Tribunal decisions

The decision

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Case Number: UI-2025-000701
First-tier Tribunal Ref: PA/62386/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Field House
Decision & Reasons Promulgated
On 14 July 2025
On the 11 August 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HIRST
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE J K SWANEY

Between

ASA
(anonymity direction made)
Appellant
and

the secretary of state for the home department
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr F Ahmad, counsel, instructed by Fountain Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms S McKenzie, senior presenting officer
Order pursuant to rule 13(1)(b) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014
Unless and until this appeal is finally determined or the court/tribunal directs otherwise the appellant is granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
DECISION AND REASONS
Anonymity
1. We have made an anonymity order because this decision contains information that could put the appellant at risk if it were disclosed and the need for the United Kingdom to comply with its obligations under the Refugee Convention outweighs the public interest in open justice.
Background
2. The background to the appellant’s appeal is contained in the Upper Tribunal’s decision dated 24 April 2025 which is set out in Annex A to this decision and is not repeated here.
3. Following the error of law hearing, it was held that the decision of Judge Hussain (the Judge) involved the making of a material error of law, in relation to his assessment of the appellant’s political opinion, his activities and whether they would give rise to a risk on return. Given the narrow issue to be determined and the limited need for fact finding, the matter was retained in the Upper Tribunal for the remaking decision.
4. In setting aside the Judge’s decision, the Upper Tribunal preserved the Judge’s findings at paragraphs 43 to 49 and 55 of his decision. The issues for determination for us were therefore about the appellant’s political opinion and whether he would be at risk on return.
5. Mr Ahmad raised a preliminary issue with us, which was whether section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 (the 2004 Act) was in issue. We confirmed that it was not. It was not raised in the grounds of appeal and was not before the Upper Tribunal in the error of law hearing. In any event, because the live issues in this re-making relate to the appellant’s sur place activities, his failure to claim asylum in France is not material.
Discussion
6. There are two issues for us to determine, which are:
(i) Does the appellant hold genuine political beliefs (or would he be perceived as holding such beliefs)?
(ii) If so, would those political beliefs give rise to a risk to him of persecution and/or serious harm on return to Iraq?
7. The preserved findings of the First-tier Tribunal relate to the appellant’s claim based on his relationship with Sara. The appellant was found not credible in relation to that part of his claim. We are remaking the decision solely in relation to the political aspect of his claim.
8. We have considered the appellant’s evidence and find that it is consistent. His evidence about his political opinions and activities at initial screening; in a form completed between his screening interview and his substantive interview; at his substantive interview; and before us is all consistent. It is also consistent with the documentary evidence before us including from his Facebook account. He answered all of the questions asked of him in cross-examination, providing a sufficient level of detail. His oral evidence was consistent with his evidence in his witness statements and interview records. Having considered all of the evidence in the round, we find that the appellant is credible in relation to the issues that are before us, and that we can place weight on his evidence.
Does the appellant hold genuine political beliefs?
9. We are satisfied to the lower standard that the appellant does hold genuine political beliefs for the following reasons.
10. The appellant mentioned having actively protested against the PUK and the KDP in Iraq in a form entitled ‘Continue asylum claim’ which is dated 3 July 2023. It was completed after his screening interview and prior to his substantive interview. The appellant stated:
I also fear the PUK and KDP (Kurdish Democratic Party), because I have been actively protesting against them in Iraq, and I have been publicly critical of them. I also hold genuine political beliefs in opposing them, based on their corruption and inhumane treatment of Iraqi citizens.
11. This is consistent with the appellant’s evidence at his substantive interview (question 29) where he confirmed that he had actively participated in a demonstration against the PUK and the KDP in Chwarqurna. The appellant was asked about his political activities at questions 80 to 82 of his substantive interview. He stated that he attended three demonstrations in Iraq in February 2021, on 4 March 2021 and on 29 July 2021. He stated that the demonstrations were about the price of petrol going up, general increases in prices and the failure to pay salaries. The appellant stated that he was not a member of any political group. His oral evidence about the reasons for the demonstrations was consistent with that given at interview. He stated that the demonstrations were not about toppling the government but were about the general situation.
12. Ms McKenzie relied on the US State Department Iraq 2021 Human Rights Report for her submission that the appellant’s account of attending demonstrations in 2021 was not credible. She relied in particular on the following:
The country experienced large-scale protests in Baghdad and several Shia-majority provinces beginning in 2019 and lasting through mid-2020, with reports of more than 500 civilians killed and 20,000 or more injured.
13. We say two things about this evidence. The first is that we take judicial notice that US State Department Human Rights Reports are usually published between March and April of the year following the year to which they relate. The report dated 2021 therefore relates to events in 2020. Secondly, the US State Department report does not document every demonstration held, so even if the report did relate to events in 2021, it is not realistic to expect that each and every demonstration that took place would be reported on. The respondent relies on an absence of evidence but does not point to any positive evidence that no demonstrations took place as asserted.
14. We find that the appellant did attend demonstrations as claimed. We find that demonstrating about matters such as the price of petrol, inflation and a failure to pay salaries are matters which are an expression of a political opinion. We attach no weight to the fact that the appellant did not belong to any particular political organisation. The appellant stated in cross-examination before us that he has not joined any organisation because he wishes to remain independent. This is perfectly reasonable. One does not have to be a member of a political party to have or to express political views.
15. The appellant gave evidence in his witness statement dated 6 July 2025. The appellant gave evidence in his witness statement dated 6 July 2025 about why participating in demonstrations and exposing the corruption and human rights abuses of the IKR and Iraqi governments is important to him. His evidence was not challenged by Ms McKenzie, and we accept that they are the appellant’s genuinely held views. Ms McKenzie suggested to the appellant that his attendance at demonstrations coincided with relevant stages of his asylum claim. The appellant denied that this was the case.
16. We find that the appellant has been engaging in activities that involve expressing a political opinion or are likely to be perceived as such in the United Kingdom. We find that he has been attending demonstrations and that he posts political material on his Facebook page. The appellant provided his Facebook profile information and activity records for his appeal hearing in the First-tier Tribunal. Although we did not have updated profile information or activity records in relation to the material in the supplementary bundle that was before us, Ms McKenzie did not challenge that the material was in fact posted by the appellant on his Facebook page. We find that it was. We also find that the appellant’s profile bears his full name and photographs of him, including at demonstrations.
17. Having found that the appellant holds genuine political beliefs, we move on to consider whether they would put him at risk on return. In doing so, we have followed the approach in HJ (Iran) v SSHD [2010] UKSC 31.
18. We find that the appellant would be open about his political opinions on return to Iraq. He has engaged in demonstrations in the past, and we find that he would continue to do so. We find that he would continue to post political material on social media.
19. In the event that the appellant would behave discreetly, we find that this is because of his fear of persecution and/or serious harm. We accept the appellant’s evidence at paragraph 12 of his witness statement dated 6 July 2025, which was not challenged.
20. Ms McKenzie addressed us in relation to the ability of the Iraqi authorities to engage in monitoring and surveillance of electronic communications with reference to the Iraq: Freedom on the Net 2024 Country Report. She contended that while they may have the ability to monitor, this is limited by a lack of modern devices. She submitted that nothing in the evidence shows that the Iraqi authorities have the ability to monitor online activities outside Iraq. We find that an ability to monitor online activities outside Iraq is not material. We are satisfied that they have the capacity to monitor online activity within Iraq, including in the Kurdistan region, and that they in fact do monitor online activity.
21. In fact, the Freedom on the Net report goes much further than Ms McKenzie suggests. The report demonstrates that:
(i) Many internet service providers (ISPs) have close ties to government and security services, e.g. Korek Telecom is owned by KRG military commander Sirwan Barazani.
(ii) Many telecommunications companies operating in the Kurdistan region and the rest of Iraq are linked to powerful political parties or militias which provide them with protection from legal accountability.
(iii) The CMC (which regulates the telecommunications sector) is neither fair, nor independent and there is no clear separation of powers between CMC and the Ministry of Communications, and both suffer from overwhelming political interference. There is no legal framework regulating telecommunications services in the Kurdistan region.
(iv) Security forces at times delete content from activists’ and journalists’ phones and social media accounts.
(v) A draft regulation proposed in 2023 would, if adopted, allow authorities to remove online content; restrict users and online platforms from publishing content that ‘insults the state, its public authorities, or natural and legal persons in Iraq’; and prohibit the sharing of disinformation during electoral periods which could hinder political mobilisation and speech online. The regulation had not been adopted as of June 2024.
(vi) In June 2022 the KRG’s Ministry of Culture issued a statement warning media organisations and social media platforms not to publish articles that criticise the Kurdistan region. The Ministry also promised to sanction those who do not comply.
(vii) Self-censorship is prevalent in Iraq, including in the Kurdistan region. Although the constitution guarantees freedom of opinion and expression, factors such as harsh criminal penalties for online content and harassment or intimidation by government authorities, political parties, and armed groups create an environment that encourages self-censorship.
(viii) Intimidation, arrests, and assassinations of social media users, online activists, and journalists are not uncommon, with social media posts sometimes triggering violent reprisals.
(ix) The Kurdistan region has been considered a relatively safe place for journalists and online activists, however the KRG has cracked down on free speech in recent years, leading to more self-censorship.
(x) Iraqis rely on social media to organise and mobilise protests and the authorities have blocked certain social media applications or internet access during times of unrest.
(xi) There are some protections for freedom of expression and press freedom, but neither the Iraqi or Kurdistan regional judiciary are independent, with judges and judicial proceedings controlled by political authorities and external parties.
(xii) Authorities in the Kurdistan region use the regional penal code to curtail freedom of expression of journalists and online activists who have been charged with criminal offences, particularly when publishing about corruption.
(xiii) Online journalists and activists are routinely detained and arrested in the Kurdistan region and the rest of Iraq. While long prison sentences for online content remain relatively rare, they have recently grown more common.
(xiv) There are protections guaranteeing the freedom to communicate without surveillance or monitoring ‘except for legal and security necessity and by a judicial decision’. However, government monitors are known to access private discussions and the US State Department’s annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices have repeatedly cited credible evidence that Iraqi and KRG authorities ‘monitored private online communications without appropriate legal authority’.
(xv) Authorities in Iraq may have purchased commercial spyware in recent years. According to a former KRG intelligence service member, spyware was purchased from Italy in 2021, and surveillance technology has also been purchased from the Chinese company Xiaomi.
(xvi) Authorities have been known to search electronic devices during arrests, sometimes as a tactic to force journalists to reveal their sources.
(xvii) ISPs in the Kurdistan region, many of which have close ties to the ruling political parties, may also monitor online activity. According to a local ISP employee, telecommunications companies in the region store and monitor user data and information. Speciﬁcally, technicians have been able to access old Facebook accounts belonging to customers and monitor how many times they were logged in and out, how many devices were logged in, and the location of users’ devices.
22. Based on this information, we find that the authorities have both the will and the capacity to monitor online activities in Iraq. In light of our finding that the appellant would continue to attend demonstrations and to engage in posting political material online, we find that there is a real risk that this will come to the attention of the Iraqi authorities.
23. Paragraph 3.1.3 of the respondent’s Country Policy and Information Note Iraq: Opposition to the government in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), July 2023 (the CPIN) states that those who have a prominent public presence, who are actively involved in or have previous history of organising or participating in protests and demonstrations. The appellant has a previous history of participating in protests and we find that he would be actively involved in participating in them in the future. While the appellant is not affiliated with any particular political party or organisation, he actively assists in publicising protests and demonstrations on his Facebook page, and we accept that he would continue to do so. We find that the appellant falls within this risk category. We find that he can properly be considered as an activist given the combination of his activities.
24. The same paragraph of the CPIN states that individuals falling within the risk groups identified may be at higher risk of arrest, detention, assault, excessive use of force and extrajudicial killing by the KRG authorities. We find that such treatment reaches the minimum level of seriousness such that it amounts to persecution and/or serious harm.
25. The respondent accepts at paragraphs 4.1.1 and 5.1.1 of the CPIN that where an individual has a well-founded fear of persecution from the state, they will not be able to avail themselves of the protection of the authorities and that they are unlikely to be able to relocate to escape that risk. We find that this is the case and that there is no sufficiency of protection and that the appellant could not reasonably relocate.
Conclusions
26. In summary, we find that:
(i) The appellant holds genuine political beliefs which he has expressed in Iraq in the past, which he expresses in the United Kingdom now, and which he would continue to express in Iraq in the future.
(ii) The only reason the appellant might engage in self-censorship or act discretely on return is because of his fear of persecution and/or serious harm.
(iii) The Iraqi authorities have the capacity to monitor social media and do in practice conduct such monitoring.
(iv) The appellant is at real risk of suffering persecution and/or serious harm as a result of his political opinion.
(v) There is no sufficiency of protection.
(vi) The appellant could not relocate within Iraq.
27. We find that the appellant has a well-founded fear of persecution for reason of his political opinion. We find that he is a refugee.
Decision
28. The appeal is allowed on asylum grounds.

Signed J K Swaney Date 24 July 2025
Judge J K Swaney
Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge
Immigration & Asylum Chamber

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-000701

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/62386/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
24 April 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SMITH
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SWANEY

Between

ASA
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms A Sepulveda, legal representative
For the Respondent: Mr N Wain, senior presenting officer

Heard at Field House on 11 April 2025
Order Regarding Anonymity
Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Anonymity order
1. We have made an anonymity order because the importance of facilitating the discharge of the obligations of the United Kingdom under the Refugee Convention in the circumstances of this case outweighs the public interest in the principle of open justice.
Background
2. The appellant appeals the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Hussain (the judge) promulgated on 29 November 2024 dismissing his appeal against the refusal of his international protection and human rights claims.
3. The appellant is a citizen of Iraq. He is of Kurdish ethnicity and was born in Rania, in the IKR. He arrived in the United Kingdom on 10 November 2021 and claimed asylum the same day. His claim was refused on 30 November 2023, and he appealed the decision. It is that appeal which gives rise to these proceedings.
4. The basis of the appellant’s claim was that he had had a relationship with a woman and that he fears her family and tribe following her father’s refusal to permit them to marry. In addition, the appellant also fears the PUK and the KDP on return because he has protested against them.
5. The respondent refused his claim, finding that his account of his relationship and the risk arising as a result was not credible and that there was no evidence that his attendance at a single demonstration in the United Kingdom had come to the attention of anyone in Iraq such that he would be of interest to the authorities on return. The respondent also rejected the appellant’s claim that he would be destitute on return due to a lack of documentation and/or an inability to obtain documentation.
6. In dismissing his appeal, the judge rejected the appellant’s claim about his relationship, finding that it was not credible. The judge also rejected the appellant’s claim that he would be at risk on return to Iraq as a result of his sur place activities. The judge did not accept that the appellant could not obtain documentation.
7. The appellant sought permission to appeal on three grounds:
(i) That the judge failed to give adequate reasons for finding that the appellant’s claim regarding his relationship was not credible.
(ii) That the judge failed to make a finding/give adequate reasons for a finding about whether the appellant has a genuinely held political opinion and if so, whether that would put him at risk on return to Iraq.
(iii) That the judge failed to make proper findings about what documents the appellant had and/or could access and that he failed to apply the guidance in SMO & KSP (Civil status documentation; article 15) Iraq CG [2022] UKUT 00110 (IAC).
8. Permission was granted on 7 February 2025 by Judge Seelhoff in respect of grounds (ii) and (iii) only. There was no application before us to renew ground (i).
The hearing
9. We heard oral submissions from Ms Sepulveda and Mr Wain. We considered those, together with the composite bundle of 638 pages (all page references are to the composite bundle) in reaching our decision, the reasons for which are set out below.
Discussion
Ground (ii)
10. Ms Sepulveda submitted that the judge focused on the appellant’s political activities rather than his political opinion and that he failed to consider all of the evidence in the round. In finding that there was ‘nothing in the appellant’s background to show that he has any political cause or conviction’ Ms Sepulveda submitted that the judge failed to have regard to the appellant’s evidence that he had demonstrated against the PUK and the KDP in Iraq (the appellant’s asylum questionnaire, page 602; and question 50 of the asylum interview record, page 621).
11. Ms Sepulveda submitted that although the appellant’s evidence was that the last demonstration he attended in Iraq was about the price of petrol, no salaries for anyone and the cost of living, that could be seen as being against the government’s policies and decisions and therefore expressing a political opinion. Ms Sepulveda submitted that it was important evidence as to his motivation and that his case had never been that he was at risk because of his membership of or affiliation with a particular political party.
12. Ms Sepulveda also submitted that in finding that there was nothing to show why the appellant would engage in activities that would put him at risk on return, the judge ignored background evidence which shows that other individuals have acted in a similar way. She submitted that the background evidence relied on demonstrates that people who oppose the KRG are at risk and identified relevant passages relied on (pages 174, 176, 179 and 269-272 of the bundle). Ms Sepulveda took us to each of those passages and submitted that they show that:
(i) Media activists are at risk and that notwithstanding the risk, other individuals have participated in activities openly.
(ii) Those critical of the KRG are at risk.
(iii) The Iraqi government uses the law to criminalise those who criticise them.
(iv) The laws are used to punish those who use social media to criticise the government and activists are routinely detained, although long sentences are rare.
13. Ms Sepulveda contended that the appellant would be viewed as a political activist and that the background evidence demonstrates that that the appellant would be at risk on return. She submitted that the use of the laws to criminalise critics amounts to persecution and not merely prosecution.
14. In relation to risk on return, Ms Sepulveda relied on the same background evidence. She submitted that the judge failed to have regard to that evidence when assessing risk on return.
15. Mr Wain submitted that the appellant had not put his case on the basis of a fear of persecution for reason of his activities in Iraq and that if the appellant’s evidence about attending demonstrations in Iraq was relevant to his genuinely held opinions, it was not relevant to risk on return.
16. In relation to the background evidence relied on by Ms Sepulveda before us, Mr Wain submitted that there was no evidence that the specific passages were relied on before the judge. He submitted that none of the evidence shows that any of the appellant’s activities have come to the attention of the authorities in the IKR. Moreover, even if the specific passages in the background evidence were relied on before the judge, Mr Wain submitted that a failure to make findings in relation to them is not material to the issue of risk on return, because none of the passages relied on shows that the KRG has the capacity to monitor activities in the diaspora.
17. Mr Wain submitted that the judge proceeded on the basis that the appellant did not hold a genuine political opinion. When asked, he accepted that this was an inference that must be drawn, because the judge did not make a specific finding as to whether or not the appellant would continue to express his political opinion on return.
18. Mr Wain submitted that ground (ii) does not disclose a material error of law because of the context in which the appellant’s case was presented and because the judge was entitled to find that the appellant’s opinion was not one that he genuinely holds.
19. In reply to Mr Wain’s submissions, Ms Sepulveda submitted that the appellant’s attendance at demonstrations in Iraq is not the basis of his fear on return, but that it is part of the relevant background in assessing whether he has a genuinely held political opinion and that it is therefore a material consideration.
20. Ms Sepulveda accepted that there is no specific background material within the appellant’s documents that specifically confirms that the authorities monitor activities in the diaspora. However, she submitted that it can be inferred from the background evidence that there is a risk to people who use social media as a forum for criticising the government and the authorities. She submitted that in this way, a person in the appellant’s position may be at risk on the basis of their political activities. She stated that what is argued is that if the authorities become aware of a person holding an opinion that challenges the regime about its policies, that person would be at risk.
21. When asked, Ms Sepulveda accepted that the evidence did not demonstrate that anyone has been targeted because of their activities outside the IKR.
22. In respect of ground (ii) we find that the judge made a material error of law. The judge found that there was nothing in the appellant’s background to explain why he would engage in activities which would put him at risk on return. We find that the appellant’s evidence at interview and in his questionnaire was evidence to which the judge failed to have regard when considering whether he holds a genuine political opinion. Contrary to Mr Wain’s submission, we find that it is material to both whether he holds a genuine political opinion and to whether he would be at risk on return. Although we accept that his claimed fear does not arise as a result of his activities in Iraq, if the appellant did in fact attend demonstrations in Iraq in the past, that is a material consideration in the assessment of how he would be likely to act on return, i.e. whether he would wish to continue to express his political opinion, and, if so, whether that would give rise to a real risk of persecution and/or serious harm. That is a question which the judge failed to address which therefore gives rise to an error of law.
Ground (iii)
23. Ms Sepulveda submitted that the judge’s findings in relation to the appellant’s ability to obtain documentation were limited to considering the feasibility of return and not the appellant’s claim that he would be destitute on return because he could not obtain his documents.
24. Ms Sepulveda submitted that in agreeing with the respondent’s findings on the point, the judge was not clear about precisely what he agreed with. Ms Sepulveda referred us to the refusal letter and the respondent’s review and submitted that they appear to be discussing feasibility of return rather than the conditions the appellant would face on return in the absence of documents. Ms Sepulveda submitted that the judge made no clear finding about how the appellant would obtain his original documents or replacement documents.
25. Ms Sepulveda accepted when asked, that paragraphs 9 and 10 of the review refer to the fact that the appellant could be returned to any airport in the IKR and that it is not accepted that he could not contact his family for assistance. She maintained her submission that it was not clear as to what the judge relied on and that what the judge considered was the feasibility of return rather than the likely conditions he would face on return, as per paragraph C.11 of the guidance given in SMO
26. Although Mr Wain accepted that there was an error of law at paragraph 55 of the judge’s decision because there is no clear finding about the CSID, he submitted that if what the judge relied on in relation to feasibility and article 3 risk on return is correct on the basis of the evidence and in law, then any error is not material.
27. Mr Wain submitted that the appellant’s evidence that his father and uncle would not support him on return was linked to his claim regarding his relationship, which was rejected. Mr Wain noted that permission was not granted in respect of the appellant’s challenge to the judge’s findings on the relationship and that there was no renewed application before us. Mr Wain submitted that the judge was entitled to rely on the reasons given for rejecting that aspect of the appellant’s claim and that there was no credible reason for the appellant not remaining in contact with his uncle or father (paragraph 48 of the judge’s decision, page 9).
28. In relation to the submission that the judge did not make clear precisely what of the respondent’s reasoning he relied on in relation to the documentation issue, Mr Wain submitted that paragraph 18 of the decision is obviously a summary of both the refusal letter and paragraphs 9 and 10 of the respondent’s review. He submitted that this is consistent with SMO and that the judge was correct to rely on the respondent’s reasoning.
29. Mr Wain reiterated his submission that even if we were to accept that the judge failed to make relevant findings, that failure would not be material.
30. In response, Ms Sepulveda contended that contrary to Mr Wain’s submission, paragraph 18 of the decision is not a summary of both the refusal letter and paragraphs 9 and 10 of the respondent’s review. She contended that it is a summary of the refusal letter only and if so, that this supports her submission that the judge only considered the feasibility of return and not whether the appellant would be able to obtain documents on return, and if not, whether he would be at real risk of serious harm.
31. We explored with the parties whether in the event we find that there is a material error of law, the matter should be retained for re-making or remitted to the First-tier Tribunal. Both Ms Sepulveda and Mr Wain agreed that it could be retained in the Upper Tribunal for re-making. Ms Sepulveda also confirmed that it is accepted that the findings relevant to ground (i) remain unchallenged.
32. We find that the judge failed to make clear findings in respect of what documents the appellant holds; whether he can reasonably be expected to obtain original documents and/or replacements; and if not, whether he would be at real risk of suffering serious harm on return flowing from a lack of documentation.
33. However, we accept Mr Wain’s submission that the judge relied on his findings regarding the credibility of the appellant’s claim about his relationship in relation to his consideration of the documentation issue. The judge rejected that claim and in doing so, made a finding that it was not credible that the appellant would not remain in contact with his uncle or father. The judge’s findings in relation to his claim about his relationship were challenged in the grounds of appeal; however, permission to appeal was not granted on that ground. Accordingly, the judge’s findings in relation to the credibility of the appellant’s claim about his relationship and the consequences flowing from it, including the lack of contact with his family in Iraq, stand.
34. The appellant’s evidence was that although he had lost his passport, his CSID remains in Iraq. The respondent cited her Country Policy and Information Note Iraq: Internal relocation, civil documentation and returns, October 2023 (the CPIN) in the refusal letter and in her review. The judge referred expressly to the CPIN in his decision. The evidence before the judge was therefore that the appellant could be returned directly to the IKR; that he would not have to travel from Baghdad to the IKR; and that the appellant’s CSID is in Iraq. In light of the judge’s findings about contact with his family, there was no evidence before the judge to suggest that the appellant could not contact his family both for assistance in providing information in connection with obtaining a laissez passer and/or to ask them either to send his CSID to him in the United Kingdom or provide it to him on arrival or shortly thereafter. The appellant’s evidence was simply that he had not been in contact with his family since 2021, not that he could not contact them should he choose to do so.
35. For these reasons, we find that any error on the part of the judge in failing to make clear findings, as set out in paragraph 30, was not material. The judge’s conclusion on both the feasibility of return and that the appellant’s return to Iraq would not give rise to a breach of article 3 of the ECHR was consistent with SMO and the evidence before him.
Conclusions
36. For the reasons set out above, we find that the judge made a material error of law in respect of ground (ii) and that he made an error of law in respect of ground (iii), but that the latter error of law is not material.
Disposal of the appeal
37. Having had regard to the views of both parties, paragraph 7.2 of the Practice Directions and what was said by the Court of Appeal in AEB v SSHD [2022], Civ 1512, we find that the appeal should be retained in the Upper Tribunal for re-making. This is because there is limited fact finding required in light of our conclusions and the preserved findings of fact.
38. We find that the judge’s findings set out at paragraphs 43 to 49 and paragraph 55 of his decision should be preserved.
Directions
(i) The appellant may file and serve additional evidence on which he wishes to rely by no later than 21 days after of the date when this decision is sent.
(ii) The appeal will be listed for a face to face hearing at Field House on the first available date after 28 days after the date when this decision is sent.

Notice of Decision
39. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involves the making of an error of law and that decision is set aside save for the preserved findings made in paragraphs 43 to 49 and 55 of the decision.
40. The appeal is retained in the Upper Tribunal for re-making before any judge including any Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge. Time estimate ½ day. Kurdish Sorani interpreter required.

J K Swaney
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
11 April 2025