclusions and having taken all the evidence “in the round” ( see paragraph 31).
67. Consequently for those reasons the appellant has not established that the FtTJ’s decision involved the making of an error on a point of law, therefore the decision shall stand.
Notice of Decision:
The decision of the FtTJ did not involve the making of a material error of law and the decision of the FtTJ shall stand.

Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds

Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds

20 July 2025