Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-000671
FIELD HOUSE First-tier Tribunal No: PA/64461/2023
LP/08330/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

6th August 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE IQBAL

Between

AD (ALBANIA)
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Gilbert, counsel instructed
For the Respondent: Ms Everett, Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 1 June 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellants are granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellants, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellants. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals against the decision of a First-Tier Tribunal Judge (‘the Judge’). On 9 November 2024, the Judge dismissed the appellant's appeal against the respondent's decision dated 6 December 2023 in which the respondent refused the appellant's protection and human rights claim.
2. I have maintained the anonymity order in favour of the appellant. I consider that on the specific facts of this appeal, the importance of properly discharging the obligations of the United Kingdom under the refugee convention outweigh the principle of open justice. This case raises issues about the appellants’ potential risk on return to their country of nationality and it is appropriate that the appellants’ identity be protected.
Factual and procedural background
3. The appellant is a national of Albania who arrived in the United Kingdom on 7 September 2021 and claimed asylum on 8 September 2021. She claims that in May 2018, she was forced to marry her partner, EC, and moved to Belgium with him. However, she became a victim of trafficking in Belgium for a period of one and a half years where she was held captive and forced to sell sex with multiple men on a daily basis.
4. Having arrived in the United Kingdom with her daughter, the appellant claimed asylum in the United Kingdom. Her claim was refused, although it was accepted she was a victim of trafficking in Belgium. She appealed the matter to the First-tier Tribunal; however this was dismissed in a decision dated 9 November 2024.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal
5. In dismissing the appeal and in so far as is relevant to these proceedings, the judge's findings of fact and conclusions include the following:
(a) The judge considered inconsistencies in the appellant's account, having regard to the expert's warning that the appellant's experience of trauma may have impeded an ability to give evidence and concluded that the appellant's credibility, in terms of reliability as a witness was damaged by the differing accounts of her trafficking. However, whilst only minimal weight was placed on inconsistencies, the judge noted the appellant's account remained unclear in terms of the core of her case when assessing risk on return - [17]-[19].
(b) Expert Evidence - The judge considered Professor Katona was a suitably qualified expert, well placed to report on the appellant's psychiatric state. However, concluded that the several inconsistencies were of some significance. In particular at section 9, where the expert recorded that "In the relatively relaxed clinical context of her assessment with me, the appellant was able to give a reasonably clear account of her past experiences and of her present circumstances," the judge found this went against the appellant, given there were several inconsistencies of some significance between her statement and her account as reported by the expert. These included whether she was formally married to her partner or had contact with her mother.
(c) The judge further noted the GP records, which recorded, "No suicidal thoughts…protective factor - daughter". Therefore in light of this, when speaking to the expert her ‘reference to her daughter being the only thing that has prevented her from death’ was simply a throwaway statement, and not a genuine reflection of her mental state - [20]-[23].
(d) Contact with mother - the judge noted that there were a number of inconsistencies about her account of contact with her mother, therefore when considered she was in contact with two sisters in the UK and previously had stated she was in contact with her mother, the judge was satisfied she had contact with her mother in Albania - [24]-[26]
(e) Contact with father - the appellant’s claimed fear of her father who forced her into an arranged marriage, was not made out, given the inconsistencies in her various accounts. The judge concluded that the appellant and her mother were no longer in contact with her father, and on the appellant’s evidence it was not reasonably likely that the father forced the appellant into an arranged marriage as claimed - [27]-[30].
(f) Contact with husband - the judge noted the inconsistencies about the alleged abuse at the hands of her husband and despite the positive conclusive grounds on trafficking decision, taking the evidence in the round, the judge considered the appellant's account too unreliable to be capable of making out her case to have a fear of persecution linked to her father, husband or third-party traffickers, even to the lower standard of proof - [31]-[36].
(g) Country evidence - The judge considered CPIN's May 2023, Medical Healthcare Provision; December 2022, Mental Health Care; December 2022, Actors of Protection; and 2024, Human Trafficking. The judge considered submissions on behalf of the appellant that the conclusions drawn by the CPIN in the first section were simply the author of the CPIN's opinion of the evidence and not evidence itself. He found however that whilst it was helpful to look at “individual pieces of evidence in the latter sections of the CPIN… that these are likely to be conflicting in places and it is the first section of the CPIN which takes all of the evidence together, and reaches a global conclusion, which is often more appropriate."
(h) The judge went on to conclude, having considered TD and AD risk factors, as well as the 2024 CPIN, which detailed immediate and medium/long-term accommodation and financial prospects of victims of trafficking and their children in Albania, that steps were being taken which were effective at minimising further risk to returning victims - [37]-[47].
(i) Sufficiency of protection - The judge concluded that there would be sufficiency of protection, having considered background evidence, despite the various risk factors put forward by the appellant - [48]-[49].
(j) Insofar as internal relocation was concerned; the judge was satisfied the appellant would not become vulnerable to re-trafficking if she were to avail herself of state protection and assistance in one of the areas suggested - [50]-[52].
(j) Article 3 - Having noted the appellant was diagnosed with PTSD and major depressive disorder, the judge considered the CPIN against Professor Katona's report and concluded that he did not accept the appellant would be at risk of suicide if returned to Albania, nor that the medical evidence or the wider evidence relating to the appellant's protection claim supported the appellant's claim that there was a real risk she would encounter a decline in her state of health, such as engage Article 3 - [53]-[57].
(k) Article 8 - It was noted the appellant had been in the United Kingdom for approximately three years. She was returning with a child, as a victim of trafficking with poor mental health which would present as obstacles. However, these were not considered to be very significant obstacles. The best interest of her child remained with her mother, and it was noted that whilst she could not speak English nor was she financially independent, these carried ‘slight’ weight. However, little weight would be given to her private life established when her immigration status in the UK was precarious. The judge further noted that as a recognised victim of trafficking with vulnerability, there were resources the appellant could draw on and whilst there were obstacles in re-integrating taking into account her two sisters present in the UK, whose reasons for claiming asylum were not put forward and looking at the fact the appellant was not currently on any medication and that there was adequate healthcare in Albania to deal with any of her conditions, it was considered that the public interest outweighed the appellant and her daughter's Article 8 reasons to remain in the United Kingdom - [58]-[65].
6. Accordingly, the FTT dismissed the appellant's appeal on all grounds.
Appellant's appeal to the Upper Tribunal
7. The appellant applied for permission to appeal which can be summarised as follows.
(a) First that the judge misdirected himself in law as to the risk on return. Particularly considering at [38] that it was "more appropriate" for the respondent's own guidance to her own caseworkers in the CPIN "assessment" and "executive summary" therefore relegating the country background information in favour of the respondent's guidance. It is argued that this section of the CPIN did not constitute evidence of itself, but merely an assessment of a variety evidential sources which was put forward as guidance to the respondent's case workers. Therefore, the error affected all stages of judicial assessment and outcome of the appeal.
(b) Second at [20-23] the judge's finding that the expert was not entitled to treat the appellant's own expression of vulnerability as anything more than a "throwaway statement", was unsupported by evidence and/or illogical.
(c) Third the judge failed to find by an appropriate standard whether the appellant's mother would accommodate her on return and failed to have reasoned regard to the evidence that ordinarily, families reject trafficking victims with children who were born out of wedlock.
Permission to Appeal and Hearing
8. The Upper Tribunal in granting permission concluded as follows:
"It is arguable the judge erred in her[sic] assessment of background evidence in the CPIN and that her consideration of the medical evidence before her was flawed. I consider that there is less merit in ground 3, but do not limit the grant of permission."
9. The respondent did not file and serve a rule 24 reply, however, at the hearing before me, Ms Everett confirmed that the respondent opposed the appeal. At the hearing, both parties' advocates made further oral submissions on each of the grounds of appeal. I have, accordingly, addressed all documentary evidence and submissions referred to, as well as the parties' respective oral submissions when setting out my analysis and conclusions. At the end of the hearing, I reserved my decision and provide this with reasons as set out below.
Analysis and Conclusions
10. I am satisfied that Ground 1 is made out. At [38] the judge concluded that the assessment and executive summary contained within the CPIN were "often more appropriate" because they brought the evidence together and reached a "global conclusion". The judge’s approach demonstrates that he was treating the respondent's evaluative assessment within the CPIN as the preferred means of determining the country conditions.
11. However, as observed in KK and RS (Sur place activities: risk) Sri Lanka CG [2021] UKUT 130 (IAC) at [301], the assessment section of a CPIN constitutes the respondent's guidance and analysis of the country evidence rather than the evidential material itself. Whilst such material may properly be considered, the Tribunal has an obligation to consider the country information on its own merits and to reach an independent view on the country conditions.
12. I find that the judge’s approach was legally erroneous as he failed to undertake an independent assessment of the underlying country evidence in its totality before making his own findings. I am further satisfied the error was material given the judge’s findings on core parts of the claim at [43], [47], [48] and [49] which demonstrate reliance, directly or indirectly, upon conclusions contained within the 2024 CPIN assessment rather than an evaluation of the underlying country material referred to.
13. At [43], the judge considered the risk of re-trafficking and relied upon the conclusion within the CPIN assessment at [3.2.1] that the risk of re-trafficking is small. At [47], the judge relied upon the CPIN assessment of the immediate and medium to long-term accommodation and financial prospects available to victims of trafficking and their children in Albania, together with the initiatives said to assist the reintegration of trafficking victims
14. I am satisfied that the judge's reliance upon the assessment section of the CPIN, without engaging with the underlying country material and the appellant's submissions recorded at [40], rendered the evaluation inadequate. The decision does not explain why the country evidence said to demonstrate systemic deficiencies was rejected in favour of the CPIN author's conclusions. Accordingly, the findings at [43] and [47] are unsafe.
15. Likewise at [48], the judge simply relied on the respondent’s assessment within the CPIN as set out at [4.1.2] and [4.5.2] that there was a sufficiency of protection therefore rejecting the submissions on behalf of the appellant that the underlying country material demonstrated significant deficiencies in the Albanian system of protection. As highlighted before me, the material within the CPIN at [10.6.13]-[10.6.14] was that the number of prosecutions and convictions for trafficking remained remarkably low despite the high prevalence of trafficking in Albania. It also included the USSD Trafficking in Persons Report 2023, cited in the CPIN at [10.1.1], which recorded that whilst the Albanian government had increased victim protection efforts during 2022, it nevertheless "does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts to do so."
16. The judge also failed to engage adequately with material country evidence relevant to the appellant's ability to reintegrate on return. Having instead characterised the appellant's reliance at [55] on sections of the CPIN as a “cherry pick”, without adequate reasons for rejecting evidence to which the judge had been specifically referred to.
17. Given that the appellant relied upon country evidence said to demonstrate systemic deficiencies in protection, support and reintegration, the judge's approach to the CPIN went to the heart of the fact-finding exercise. I am satisfied that the error materially affected the assessment of risk, sufficiency of protection and reintegration and was therefore capable of affecting the outcome of the appeal.
18. In considering Ground 2, I am also satisfied that the judge materially erred in his treatment of the psychiatric expert evidence. At [23], the judge concluded that the appellant's statement that her daughter was the only thing preventing her death was no more than a "throwaway statement". That finding was not adequately supported by the evidence before the Tribunal. Professor Katona had expressly considered the appellant's denial of active suicidal ideation, the GP records and the fact that her daughter was identified as a significant protective factor. The judge did not provide adequate reasons for departing from that assessment.
19. At [53]-[57], the judge accepted Professor Katona's diagnoses of PTSD and major depressive disorder. However, there was no meaningful engagement with the expert's opinion, when rejecting the assessment of suicide risk at [20]-[23], that the appellant's subjective fear of return would be likely to cause a deterioration in her mental health and increase the risk of self-harm.
20. The judge instead relied upon the absence of documented suicidal ideation within the GP records. However, the GP records to which I was referred also identified the appellant's daughter as a protective factor, a matter expressly noted by the judge at [22]. I find the judge failed adequately to engage with Professor Katona's professional assessment and instead substituted his own interpretation of the appellant's presentation. This was notwithstanding that Professor Katona had expressly considered the appellant's denial of active suicidal intent whilst identifying her daughter as a significant protective factor. In those circumstances, whilst the judge accepted at [20] that Professor Katona was a "suitably qualified expert in his field who is well-placed to report on the Appellant's psychiatric state", he failed to provide adequate reasons for departing from the expert's conclusions.
21. The Grounds at [13] also identify the judge’s failure to engage with material aspects of Professor Katona's evidence, including his opinion that the appellant's presentation was supported by consistent symptomology, objective clinical findings, the absence of feigning or exaggeration and consistency with the wider medical records. These are matters which were capable of supporting the reliability of the appellant's account, however they were not addressed nor were adequate reasons given for discounting them.
22. The judge's findings do not demonstrate adequate engagement with Professor Katona's report or with the extent to which the opinions expressed there, were consistent with the appellant's medical records. Rather, the judge rejected the expert opinion largely by reference to perceived inconsistencies in the appellant's account, without considering the clinical explanations provided by the expert for the existence of such inconsistencies. The deficiencies in the judge's assessment of the appellant's mental health and presentation on return materially infect the findings on core issues in the appeal. In particular, they undermine the assessment of the appellant's ability to re-establish herself on return, including her ability to obtain employment, secure accommodation and care for her child. They also bear directly upon the assessment of vulnerability and the risk of re-exploitation. As these matters were inextricably linked to the appellant's psychiatric condition and functioning, the flawed treatment of the medical evidence renders those findings unsafe.
23. For all these reasons, I am satisfied that the judge materially erred with reference to Ground 1 and Ground 2. Ground 3 was not pursued with vigour; however, I need not deal with that in any detail. For the reasons outlined above, I am satisfied that the judge’s decision to dismiss the appeal should be set aside pursuant to section 12(2)(a) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act, 2007.
24. Having therefore considered paragraph 7.2 of the Practice Directions and having due regard to what was said by the Court of Appeal in AEB v SSHD [2022] EWCA Civ 1512, and Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC), I carefully consider whether to retain the matter for remaking in the Upper Tribunal.
25. I am satisfied that given the failures to consider the medical report and the country evidence the appropriate course is for the appeal to be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be heard afresh by a judge other than the judge who previously determined the matter. The appeal shall be heard de novo.
Notice of decision
26. The decision of the Tribunal dated 9 November 2024, contained material errors of law and is set aside.
27. The matter is remitted to be heard by a different Judge of the First Tier Tribunal.

S Iqbal
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

28.07.2026