Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-000719

First-tier Tribunal: PA/54968/2023
LP/09855/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 1 July 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE J F W PHILLIPS

Between

KK
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr K Wood, Immigration Advice Service
For the Respondent: Ms C Newton, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 12 June 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant, his ex-wife and their son are granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant, his ex-wife or their son. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant appeals with permission against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 11 December 2024 dismissing his appeal against the Respondent’s decision refusing his protection claim.
Background
2. The Appellant a citizen of Namibia asserts, in summary, that he would be at risk on return due to adverse interest from relatives following his refusal to marry his uncle’s widow.
The appeal to the First-tier Tribunal
3. The Appellant’s appeal against the Respondent’s decision was heard by the First-tier Tribunal in Manchester on 11 December 2024 and dismissed. The Judge found that the Appellant’s claim did not engage the Refugee Convention, that the core of the Appellant’s account was incredible, that there was sufficiency of protection and a viable internal relocation alternative and that Article 8 was not engaged.
The appeal to the Upper Tribunal
4. The Appellant was granted permission to appeal the decision by First-tier Tribunal Judge Murray on 5 February 2025.
5. The Appellant raises three grounds but in doing so does not challenge the finding that the Refugee Convention is not engaged. The first ground argues that the Judge made a material misdirection in law by failing to follow Joint Presidential Guidance and as a result failed to treat the Appellant as vulnerable. The second alleges making an irrational finding of fact or permitting a procedural unfairness. The third alleges a failure to provide adequate reasons for findings of fact on a material matter.
The hearing
6. Mr Wood appeared for the Appellant and Ms Newton for the Respondent. Mr Wood referred to the grounds of appeal. He said that the Judge had set the bar too high in failing to treat the Appellant as vulnerable and that given the Joint Presidential Guidance he was bound to treat the Appellant as vulnerable. The Respondent’s own guidance says that underlying factors should be taken into account when assessing credibility. So far as the second ground is concerned the Judge impugns the Appellant’s account on the basis of evidence that was not before him. The Judge then goes on to ignore the Respondent’s acceptance that weight should be attached to police and medical documents. Dealing with the third ground Mr Wood said that the Judge had given no reason for his finding that there was a sufficiency of protection.
7. Ms Newton relied on the rule 24 response. The Judge clearly considered the question of vulnerability and found that it was not necessary to treat the Appellant as a vulnerable witness. In respect of ground 2 the Respondent accepted that the Judge fell into error at paragraph 23 of his decision. Ms Newton said that if the decision was set aside the Respondent would endeavour to provide evidence in this respect. So far as documentation is concerned the Respondent did not make a concession. By using the expression ‘some weight’ it was wrong to suggest that the Judge was bound to accept this evidence in its entirety. The degree of weight to be attached was a matter for the Judge.
Findings – Error of Law
8. Ground one of the application along with Mr Woods submissions assert that the Joint Presidential Guidance Note No 2 of 2010 when read alongside the footnote to paragraph 2 of that guidance required the Judge to treat the Appellant as vulnerable. The footnote refers to s.59 of the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006 where a vulnerable adult is defined, inter alia, as an adult who “receives any form of health care”. This is of course an extremely wide definition defining as it does a person receiving health care in any form as vulnerable. This could, for example, include an ingrowing toenail or a sprained wrist. The Guidance goes on to say at paragraph 3 that the consequences of such vulnerability differ according to the degree and that it is a matter for the Judge to determine the effect on the quality of the evidence and the weight to be placed upon the vulnerability. The Guidance whilst referring to the definition of vulnerable adult requires the Judge to consider the effect of vulnerability but to does not require the Judge to treat a vulnerable adult as a vulnerable witness.
9. It is very clear indeed from paragraph 14 of the decision that the Judge considers the Appellant’s vulnerability and having done so that the Judge is satisfied that the Appellant is able to take part in the proceedings “without further assistance or adjustment” and as a result the Judge found there was no need to treat the Appellant as a vulnerable witness. In my judgement the Judge has done what he was required to do both in respect of the Guidance and the Equal Treatment Bench Book and has not erred in law and has not erred procedurally.
10. Ground two essentially refers to two aspects of the decision. It first points out that Judge’s finding that the Appellant was inconsistent as to who his bride was to be was unsupported by any evidence. There was a reference in the refusal decision but there was no evidence in this respect. The rule 24 response agrees that this finding was “misplaced” and both the response and Ms Newton’s submissions say that if an error of law is found the Respondent will endeavour to provide evidence of the inconsistency. This appears to be close to a tacit acceptance that this does indeed amount to an error of law.
11. The second aspect referred to in ground two asserts that the Judge goes behind the Respondent’s acceptance of the evidence put forward by the Appellant in respect of an assault that took place on 14 February 2020 and which was reported to the police. The Respondent responds that saying “some weight” could be placed on the police and medical documents did not amount to an acceptance of the documents rather that the amount of weight that could be attached to them was up to the Judge. I disagree but in disagreeing I take particular account of the short and dismissive way in which the Judge deals with these documents at paragraphs 21 and 22 of the decision. There is no reasonable examination of the police and medical documents to which the Respondent has accepted that some weight can be attached. Indeed the only real credibility issue upon which the Judge makes a decision in those short paragraphs is in respect of the Appellant’s claim that police could not investigate because they did not have transport whilst the country information indicates that the police station is an urban area. In my judgment this of itself is an unsafe finding in that lack of transport and being in an urban area are not mutually exclusive concepts. On the basis of this one flawed credibility finding to then go on to reject document sin accordance with Tanveer Ahmed cannot be justified.
12. As a result it is my judgment that the error of law asserted in ground two is made out and as this error was fundamental to credibility it is a material error.
13. The final ground refers to sufficiency of protection. The Judge finds at paragraph 25 that there is “sufficiency of protection … should there be a need”. The assertion is that there is no evidential basis for this conclusion or indeed for the conclusion that there was a viable internal relocation alternative. In the rule 24 response the Respondent agrees that paragraph 25 “lacks in reasoning when looked at in isolation” but notes the subsequent finding that the Appellant’s relatives are not particularly influential and have no ongoing interest.
14. In my judgment there is a very clear lack of reasoning shown in paragraph 25 not only taken in isolation but also when taken together with the subsequent paragraph. Paragraph 25 is a stand-alone paragraph. Indeed it is a single sentience. The Judge is satisfied that there is sufficiency of protection without giving any reason at all how that conclusion was reached. The following paragraph is distinct in that it refers to internal relocation and not sufficiency of protection.
15. In my judgement the assertion that the Judge has failed to provide any or any adequate reasonings for findings of fact on material matters is made out. Taken together the two elements of ground three show a material error of law.
16. Finally I have considered the Judge’s finding in resect of article 8 which is dealt with in a cursory fashion in paragraph 28. The grounds assert that there is a lack of any reasoning and indeed it is unclear from this paragraph how the Judge reached his decision.
17. I therefore find that the Judge made material errors of law and set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal.
Remaking
18. I am satisfied that none of the Judge’s findings, except the decision that the claim does not engage the Refugee Convention, can be preserved. Given that the findings set aside are fundamental to the credibility of the Appellant’s account and applying paragraph 7.2 of the Practice Statements of the Immigration and Asylum Chambers of the First-tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal, the appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of material errors on a point of law.
The unchallenged finding that the claim does not engage the Refugee Convention is preserved. In all other respects the decision of the First-tier Tribunal is set aside with no other findings preserved.
The remaking of the decision in the appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal at Birmingham, to be remade afresh and heard by any judge other than Judge Farrelly.

Judge J F W Phillips
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal

27 June 2025