Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case Nos: UI-2025-000694
UI-2025-000695

First-tier Tribunal Nos: EA/01451/2024
EA/01452/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On the 12 August 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MAHMOOD

Between

Zahida Parveen
Masood Ahmed
Appellants
and

Entry Clearance Officer
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellants: Litigants in Person
For the Respondent: Mr A Tan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Manchester Civil Justice Centre on 4 July 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is my oral decision which I delivered at the hearing today.
Introduction
2. The Appellants are litigants in person. They are out of country and they are assisted by their son Mr Zeeshan Masood and by his wife, Mrs Huria Arshad, an Italian national, who is their EUSS Sponsor.
3. At this hearing, I am deciding whether or not there was a material error of law in the decision of the First-tier Tribunal which had dismissed the Appellants’ appeals against the Respondent’s refusal to grant them entry clearance.
4. Even though the Appellants and Sponsor are litigants in person, I have been provided today with a skeleton argument. Mr Tan and I have seen that for the first time this morning. Mr Zeeshan Masood has explained that although he is without legal representation, he has a friend who has provided him with assistance in drafting that document.
5. I should also add that Mr Ahmed is also in court, he is an interpreter appointed by the Tribunal. I think that was to assist Ms Huria Arshad who is the Italian national Sponsor, but as it happens, she was not going to give evidence. It was clear that her husband, Mr Masood, was going to be making submissions and, if I may say so, I found Mr Masood’s submissions and English to be of a good standard. Nonetheless, I asked the interpreter to remain in court, just in case any assistance became necessary.
Background
6. The background to this case is that it had come for hearing before First-tier Tribunal Judge Mather (“the Judge”) and by way of a decision dated 16th December 2024, the Judge had dismissed the Appellants’ appeals against the Respondent’s decision to refuse them an EUSS family permit.
7. Permission to appeal was granted by the First-tier Tribunal after grounds of appeal were drafted by the Sponsor himself.
8. Meaning no disrespect, the grounds of appeal were not drafted in a particularly clear way but nonetheless, the First-tier Tribunal Judge accepted that there were two grounds of appeal.
9. The skeleton argument perhaps can fairly be referred to because it sets out the Appellants’ case. It refers to the background as being as follows:
“The Appellants are Pakistani nationals, who are dependent upon their daughter-in-law (Zeeshan Masood’s wife), who is an Italian national. The Appellants made an application for a family permit under EUSS / EEA Regulations of the Regulations 2016 and the applications and appeals were refused / dismissed on the basis of dependency.”
10. The skeleton argument then refers to various matters where it is said that there was dependency. There is also a reference to case law, including Reyes (EEA Regs: dependency) [2013] UKUT 00314 (IAC). Paragraph 19 is referred to:
“It is clear from the wording of both Article 2.2 and regulation 7(1) that the test is one of present, not past dependency. Both provisions employ the present tense (Article 2.2(b) and (c) refer to family members who ‘are dependants’ or who are “dependent”; regulation 7(c) refers to ‘dependent direct relatives…’). Fourth (and this may have relevance to what is understood by present dependency), interpretation of the meaning of the term must be such as not to deprive that provision of its effectiveness.”
11. There is also reference to Secretary of State for the Home Department v Rahman and Ors. Case C-83/11 and it is said, “It is submitted that the Appellants required financial support for appellant’s essential financial needs, given the evidence and particular circumstances”.
The Hearing Before Me and Consideration
12. Mr Masood quite understandably explains to me today that he has been attempting for some time to have his parents join him here in the United Kingdom. He said he had been in Dubai initially, that he has been supporting his parents for some time, that he is the only son and he says that when there was the original refusal of the application, he was not able to provide a birth certificate. Ultimately, he said he obtained DNA testing to show the relationship between him and his parents and that then led to a further application.
13. It appears fair to observe that Mr Masood is perhaps unsurprisingly somewhat frustrated by the fact that it was only during the hearing that he was asked questions about documentation and why evidence in relation to the ‘dependency’ matters. It also appears that Mr Masood, if he did not understand it before, appreciates now that in these cases, the burden of proof is on the Appellants to deal with the application’s requirements and to provide the evidence. He now seems to appreciate too, that if there is a refusal by the entry clearance officer, then the Appellants must look to that refusal and to deal with each and every aspect of where there the Respondent contends that there is a deficiency or where evidence is required.
14. It appears to me that perhaps, explained in that way, Mr Masood appreciates now, if he did not before, what Mr Tan was therefore referring to during his submissions. Mr Tan explained that the Judge set out, with adequate reasoning, and in a lawful manner, where there were deficiencies in the evidence.
15. By way of example, in relation to bank statements, the Judge said at paragraph 23 of his decision that whilst bank statements were provided, the Judge was told, (presumably by Mr Masood), “It is not possible for the first Appellant to provide evidence of their financial circumstances/expenditure”.
16. The Judge also said,
“It is the first Appellant’s claim that he keeps in contact with Mr Masood/Sponsor by telephone / WhatsApp calls but no evidence was put forward as to how this was paid for. No credible evidence was put forward as to why documentation for the payment of utility bills / phone bills / other purchases were not submitted.”
17. Similarly there is reference by Mr Tan to paragraph 24 of the Judge’s decision in relation to medical treatment at the Rawalpindi Institute of Cardiology where the Judge said there was no evidence submitted to show how the treatment/medication was paid for and the Judge concluded, “I do not find the explanation given by the first Appellant/Mr Masood for the absence of such evidence to be credible.”
18. The Judge said at paragraph 26, “No evidence had been submitted regarding the ownership of the family home said to be owned by the Appellants”.
19. Then it was said that, in the Notice for Refusal that only three electricity bills in the name covering a three month period and in oral evidence, Mr Masood stated that the gas bills were in the name of the first Appellant and that no further copies of utility bills have been submitted, despite ample time having been provided to enable that to be done.
Conclusion
20. Ultimately the Judge also said that he found it significant that the Appellants chose only to provide bank statements showing the remittances on such withdrawals and that it was not accepted as credible that their explanation as to why the documentation detailed in the notice of refusal was not provided. The Judge said he accepted money had been sent by the Sponsor to the Appellants over a period of time, but the Judge concluded that he was not persuaded the Appellants were financially dependent, as claimed.
21. It is not for me to advice or suggest how the Appellants ought to provide their evidence. Whether it is in the form of witness statements or other documents.
22. I am aware that it is possible, particularly in rural village parts of Pakistan transactions take place by way of cash. But whilst that can be the starting point, here the Respondent’s decision set out in some detail what the Entry Clearance Officer said was deficient in terms of the evidence.
23. The burden of proof remained on the Appellants to set out how they claimed to overcome those deficiencies.
24. Now that the appeal is here before me at the Upper Tribunal, I have to assess whether there is a material error of law in the decision of the First-tier Tribunal. I am not able to set aside the decision just because I disagree with it or because I have sympathy for the Appellants and/or the Sponsor.
25. In relation to the adequacy of reasons and interference with factual findings the observations of Dingemans LJ in Terghazi v SSHD [2019] EWCA Civ 2017; [2020] Imm. A.R. 461 at [45] make clear,
“A further principle which it is relevant to note is that, even if an appellate court is entitled to hear an appeal because of an error of fact (because the appeal court has jurisdiction to hear appeals on facts) appellate courts should be very cautious in overturning findings of fact made by a first instance judge. This is because first instance judges have seen witnesses and take into account the whole “sea” of the evidence, rather than indulged in impermissible “island hopping” to parts only of the evidence, and because duplication of effort on appeal is undesirable and increases costs and delay. Judges hearing appeals on facts should only interfere if a finding of fact was made which had no basis in the evidence, or where there was a demonstrable misunderstanding of relevant evidence, or a demonstrable failure to consider relevant evidence so that the decision could not reasonably be explained or justified.”
26. There is a well-settled series of previous cases which explain to me that I must show appropriate restraint before I interfere with the expert First-tier Tribunal Judge’s decision. Ultimately, the First-tier Tribunal Judge was the one who heard from the Sponsor and heard the submissions. I am unable to discern any material error of law in the Judge’s decision. The grounds of appeal and skeleton argument show mere disagreement with the Judge’s decision and attempt to reargue the appeal. There were a series of deficiencies with the Appellants’ evidence. The Judge did not arguably err in any respect when he dismissed the Appellants’ appeal.
27. That is my judgment.
Notice of Decision
There is no error of law in the decision of the First-tier Tribunal. Therefore, the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dismissing the Appellants’ appeals stands.
The Appellants’ appeal to the Upper Tribunal is dismissed on all grounds.

Abid Mahmood

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

30 June 2025