Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-000690

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/67145/2023; LP/01662/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 24th of April 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE PINDER
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE STERNBERG

Between

A S
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: No attendance, no legal representation.
For the Respondent: Ms A. Ahmed, Senior Presenting Officer.

Heard at Field House on 9 April 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The Appellant appeals the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (‘the FtT’). On 20th November 2024, the First-tier Tribunal Judge (‘the Judge’) dismissed the Appellant’s appeal against the Respondent’s decision of 11th December 2023, in which the Respondent refused the Appellant’s protection and human rights claim.

2. We have maintained the Anonymity Order in favour of the Appellant. We consider that, on the specific facts of this appeal, the maintenance of the integrity of the United Kingdom’s immigration system and the Appellant having raised a claim to international protection are such that an Anonymity Order is a justified derogation from the principle of open justice.

Factual background

3. The Appellant is a citizen of Bangladesh, who has claimed to have been member of the student wing of the Bangladesh National Party (‘the BNP’) and who claims to have been threatened and attacked in 2019, prior to leaving Bangladesh for the UK.

4. The Appellant came to the UK on 10th October 2021 with entry clearance as a student. He claimed asylum on 15th February 2022. The Appellant’s protection and human rights claim was refused by the Respondent on 11th December 2023.

The decision of the First-tier Tribunal Judge

5. The Judge at first instance, in dismissing the Appellant’s appeal, reached the following findings:

(a) The credibility of the Appellant’s account is damaged as a result of an inconsistency in the Appellant’s accounts of where and how the attack on him in 2019 took place – [13];
(b) No credible explanation was provided by the Appellant to explain the different name detailed on a medical report purporting to confirm a medical examination of him in Bangladesh on 7th October 2019 and why a second document, purporting to be a discharge certificate, did not reflect the claimed one week period of the Appellant’s hospital admission. As a result, the Judge gave very little weight to these two documents – [14]-[16];
(c) As a result of the above considerations, the Judge did not accept that the Appellant was attacked as claimed by supporters of the Awami League on 7th October 2019 – [17];
(d) The Judge gave no weight to the letter and witness statement of the Appellant’s witness. The letter, attested in Bangladesh on 20th November 2023, stated that the Appellant was an active member of the student wing of the BNP and that the author of the letter is the Convenor of Kamalganj Sub-District Committee, Bangladesh Jatiyotabadi Chatra Dal (JCD), Sylhet, Bangladesh. The witness statement stated that the author is also seeking asylum in the UK and the witness did not attend the appeal hearing. The Judge compared this information with the Appellant’s own evidence, which was that the Appellant’s witness was already in the UK on the date that the witness’ letter was attested (20.11.2023) and he could not have been in Bangladesh on that date as well – [19];
(e) The Judge gave little weight to another letter because the author’s information concerning the continuing of political activities by the Appellant in the UK in support of the BNP, including Facebook content being shared and protests, did not reflect the Appellant’s own account at interview that he had not been politically active in the UK – [20];
(f) Little weight was attached to the Appellant’s photographs as these were not dated and in the demonstration photograph, they showed the Appellant wearing the same clothes – [21];
(g) The Judge did not attach any weight to the First Information Report (‘FIR’) purporting to relate to an incident involving the Appellant on 13th November 2022. Similarly, for an arrest warrant issued on 20th February 2023. The Judge considered that these documents were issued more than a year and a half after the Appellant had arrived in the UK and in the context of the Appellant securing travel documentation and leaving Bangladesh without difficulty – [22];
(h) The Appellant stated in his interview that he had not been politically active in the UK and he had not provided a download of his Facebook account in relation to claimed political posts whilst in the UK – [23];
(i) The Appellant’s account lacked credibility: he did not claim asylum on entering the UK and only claimed after he ceased studying. This delay damaged the credibility of his account – [24];
(j) The Appellant’s account to have been a member of the BNP’s student wing and to have been threatened or attacked by members/supporters of the Awami League whilst in Bangladesh was not accepted – [25]-[26];
(k) The Appellant’s contention that the position in Bangladesh for BNP members is even more dangerous following the fleeing to India of the Awami League leader was not supported – [26];
(l) The Appellant has not established a private and family life in the UK and there is no breach therefore of his Article 8 rights – [27].

6. Accordingly, the Judge dismissed the Appellant’s appeal on both protection and human rights grounds.

The Appellant’s appeal to the Upper Tribunal

7. The Appellant applied out-of-time for permission to appeal against the Judge’s decision. A different judge of the FtT granted an extension of time and granted permission to appeal on the following basis:

2. The grounds argue that the Judge made findings on points not raised in cross-examination. The inconsistency at paragraph 13 was not significant, the Appellant was not asked about the medical certificate in paragraph 14. It is argued that the Judge erred in the assessment of the medical documents and discharge certificate, the question of photographs of injuries and there was no need for the Appellant to have been arrested or detained. The findings on the party letter at page 20 are criticised as are the findings on the FIR.

3. That points have been taken that were not put to the Appellant are arguably unfair but in the Upper Tribunal far more detail will need to be given in respect the individual findings and why they amount to an error. With some hesitation I find that the grounds are arguable.

4. The grounds disclose arguable errors of law and permission to appeal is granted.”

8. In response, the Respondent filed and served a Rule 24 reply, defending the appeal and maintaining that the Judge gave correct, adequate and sustainable reasons for dismissing the Appellant’s appeal and that the grounds of appeal amounted to mere disagreement with the decision.

The appeal hearing in the Upper Tribunal

9. As recorded above, there was no attendance from the Appellant at the hearing before us, nor was he legally represented. Prior to the appeal hearing, on 1st April 2025, the Tribunal received correspondence from the firm of solicitors, who was on record as the Appellant’s representatives. In this letter, the solicitors confirmed that they had not been able to comply with the Tribunal’s standard directions for the preparation, filing and serving of the Appellant’s consolidated appeal bundle as a result of a lack of instructions from the Appellant. They also confirmed, for the same reasons, that they wished to come off the record. No further communication from the solicitors, nor from the Appellant, was received thereafter.

10. We considered whether to proceed in the absence of the Appellant, pursuant to Rule 38 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 (‘the Procedure Rules’). We were satisfied that the Appellant had received notice of the hearing listed before us as the notice was sent to him on 14th March 2025 by post to the address held for him on the Tribunal file. Ms Ahmed was effectively neutral as to whether we should proceed leaving this to us to determine. By 10:53am when we called the matter on, there was still no attendance from the Appellant and the necessary enquiries had been made by our clerk to check whether or not he had attended the Tribunal centre.

11. In light of the Appellant having been sent the Notice of Hearing as detailed above and his solicitors having come off the record for a lack of instructions, we determined that it was in the interests of justice to proceed. The Respondent had attended and was ready to proceed. We had not received any form of communication from the Appellant’s previous solicitors, nor from the Appellant himself, to indicate that the Appellant had difficulties in attending the hearing or that he was seeking an adjournment. The Appellant has had ample time to provide his instructions to his solicitors and to indicate his position to this Tribunal since the grant of permission to appeal dated 5th February 2025. He has failed to do so. We did not consider it to be in the interests of justice to delay this matter any further, particularly in the absence of any good reason for doing so.

12. Ms Ahmed, on behalf of the Respondent, made further oral submissions on each of the ground of appeal pursued in writing and relied on the Rule 24 response settled by her colleague.

13. We have addressed the parties’ respective written pleadings and Ms Ahmed’s oral submissions in the section immediately below when setting out our analysis and conclusions. At the end of the hearing, we reserved our decision and provide this below with our reasons.

Analysis and conclusions

14. The grounds argue that three issues in particular had not been raised by the Respondent in cross-examination of the Appellant nor by the Judge by way of clarification at the appeal hearing in the FtT:

(i) The issue of the Appellant’s name on one of the medical certificate (para 5);
(ii) The lack of dates for the Appellant’s photographs and about the Appellant’s clothes in the demonstration photographs (para 11);
(iii) The FIR submitted in support of the Appellant’s appeal (para 12).

15. The Respondent relied on the authority of Abdi & Ors v Entry Clearance Officer [2023] EWCA Civ 1455, [29] where Popplewell LJ considered the Scottish Court of Session’s decision in HA v Secretary of State for the Home Department (No 2) [2010] SC 457 [2010] CSIH 28:

“…There is, on the other hand no general obligation on the tribunal to give notice to the parties during the hearing of all the matters on which it may relay in reaching its decision (see [10]). Where an applicant can generally be expected to be aware that the tribunal will have to assess their credibility, there will generally be no unfairness in a tribunal proceeding without drawing attention to a point which the applicant could reasonably expect to be plainly relevant to that assessment (at [11]-[12])”

16. In addition, the Respondent disclosed an extract from the Presenting Officer’s attendance note prepared after the appeal hearing in the FtT. This is extracted at para 10 of the Respondent’s Rule 24 reply as follows:

“Furthermore, the Presenting Officer’s hearing minutes indicate that their cross examination covered matters relating to medical documents and photos.

• ‘Cross-Examination undertaken – Awami party not in power so why the fear, permission to work on student visa, how are you supporting yourself, attack on 7-10-2019, any other attacks, friend (X) WS and his letter, case filed against, warrant documents, medical letters, photos, political letters, photographs, family life in Bangladesh’ (PO Ms. Furtado’s hearing minutes).”

17. Ms Ahmed rightly emphasised that no such evidence had been forthcoming from the Appellant. The grounds had asserted that matters had not been raised at the hearing with the Appellant but the grounds are not signed. There is no witness statement nor any form other evidence, such as an attendance note or similar to support this assertion. This is despite the FtT Judge’s express indication that far more detail will be required to support the grounds pleaded when granting permission to appeal.

18. We also noted, as emphasised by Ms Ahmed, that the Respondent had not accepted the Appellant’s claim that he had been attacked in the past. This is clear from para 3 of the Respondent’s review. At para 6 of the same review document, the Respondent had also raised the following:

“The additional documents provided, purporting to be from Bangladesh, should also be approached with extreme caution. Given the timing of these documents being produced and the lack of explanation as to the delay- together with the levels of corruption in Bangladesh, surrounding documentation- as outlined in the RFRL. In the round, with reliance on Tanveer Ahmed, the respondent invites the tribunal to place no weight on these documents.”

19. In light of the above, we do not consider that the Appellant has demonstrated that there was any procedural unfairness. The alleged unfairness is barely particularised in the grounds of appeal and is not supported by any evidence. The Respondent’s evidence directly disputes the Appellant’s case on the lack of cross-examination and this has not been responded to in any way by the Appellant whether evidentially or otherwise. All that the Appellant has presented are a number of assertions in the unsigned grounds of appeal about what took place at the hearing before the FtT. Furthermore, it is clear that the Appellant was aware that the Respondent had submitted that the Appellant’s documents from Bangladesh should be treated with caution and considered in the round pursuant to Tanveer Ahmed.

20. The grounds also submit that the Judge’s finding at [13] - that the Appellant’s accounts of how the claimed attack took place were inconsistent - and the Judge’s finding at [15] on the medical discharge certificate were incorrect. We disagree. The Judge’s reasons for those findings were detailed and grounded in the evidence before her. We are satisfied that the grounds as pleaded amount to no more than a mere disagreement and an attempt to re-argue these matters.

21. At para 8 of the grounds, it was submitted that “one does not need to be arrested or detained which at paragraph 18 the FtJ appears to be suggesting”. This is a surprising submission, to say the least, because the Judge makes clear at [18] that she was doing no more than recounting the Appellant’s own evidence. She was not making any form of suggestion or finding:

“The appellant was asked (at question 39) whether he organised any demonstrations and he stated that he did not and that he had never been arrested or detained.”

22. With regards to the Appellant’s witness and the Judge’s rejection of their evidence, it was pleaded on behalf of the Appellant that the witness statement was in fact signed (para 9) and that the Appellant cannot tell the witness how a letter should be written. The grounds submit that the fact that a document does not contain certain information does not mean that it is not genuine (para 10). The Judge was said to have imposed their own personal view on the documentary evidence of the FIR (para 12).

23. We accept that the Judge recorded at [19] that the witness statement provided was undated and unsigned and we are prepared to accept that the lack of a signature may have been remedied on the day of the hearing. However, it is clear from the Judge’s reasons at [19] that this is not why the Judge decided to place no weight on the witness’ statement and the same witness’ letter. Several reasons were given, as we have summarised at para 5(d) above. These included that the witness did not attend the hearing and was not therefore tendered as a witness for their evidence to be tested by way of cross-examination. In addition, the Judge had concerns with regards to how and where their letter had been attested in light of the Appellant’s evidence concerning this witness. The Judge was entitled to place no weight on this document in circumstances where the letter purported to be attested in Bangladesh at a time when, on the Appellant’s evidence, the author was already in the UK. The Judge’s conclusions were therefore reasonably open to her and the Appellant has not demonstrated that these were perverse or that the Judge has failed to take into consideration relevant matters.

24. With regards to the FIR, the grounds do not particularise how the Judge imposed their own personal view of this document. Again, it is clear from the Judge’s reasons set out at [22] that she considered this document, in the round, as she was required to. The Judge was concerned with the fact that this document was issued more than a year and a half after the Appellant had arrived in the UK. We are satisfied that this concern was reasonably open to her, particularly when the Respondent had raised concerns over this document as well, as we have already addressed above.

25. Lastly, with regards to the Judge’s finding that the Appellant had been able to leave Bangladesh without any difficulty, the grounds submit that the Judge had failed to have regard to background material, which states that 99% of persons attempting to leave the country, even if charged with a crime, would not normally encounter difficulties (para 12). Even if this particular submission is made out, we do not consider any error to have been material. This is because, as we have considered above, the Judge had numerous concerns and gave multiple, detailed reasons for not accepting the various aspects of the Appellant’s claim. Any error on inferences drawn from the lack of difficulty experienced by the Appellant when leaving Bangladesh is not therefore capable of displacing the Judge’s other concerns and findings. We also remind ourselves of the guidance from Green LJ in the Court of Appeal in Ullah v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 201 at [26].

26. For all of the reasons above, we do not consider that the Judge has materially erred in law as pleaded in the Appellant’s written grounds of appeal. No grounds of appeal were pursued seeking to challenge the Judge’s findings on the Appellant’s claim under Article 8 ECHR.

27. In the circumstances, we dismiss the Appellant’s appeal and order that the decision of the Judge shall stand.

Notice of Decision

28. The Appellant’s appeal is dismissed. The Judge’s decision to dismiss the Appellant’s protection and human rights appeal stands.

Sarah Pinder

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

11.04.2025