Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-000698

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/52752/2024; LH/07281/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

24th April 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SMITH
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SWANEY

Between

ANGELINA JOHN
[NO ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE]
Appellant
and

ENTRY CLEARANCE OFFICER
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr S Hingora, Counsel instructed by Indus Solicitors (via CVP)
For the Respondent: Ms N Kerr, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on Friday 11 April 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
BACKGROUND
1. The Appellant appeals against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Richards-Clarke dated 8 December 2024 (“the Decision”) dismissing her appeal on human rights grounds (Article 8 ECHR) against the Respondent’s decision dated 19 February 2023 refusing her human rights claim. The Appellant’s human rights claim was made in the context of an application to join her daughter, Cinderella John (“the Sponsor”), as an adult dependent relative.
2. Within the Immigration Rules (“the Rules”), the issue for the Judge was whether Appellant met paragraphs ADR.5.1 and ADR.5.2 of the appendix to the Rules relating to adult dependent relatives. Whilst relevant to the Judge’s consideration of the Appellant’s human rights, the central question was whether the refusal of entry breached her Article 8 rights to respect for her private and family life.
3. The Judge did not accept that the Appellant met paragraph ADR.5.1 and did not therefore go on to consider the other paragraph of the Rules. She concluded for that reason that the Appellant did not satisfy the Rules for entry as an adult dependent relative. That conclusion fed into the assessment of Article 8 ECHR, but the Judge also there considered the interference with the Appellant’s private and family life with the Sponsor as well as the public interest. The Judge concluded that the refusal of entry did not breach the Appellant’s Article 8 rights. She therefore dismissed the appeal.
4. The Appellant challenges the Decision on four grounds summarised as follows:
Ground 1: failure properly to assess the Appellant’s care needs.
Ground 2: errors in the assessment of credibility.
Ground 3: failure properly to apply Appendix ADR (paragraph ADR.5.2).
Ground 4: failure to conduct a proper proportionality assessment under Article 8 ECHR.
5. Permission to appeal was granted by First-tier Tribunal Judge Chinweze on 7 February 2025 in the following terms:
“3. In dealing with paragraph ADR 5.1 of the Rules, the judge accepted medical evidence that the Appellant suffered from a depressive disorder and anxiety which caused forgetfulness [13]. The judge also referred to evidence that the Appellant was forgetful and unmotivated, [14] nor did the judge dispute evidence that a carer bought groceries, medicine, prepared food for the Appellant and took her to appointments.
4. It is arguable the Judge failed to give adequate reasons for finding the Appellant’s mental illnesses (which he accepted caused forgetfulness and a lack of motivation), prevented her from undertaking these tasks [sic].
5. The judge also finds at [14] that the Appellant is able to eat and drink, however this does not address the Appellant’s ability to cook for herself or the evidence that her meals were prepared for her.
6. It is arguable that the judge has made inconsistent findings and has failed to sufficiently address whether the Appellant’s mental health affected her ability to undertake everyday tasks.
7. Permission is given on ground (ii) as it flows from ground (i).
8. Permission is given on ground (iii) as the judge did not consider the requirements of ADR 5.2 as he had concluded paragraph ADR 5.1 had not been met.
9. As the judge’s proportionality assessment was influenced by his findings on ADR 5. , permission is given on ground (iv).
10. The grounds and the decision disclose arguable errors of law, therefore permission to appeal is granted.”
6. The appeal comes before us to decide whether there is an error of law. If we determine that the Decision does contain an error of law, we then need to decide whether to set aside the Decision in consequence. If we set the Decision aside, we must then either re-make the decision or remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal to do so.
7. We had before us a bundle running to 93 pages containing the documents relevant to the appeal to this Tribunal, and the Appellant’s and Respondent’s bundles before the First-tier Tribunal so far as relevant to the issues we need to determine. We refer to documents in that bundle as [B/xx].
8. Having heard from Mr Hingora and Ms Kerr we indicated that we would reserve our decision and provide our reasons in writing which we now turn to do.
DISCUSSION
Ground 1
9. We begin our consideration of the Judge’s assessment of the Appellant’s case within the Rules relating to adult dependent relatives by reminding ourselves of the test. That is set out at [§10] of the Decision and reads as follows:
“ADR.5.1 The applicant, or if the applicant is applying as a parent or grandparent, the applicant’s partner, must, as a result of age, illness or disability, require long-term personal care to perform everyday tasks.
ADR.5.2 Where the application is for entry clearance, the applicant, or if the applicant is applying as a parent or grandparent, the applicant’s partner, must be unable to obtain the required level of care in the country where they are living, even with the financial help of the sponsor because either:
(a) the care is not available and there is no person in that country who can reasonably provide it; or
(b) the care is not affordable.”
10. As the Judge reminded herself at [14] of the Decision by reference to the Court of Appeal’s judgment in Ribeli v Entry Clearance Officer, Pretoria [2018] EWCA Civ 61, “the test imposed for entry clearance as an adult dependent relative is a rigorous and demanding one” (see also in that regard BritCits v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] EWCA Civ 368).
11. The Judge referred to the evidence before her as to the need for care at [§13] of the Decision as follows:
“..the appellant relies on her witness statement, the witness statement from Mrs Honey Mahvish, the evidence of her sponsor daughter together with the letter from Dr Ayesha Uqaily Consultant Psychiatrist 2 December 2023 at page 244 of the hearing bundle. This states that the appellant ‘66 years of age, is diagnosed to have depressive disorder and comorbid anxiety’ and that ‘she is advised to stay with her family and under supervision due to forgetfulness secondary to depressive disorder’. It is not in dispute that the appellant has been diagnosed with depression and anxiety and I attach weight to this diagnosis as set out in the letter from the appellant’s Consultant Psychiatrist. However, I am not satisfied that it follows from this that the appellant requires long-term person care to perform everyday tasks as a result [of] age, illness, or disability. In her evidence Mrs Honey Mahvish sets out the help that she currently provides to the appellant in Pakistan; this includes buying groceries and medicine, preparing food and taking the appellant to appointments.”
12. Having directed herself in accordance with the Rules and the case-law, and referred to the (limited) medical evidence and the evidence from the person who had been acting as a carer over time, the Judge went on to deal with the Appellant’s case under paragraph ADR.5.1 at [§14] of the Decision as follows:
“..The evidence before me is that while the appellant is forgetful and unmotivated she is able to take journeys, move around, wash and bathe herself, manage her toilet needs, eat and drink, dress and undress and communicate with her daughter and others. The medical evidence before me does not suggest otherwise. I accept that the appellant is lonely and grieving following the death of her siblings in July 2022 and October 2023. I also accept that the appellant’s only child lives in the United Kingdom, the appellant misses her and wants to live with her. That said, the evidence before me is that the appellant’s requirement of help with going out to appointments, shopping and preparing food falls short of the appellant requiring long-term personal care to perform everyday tasks as a result of age, illness or disability. The appellant does not meet the requirements of the Immigration Rules ADR.5.1.”
13. The Appellant challenges those findings for a number of reasons summarised as follows:
(a) The medical evidence confirmed a diagnosis of “severe depression, anxiety, crying spells, hallucinations, and heart problems, which severely impair her ability to manage daily tasks” ([§4.1] of the grounds).
(b) There was “detailed testimony” from the Sponsor and Appellant describing her “inability to perform all basic daily tasks”. It is said that “the Appellant’s condition necessitates constant supervision to prevent harm, including medication mismanagement, kitchen accidents and neglect of personal hygiene” ([§4.2] of the grounds).
(c) There was evidence that, as a result, the “temporary caregiver” (ie Mrs Mahvish) had to ask the Sponsor to intervene because she could no longer continue to care for the Appellant as a result of which the Sponsor had to travel to Pakistan in January 2024 ([§4.3] of the grounds).
(d) It is said that the Judge failed to “meaningfully engage” with the evidence ([§5] of the grounds), and failed to take into account that “the Sponsor’s efforts to secure local care were explicitly described as temporary, unreliable, and unsuitable as long-term solutions” ([§6] of the grounds).
We leave out of account at this stage what is said at [§7 - 10] of the grounds because, although pleaded under the heading of the first ground, the points there raised deal with availability of care which falls under paragraph ADR.5.2. and becomes relevant only if paragraph ADR.5.1. is met.
14. Dealing first with the medical evidence about the Appellant’s medical condition and needs, we asked Mr Hingora to refer us to everything which was before the Judge. That evidence is to be found at [B/35-47].
15. The first document at [B/35] is a handwritten letter dated 11 September or November 2023 (the date is not clear) from Dr Bachani, Physician and Surgeon. This is not in the form of a report and therefore provides no context for what is there said. It is not clear for example whether he is the Appellant’s treating physician, whether he has even met her and if so, how often and for what purpose. The letter reads as follows:
“This is to state that Mrs Angelina John is suffering from severe depression, anxiety according with assessment outcome this issue is associated with loneliness and crying spells due to her siblings passing away and no individuals present to take care of her in person thereby she needs to be living with her daughter which will be beneficial in overcoming her depression and anxiety.”
Even leaving aside the defects in this letter in terms of providing context for the comments made, what is there said falls very far short of providing evidence that the Appellant requires “long-term personal care to perform everyday tasks”.
16. The second document is that referred to by the Judge and is a letter dated 2 December 2023 from Dr Ayesha Uqaily, Consultant Psychiatrist ([B/36]). Again, that provides no context for the comments made. In full it reads as follows:
“Angelina John, 66 yrs of age, is diagnosed to have depressive disorder and comorbid Anxiety. She is being treated for the same, however staying alone after death of the only brother living with her is an added stress and contributes to anxiety and low mood. She is advised to stay with her family and under supervision due to forgetfulness secondary to depressive disorder. Advised to come for regular follow up.”
Again, that evidence falls short of suggesting that the Appellant needs help with everyday tasks. At most, it suggests that the Appellant would benefit from supervision due to forgetfulness which is linked to her depression (it is not suggested for example that she is suffering from dementia). There is no updating evidence from this doctor or indeed any other medical professional.
17. The following page is also what appears to be a prescription written by Dr Uqaily also dated 2 December 2023 which includes by way of side annotations, manuscript notes which may indicate that the doctor on that day took a history from the Appellant and provided a diagnosis. That is though not relevant to any challenge to the Decision because the Judge accepted the diagnosis.
18. At [B/38] is what appears to be a prescription from Dr Aslam dating back to January 2020 which is illegible. There is no transcription of that document if the medication there prescribed is said to be relevant to the Appellant’s care needs. The document at [B/39-42] relates to a medical condition suffered by the Sponsor and is therefore not relevant to the issue of the Appellant’s care needs. The document at [B/43-44] is, again, a largely illegible prescription dated 23 December 2024 with no explanation as to the relevance. [B/45] is a further copy of the letter from Dr Bachani (see above). At [B/46] is a prescription from the Sir Syed Hospital dated 31 May 2024 which, whilst legible, has no bearing on the Appellant’s need for care with everyday tasks. The final document is the certification that the Appellant is not suffering from tuberculosis (which is required for the entry clearance application).
19. In sum, therefore, the medical evidence does not provide the necessary evidence that the Appellant requires “long-term personal care to perform everyday tasks”. The Judge considered the recommendation that the Appellant come to live with her family but rejected this as providing the necessary evidence of care needs. That was a conclusion that she was entitled to reach on the evidence.
20. The other evidence comes from Mrs Mahvish who had been looking after the Appellant, from the Appellant herself and from the Sponsor. Only the Sponsor gave oral evidence as the Appellant and Mrs Mahvish live in Pakistan.
21. Mrs Mahvish’s statement is at [B/31-34]. We have read that carefully. It is dated 11 June 2024 and confirms that she has been supporting the Appellant as her friend since October 2023 when the Appellant’s brother died. On a fair reading, taken as a whole, that statement is sufficiently summarised by the Judge at [§13] and [§14] of the Decision. The Judge accepts that the Appellant has been diagnosed with depression. She also accepts that the Appellant forgets things but records that she is able to carry out everyday tasks. It is of note that, whilst Mrs Mahvish confirms that she asked the Sponsor to come to Pakistan to visit her mother because Mrs Mahvish was unable to help out for some time due to her own commitments, that visit was in January 2024 (according to the Sponsor’s statement). Mrs Mahvish’s statement as to what she does to assist the Sponsor is in the present tense and therefore was continuing at the date of her statement in June 2024 (as is confirmed by the Sponsor in her statement). In any event, the statement falls short of providing evidence that the Appellant needs help to carry out everyday tasks. It is not suggested that Mrs Mahvish lives with the Appellant and therefore gives care on a 24/7 basis. They both give different addresses in their statements.
22. The Appellant’s own statement is at [B/18-22]. That is dated 12 June 2024. We accept that, other than recording that there was a statement from the Appellant, the Judge does not refer to the detail of this statement aside from noting the evidence that the Appellant misses the Sponsor and wishes to live with her. However, the statement does not take matters further than the statement of Mrs Mahvish in terms of the care which Mrs Mahvish provides. The Appellant refers to her forgetfulness. She says that she has forgotten to take medication and suggests that she has overdosed in the past but there is no medical evidence about any overdose.
23. The Sponsor’s evidence about the Appellant’s needs is necessarily more limited because it deals with the period when she visited to cover for Mrs Mahvish’s absence. The Sponsor’s statement is at [B/23-30]. It is dated 11 June 2024. It sets out at [§11], the Appellant’s care needs at the time of her visit. Much of what is there said is directed at availability of care in Pakistan. Again, we accept that the Judge did not expressly refer to the evidence in the Sponsor’s statement. However, the identification of care needs says no more than is said by Mrs Mahvish in her statement. There is a further statement from the Sponsor dated 29 November 2024 ([B/84-86]) but that deals with care availability in Pakistan and not with the Appellant’s care needs.
24. Although we accept that the Judge did not set out expressly the Appellant’s and Sponsor’s evidence about care needs save to record that it was before her, we are satisfied that any failure in that regard could make no difference. The evidence which was most important to the Judge’s assessment of the care needs of the Appellant was that of the person who was caring for her at the time of the hearing – Mrs Mahvish. That is not medical evidence of the need for care but is taken into account by the Judge. The Judge was entitled to conclude that the Appellant could not meet the test under paragraph ADR.5.1 for the reasons she gave at [§13] and [§14] of the Decision. Ground one is not made out.
Ground 2
25. Our conclusion on ground one overlaps with the Appellant’s second ground challenging the Judge’s failure to consider the evidence of the Appellant and Sponsor. At [§13] of the grounds, it is suggested that the Judge “unjustly dismissed the Sponsor’s evidence as ‘self-serving’ without engaging with its substance”. We can find no such comment made by the Judge. It is suggested that the Judge rejected the Appellant’s and Sponsor’s evidence based on an assessment of their credibility. There are however no adverse credibility findings. The Judge accepted the diagnosis of the Appellant’s medical condition. She accepted the evidence of Mrs Mahvish which as we have indicated is of a piece with that of the Appellant and Sponsor. For those reasons and as above, the second ground does not identify any error which is material.
Ground 3
26. We turn then to the third ground which challenges what are said to be the Judge’s failures properly to consider care available in Pakistan. Within the Rules, there is a simple answer to this ground. The Judge at [§15] of the Decision concluded that as she was not satisfied that the Appellant required long-term personal care to perform everyday tasks, she did not need to go on to consider ADR.5.2. The Appellant could not meet the Rules because she did not meet paragraph ADR.5.1 and therefore whether she could meet paragraph ADR.5.2 was irrelevant. The Judge did not therefore need to make findings within the Rules.
27. Nor did the Judge need to consider availability of care in order to perform everyday tasks outside the Rules because she had found that the Appellant did not require that care. There is therefore no error under the third ground. For the same reasons, there is no error made by the Judge in relation to the matters pleaded at [§7-10] of the grounds as those are issues relating to availability of care which are irrelevant once there is a maintained finding that the Appellant does not need such care.

Ground 4
28. Turning then finally to the fourth ground, it is said that the Judge has “failed to balance the Appellant’s compelling need for care and the Sponsor’s position as her sole child against the public interest in immigration control” ([§20]). Of course, the Judge had not accepted that the Appellant had any “compelling need for care” which is therefore the answer to this point.
29. There is an additional point raised here (and also raised in relation to the availability of care which as we have already indicated is irrelevant in the circumstances). That is what are described as “the specific vulnerabilities faced by the Appellant as a Christian elderly woman in Pakistan, which heighten her dependency on the Sponsor” ([§23]).
30. As Ms Kerr pointed out, there is limited reliance on this factor in the evidence nor is it raised in the Appellant’s skeleton argument. The fact of the Appellant being Christian is mentioned at [§11] of the Appellant’s statement but only in the context of making availability of care “impossible” because Christians in Pakistan are on her account “treated lower than other humans in Pakistan”. It is referred to in a similar context by the Sponsor in her statement at [§11(h)]. Again, this may have been relevant if the Judge had accepted that the Appellant required long-term personal care but is not relevant in circumstances where that was not the Judge’s finding.
31. Mr Hingora in his submissions accepted that the fourth ground was parasitic on the other grounds. He also said that there was no consideration of the gravity of the interference or of the care available abroad. As to the latter, the Judge did deal with this at [§19] of the Decision. Having regard to the level of care that she had found the Appellant to need, she there found that the “appellant is able to obtain the required level of care … and that such care is likely to be affordable”. This was in the context of the finding that “the evidence …does not support a finding that the appellant requires, or is currently provided with 24 hour care, nor does she require residential care.” The Judge there repeated her earlier findings as to the extent of care required.
32. As to interference with the Appellant’s Article 8 rights more generally, the Judge made the following finding as to interference:
“18….(b) I weigh the following family and private life factors in the appellant’s favour. The appellant is 66 years of age and has been diagnosed with depressive disorder and comorbid anxiety. The appellant’s sponsor daughter is her only child, and they have a strong bond, and the appellant’s daughter is committed to caring for her mother in the United Kingdom.”
33. The Judge referred herself at [§18(a)] of the Decision to the public interest having regard in particular to her earlier findings that the Appellant could not meet the Rules. Thereafter, at [§20], having referred to the Appellant’s care needs, and that the Appellant would be able to maintain contact remotely and via visits, the Judge conducted a balancing assessment in the following terms:
“Having taken all these factors into account and carried out the balancing exercise I am satisfied that any interference with the appellant’s family life is justified or proportionate as at the date of the hearing. I therefore reach the conclusion that it would be justifiable and proportionate to dismiss this appeal. In all the circumstances here, I find that the public interest does require the refusal of entry of the appellant. For the same reasons I find that refusing leave to enter does not result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for the appellant and her daughter. Therefore, for the reasons set out above I do not find that the decision under appeal here to place the United Kingdom in breach of its obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights.”
34. That assessment does not disclose any error of law. Having regard also to our conclusions as to the other three grounds and Mr Hingora’s acceptance that this fourth ground was parasitic on those other grounds, there is no error in the Judge’s Article 8 assessment.
CONCLUSION
35. For those reasons, we conclude that there is no error of law in the Decision. Whilst we have accepted that the Judge did not expressly consider the evidence of the Appellant and the Sponsor since that did not differ from the evidence of Mrs Mahvish which the Judge did consider, we are satisfied that the failure to refer expressly to the evidence of the Appellant and Sponsor could make no difference to the Judge’s findings about the level of care required by the Appellant.
36. For those reasons, we uphold the Decision with the consequence that the Appellant’s appeal remains dismissed.

NOTICE OF DECISION
The Decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Richards-Clarke dated 8 December 2024 does not involve the making of an error of law which is material to the outcome. We therefore uphold the Decision with the result that the Appellant’s appeal remains dismissed.

L K Smith
Upper Tribunal Judge Smith
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

15 April 2025