UI-2025-000699

• Status of case: Unreported
• Hearing date: 19 Sep 2025
• Promulgation date: 14 Jan 2026
• Publication date: 29 Jan 2026
• Last updated on: 29 Jan 2026

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-000699

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/55702/2022
LP/00631/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 14th of January 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE PINDER


Between

D G
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent


Representation:

For the Appellant: Mr R Toal, Counsel instructed by Turpin & Miller.
For the Respondent: Ms S Simbi, Senior Presenting Officer.

Heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 19 September 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant DG is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.


DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction

1. The Appellant DG appeals against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (‘the FtT/the Judge’) dated 16th December 2024. In this decision, the FtT dismissed the Appellant’s protection and human rights appeal against the Respondent’s decision of 23rd November 2022, in which the Respondent refused the Appellant’s claims and maintained an earlier decision to deport him from the UK.

2. I have maintained the Anonymity Order in favour of the Appellant, first made by the FtT. I consider, on the specific facts of this appeal, that a derogation from the principle of open justice is justified. This is because the Appellant has raised a claim to international protection but also to being a victim of modern slavery/trafficking, with the latter remaining outstanding.

3. By the time of the FtT hearing, and following a referral to the National Referral Mechanism (‘NRM’), the Appellant had been issued on 8th June 2021 with a positive reasonable grounds decision that he may be such a victim. However, a conclusive grounds decision had not subsequently been made and on 28th March 2023, the Respondent made a public order disqualification decision effectively excluding the Appellant from any modern slavery support on the basis that the Appellant posed a high threat to public order and had low modern slavery recovery needs. At the time of the FtT hearing, the Appellant was in the process of challenging the Respondent’s public order disqualification decision by way of judicial review proceedings and this remained the case when the matter came before me.

Factual and procedural background

4. There is a lengthy and complex background to this matter and since this is both well known to the parties and comprehensively summarised by the Judge at [2]-[10] of the decision, I do not rehearse this in much detail here.

5. As far as is relevant to the appeal in this Tribunal, the key procedural history includes the following:

(a) The Appellant first entered the UK on 27th October 2014 as a child, aged 17 years old. His subsequent asylum claim was unsuccessful and certified in 2015 as clearly unfounded so that he could not appeal this decision to the FtT while in the UK;
(b) The Appellant was arrested on 6th January 2018 and subsequently convicted on 21st February 2018 for being in possession of cocaine with intent to supply and for additional offences relating to the false use of an identity document and driving without insurance. The Appellant was sentenced to 40 months’ imprisonment in a young offenders institute;
(c) The Respondent issued a decision to deport the Appellant and a deportation order on or around 10th April 2019;
(d) The Appellant lodged a fresh protection claim with the Respondent, making several sets of written representations in support of the same. Those representations were refused by the Respondent in her decision of 23rd November 2022. This is the decision, which the Appellant appealed to the FtT and which has led to these proceedings. Whilst the Appellant’s representations were under consideration of the Respondent, as summarised above at para 3, the Appellant was referred to the NRM, ultimately resulting in the Respondent’s public order disqualification decision. The Appellant’s subsequent challenge to the public order disqualification decision remains outstanding;
(e) On 9th April 2024, the Appellant was convicted again of possession of cocaine with intent to supply. He pleaded guilty to this offence and was sentenced to 46 months’ imprisonment;
(f) On 7th May 2024, the Respondent confirmed to the Appellant in a separate notice that she was intending to invoke the provisions contained in s.72 of the 2002 so as to exclude the Appellant from being able to benefit from the safeguards provided by the Refugee Convention. The Respondent then issued on 28th August 2024 a certificate under s.72(9)(b) of the 2002 Act confirming that the presumption that the Appellant posed a danger to the community as a result of his conviction(s) applied to him.

6. The Appellant appealed against the Respondent’s decision of 23rd November 2022 to the FtT and this appeal was heard by the Judge on 30th September and 3rd December 2024. The Judge did not hear from the Appellant at the hearing and the matter was conducted on submissions-only over the course of two days. This is for the reasons that the Judge summarised at [16]. The Appellant pursued his appeal on the basis that his removal would be in reach of the Refugee Convention and the ECHR: first, because of a well-founded fear of his brother and his associations and second, because he has been a victim of trafficking/modern slavery, who also fears re-trafficking on return.

The decision of the First-tier Tribunal

7. Because the Appellant was only granted permission to appeal on some of the grounds he seeks to pursue (see para 14-15 below), I only summarise the Judge’s findings that relate to the Appellant’s onward appeal to this Tribunal.

8. With regards to the Appellant’s claim of fearing his brother and associates, the Judge concluded as follows:

(a) The Respondent has conceded that the Appellant has a subjective fear of his brother and of those his brother owes money to. The Appellant’s brother is a criminal and has “caused the Appellant and his family difficulties”. The Appellant has given a reasonably consistent account of the fear of his brother over the period of nine years that he has been here – [45];
(b) The appellant has established a subjective fear of his brother when he left in 2014 and this fear was to the point where he sought protection from the authorities – [47];
(c) “This is a case where the threat is posed by a non-state actor, it is not claimed that the (A)ppellant’s brother has any influence over the authorities in Albania and it is a fact that the (A)ppellant did seek the protection of the courts against his brother. This resulted in the protective order being made. The (A)ppellant has not claimed that the order was breached or was ineffective in any way.” – [48];
(d) In relation to the fear of his brother and those he owes money to, the Judge found that there would be sufficiency of state protection and also “that internal relocation would not be unreasonable because there is nothing to suggest that (the Appellant’s brother) has any influence or power in Albania.” – [48].

9. With regards to the Appellant’s claim of being a victim of trafficking, the Judge concluded as follows:

(a) First in relation to the person who the Appellant claims facilitated his entry into the UK (I will refer to him as ‘X’), the Judge did not accept that the Appellant was at risk from him because the Appellant had confirmed in his most recent evidence that neither he nor his family have been contacted by X. Further, that contact had been lost with X because the Appellant’s mobile phone was seized on arrival in the UK. Neither did the Judge accept that X has any reach or influence or wish to harm the Appellant having lost contact nine years ago – [49];
(b) It was also not plausible that the Appellant thought that someone whom he met in a bar, and who agreed to obtain identity documents for him for no charge, would do so in a professional legitimate manner. The Judge did not accept either the Appellant’s claim that he did not know his identity documents were false until he arrived in the United Kingdom. This was because he had travelled on the flight from Italy to the UK alone and so would have been in possession of the false Romanian passport. The Judge stated that “(i)t would have been obvious it was not his own Albanian passport” and thus, the Judge found that “the (A)ppellant knew he would be working in an illegal operation when he arrived and he made the decision to enter the United Kingdom with this knowledge.” – [50];
(c) With regards to the Appellant’s claim to have been forced into the illegal drugs trade in the UK, the Judge considered at [51] that the Appellant’s accounts of this varied slightly. The Judge noted at [52] that “(i)t may be that the (A)ppellant could have provided reasonable explanations for these apparent inconsistencies had he given evidence.” – [52];
(d) The Judge also considered that the Appellant’s guilty plea in 2024 went against the Appellant’s claim to have been exploited and the Judge did not accept the Appellant’s explanation as reasonable, noting that the Appellant had received advice (in the form of an expert report commissioned by his immigration solicitors) pre-dating this guilty plea, in relation to a potential defence to the 2018 conviction under the Modern Slavery Act – [53];
(e) Lastly, the Judge considered that the Appellant had not established that his being stabbed in 2021 and 2023 was connected to the persons he feared and/or connected to his refusal(s) to sell drugs – [54].

10. At [56]-[63], the Judge considered whether the Appellant had successfully rebutted the presumption that applied under s.72 of the 2002 and found that he had not. This was as a result of the Judge rejecting the Appellant’s account to have been forced to work in the illegal drugs trade, the Appellant’s conviction and a lack of remorse expressed and insight by the Appellant.

11. At [64]-[78], the Judge went on to consider whether the return of the Appellant would breach the UK’s obligations under the ECHR Articles 2, 3 and 4. The Judge stated that “(w)hilst (they) have not accepted that the appellant has established he has been exploited, the focus of the hearing was in relation to the position of the appellant on return and whether this would breach the United Kingdom’s obligations under the ECHR and so (the Judge did) consider it relevant and necessary to consider evidence and submissions in relation to the position on return.”

12. The earlier finding that the Appellant would be able to access sufficiency of protection against his brother and his associates was carried forward at [65], where the Judge also cited from AD and others v Sweden ((Application no. 22283/21). At [66]-[75], the Judge considered this European Court authority further, together with the Appellant’s expert reports and the Respondent’s relevant CPINs in the context of the Appellant’s trafficking claim. The Judge’s conclusions are at [76]-[78] where the Judge stated that, had they found the Appellant to have been a victim of trafficking, they would have concluded that this return would not have breached the UK’s obligations.

13. The Judge reached the conclusions above on the basis that the evidence indicated that progress has been made recently and there is a recognition that it is not only females and minors who require support on return. In addition, in light of the Appellant being able to explain his situation to experts in the UK, there is no reason in the Judge’s view why he cannot self-refer in order to gain access to financial support and accommodation, which the evidence confirms is available in different areas of Albania. In terms of internal relocation as a viable option, the Judge disagreed with the Appellant’s submissions and found that there was no suggestion that the persons, whom the Appellant fears in relation to his claim to have been trafficked, have any influence or reach, which might enable them to locate the Appellant elsewhere in Albania.

The Appellant’s appeal to the Upper Tribunal

14. The Appellant was granted permission to appeal to the Tribunal by another judge of the Upper Tribunal. The grant of permission permitting the Appellant to pursue his appeal on limited grounds (his first and third to sixth Grounds) was in the following terms:

“It is arguable that the First-tier Tribunal acted unfairly by deciding central issues in the case when those issues had not been raised by the Respondent or the Tribunal at or before the hearing. It is further arguable that the Tribunal’s conclusions as to the adequacy and availability of state protection, and the viability of internal relocation, were not supported by the evidence, and/or that the Tribunal’s reasoning was not sufficient to explain its conclusions on those issues. It is also arguable that the First-tier Tribunal erred by not addressing the Appellant’s Article 4 case.”

15. The Appellant’s ground of appeal which was not successful in attracting permission to appeal (his second Ground – paras 5-9 of the Appellant’s grounds of appeal) related to the FtT – it was argued - applying the wrong standard of proof. The Upper Tribunal judge granting permission was of the view that the FtT had expressly directed itself to the appropriate standard and those grounds of appeal did not demonstrate, even arguably, that that standard had not been applied.

16. In response, the Respondent filed and served a reply under Rule 24 of the Procedure Rules.

17. At the hearing, both parties’ advocates made further oral submissions with Ms Simbi, on behalf of the Respondent, defending the FtT’s decision. I have addressed the parties’ respective written pleadings and oral submissions in the section below when setting out my analysis and conclusions. At the end of the hearing, I reserved my decision on whether the FtT had made material error(s) of law and provide this below with my reasons.

Analysis and conclusions

Procedural unfairness – the Appellant’s first ground of appeal

18. The main and central ground of appeal pursued by the Appellant pleads procedural unfairness, with – it is said – several issues being considered and concluded by the Judge without having been raised by either party as issues in dispute and without being identified as such at the outset, or at any other relevant time, by either party or the Judge. These issues relate to the Appellant’s claim to have been trafficked.

19. It is first important to note that the Appellant claimed to have been trafficked once from Albania to the UK in 2014 and then to have been forced to work in the illegal drugs trade once in the UK. It is thus important to deal with these two aspects of the Appellant’s claim and appeal distinctly.

20. The reasonable grounds decision, which had been relied upon by the Appellant, both before the Judge at first instance and as part of his appeal grounds to the Tribunal, resulted from a referral concerning the Appellant’s claimed trafficking to the UK and subsequent vulnerabilities on arrival, which included whether or not he was forced to work in the illegal drugs trade once in the UK. This is confirmed in the NRM referral minute (TB [319]-[320]) and the reasonable grounds decision [TB [324]-[332].

21. The Appellant rightly acknowledges that the reasonable grounds decision of the Respondent dated 8th June 2021 was referred to by the Judge at [8]. In addition, that the Judge directed themselves correctly at [39] that they were not bound by the this decision. The Appellant argues however that with the Respondent not having withdrawn her reasonable grounds decision nor having indicated that she disputed the Appellant’s claim to have been trafficked, it was procedurally unfair of the Judge to decide a central issue in the case against the Appellant without any notice having been given to the Appellant.

22. The Respondent maintains that there has been no procedural unfairness, noting in particular the Respondent’s confirmation given at the hearing on 1st May 2024 that she intended to withdraw the concessions made earlier in the 2015 decision and the reasonable grounds decision (summarised by the Judge at [34]). Following the Tribunal’s directions, the Respondent set out the specific credibility issues taken by her in August 2024. These were set out under the heading “credibility” at paras 14 and 15 of the s.72 Notice/letter dated 28th August 2024. There was ample notice to the Appellant therefore and this was what the Judge had rightly considered at [34]-[39]. The Respondent argues that it was the Appellant’s decision, on advice, not to give oral evidence, whilst remaining on notice that credibility was in issue. The latter was also illustrated by the fact that his legal representative made submissions on credibility at the hearing.

23. It is correct that the Judge found at [35] that the Appellant had been “on notice that the credibility of his account (was) in issue”. The Judge referred to here to the decision letter dated 23rd November 2022 and the s.72 letter dated 28th August 2024. The Judge then went on to summarise the issues taken by the Respondent in those letters, which were that:

(a) The Appellant had expressed an intention to apply to the Facilitated Returns Scheme (FRS), with the Respondent concluding from this that, had the Appellant’s life really been in danger, he would not have applied to return to Albania on this scheme;
(b) The Appellant had provided an inconsistent account of why he came to the United Kingdom, when comparing the Appellant’s account to his mother’s account to the Italian authorities in December 2015, which was that the Appellant had sought protection because he was exposed to danger from an ongoing blood feud;
(c) The Appellant had not sought to challenge either of his 2018 and/or his 2024 criminal convictions or sentences based on forced criminality;
(d) The Appellant had not sought the protection of the police in relation to the claimed forced criminality leading to his conviction in 2024, despite stating that he would do so in August 2020. The Respondent concluded from this that financial reward was the Appellant’s motivation.

24. The Judge also noted that the Respondent had invoked s.8 of the 2004 Act and considered that the Appellant’s credibility had been damaged because he had used a false Romanian passport to enter the UK and had only claimed asylum after being apprehended and refused entry to the UK, not claiming asylum in Italy.

25. At [38], the Judge considered that the Appellant had been on notice that the Respondent has taken issue with the credibility of his account to have been trafficked to the United Kingdom and with his account of having been forced into the illegal drugs trade because he is a victim of modern day slavery.

26. From the Judge’s summary in the decision of the credibility issues taken by the Respondent together with the issues as they are raised in the Respondent’s decision of 24th August 2024, I am not satisfied that the Appellant was on notice, for the purposes of the hearing at first instance, that the Respondent disputed the manner in which the Appellant was brought to the UK and whether this amounted to trafficking.

27. It is clear from the Respondent’s earlier decision of 23rd November 2022 that no substantive issue was taken with the credibility of the Appellant’s account in respect of this aspect of the Appellant’s claim. This decision is very detailed and comprehensive in its summary of the Appellant’s claim and its consideration of background evidence. It is only at paras 38-39 that the Respondent states that the Albanian authorities are making progress to combat the issue of blood feuds and that the Appellant could approach the police to report any issues he had “with the gangs or (his) brother”. This is despite an express reference, summarised at para 31 of this same decision, to the Appellant having submitted evidence in support of his fresh representations that there are problems on return “for men/boys, who have been trafficked, victims of violence and vulnerability in Albania”. There is a further reference to the Respondent’s understanding of the background evidence concerning the Albanian authorities “being serious about the problem of trafficking”.

28. It is therefore only the Respondent’s letter of 24th August 2024, as also noted by the Judge, that can be described as having raised concerns with the credibility of the Appellant’s account. This contained a list of issues at para 14 of the letter, summarised by the Judge at [35] and summarised above at para 23, as well as the s.8 issues at para 15 of the letter, summarised above at para 24.

29. Looking therefore at the list of issues raised by the Respondent at para 14, the first two issues (para 14i. and ii.) relate to the reasons why he left Albania, namely a blood feud vs problems from his brother and associates. The last issue (para 14v.), relating to the Appellant’s expressed intention in 2018 to apply for the Facilitated Return Scheme, also arguably goes to this but also arguably to whether there remains a risk perceived by the Appellant from those whom he claimed trafficked him. The remaining two issues (para 14iii. and iv.) raise concerns with regards to the Appellant’s forced criminality modern slavery claim in the UK.

30. It is far from clear therefore, from the way in which the Respondent put the Appellant on notice through her decision of 24th August 2024 that she was seeking to contest how the Appellant came to the UK in 2014 and whether this in itself amounted to trafficking. The only issue that could be understood as relating to the Appellant’s claimed fear in relation to having been trafficked in 2014 is the Respondent’s concern with the FRS application. However, this goes to fear and risk on return and arguably not to whether he was trafficked in the first place.

31. The Respondent’s list of issues at para 14 of the 28th August 2024 letter was in contrast with the Competent Authority’s preliminary view that no credibility concerns have been identified, as noted in the reasonable grounds decision of 8th June 2021. As I have already noted, the Respondent’s 2022 decision did not contest the Appellant’s claim to have been trafficked in 2014 either. Whilst there is a detailed summary of other discussions between the Judge and the parties’ advocates at the hearings relating to other evidential issues, for example at [14], there is no summary of any discussions as to the parameters of the Respondent’s credibility concerns as raised in her letter dated 24th August 2024. I also note the Judge recorded at [64] that “the focus of the hearing was in relation to the position of the appellant on return”.

32. Based on the above, I am satisfied that the Appellant was, at best, not on notice of the issue of his claimed trafficking to the UK in 2014 being disputed and at worst, it was equivocal whether the Respondent was disputing this. If the latter, in light of the complex procedural history in this case and the Respondent not having disputed this issue in 2022 and the Competent Authority’s reasonable grounds decision, it was incumbent on the Judge to either clarify and narrow the issues further before proceeding with the appeal substantively or to raise any issues or concerns that the Judge held separately against the Appellant with the parties prior to determining the appeal.

33. On this basis therefore, I am satisfied that the Judge made a material error of law when proceeding and determining a central aspect of the Appellant’s claim against him when he was not on notice of this. I consider this to be a central aspect of the Appellant’s claim, because if he was trafficked in 2014, this potentially determines the extent of any vulnerabilities that the Appellant may have had at the time, and any subsequently, which he may still have to date. Those same vulnerabilities, if any, may also relevant to the Appellant’s conduct once he arrived in the UK. All in a context when the Appellant was a minor - he was 17 years old when he arrived in the UK and younger when in Albania and experiencing ill-treatment from his brother and associates, which has been accepted by the Respondent.

34. The Judge found at [49] that that the Appellant would not be at risk from X, whom the Appellant claimed to have trafficked him, for reasons, largely, relating to the passage of time and the lack of contact or threats received since (see summary at para 9(a) above). That may very well be the case but does not detract from the need to have determined whether or not the Appellant was trafficked in the first place for the reasons that I have touched on above at para 33.

35. In addition, the Judge then gave other reasons for rejecting the Appellant’s claim to have been trafficked in 2014 that relate to plausibility (see summary at para 9(b) above). Firstly, those are not issues that had seemingly been raised by the Respondent in advance of the hearing. This would have informed the Appellant’s decision not to give evidence at the hearing before the Judge. I also consider this to have been procedurally unfair.

36. Secondly, those matters were arguably not ones that the Judge was entitled to hold against the Appellant. This is because the “means stage” from the trafficking definition is not required when assessing whether a child has been trafficked - the definition recognises that a child cannot give informed consent to their own exploitation, even if they agree to travel or understand what has happened.

37. Thirdly, it is well established that assessments of plausibility are generally unhelpful as these often entail subjective assessments and/or cultural and socio-economic assumptions. There is no reference at [50] to the Appellant’s age for example, nor to the circumstances in which he left Albania, which were accepted by the Respondent and by the Judge – see [45]-[46]. Those circumstances would, at the very least, have been relevant to the Appellant’s conduct in seeking to leave Albania, and how he would have done so. It is not apparent from the Judge’s decision that these relevant matters were considered and this has arisen, in my view, from a failure to raise this with the Appellant prior to the hearing as addressed at para 35 above.

38. For the avoidance of doubt, neither party raised the trafficking definition as it applies to a child, that I have briefly considered at para 36 above. For the reasons that I have set out above, I would have concluded that the Judge made a material error of law under this ground of appeal without consideration to this issue. In any event, it is necessary for the correct law to be applied.

39. Whilst these claimed events took place some 11 years ago, whether or not the Appellant was trafficked in 2014 is material in my view since it would be relevant to the assessment of risk on return. This is because, as I have already addressed, this is reasonably likely to inform any vulnerabilities that the Appellant may have or experience on return. The claimed events from 2014 and thereafter are also reasonably likely to inform whether the Appellant was vulnerable to forced criminality whilst in the UK. This is why I am of the firm view that the Judge erred in law and that these errors are material as stated here and at para 33 above.

40. For these reasons, I am also not satisfied that the Judge’s findings on the Appellant’s modern slavery claim when in the UK can be relied upon if there has not been a lawful assessment of the Appellant’s initial trafficking claim. These issues are potentially inter-related as I have addressed above and ought to be considered afresh all together.

41. The nature of trafficking claims is often complex and established guidance instructs that “being a past victim of trafficking and being at real and immediate risk of being (re-) trafficked are very closely inter-related” and it “is prudent to regard any past victim of trafficking as a potential victim of re-trafficking” - TDT, R (On the Application Of) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Rev 1) [2018] EWCA Civ 1395, Underhill LJ at [39]-[40], with whom Floyd LJ and Dame Elizabeth Gloster agreed. For this reason, it would be artificial to try and compartmentalize the claimed experiences that the Appellant had when coming to the UK from those that he claims to have experienced thereafter in the UK. For this reason and those set out above, I am satisfied that the Judge’s findings on the Appellant’s claim to have experienced forced criminality when in the UK should also be set aside.

The Appellant’s remaining grounds of appeal

42. The Appellant’s remaining grounds of appeal all seek to challenge the Judge’s findings on sufficiency of protection, internal relocation and the UK’s obligations under the ECHR, in particular Article 4.

43. Since those issues are in part informed by the facts that precede them, which include whether or not the Appellant was trafficked to the UK and/or subjected to forced criminality when in the UK, it follows that the Judge’s findings on these issues also fall to be set aside and will need to be considered afresh. It is not necessary for me therefore to set out in detail the reasons for this as they flow from my conclusions on the Appellant’s first ground of appeal.

44. I will however briefly address the Appellant’s third ground of appeal, which argues that the Judge’s conclusion that there would be sufficiency of state protection is irrational. The Appellant submits that this conclusion is grounded in the Judge’s finding that the Appellant had not claimed as part of his appeal that the protective court order, previously obtained by him in Albania against his brother, was breached or was ineffective in any way – see [48] (and summary at para 8 above). For this reason, the Judge concluded that the Appellant could seek the protection of the courts and/or authorities again, as he had done previously before leaving Albania.

45. In order to demonstrate that this was not a finding that was reasonably open to the Judge, the Appellant relies on the fact that the Respondent accepted the Appellant’s account of the problems he had experienced in Albania from his brother and others associated with him – see the Respondent’s refusal letter dated 6th July 2015 where a detailed summary of the Appellant’s claim in this respect is recorded by the Respondent at para 1f.-h and paras 19-21 where the Respondent accepted the Appellant’s subjective fear of his brother and associates but rejected the Appellant’s protection claim on grounds of sufficiency of protection. Further, the Appellant submits that the credibility issues raised in the later letter of 24th August 2024 did not displace this.

46. The Appellant’s account, as given to the Respondent, comprised the specific events summarised by the Appellant at para 13 of his grounds of appeal, which included the Appellant effectively being threatened for having sought the protection of the court, being attacked by men connected to his brother a couple of months after the court order was issued against his brother, and being threatened if he was to return to court. The Appellant had also claimed to have been beaten by his brother before he was able to leave Albania.

47. Given the Appellant’s account, the Appellant submits that the Judge’s findings that the Appellant “has not claimed that the order was breached or was ineffective in any way” and that it was not asserted that there were difficulties after the protective order was granted are perverse.

48. The Appellant also addresses the Judge’s findings on the adequacy of protection based on background evidence and case-law. At [66] the Judge concluded that “no reason was given why I should depart from this decision” – the decision referred to here was that of the European Court of Human Rights in AD v Sweden. The Appellant argues that he did in fact give the Judge a reason to depart from this decision, which resided in the submission that the Judge should follow Kacaj [2001] UKIAT 18 instead. The Upper Tribunal held in the latter authority at [21] that “(i)f this best (by the authorities) can be shown to be ineffective, it may be that the applicant will have established that there is an inability to provide the necessary protection”.

49. The Appellant argues that his own experience of seeking state protection, coupled with the background evidence concerning victims of trafficking, supported a finding that there would not be, in his particular case, sufficiency of protection. The Judge’s reliance on AD v Sweden when concluding “the Albanian authorities’ capacity to protect their people cannot be regarded as insufficient for the general public” did not address the assessment that the Judge was required to undertake in respect of the Appellant himself and what protection he himself may be able to benefit from on return.

50. The Respondent states in her Rule 24 that the Judge permissibly found that there is in general state protection in Albania in accordance with case law and the CPIN and that this ground amounts to mere disagreement only.

51. AD v Sweden has provided guidance on the Albanian authorities’ capacity to protect and that this cannot be regarded as insufficient for the general public. At [71], the Court confirmed this and also stated that “(n)or can it be regarded as generally insufficient for all persons who are targeted by criminal organisations” (my emphasis). What was required however in this case was an assessment as to the sufficiency of protection for this particular Appellant. For the reasons that I have set out above, this was not done by the Judge with a failure to factor in the Appellant’s evidence that the protection already offered to him by the Courts in Albania had not deterred his brother and/or his associates. It is not enough for the Respondent to argue that the general position as to state protection suffices when she accepted the account given to her by the Appellant as far as his brother was concerned.

52. Further, the European Court dismissed the applicants’ appeals in AD v Sweden after a detailed assessment of what matters had been reported by the applicants in those cases to the Albanian authorities and whether there was evidence that there were failures on the part of the authorities to take relevant measures. Further, the Court found that there was no indication that the applicants complained to any higher authority in Albania about any lack of action by the police and the Court held overall that the evidence did not show that the Albanian authorities failed to take the reports seriously or refused to act on them. This in contrast with the Judge’s conclusion in this matter that because the Appellant had previously sought protection from the courts in Albania, he can do so again, without engaging with the Appellant’s evidence that the protection given to him had not been effective.

53. In light of the above, I am satisfied that the Judge made material error(s) of law and the Judge’s decision promulgated on 16th December 2024 shall be set aside, with no findings of fact preserved. Given the scale of the fact-finding to finally determine the appeal, it is necessary and appropriate to remit the matter to the First-tier Tribunal with no retained findings.

Notice of Decision

54. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 16th December 2024 contained material errors of law and is set aside.

55. The appeal is to be remitted back to the FtT for remaking afresh before a different judge.


Sarah Pinder

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber


06.01.2026