Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-000684

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/56154/2022

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 25th of April 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RINTOUL

Between

ALISAR ZALITOU
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: No appearance
For the Respondent: Ms E Blackburn, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Royal Courts of Justice (Belfast) on 11 April 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals with permission against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal, a panel of First-tier Tribunal Judge Grimes and First-tier Tribunal Judge Callaghan, promulgated on 31 October 2024 dismissing her appeal against the decision of the Secretary of State made on 12 August 2022 to refuse her leave to enter the United Kingdom.
2. The appellant is a citizen of Syria and seeks entry to the United Kingdom on the basis of her family life with her father, Khaled Zalitou (“the sponsor”) who is recognised as a refugee in the United Kingdom since March 2019. The appellant applied for entry clearance to the United Kingdom in February 2022 along with her mother and younger sister who at that time was a minor. Both were granted entry clearance to join the sponsor in the United Kingdom.
3. The respondent refused the application under the then applicable provisions of E-ECDR to Appendix FM, that is entry clearance as a dependent relative. The respondent was also not satisfied that Article 8 of the Human Rights Convention was engaged or that there were exceptional circumstances which would render refusal of the appellant’s application in breach of Article 8 because it resulted in unjustifiably harsh consequences for the appellant or her family.
4. The First-tier Tribunal heard evidence from the sponsor who was represented by Mr McStravick. They also had before them a “stitched bundle” and an additional bundle.
5. It was conceded that the appellant did not meet the requirements of E-ECDR of Appendix FM and the only question to be determined was whether there are exceptional circumstances in this case which would render the refusal a breach of Article 8.
6. The Upper Tribunal directed itself [11] in line with Al Hassan and Others (Article 8; entry clearance; KF (Syria)) [2024] UKUT 00234 and Kugathas v SSHD [2003] EWCA Civ 31.
7. The First-tier Tribunal noted [12] that there was no evidence corroborating confirmed contact between the sponsor and his family such as screenshots of the WhatsApp calls which had been submitted by the previous representatives in 2022 and which had not been produced to panel. They were not satisfied on the evidence before them that the appellant, her mother or sister were in regular contact with the sponsor [12].
8. The panel observed that there was no evidence to support the sponsor’s evidence as of his income or the transfer of money to his family; no statements of anyone involved in the alleged transportation of money to the family and the panel concluded that it had not been shown that the sponsor was providing financial support to the appellant [13].
9. The panel were not satisfied either in the absence of evidence, that the appellant’s health condition is such that it gave rise to ties or a level of dependency between the sponsor or her other family members which was more than the normal emotional ties between and an adult and parent [14]. Nor were they satisfied that the decision by the appellant’s mother and sister not to enter the United Kingdom without the appellant was demonstrating there was more than the normal emotional ties between her and the family [15].
10. Having concluded that there is no evidence of anything other than family life did not exist between the appellant and the sponsor [15], the First-tier Tribunal considered the position in the alternative, setting out factors which would suggest refusal would be disproportionate [18] and the factors which would suggest that refusal would not be disproportionate [19] concluding [20] that even if Article 8 was engaged they are not satisfied the appellant had discharged the burden of proof to establish that there were exceptional compelling circumstances such that it would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for the appellant or any of her family members including the sponsor to refuse entry clearance.
11. The appellant sought permission to appeal on the grounds that the First-tier Tribunal had erred;
(i) In failing properly to take into account the security situation in Syria, the humanitarian situation in Syria at the time being so dire that it was “Robinson obvious” even if no evidence had been produced as to the security situation and as shown in the CPIN.
(ii) In concluding that an Article 8 relationship no longer exists simply because one party to that relationship flees the country to escape harm and in concluding that the decision of the appellant’s mother and sister to remain Syria to support the appellant pending the outcome of the appeal did not represent anything over and above the normal emotional ties between an adult and parent this being a factor which ought to have attracted significant weight given the mother and sister had chosen to remain in a war- torn state.
12. On 5 February 2025 First-tier Tribunal Judge Mulready granted permission on all the grounds, extending time by some two months.
13. The judge noted:-
“It is arguable that this [the CPIN] should have been considered in determining whether the Appellant having no choice but to stay there, whilst the rest of her family are either already in the UK, or have entry clearance to come to the United Kingdom, would generate unjustifiably harsh consequences for her.
…
4. The judge noted “It is well established that there is no relevant family life for the purposes of Article 8 simply because of the family relationship between adults who live in different countries.” The decision does not record consideration of that in this case that the adults are living in different countries for reasons of exceptional hardship, including the severe security situation detailed in the CPIN, and it is arguable this should have been considered when determining both whether Article 8 was engaged, and whether maintaining the Respondent’s decision would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences.”
14. Subsequent to the grant of permission standard directions were sent to the parties on 12 February 2025. On 17 March 2025 a notice was issued listing the hearing for 11 April 2025. On 31 March 2025 a further request was sent to the representatives notifying that they had failed to comply with the directions to upload a hearing bundle.
15. I am, however, aware because of my involvement in another case represented by Mr McStravick that he was aware of the hearing.
16. In his email of 5 March 2025 Mr McStravick wrote as follows:
“… as a result of the strike by the Immigration Solicitors Northern Ireland who have not been in a position to represent this applicant next week for this reason and indeed because there are no Counsel available.
There is a second matter UI-2025-000684 Miss A Zalitou and HU/56154/2022 affected by the strike. The standard directions will not be complied by 19/3/2025.
Finally, this firm has decided to close as a result of the poor remuneration from legal aid and other matters on the 28/3/2025. All files will be transferred hopefully before this date.
17. I am aware that this strike has come to an end but that is not an excuse for not communicating with the court nor does it absolve a solicitor from his duties to the court or for that matter to his client. No further communication was received as to whether the file had been transferred to another practitioner.
18. I was satisfied that due notice of the time, date and venue of the hearing had been served on the appellant’s solicitors and thus on her. I noted also that there was no indication that J McStravick had come off the record and I was entitled to assume that he had complied with his duties in forwarding relevant information about the hearing to the appellant and sponsor. I noted also from the decision of the First-tier Tribunal there had been a failure had been in past to provide relevant evidence.
19. Having had regard to the file and the grounds of appeal, I was satisfied that I could proceed to determine the appeal in the absence of the appellant or any representative without the need to adjourn it and that it would be in the interests of justice and fairness to do so.
20. I heard brief submissions from Ms Blackburn. She submitted that it was for the appellant to prove her case and that, in failing to adduce further evidence to support her case, she had not done so. It was not a requirement for the First-tier Tribunal to take into account a CPIN nor was there any indication that they had been asked to do so or that any submissions had been made on that issue. She submitted further that the First-tier Tribunal had reached conclusions open to it in the light of the evidence that there was no family life between the appellant and her sponsor or for that matter her mother and sister. Again she submitted that there was no submission made.
21. I indicated that I would dismiss the appeal for reasons to be given in writing.
The Law
22. In assessing the grounds of appeal, I bear in mind and apply Ullah v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 201 at [26].
23. I also bear in mind what was held in Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 at [2] and in HA (Iraq) [2022] UKSC 22 at [72], and that the decision must be read sensibly and holistically. Justice requires that the reasons enable it to be apparent to the parties why one has won and the other has lost: English v Emery Reimbold & Strick Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 605, [2002] 1 WLR 2409 at [16]. When reading the decision, I am entitled to assume that the reader is familiar with the issues involved and arguments advanced. Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed and an appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract.
24. The panel directed themselves properly according to the law at [11]. It is correct to state that there is no relevant family life for the purposes of Article 8 simply because there is a family relationship and they also live in different countries. The use of the word “simply” indicates that the panel were aware that this was not the sole criterion and, indeed, the self-direction to Kugathas confirms that they were aware of the need to take into account all the relevant factors and in particular whether there was real, committed or effective support.
25. The First-tier Tribunal set out its concerns at [13] to [15] as to the lack of evidence of ongoing contact which they considered could have been provided. It is telling that the grounds do not engage with that or suggest that material could have been provided. It is of particular note that screenshots of WhatsApp messages had been produced previously but they had not been provided to the First-tier Tribunal for the purposes of that hearing. The panel gave adequate and sustainable reasons for concluding why there was insufficient evidence as to show that there was financial support from the sponsor to the family. It is of note also that there is no challenge to that finding, or for that matter the finding that there was insufficient evidence to say that the appellant has any health issues.
26. The First-tier Tribunal dealt properly with the submission that the decision of the mother and daughter to continue to remain in Syria as evidence of a close family unit. The Tribunal gave adequate and sustainable reasons for concluding, in particular the lack of evidence from the appellant, her mother and sister as to their current living situations and the absence for any reason to be giving such evidence, that there was anything over and above normal emotional ties between an adult and the parent. This was, in any event only a single factor.
27. In reality the challenge to the finding that there was not a family life for the purposes of Article is little more than a disagreement with properly reasoned findings of fact reached by a Tribunal which had the benefit of hearing all the evidence and seeing the sponsor give evidence.
28. Further, and in the alternative, it is not an error for the panel not to have taken into account the situation in Syria. There is no indication that the relevant CPIN or parts of the CPIN were put to the panel nor that submissions on that as to how they related specifically to the appellant and her family. It is for the appellant to prove her case. It was thus for her to provide this evidence and submissions to that effect. Such a point is not “Robinson obvious”. Further and in any event, as to the conclusion that there was no family life between the appellant and sponsor it cannot be argued that any error with respect to assessing proportionality was material. And, when dealing with that issue in the alternative in significant detail at [18] and [19] the Tribunal dealt with the appellant’s status as an unmarried female in Syria and the claim to risk of persecution, noting [18(e)] there is no evidence of any ongoing persecution or harassment against the appellant and that there was inadequate evidence as to her ongoing living situation.
29. For these reasons, I consider that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error of law and I uphold it.
Notice of Decision
(1) The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error of law and I uphold it.

Signed Date 15 April 2025

Jeremy K H Rintoul
Upper Tribunal Judge Rintoul