Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-000725
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/58203/2022
LH/00747/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 19th of June 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE JACKSON
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE GRIMES

Between

SHONE ROMULUS
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr D Furner, Solicitor at Birnberg Peirce Ltd
For the Respondent: Ms A Arifa Ahmed, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 16 April 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
1. In a decision promulgated on 19 August 2025, the Upper Tribunal found an error of law in the decision of First-tier Tribunal promulgated on 14 November 2024, in which the Appellant’s appeal against the decision to refuse his human rights claim and to refuse to revoke his Deportation Order was dismissed. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal was set aside, with preserved findings of fact on 19 August 2025. A copy of the error of law decision is attached at Annex A, the contents of which shall not be repeated here, save as where helpful to do so. This is the remaking of the Appellant’s appeal on human rights grounds.
2. No Anonymity Order has been made in respect of the Appellant, however this decision anonymises the names of the Appellant’s children, all of whom are under the age of 18 and in respect of whom it is appropriate that they are not individually identified. The children are referred to as C1 (aged 17 years), C2 (aged 14 years), C3 (aged 13 years), C4 (aged 11 years), C5 (aged 10 years), C6 (aged 6 years) and C7 (aged 4 years) throughout this decision.
Immigration and factual history
3. The Appellant is a national of St Lucia, born on 30 October 1987, who arrived in the United Kingdom on 17 April 2000 with his family. The family were refused leave to enter and were given temporary admission to 23 April 2022, following which the family absconded. An application for indefinite leave to remain under a family concession route was made on 15 August 2005, which was refused on 13 November 2009, however following a successful appeal on 2 March 2010, the Appellant was granted discretionary leave to remain from 28 January 2011 to 27 January 2014 on the basis of his relationship with a British partner and their recently born daughter (C1). He has not otherwise held any lawful leave to remain in the United Kingdom.
4. On 20 July 2006, the Appellant was convicted of obstruction of an engine or carriage on a railway and fare evasion, for which he was sentenced to 40 hours of community service.
5. On 9 January 2007, the Appellant was convicted of theft from a motor vehicle, for which he was sentenced to a 12 months’ supervision order; 60 hours’ unpaid work and required to pay £100 compensation and £50 costs.
6. On 8 September 2010, the Appellant received a caution for common assault.
7. On 8 November 2011, the Appellant was convicted of using threatening, abusive and insulting words or behaviour with intent to cause fear or provocation of violence; for which he was sentenced to 16 weeks’ imprisonment, wholly suspended for 12 months.
8. On 3 May 2013, the Respondent wrote to the Appellant to inform him that she was considering his immigration status and liability to deportation in view of his, “involvement with gang related criminal activity including, assault, robbery, possession of class A drugs, witness intimidation and threats to kill.” The Appellant was given an opportunity to make submissions in response, which he subsequently made, including a denial of any offending since 2011, that he was not a gang member and on the basis of his relationship with his (then) three children.
9. On 11 December 2013, the Respondent sent notice of a decision to deport the Appellant on the basis that his deportation was conducive to the public good, with expanded reasons given further to those identified in the letter of 3 May 2013. The First-tier Tribunal dismissed the Appellant’s appeal against this decision on 28 April 2015. A copy of the relevant findings are set out in more detail at Annex B to this decision. In essence, the First-tier Tribunal made a number of findings that the Appellant had committed a number of crimes beyond those he had been convicted of, including that he had raped or had sex with minors; a number of assaults; that he was involved in the supply of drugs and had gang affiliations. At the appeal, the Appellant was found to be a poor witness.
10. Overall, the First-tier Tribunal found that the Appellant was a foreign criminal and a persistent offender pursuant to section 117D of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act (the “2002 Act”). However, subsequently following Chege (“is a persistent offender”) [2016] UKUT 00187 (IAC), there is no dispute that the Appellant is neither a persistent offender nor a foreign criminal as defined (as only offences established by a conviction or caution are relevant) such that the framework in Part V of the 2002 Act does not apply to him (fuller consideration was given to this in the error of law decision attached). At the time of the First-tier Tribunal decision, this framework was applied with findings made on the exceptions set out in section 117C as follows. The Appellant did not meet the private life exception as although he was socially and culturally integrated within the United Kingdom, he had not been here lawfully for more than half of his life and there were no very significant obstacles to his reintegration in St. Lucia, where he had visited family. In relation to family life, it was not accepted that the Appellant was in a genuine and subsisting relationship with the mother of his youngest child (as claimed) and although it was accepted that he did have such a relationship with all three of his children, his deportation would not be unduly harsh on any of them to remain in the United Kingdom. Finally, there were no very compelling circumstances to outweigh the significant public interest in deportation.
11. The Appellant’s appeal rights were exhausted on 17 August 2015, further to which a Deportation Order was signed on 18 September 2015.
12. On 11 December 2016, the Appellant applied for leave to remain which was treated as further submissions and an application to revoke the Deportation Order. On 12 March 2019, the Respondent refused to revoke the Deportation Order and refused to treat the further submissions as a fresh claim.
13. The Appellant made further submissions on 20 December 2019, which the Respondent refused on 19 October 2022. Further submissions based on Article 3 health grounds were made by the Appellant, which were refused by the Respondent on 15 June 2023. The appeal against the latter on Article 3 grounds is subject to preserved findings of fact, as set out in Annex C to this decision and is not considered further within the main part of this decision.
14. In summary, the Respondent refused the Appellant’s human rights claims and refused to revoke his Deportation Order by reference to the exceptions to deportation. The Appellant’s claim was based on having five children in the United Kingdom; his private life and in particular his work as an actor and on the basis that he had suffered brain damage and needed support to manage his condition. The Respondent noted that there was no up to date evidence in relation to the Appellant’s claimed partner and little information to as to his children (including no details at all in relation to two of them) and found that neither the family life exception nor the private life exception to deportation had been met. In relation to the Appellant’s health condition, there was no ongoing treatment but support to manage the condition, which would be available on return to St Lucia.
15. The Appellant’s appeal was dismissed by the First-tier Tribunal in a decision dated 14 November 2024. Although the decision was set aside for an error of law, as set out in that decision, the majority of the findings of fact contained therein are preserved (as set out in Annex C to this decision) as they were not infected by any error.
The Legal Framework
Deportation
16. Section 3(5)(a) of the Immigration Act 1971 (the “IA 1971”) provides that a person who is not a British citizen may be deported if the Secretary of State deems his deportation to be conducive to the public good. Section 5(1) provides that where a person is liable to deportation under section 3(5) or (6), then the Secretary of State may make a deportation order against him which is an order requiring him to leave and prohibiting him from entering the United Kingdom. Further provisions in relation to deportation are set out in statute in Part V of the 2002 Act and in the section on ‘Deportation of Criminals’ in the UK Borders Act 2007 (which specifically concerns automatic deportation and is not applicable on the facts of the current appeal).
17. By virtue of section 117A of the 2002 Act, Part V of that Act applies where a court or tribunal is required to determine whether a decision made under the Immigration Acts breaches Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and as a result would be unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998.
18. Section 117A applies to the public interest considerations in all cases. So far as relevant to this appeal, section 117B sets out factors to be considered in all cases and section 117C sets out the additional consideration in cases involving foreign criminals, which are as follows:

“117C. Article 8: additional considerations in cases involving foreign criminals
(1) The deportation of foreign criminals is in the public interest.
(2) The more serious the offence committed by a foreign criminal, the greater is the public interest in deportation of the criminal.
(3) In the case of a foreign criminal (“C”) who has not been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of four years or more, the public interest requires C’s deportation unless Exception 1 or Exception 2 applies.
(4) Exception 1 applies where –
(a) C has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of C’s life,
(b) C is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom, and
(c) there would be very significant obstacles to C’s integration into the country to which C is proposed to be deported.
(5) Exception 2 applies where C has a genuine and subsisting relationship with a qualifying partner, or a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a qualifying child, and the effect of C’s deportation on the partner or child would be unduly harsh.”
19. At the outset of the hearing, Ms Ahmed submitted that section 117C of the 2002 Act does not apply at all to the Appellant as he does not fall within the definition of ‘foreign criminal’ in section 117D of the 2002 Act and further, that the provisions in this section should not be considered even as a reference point. To do so would be inappropriate as it would apply a more onerous test to a person without criminal convictions and the only consideration must be by applying a pure Article 8 assessment.
20. We reject Ms Ahmed’s submission for two reasons. First, this is a matter which was settled at the error of law stage following the Respondent’s express submission to the contrary that section 117C of the 2002 Act was an appropriate reference point and no error of law was pursued on that basis from the First-tier Tribunal’s decision, instead the focus was on the error in not then finishing the assessment under Article 8. Secondly, Ms Ahmed’s submission is directly contrary to the Respondent’s published position as set out in the section ‘The Article 8 Framework’ in her guidance, ‘Criminality: Article 8 ECHR cases’ (last updated 22 March 20261), which provides as follows:
“Where deportation is being considered on the ground it is conducive to the public good or on European Economic Area (EEA) public policy and public security decisions and the person has not been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least 12 months (including a suspended sentence of at least 12 months in relation to offences where the person was convicted on or after 22 March 2026), and has not been convicted of an offence that has caused serious harm or is a persistent offender, the Immigration Rules must be used as a guide when considering an Article 8 claim because they reflect Parliament’s view of the balance to be struck between a person’s right to private and family life and the public interest.”
21. Although the policy refers to the Immigration Rules, the substantive content in those is materially the same as in section 117C of the 2002 Act.
22. Returning to the substantive provisions of section 117C(5) of the 2002 Act, the Supreme Court considered the test for and factors to be taken into account when assessing the meaning of ‘unduly harsh’ in paragraph 399 of the Immigration Rules and section 117C(5) in KO (Nigeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] UKSC 53. In paragraph 23, Lord Carnworth held as follows:
“On the other hand the expression “unduly harsh” seems clearly intended to introduce a higher hurdle than that of “reasonableness” under section 117B(6), taking account of the public interest in the deportation of foreign criminals. Further the word “unduly” implies an element of comparison. It assumes that there is a “due” level of “harshness”, that is a level which may be acceptable or justifiable in the relevant context. “Unduly” implies something going beyond that level. The relevant context is that set by section 117C(1), that is the public interest in the deportation of foreign criminals. One is looking for a degree of harshness going beyond what would necessarily be involved for any child faced with the deportation of a parent. What it does not require in my view (and subject to the discussion of the cases in the next section) is a balancing of the relative levels of severity of the parent’s offence, other than is inherent in the distinction drawn by the section itself by reference to length of sentence. Nor (contrary to the view of the Court of Appeal in IT (Jamaica) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] EWCA Civ 932, [2017] 1 WLR 240, paras 55, 64) can it be equated with the requirement to show “very compelling reasons”. That would be in effect to replicate the additional test applied by section 117C(6) with respect to sentences of four years or more.”
23. Within the Supreme Court’s consideration of the specific appeal in KO, further reference is made to the authoritative guidance on the meaning of unduly harsh given in MK (Sierra Leone) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] UKUT 223 (IAC), which held in paragraph 46:
“By way of self-direction, we are mindful that ‘unduly harsh’ does not equate with uncomfortable, inconvenient, undesirable or merely difficult. Rather, it poses a considerably more elevated threshold. ‘Harsh’ in this context, denotes something more severe, or bleak. It is the antithesis of pleasant and comfortable. Furthermore, the addition of the adverb ‘unduly’ raises an already elevated standard still higher.”
24. The Supreme Court further considered the “unduly harsh” test in HA (Iraq v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22 in which the self-direction set out above from MK was approved as the correct approach and confirmed that there is no notional comparator test to be applied.
Revocation of Deportation Orders
25. Section 5(2) of the IA 1971 gives the Secretary of State power at any time to revoke a Deportation Order. Specific provisions for this are made within the UK Borders Act 2007 (which do not apply to the present appeal as this is not an automatic deportation case). Otherwise, provision for the revocation of a deportation order is contained in the Immigration Rules. The relevant parts of which (as they were for the decision under appeal in this case) for consideration of a revocation of a Deportation Order are in paragraphs 390 to 391A as follows:
“390. An application for revocation of a deportation order will be considered in the light of all the circumstances including the following:
(i) the grounds on which the order was made;
(ii) any representations made in support of revocation;
(iii) the interests of the community, including the maintenance of an effective immigration control;
(iv) the interests of the applicant, including any compassionate circumstances.
390A. Where paragraph 398 applies the Secretary of State will consider whether paragraph 399 or 399A applies and, if it does not, it will only be in exceptional circumstances that the public interest in maintaining the deportation order will be outweighed by other factors.
391. In the case of a person who has been deported following conviction for criminal offence, the continuation of a deportation order against a person will be the proper course:
(a) in the case of a conviction for an offence for which the person was sentenced to a period of imprisonment of less than four years, unless 10 years have elapsed since the making of the deportation order when, if an application for revocation is received, consideration will be given on a case-by-case basis with the deportation order should be maintained, or …
Unless, in either case, the continuation would be contrary to the Human Rights Convention or the Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, or there are other exceptional circumstances that mean the continuation is outweighed by compelling factors.
391A. In other cases, revocation of the order will not normally be authorised unless the situation has been materially altered, either by change of circumstances since the order was made, or by fresh information coming to light which was not before the appellate authorities or the Secretary of State. The passage of time since the person was deported may also in itself amount to such a change of circumstances as one revocation of the order.”
26. We do not set out paragraphs 398 and following of the Immigration Rules which were, at the time of the decision under appeal, materially the same as the provisions in Section 117C of the 2002 Act. In relation to the specific provisions above as to revocation, these were considered in detail by Underhill LJ in Secretary of State for the Home Department v ZP (India) [2015] EWCA Civ 1197 in a case which concerned decisions prior to the introduction of section 117C of the 2002 Act, but approved of in later cases under that newer regime as having equal applicability. Underhill LJ held:
(i) paragraph 390 plainly applies to all applications to revoke a deportation order, whether made by a foreign criminal or not and whether or not the applicant is in the United Kingdom [paragraph 21];
(ii) paragraph 390A applies to pre-deportation revocation applications and paragraph 391 to post-deportation applications [paragraph 22];
(iii) paragraph 391 states the Respondent’s policy as to the proper length of time for which a deportation order should continue, but does not otherwise require a fundamentally different approach to pre-deportation applications [paragraphs 23 and 24];
(iv) in a case falling under paragraph 391, there will need to be an assessment of the proportionality of maintaining the order in place for the prescribed period, balancing the public interest in continuing it against the interference with the applicant’s private and family life; but in striking that balance they should take as a starting-point the Secretary of State’s assessment of the public interest reflected in the prescribed periods and should only order revocation after a lesser period if there are compelling reasons to do so;
(v) up to a point, the public interest in maintaining the order will generally diminish with the passage of time and that must be borne in mind in striking the proportionality balance – where there are compelling factors in favour of revocation, all else being equal, these would be stronger if a person had already been excluded for a long time. It was not accepted that the passage of time can by itself be relied on as constituting a compelling reason for early revocation as it is inherent in the making of a deportation order that there must be a period before the deportee becomes eligible for re-admission. The default position must be that deportees should serve the entirety of the prescribed period in the absence of compelling reasons to the contrary [paragraph 25];
(vi) it was not necessary to decide whether the phrase “in other cases” in paragraph 391A in practice meant in cases other than those of foreign criminals, but the Respondent submitted that that was plainly the intention and Underhill LJ was inclined to agree [paragraph 26].
27. Mr Furner submitted that the provisions of the Immigration Rules in relation to revocation were not directly relevant in the context of an appeal which could only be brought and allowed or dismissed on human rights grounds. However, we consider these provisions as part of the relevant framework and as an expression of the Respondent’s policy (in the same way as it is for deportation) for the broad assessment required for Article 8 purposes.
Article 8
28. When considering an individual’s right to respect for private and family life in accordance with Article 8, then the usual step-by-step approach set out in Razgar [2004] UKHL 27, applies as follows:

(i) Will the proposed removal be an interference by a public authority with the exercise of the applicant’s right to respect for his private or (as the case may be) family life?
(ii) If so, will such interference have consequences of such gravity as potentially to engage the operation of Article 8?
(iii) If so, is such interference in accordance with the law?
(iv) If so, is such interference necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others?
(v) If so, is such interference proportionate to the legitimate public ends sought to be achieved?
29. In conducting the final proportionality balancing exercise, we take into account the Supreme Court’s decision in (HA) Iraq and in particular the summary of relevant factors to consider in the proportionality balancing exercise in paragraph 51 which states:
“51. When considering whether there are very compelling circumstances over and above Exceptions 1 and 2, all the relevant circumstances of the case will be considered and weighed against the very strong public interest in deportation. As explained by Lord Reed in Hesham Ali at paras 24 to 35, relevant factors will include those identified by the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) as being relevant to the article 8 proportionality assessment. In Unuane v United Kingdom (2021) 72 EHRR 24 the ECtHR, having referred to its earlier decisions in Boultif v Switzerland (2001) 33 EHRR 50 and Uner v The Netherlands (2006) 45 EHRR 14, summarised the relevant factors at paras 72-73 as comprising the following:
• the nature and seriousness of the offence committed by the applicant;
• the length of the applicant’s stay in the country from which he or she is to be expelled;
• the time elapsed since the offence was committed and the applicant’s conduct during that period;
• the nationalities of the various persons concerned;
• the applicant’s family situation, such as the length of the marriage, and other facts expressing the effectiveness of a couple’s family life;
• whether the spouse knew about the offence at the time when he or she entered into a family relationship;
• whether there are children of the marriage, and if so, their age; and
• the seriousness of the difficulties which the spouse is likely to encounter in the country to which the applicant is to be expelled …
• the best interests and well-being of the children, in particular the seriousness of the difficulties which any children of the applicant are likely to encounter in the country to which the applicant is to be expelled; and
• the solidity of social, cultural and family ties with the host country and with the country of destination.”
Non-conviction evidence
30. In relation to non-conviction evidence, the Upper Tribunal gave the following guidance in Farquharson (removal – proof of conduct) [2013] UKUT 00146 (IAC):

(1) Where the respondent relies on allegations of conduct in proceedings for removal, the same principles apply as to proof of conduct and the assessment of risk to the public, as in deportation cases: Bah [2012] UKUT 196 (IAC) etc applicable.
(2) A criminal charge that has not resulted in a conviction is not a criminal record; but the acts that led to the charge may be established as conduct.
(3) If the respondent seeks to establish the conduct by reference to the contents of police CRIS reports, the relevant documents should be produced, rather than a bare witness statement referring to them.
(4) The material relied on must be supplied to the appellant in good time to prepare for the appeal.
(5) The judge has a duty to ensure a fair hearing is obtained by affording the appellant sufficient time to study the documents and respond.
(6) Where the appellant is in detention and faces a serious allegation of conduct, it is in the interests of justice that legal aid is made available.
Devaseelan
31. The principles to be applied to appeals in which there has been a previous determination are set out in Devaseelan (Second Appeals – ECHR – Extra-Territorial Effect) Sri Lanka [2002] UKIAT 00702 apply.
The preserved findings
32. As per paragraph 94 of the error of law decision at Annex A, we preserved the following paragraphs of the First-tier Tribunal’s decision of 2024:
• Paragraphs 27 to 75
• Paragraphs 76 – 83 (albeit these record evidence and submissions rather than containing any findings per se)
• Paragraphs 84 to 90 (save for the part of paragraph 89 which touches upon the incident in 2021 upon which more detailed findings are likely to be necessary)
• Paragraphs 94 – 104
• Paragraphs 106 – 107
• Paragraphs 110 – 111
• Paragraphs 113 – 134 (albeit in respect of the balance sheet factors in paragraphs 114 – 115, these are findings in respect of the very compelling circumstances assessment in section 117C(6) of the 2002 Act and are not preserved as comprehensive for the purposes of a freestanding Article 8 assessment).
33. These paragraphs are set out in full in Annex C to this decision, with reference made to those findings where appropriate in this decision in relation to the matters remaining in issue to be determined and as appropriate, any updated evidence will be considered with additional findings made where required. The findings in relation to Article 3 are preserved in their entirety and need no further reference as there are no remaining issues on this ground to be determined.
34. On behalf of the Appellant, in his skeleton argument, Mr Furner relied on new evidence in relation to C7 to submit that the appellant’s deportation would be unduly harsh on him to remain in the United Kingdom now.
The Respondent’s evidence
35. The Respondent relies on a number of pieces of evidence in relation to the Appellant’s criminal behaviour and associations, including convictions; primarily the PNC but also written statements from DC Petrov, DC Dollery and PC Fox; together with the underling CRIS reports referred to therein. In relation to the allegations in DC Petrov’s written statement and the associated documents, these are the subject of preserved findings of fact from both the First-tier Tribunal decision in 2015 (the salient parts of which are reproduced at Annex B) and the First-tier Tribunal decision in 2024 (set out in full at Annex C) and therefore will not be repeated here in any detail.
36. DC Kate Dollery made a written statement on 18 December 2023. DC Dollery was employed by the Metropolitan Police Service as a Detective Constable on the International Assistance Unit, part of Central Specialist Crime, having previously worked as part of Operation Nexus. Her statement sets out the various sources of information available to her from police records. The statement is to provide the offending history of the appellant since the previous statement of DC Petrov made on 13 November 2013. The statement details five separate incidents, although we refer to only the first, second, third and fifth of these as the Respondent confirmed at the beginning of the hearing before us that she was no longer relying on the fourth allegation as there was no supporting crime report for this. The remaining four incidents were set out by DC Dollery as:
“11/08/2018 – Domestic Incident – [ref no]
Police called by subject’s partner who was distressed about the way he picked up a dog. It seems to have been a drunken argument, no offences alleged, recorded as a non-crime domestic.
12/09/2018 – Domestic Incident – [ref no]
Police called by subject’s ex-partner, both parties had been drinking and subject was blocking her path and threatening to hurt her. Officers spoke to both parties and no offences were recorded, recorded as non-crime domestic.

02/07/2021 – Possession Class A – [ref no]
The subject along with two others was seen to be making an exchange of something by officers, the three males were stopped and searched and two wraps of Crack Cocaine were found by the wall they had been sitting on. No-one admitted ownership of the drugs, so all three were arrested, all three denied ownership in interview and the decision was made to NFA.

…

20/01/2022 – ABH – [ref no] – Subjects girlfriend calls Police over an argument at a party over a dog. Police were told on arrival that the subject pushed her back with his own crutches and whilst on the floor he put her head between his legs and hit her on the head on the floor multiple times. The victim showed officers messages that the subject had sent saying – sorry but I had to restrain you. The subject also made counter allegations to Police that the victim had scratched his face causing a cut, the victim denied this.
Dismissed at Court.”
37. DC Dollery’s statement also included a reference to the appellant as “previously been a VISOR (Violent and Sexual Offenders Register) nominal.”.
38. DC Dollery made a second written statement dated 8 July 2024 in which 10 different alias’ for the Appellant were given, including the name ‘Trim’ used on many occasions when arrested, however fingerprints were taken on arrest to confirm the Appellant’s actual identity.
39. PC Alison Fox made two written statements on 4 January 2026 and 4 March 2026. PC Fox is employed by the Metropolitan police in MO10, Met prosecutions, based in New Scotland Yard and assists with Home Office Immigration Enforcement. She describes in her statement the various sources of information available to her, including the Crime Reporting Information System (CRIS), Criminal Intelligence Reports (CRIMINT), integrated Information Platform (IIP); CONNECT – Integrated Police Information System and the Police National Computer (PNC) and a more detailed descriptions of those various systems, information they hold, who can enter and access information and so on.
40. In her first statement, PC Fox sets out two incidents and a follow up matter in relation to the Appellant’s history since 18 December 2023. The first was in relation to the Appellant being arrested on 4 November 2025 for malicious communications, category Domestic Abuse with offence dates between 4 October and 4 November 2025. The victim claimed to have been receiving threats and harassing messages from her ex-partner on multiple occasions causing significant distress and anxiety. The Appellant was placed on police bail with conditions not to contact the victim directly or indirectly or attend a named address. A non-molestation order referral was made. The second was in relation to suspected theft of a motor vehicle on 20 October 2025 which was under investigation, same victim as in the first incident. The statement also refers to a Claires Law application being requested and upheld on 30 October 2025.
41. In her second statement, PC Fox updates information from her last statement. In relation to the Appellant’s arrest on 4 November 2025 for malicious communications, category Domestic Abuse, no further action is to be taken on the basis that the offence was not made out, the language used in messages being insufficient to pursue the charge. In relation to the Appellant being named as a suspect of a theft of a motor vehicle from his ex-partner, no further action is to be taken as there was insufficient evidence to charge the Appellant, who had also reported the vehicle stolen and both he and the victim had an agreement to purchase it together with repayments made by the Appellant. As at the date of the statement, there were no further arrests or prosecutions pending.
42. PC Fox attended the oral hearing and gave oral evidence. As an update to the incident of ABH on 20 January 2022 in DC Dollery’s statement, PC Fox stated that there was CPS authority to charge and the matter came to court but was then dismissed as no evidence was offered. The specific reasons for this were not recorded, but there were potentially a number of different reasons why this happened, including that a witness or victim did not attend court or administrative issues.
43. In relation to the incidents set out in her own statements, PC Fox confirmed that no further action was taken on two of them as there was insufficient evidence to charge the Appellant and a police error had been accepted that the vehicle which was the subject of the theft allegation was wrongly returned to the Appellant rather than the registered keeper.
44. In cross-examination, PC Fox was unable to answer some of the questions about earlier incidents as she was not the officer in the case; nor for the same reasons was she specifically able to attest the truth of statements made by others. PC Fox has had no direct previous involvement with the Appellant, her information is only from access to police records which she described, in particular the CRIS reports.
45. In relation to earlier incidents where no charges were brought or criminal behaviour identified, PC Fox was asked why they would be included at all in police information. She explained that a call was made to the police in relation to each incident, police attendance was considered necessary and therefore there was a record of that even if no offence was established when the police attended. In relation to the drugs incident on 3 July 2021, PC Fox was unable to give any further details than those available in the CRIS reports and noted that there was no longer a requirement to document or count cash held by a person if taken into custody. A person is only taken in to custody if there is a basis for suspicion and two specific reasons must be given to justify custody to a custody sergeant.
46. We asked PC Fox further questions to understand the terminology and references used in some of the documentation. In particular, she explained that VISOR was the violence and sex offender management board, who manage a list of people meeting a certain threshold score as posing a high risk of harm. The score is based on a combination of previous offending history and intelligence. Those on the list are then referred to MAPPA (Multi-agency public protection arrangements) for consideration of management of that person. A PNC record would show whether there is a live VISOR for an individual, but not on the limited PNC version available to the Tribunal on this appeal, PC Fox would have to access the system to find exact dates on which the Appellant was within VISOR. From DC Dollery’s statement she would infer that the Appellant dropped out of VISOR some time between 2012 and 2018. For a person to drop off VISOR, there would be an assessment by the Jigsaw unit that deals with risk assessment for complex cases and if a person no longer meets the threshold, they will drop off the list, but the marker will remain on their PNC.
The Appellant’s evidence
Witness evidence
The Appellant
47. In his first written statement (unsigned and undated, prepared for the First-tier Tribunal hearing in 2024 and a signed copy was submitted after the hearing) the Appellant sets out his personal and family background. He states that he had a troubled childhood, was excluded from school and sent to a special school, and his behaviour at that time was not good as he had found it hard to adapt to a new place to live. The Appellant’s last conviction was in November 2011 at the time of the London riots which he was not involved in, but there was a lot going on in his area and he felt aggrieved being approached by the police. The Appellant states that he was in a bad crowd when he was younger, he associated with some of the wrong people and was often arrested as he was in places he should not have been where bad things happened. However, since then he has grown up and no longer keeps that type of company.
48. The Appellant referred to a bleed on his brain in September 2015 which affected the evidence he gave at his appeal in April 2015, he is not good at remembering, mixes a lot of things up and finds it hard to recall different events from others. This still affects his memory and he struggles with getting around as he has difficulty planning routes and planning ahead, relying on friends to get to places.
49. At the moment the Appellant is unable to take on paid employment, but following his role in the TV series Top Boy he still does bits and pieces of acting work and puts videos out with friends. He has done charity work with the AP Foundation to persuade young people away from gangs which he was well suited to do because of his role in Top Boy. The Appellant has also encouraged kids in Hackney to get in to acting and used his contacts to get some roles in Top Boy.
50. The Appellant lists his seven children and writes a paragraph about each of them, including their current stage of education, where they live and how close he is to them. In relation to C1, he refers to playing a big role in her schooling and her role in Top Boy which has caused her some difficulties and bullying at school. The Appellant has attended meetings on this, collected her from school to make sure she is safe and advised C1 to deactivate her social media.
51. The Appellant lives with his mother who helps him to organise things and to foster an atmosphere where all his children can meet. C1, C2, C3, C6 and C7 all live close to the Appellant in London (C2 slightly further away) and C4 and C5 live in Northampton. All of the children live with their respective mothers and he sets out the various levels of contact he has with them pending on distance from where he lives. The Appellant states he has a close bond with all of the children and has a WhatasApp group on his phone to communicate with all of the mother’s and plan for times for all of the children to be together. He is concerned that if he is deported, the connection between his children would fall apart because the Appellant is the one that organises it all.
52. In terms of the allegations in DC Dollery’s written statement he refers to the following incidents:
(a) The incident in August 2018 related to a woman who he was seeing at the time who called the police when she was very drunk. He picked up their puppy by his neck as that his how dog’s mother’s carry them so the Appellant knew it was not harmful, but his partner thought he was trying to harm it. After the police arrived, he agreed to leave for the night for things to calm down.
(b) The Appellant does not remember an incident in September 2018, he does not think it was something he was there for.
(c) As to the possession of crack cocaine, the Appellant denies this. He states that he was going to McDonalds near the cemetery on Mare Street, smoking a roll-up and two older guys asked him for a roll up and a lighter which he gave to them. At the time, the police were chasing someone on an electric scooter, then one of the guys was shouting something like ‘babylon are coming’, so the police came over, he went crazy and the police pinned him down. All three men were arrested although the Appellant was nothing to do with it. Later he found out some drugs had been found but this was nothing to do with him.
(d) The Appellant had no idea where the allegation of drink driving and driving without insurance in 2019 came from, he would only be in a car with a friend driving.
(e) At the time of the incident in January 2022, the Appellant was on crutches, he had been drinking at a party and a woman he was seeing got angry with him and scratched him in the face. The Appellant restrained her to stop her hitting him, but did not hit her head on the floor multiple times as alleged and she had no injuries.
53. As to possible deportation to St Lucia, the Appellant states that he has not lived there since he was 12 years old and has very few memories. He visited in 2011 and felt like an outsider. The Appellant’s uncle lives in Barbados and had been living in St Lucia looking after the Appellant’s grandmother until she died on 14 April 2023. Another uncle died a few years ago. These details were from the Appellant’s mother as he had forgotten them. If returned to St Lucia the Appellant would be without his family and find it hard to cope without people to help him and it would be difficult to adapt. He struggles with depression and his activities with his children keep him stable. In the United Kingdom the Appellant wants to continue with his work as an actor and has ideas to start a clothing business and a cooking business. He has lots of contacts in his local area from his role in Top Boy which could help him in the future.
54. In his second written statement dated 10 December 2025, the Appellant states that he has not been in any trouble since his last statement and is focusing on his family and spending time with them. He states that he is particularly close to C1, C3 and C7, the first two of which are aware of the risk of deportation and are worried about it; with C1 becoming emotional and C3 shutting down and not wanting to talk about it. The Appellant states that Ms Dos Santos is supporting of his relationship with C1 and they co-parent very well. He is close to C2 who also has a close relationship with C1. The Appellant is concerned about them retaining sibling relationships without him being there to facilitate it.
55. The Appellant states that his relationship with C2 has been strained in the last six months because she has become despondent, following an argument at family gathering she has not wanted to speak to the Appellant and he does not know what to do about it as he doesn’t really have a relationship with C2’s mother who is responsible for her day-to-day care.
56. The Appellant sees C5 and C6 less frequently than before as their mother has entered in to a new relationship, but he does still see them and spend time with them at his mother’s house every couple of months. The Appellant has enrolled them both in football coaching, so he travels to Northampton to watch them play every two weeks or so.
57. The Appellant is in a close and loving relationship with his current partner, Nahiya Mohammed Muhedin and their son, now aged 4. He lives at his mum’s house but often stays with her or she stays with him. She lives with her mum and sister in Wood Green. His partner has arthritis and physical pain from this, so she needs to take breaks from everyday care of their son, which the Appellant takes over for. The Appellant plays a hands on role with C7 and takes care of him a lot by himself when his mother has arthritis flare-ups. He often takes C7 to school where he is now in reception.
58. There is no longer a WhatsApp group with all the mothers of the Appellant’s children as relationships are not good or have changed. He hopes in the future for all the siblings to retain their relationships with each other through him, as C1, C3, C4, C5 and C7 do now.
59. The Appellant attended the hearing, adopted his written statements and gave oral evidence. At the outset, Mr Furner reminded us of the medical evidence relevant to the Appellant giving evidence, albeit no application was made to treat him as vulnerable witness.
60. In cross-examination, the Appellant was asked about the limited further or updating evidence submitted. He stated that he probably has a lot of other stuff, but he forgot a lot of things and was then told it was too late to submit more. When asked why there was still no evidence about the WhatsApp group, the Appellant said he didn’t really know, he still has the group, but some people have been removed, some added and currently it is very quiet. When asked about missing birth certificates for three of the children, the Appellant thought he had provided these to his solicitors, but his mum has them and she would have done this. In relation to medical evidence, the Appellant said that he tried to get updated evidence about himself but there wasn’t enough time. He stated that he is now on medication after something had been missed in previous appointments, but did not specify what this was or what it was for.
61. The Appellant was asked about getting in to trouble in the past with the police, in incidents involving crime and with a history of violence and aggression especially against women; all of which he denied. He stated that after he had children he tried to keep himself clean and not get in to any trouble with the police; but wouldn’t say that he committed any crimes. When asked if he had any convictions, the Appellant stated none that he knew of, only a caution and a suspended sentence once for playing loud music in the park. The Appellant has taken steps to keep away from crime and trouble, through his acting and charity work to help get kids off the street and away from knife crime. He was unable to remember any details about his charity work (the name of the charity, the name of anyone he worked with, when he did this and stated that he had lost contact with a lot of people). The Appellant did accept that he had previously mixed with bad company. The Appellant stated now he has no friends but also that he spends his time with friends and family and cooks for them.
62. The Appellant was asked about dependence on alcohol that was previously referred to in the medical evidence. He stated that he had discussed with his doctor, but only drinks on Fridays and Saturdays and unable to say if he is an alcoholic or dependent on alcohol (although then said he wasn’t), but does drink behind his wife’s back as she doesn’t like him doing this. She would like the Appellant to be more religious and drinking alcohol is forbidden.
63. In relation to the incident on 11 August 2018, he said that this involved his partner at the time and they had both been drinking and there was an argument about their dog; on which he gave quite a bit of detail as to what happened (which is not necessary to set out in this decision). To the previous detailed account in his statement, the Appellant added that he thought his partner’s drink may have been spiked as she was acting crazy and paranoid.
64. In relation to the incident on 12 September 2018, the Appellant said he could not remember this and did not know anything about it. He said sometimes in relationships a lot of stuff happens, particularly with his ex-partner and their families, as she made a lot of stuff up and this was probably one of those times as he was sure this never happened.
65. In relation to the drugs incident on 2 July 2021, the Appellant remembered this and stated that he was not sitting on a wall, he walked past two other people and gave them a lighter and tobacco; then the police started chasing someone else and one of the two people then starting shouting crazy things and they were all arrested. There was CCTV of the area which would show what happened. The Appellant was challenged on some of the details he had given which were not in the police report or were inconsistent with it. He stated that he didn’t know the guys, wasn’t involved with them as did nothing wrong. If anything, he was trying to calm the situation down and before that just walking away. The Appellant said that he was not the person who dropped the drugs behind the wall and he didn’t know who did.
66. In relation to the incident on 20 January 2022, the Appellant said the person involved was not his partner but someone he had an intimate relationship with and it occurred at a friend’s party. A woman demanded money from the Appellant to pay other guys for cocaine and when the woman who complained of assault saw the conversation, she got jealous and grabbed the Appellant by the throat, she scratched his face. At the time the Appellant had a broken ankle and was on crutches. He put the woman down on the floor and restrained her, before leaving and calling the police himself.
67. The Appellant was asked about there being a number of incidents involving what he described as crazy women, particularly whether he was making it up or just blaming others. He stated that he is the calm one, these were just arguments, the women had been drinking and there were disagreements.
68. The Appellant was unsure which of the children’s mother’s had given written statements for the appeal, he thought they all had and he believed this had been done through the solicitors. When it was suggested to the Appellant that the Independent Social Worker, Mr Absolon, had not spoken to Ms Peach or Ms Sutherland, he asked if he was being accused of giving the wrong phone number, which he then denied as no one else could speak on behalf of the children. The Appellant stated there was no letter from C3 to support the appeal as he was supposed to arrange this and totally forgot.
69. The Appellant had assistance from family members to get evidence to prepare for the appeal and for some matters he stated that there had not been sufficient time or it was too late to get evidence, at other times he had forgotten to do so and/or thought others, such as his mother had dealt with documents.
70. In terms of financial support, the Appellant receives some from his mother and otherwise he cooks for family, friends and at parties for which he is paid. The Appellant’s mother used to buy his train tickets to see his two children in Northampton, but he no longer travels there as his wife does not want him to stay with his ex-partner so the children visit him in London instead.
71. The Appellant was asked about C1’s education and what she is doing now. He said he didn’t think to put in any evidence about that and thought others would say what was needed. The Appellant contacted her school to do a statement but he didn’t know if they did. At the moment, C1 is doing really well, she got good grades in her GCSEs (with A*s, Bs and Cs but he wasn’t exactly sure of all the grades) and is now at sixth form studying all the basic subjects, science and English. The Appellant said that C1 would be devastated if he were to be deported as she talks to him about issues first and can speak to him about anything. She would not be able to visit him in St Lucia as he has nothing there and if not suitable for him, it would not be suitable for her either and he could not afford somewhere for her to stay. C1’s mother, Ms Dos Santos, is supportive and has been to St Lucia. C1 could keep in touch with the Appellant in St Lucia by phone and video calls.
72. The Appellant stated that he could not live in St Lucia with his wife or C7, but that they are both supported by their wider families in the United Kingdom. However, C7’s life would be destroyed without the Appellant and although he would not say his wife is dependent on him, her arthritis comes and goes on different days. In the United Kingdom, his wife has a brother, sister-in-law (and their children), a sister and her mum who she cares for. There are no statements from any wider family as the Appellant did not want to bother them or get them involved.
73. When asked about acting work and whether he could continue in St Lucia, the Appellant stated that he could not as there is no film industry there. He did start a clothing business but investment fell through and it cost too much money. In St Lucia there is not much of a market for a lot of things.
74. We asked the Appellant some further questions for clarification. First, in relation to Top Boy and C1’s involvement. The Appellant stated the first series was around 2011 and C1 was around 2 or 3 when she was in it. In later series a different child was used for the same character and C1 has no interest in acting now. Although she was a toddler at the time, he has acknowledged that C1 was his daughter in real life although kids at school when she got older didn’t believe her. There have been issues around school for C1 and C3 which meant the Appellant stopped attending the schools.
75. As to contact between the siblings, the Appellant stated that this would fall apart without him as although sometimes C1 and C3’s mums speak about the girls staying with each other (at their houses without the Appellant), he is the one to organise things.
76. We asked if the Appellant accepted the findings made by the First-tier Tribunal in 2015, which he said he didn’t know, he did not remember anything about those things.
77. There were multiple times during the Appellant’s evidence when he referred to advice he had been given by his solicitors about the appeal, further to which we reminded him that those matters were legally privileged and he was not required to (nor had he been asked to) disclose those details. A brief pause was taken during his evidence for Mr Furner to explain this again to him as well. Ultimately it was a matter for the Appellant what he wanted to say in evidence and we were satisfied that he understood he was not required to give any details of his legal advice.
Nahiya Mohammed Muhedin
78. The Appellant’s current partner (wife by Islamic marriage and referred to by the Appellant and elsewhere in this decision as his wife), Nahiya Mohammed Muhedin made two written statements in support of the Appellant’s appeal. The first was unsigned but dated 22 May 2024 (a signed copy was provided after the hearing) and the second was signed and dated 10 December 2025.
79. In her first statement, Ms Muhedin refers to her relationship with the Appellant, their Islamic marriage nearly four years prior and that they have a son born in June 2021. At the time of that statement, she lived in a hostel type room but was also at her mother’s house where the Appellant stayed with them a lot. Ms Muhedin describes the Appellant as a very hands on father in terms of childcare and activities and he has a strong bond with C7, enjoying outings together. The Appellant does a lot of the cooking for the family as he enjoys it and aspires to open a restaurant in the future.
80. If the Appellant were to be deported, Ms Muhedin worries for her son growing up without a father. C7 already asks about the Appellant when he is not there. She would also miss the Appellant as he is always there to support her when needed. Ms Muhedin hopes to be able to return to work with the Appellant looking after their son, which she says would only be possible with his support. The Appellant also takes C7 to see his other siblings at his mother’s house, with whom he has a good relationship.
81. Ms Muhedin describes appreciating the Appellant’s character and integrity, with him being a very selfless individual who consistently displays compassion towards others and willing to help a hand to those in need and who approaches everything with a strong sense of commitment. She states that the Appellant “consistently goes above and beyond to fulfil his obligations and provide the best possible support for his family” and that he “has a natural inclination to understand and consider the feelings and perspectives of those around him”.
82. In her second written statement dated 10 December 2025, Ms Muhedin states that she is the primary carer for her mother and spends most of her time at her home, where the Appellant visits and stays over regularly. He is unable to live there full-time due to Ms Muhedin’s mother’s health conditions – diabetes, depression, anxiety and mobility issues due to sciatica. The home is crowded as Ms Muhedin’s sister also lives there.
83. The relationship between the Appellant and C7 is described as incredibly strong and loving, with C7 becoming visibly distressed when the Appellant is not around and asks where he is, often waiting anxiously for his return. C7 has cried when the Appellant is not there as they have a deep attachment which is vital for C7’s emotional wellbeing. The Appellant supports C7 with school routines, confident, emotional stability, helps get him ready for school, encourages learning and talks to him about his day.
84. Ms Muhedin has experienced severe and unexplained pain since 2023 and has had to attend A&E several times because of it, including in September 2024 when she was diagnosed seropositive rheumatoid arthritis. The condition flares up almost every week during which she has to rest or lie down and the Appellant steps in to give her breaks to rest, attend medical appointments, go swimming and manage her condition. She also suffers from depression and feels overwhelmed caring for her mother, managing household pressures, looking after C7 and due to the deterioration in her physical health. Ms Muhedin relies on strong painkillers and the Appellant to take on a larger caring role for C7, including arranging his nursery and school placement.
85. The Appellant is described by Ms Muhedin as having an exceptional character, and that “he is a selfless caring individual who always puts the needs of others before his own. He is patient, kind, gentle, dependable. … He is hardworking, responsible, and someone who genuinely wants the best for the people around him.”. Ms Muhedin would be devastated if the Appellant were deported, C7 would lose his father and she cannot imagine how she would cope with the pressures she faces already without the Appellant’s support.
86. Ms Muhedin attended the hearing, adopted her written statements and gave oral evidence. In cross-examination she stated that she became her mother’s carer just before the last appeal hearing in 2023. Her mother suffers from sciatica, anxiety and depression, diabetes, high blood pressure and high cholesterol, as well as having mobility problems and requires support throughout the day; although there is no medical evidence of those conditions, only evidence of carer’s support, although it does not name Ms Muhedin’s mother as the person being cared for. Ms Muhedin thought this would be sufficient evidence and that no statement was required from her mother or her sister, the latter has nothing to do with the case.
87. As to Ms Muhedin’s health, she stated that she has swelling in her joints, inflammation and pain and when this is bad she is unable to lift things, including C7 and walking is difficult and slower. She accepted there was no updated evidence of her mental health but stated that she was last prescribed medication in 2025.
88. If the Appellant were deported, Ms Muhedin could not relocate with him as he has nothing there and her family are here, including a brother. Ms Muhedin and C7 live with her mother and sister, not with the Appellant but one day they want to live together.
89. We asked further questions for clarification. Ms Muhedin is not currently working and is supported by state benefits, as is her mother.
90. In her written statement she referred to the Appellant going above and beyond for others and we asked for an example of this. She stated is he helpful, takes C7 to school when she is not able to do, cooks for the family and does the shopping, also does selfless things like give food or money to a homeless person.
91. In a typical day, Ms Muhedin wakes up, gets C7 ready for school or if the Appellant is there he does it; then she takes care of her mother making sure she takes her medication and makes breakfast. After that she cleans the house, takes her mother to appointments, makes lunch, gives medication and after C7 comes back from school, the main thing that the Appellant does is to make sure C7 has eaten. C7 has no medical conditions or other difficulties.
Hayley Dos Santos
92. Ms Hayley Dos Santos, C1’s mother, made two written statements in support of the Appellant’s appeal. The first was unsigned and dated 22 May 2024 (a signed copy was submitted after the hearing), the second was signed and dated 7 April 2026.
93. In her first statement, Ms Dos Santos says she has a good relationship with the Appellant and they make decisions together about C1. The Appellant visits often and when C1 was younger, he would take her to school most days and often still does. He has always been active with her schooling and he helps her with adverse attention she received from appearing in Top Boy with him. C1 also visits the Appellant at his mother’s house, stays over and has a good bond with her other siblings who all meet up there, facilitated by the Appellant.
94. Ms Dos Santos states that it would be absolutely devastating for C1 if the Appellant were deported as he was always been her rock and it would be even harder for her as lots of people recognise her from the TV show and her dad mentors her through it. They have a special bond and Ms Dos Santos does not think C1 would cope, losing him would be traumatic. There are things that C1 discussed with her father that she doesn’t talk to her mum about, and the other way round. Contact by phone in St Lucia would lose that bond between C1 and the Appellant, as much of that relies on him being able to see her and read what is going on which she can not always express as she is not yet an adult and because she is at a crucial stage in her life.
95. In her second statement, Ms Dos Santos simply confirmed that the Appellant and C1 continue to have a very special bond and each other often. C1 is distressed about the uncertainty of the Appellant’s future and Ms Dos Santos worries for her if he was not around.
96. Ms Dos Santos attended the hearing, adopted her written statements and gave oral evidence. In cross-examination, she said that C1 was currently attending sixth form studying English, sociology and psychology and said her studies would be affected if the Appellant were deported as that would affect her mental health as the Appellant plays a vital role in her life. In her GCSEs, C1 achieved grades from 9s to 5s and has been supported in her studies by both parents and wider family. The Appellant does not provide any financial support for C1.
97. C1 gets on with all of her siblings and is closest to C3 as they are close in age and stay at each other’s houses. Ms Dos Santos has a good relationship with C3 and her mother, as well as with all the other children. She does not contact the other mothers directly, but they all get on really well when they see each other at family events.
98. Ms Dos Santos describes C1 as distressed at the thought of the Appellant being deported as it is not the same to keep in touch by phone & video and the Appellant is the more relaxed parent for her to talk to. She did not think C1 could visit the Appellant in St Lucia as he has no one and no stability there and long term she wants to go to university so questioned how she would be able to organise this; it would not be often due to studies and it is not cheap to fly there. Ms Dos Santos went to St Lucia once for a holiday around 2010.
99. We asked Ms Dos Santos a few questions for clarification. In relation to C1’s acting in Top Boy, she stated that she is no longer acting but is still recognised for her role in the past and has a high following on tik-tok (not purely because of her acting role, in part just as a popular teenager). Sometimes this creates problems that the Appellant goes through with her and shows her what he does when issues arise. An example is when C1 was not picked for the last series when she was around 14 years old. C1 was last in Top Boy when she was 4-6 years old.
Petra Romulus
100. The Appellant’s mother, Petra Romulus, also made two written statements in support of the Appellant’s appeal. The first was signed and dated 22 May 2024, the second was unsigned and dated 8 Apri 2026 (no signed copy was provided after the hearing as requested).
101. In her first statement, Ms Romulus states she has a close relationship with the Appellant and she helps him because he has a bad memory and difficulty making plans. She also financially supports him as due to his status he is unable to have a full-time job to provide for himself and his family. The Appellant is actively involved in all of his children’s lives and they often visit at Ms Romulus’ home with the Appellant cooking for the family. C1 and C2 visit most often as they live close by and the Appellant keeps all of the siblings connected, which would not be possible without him. He uses a Whatsapp chat to keep in touch with the older siblings and for them to be in touch with each other. The Appellant spends time with all of his family members and is now more mature.
102. Ms Romulus worries about the Appellant’s safety if he were to be deported to St Lucia as he would be like a foreigner there, he doesn’t know or remember anything and has no close family or friends to support him there. St Lucia is riddled with crime. Ms Romulus’ mother who lived in St Lucia passed away on 14 April 2023 and her brother who lived there passed away on 4 November 2021. Another brother lives in Bardados. In St Lucia, the Appellant would not manage to get a job and he would struggle with his mental health without his children, becoming isolated and his children would be negatively impacted without him too.
103. In her second statement, Ms Romulus states that the Appellant continues to split his time between her home and that of Ms Muhedin; that he continues to have a close relationship with C1 and C3 and her home is where all the children can get together and where C5 and C6 visit when they can. Ms Romulus continues to worry about the Appellant being deported.
104. Ms Romulus attended the hearing, adopted her two written statements and gave oral evidence. In cross-examination she stated that she knew about the WhatsApp group referred to by the Appellant as she is a member of it. It was set up a few years ago before the children had their own phones, messages would be sent out to see if any of the children were free and if so, arrangements would be made for them to come to Ms Romulus’ house. The Appellant has a relationship with all of his children and they would all be affected if he were to be deported, particularly the older ones.
105. Ms Romulus provides financial support to the Appellant and helps him to buy things for his children as and when he needs it, particularly around their birthdays and Christmas, around £100-£150 a month. If he returned to St Lucia, there is no family there for the Appellant, no one to support him, no jobs and it is bad place to bring up children; there would be nowhere for her to visit the Appellant in St Lucia either.
106. We asked some questions for clarification. When asked if she would continue to provide financial support to the Appellant in St Lucia, she said that if it comes to it, she couldn’t leave him on the street. The Appellant would need support in St Lucia as it is not an easy country, he hasn’t been there since he was 11 years old, there are no jobs and everything is expensive. Ms Romulus was born there so knows the country, sees things on the news about it and when her mother was alive visited regularly. She last visited there to go to her mother’s grave last year and stayed in a hotel.
107. Ms Romulus was also active in the WhatsApp group, sending messages to arrange family meetings as well as the Appellant. The last time all seven children visited her home together was the summer holidays last year and since then, either two or four of them visit at the same time. Ms Romulus has a son and daughter in the United Kingdom who live relatively close to her; with her daughter visiting when the Appellant’s children do, going to the park and swimming with them and often spends time with C1 and sometimes C3 on her own as well. Ms Romulus’ son doesn’t come to visit as often, but does come to eat with them sometimes and plays online with C5.
C1
108. C1 wrote a letter dated 6 October 2025 in support of the Appellant, describing him as loving and selfless, putting others before himself. He has always cared for C1 and her siblings with dedication, kindness and patience, picking them up from school, teaching them life lessons and spending quality time together as a family and making sure they had what they needed. C1 states that she does not understand why anyone would want to deport the Appellant, who has contributed positively to his family and community and losing her father would be devastating for her. The Appellant is her role model and source of strength that she does not know how she would cope without him.
109. C1 attended the hearing, adopted her letter and gave oral evidence; with appropriate explanations about the proceedings to make adjustments for her age to enable her to do so. In her own words she described her relationship with the Appellant as good, she loves him, can see him whenever she wants, is really comfortable with him and there are things that she can talk to him about rather than with her mum as he is a bit more open about things. C1 stated that she could not live without her dad if he was deported and their relationship would be lost very easily if online because of the time differences and other stuff.
110. C1 remembered it was fun being on Top Boy as they had a trailer and she would learn her lines with her dad. She stated that sometimes people still speak about it and make fun about it (caller her things like ‘crack baby’ from the character in the show), which her dad understands and supports her with.
111. In cross-examination, C1 stated that although she has other supportive family, it is not the same as having her dad here as well. When asked about visiting him in St Lucia, she said she didn’t know where he was going or live or how she would be able to afford to do this, or that it would not be practical when she went to university.
112. C1 said that the comments about Top Boy can be in person and online, the latter are easier to delete and filter out. C1 is able to stand up for herself with such comments up to a point. She stated that bad comments are made every now and then when the show comes up. The Appellant’s advice is that others are just jealous and should be ignored, which C1 can do to a certain extent. The Appellant is always recognised in public for his role when C1 has been with him.
Independent Social Worker reports
113. In a report initially dated 18 September 2023, Christine Brown, an Independent Social Worker set out details of her assessment of the Appellant and his family relationships. The report was amended on 10 and 11 June 2024 and headed as an ‘addendum report’ (which is the only report available to the Upper Tribunal as a single document). It had been envisaged that during the time between the reports Ms Brown would be able to meet with other family members and former partners which did not take place and therefore the report was expressly more limited in content as a consequence and the author stated that a further extended assessment would provide greater clarity.
114. The reports cover in detail the Appellant’s involvement with each of his children, their relationship and the possible impact of his deportation on them as at the time of assessment and writing. We have considered both the report in full but refer to the conclusions set out therein relatively briefly given that there are preserved findings of fact in relation to the report and weight to be attached to it and given there is a more recent and up to date Independent Social Worder report which sets out the current family relationships and it is the current situation which we are required to assess.
115. In the report, Ms Brown in essence concludes as follows. First, although she did not meet all of the children or their mothers, the Appellant appeared as a loving and committed father to all of his children, with some variance in the attachment the children felt towards him. The Appellant was described as the dynamic factor in facilitating the coming together of all of the children. Secondly, the Appellant was 25 years old at the date of his last conviction, a threshold at which offending diminishes or ends altogether and his offending appears to have ended. This coincided with his role in a TV series which gave him a heightened profile and a sense of worth and positive self-esteem; which together with a new found maturity meant he had redirected his life away from offending a crime. Being a father also contributed to this. Thirdly, the Appellant’s deportation would render his seven children effectively fatherless and contact with them could not properly be maintained by phone, letters and social media. The Appellant had experienced a similar distance from his own father whilst growing up. Long distance visits are rarely a successful form of maintaining communication and are increasingly difficult to manage for a child over the longer term. Fourthly, separation would be harmful to the children, by reference to broader studies on such impacts with damage felt in behaviour, mental health and school attainment. Fifthly, the best interests of all children will be best met by the Appellant remaining in the United Kingdom and the family members in their varying forms and formats being able to continue uninterrupted in their daily lives.
116. A second Social Work Assessment Report was completed by Mr Daniel Absolon on 8 October 2025 following a four hour assessment in person on 26 September 2025 with the Appellant, Petra Romulus, Nahiya Mohammed Muhedin, C1, C3 and C7 and a phone conversation with Ms Dos Santos on 29 September 2025, with Ms Nicole Sutherland (C3’s mother) on 6 October 2025 and with Ms Naomi Peach (C5 & C6’s mother) on 8 October 2025.
117. Mr Absolon’s report sets out a brief history for the Appellant; the relationship between him and each of his children; the effect of deportation on some of the children (no full assessment being possible for C4, C5 or C6); the Appellant’s role in maintaining sibling relationships; and the best interests of the children (which was to maintain regular face to face contact with the Appellant).
118. In relation to C1, Mr Absolon describes a close bond with visits to the Appellant at least every other weekend and ad hoc visits during the week; with each other being their most significant attachment. Mr Absolon’s opinion was that the shared acting experience alongside the Appellant was significant with regards to their emotional bond, creating a more profound level of emotional dependency and connection and the Appellant being able to guide C1 “with respect to the challenges associated with becoming a recognisable figure amongst her peers. C1’s role in Top Boy would have made her more prominent and visible to her peers, and it was apparent that the heightened sense of recognition created a degree of pressure that is unusual for a young person of her age to experience.” (6.5). Further, Ms Dos Santos stated that C1 would go to the Appellant more than she does her as he is more understanding; consistent with what C1 herself said. There was consistent information as to co-parenting, with the Appellant playing an active role in attending appointments at school, parents evenings and health appointments.
119. As to the effect of deportation on C1, Mr Absolon referred to the importance of father involvement for adolescents and being at a key juncture in her academic pathway currently studying for her A levels and separation from her father would impact on her ability to engage in education. This is an important developmental stage for C1 as she transitions into adulthood and in Mr Absolon’s opinion, “the loss of direct contact with her father at this juncture in C1’s development would be severe, with respect to the impact that it would have on her emotional development and general well-being. … I do not believe the prospect of remote communication or occasional visits is likely to mitigate any of these harms.”.
120. In relation to C2, there had been no contact for the last five months after a disagreement and although some information was given by the Appellant, there was no contact with either C2 or her mother for this assessment.
121. In relation to C3, Mr Absolon considered the Appellant demonstrated an understanding of C3’s needs, interests, routines and relationships, taking an active involvement in her life including participating in school-related matters; supported by C3’s mother saying he played an active part and communicate about C3. C3 stated that she visited the Appellant every two weeks and examples of activities were given.
122. As to the effect of deportation on C3, Mr Absolon refers to her diagnosis of ADHD and difficulty expressing her feelings, with a report from Ms Sutherland (her mother) that her behaviour had become more challenging in the last two weeks which was attributed to concern about the Appellant’s potential deportation. Mr Absolon considered that the Appellant’s deportation would likely create a risk to C3’s mental health.
123. In relation to C4, the contact between her and the Appellant is rare and no contact was made with her or her mother for this assessment.
124. In relation to C5 and C6, who live in Northampton, the Appellant used to see them every two weeks but visits have become less frequent; but the children visit the Appellant at his mother’s home including for extended periods during the holidays. Ms Peach stated that the Appellant sees C5 and C6 approximately six times a year, with contact restricted by the Appellant’s financial situation. The Appellant was able to describe things about C5 and C6.
125. As to the effect of deportation on C5 and C6, Mr Absolon anticipated that they would manage a longer-term separation, although their mother was concerned about this impacting on her support network.
126. In relation to C7, the Appellant was observed with his son demonstrating appropriate care and that he continued to play an active role in C7’s day-to-day care, spending much of their time together as a family despite living separately. The Appellant was involved in C7’s placement at nursery and school, playing an active part in his education. Mr Absolon referred to Ms Muhedin’s health problems and the likelihood that her practical dependence on the Appellant is likely to increase over time and that she also suffers from long-term depression for which she is prescribed anti-depressants. Ms Muhedin told Mr Absolon that the Appellant was better at managing C7’s expectations than she was.
127. As to the effect of deportation, Mr Absolon was of the view that for C7 this is likely to be severe, bleak and significantly detrimental to his mental and emotional wellbeing due to his lack of ability to process deportation and following research on long-term separation from a parent (some of which is cited). Mr Absolon’s opinion was that Mrs Muhedin would struggle to manage the various challenges of caring for C7 alone, especially considering her health and that any escalation in behaviour linked to separation would present a significant challenge.
128. Overall, Mr Absolon considered that the Appellant has relationships with all of his children, which vary in quality and the depth of their emotional attachment, with the strongest relationships being with C1 and C7. The Appellant is focused on ensuring the children’s wellbeing and meeting development needs, as well as being committed to their educational attainment. He has struggled to provide financially for his children giving the Appellant a sense of inadequacy. The impact of deportation on each child would be different, as referred to above.
129. As to sibling relationships, Mr Absolon heard from the children and their mothers that the Appellant plays a key role in supporting the siblings to stay connected with each other and that this would be adversely affected if he were to be deported, resulting in a significant decrease in sibling group contact. The Appellant’s mother would not be able to care for the children as often given her shift work. Overall, Mr Absolon was of the opinion that the Appellant “plays a vital role in holding the family together, effectively acting as a lynchpin for children whom in his absence would likely be disconnected from their siblings and extended family. As young people move through adolescence it is common for them to seek more social interactions away from their family unit and without [the Appellant’s] involvement I anticipate that the siblings’ relationships would suffer as a result of his absence.”
130. Mr Absolon attended the oral hearing and gave evidence. The criticisms of his report in the Respondent’s skeleton argument were put to him for comment. First, in relation to the assessment time of four hours, he stated that the legal aid benchmark for a social work assessment was 30 hours including preparation and the report, but the task is different for a best interests assessment like in the present case and around five hours in total was spent including phonecalls; which would be typical for this sort of case. Further, he spent a day reading the bundle and Tribunal decisions.
131. In relation to C1, Mr Absolon stated that there was no real significance of her approaching 18 or legally being an adult as she is still within late adolescence, transitioning through education and managing her mental health; for all of which she still needs parental involvement.
132. In cross-examination, Mr Absolon confirmed that he had sufficient time to speak to each person individually and to observe the Appellant with those children present. For those spoken to on the phone, the Appellant provided the contact details and there was no independent verification to check that the people he spoke to were who they claimed they were, albeit they showed insight in to the children discussed so there was nothing to suggest anything untoward. Mr Absolon had made checks with the relevant local authorities for any child protection concerns in relation not the children, although he only received responses from Tower Hamlets and Harringay.
133. In relation to C7, Mr Absolon stated that he recorded that Ms Muhedin would struggle as a single parent relying on what he had been told and that the report did not expressly consider other family support available. Mr Absolon stated that support is more than practical needs, but there would be a struggle to manage emotional needs and behaviour which may emerge over time.
134. In relation to the risk assessment for C1 and her mother, Mr Absolon stated there were no further details than what was in paragraph 6.11 of his report and agreed there was no reference to a violent assault of Ms Dos Santos’ friend in 2009 or that the former had not been found credible in her evidence on this. As to the bond between the Appellant and C1, Mr Absolon described this as vital and more than just an emotional bond, with practical and financial dependency as well as working together (although he did not know when they worked together).
135. Mr Absolon’s report did not set out in detail the level of contact with each of the children, which we asked him for details of. He stated that there was regular fortnightly contact with C1, with ad hoc contact in between and regular phone/text contact. The relationship with C2 was fragmented with no contact at all in the five months before the report. There are fortnightly visits with C3 and some phone/text contact. There was very limited contact with C4 and contact around six times a year with C5 and C6. The most frequent contact was with C7 as the Appellant cared for him throughout the week. As to contact with the children’s mothers, this varied and the Appellant had said he would have conversations with them if issues arose. As to sibling contact, this was said to be around school holidays, with certain children (C1, C3 and C7) having more regular contact and co-ordinating fortnightly visits. In addition, C1 and C3 spend time at each others’ homes and there is contact between their mothers.
136. In relation to C7, Mr Absolon confirmed that his behaviour was typical of that of any four-year old and there were no additional or specific behavioural concerns when referring to the Appellant being better at managing these in paragraph 6.45 of the report. Different behaviour may develop in the event of separation from the Appellant.
Medical evidence
137. There is a clinical neuropsychological report on the Appellant dated 8 January 2024 from Dr Ziyal, a Chartered Consultant Clinical Neuropsychologist. The report details various functional assessments undertaken and information from an interview with the Appellant. The conclusions in terms of the Appellant’s ability in four key domains of intellectual abilities, memorising and learning abilities, the executive function of verbal fluency and mood state are as follows:
• Intellectual Abilities: Mr Romulus’ intellectual abilities range between the average and the low average levels of cognitive function, between the 28th and the 23rd percentiles of his peers. This level is probably an underestimate of his true cognitive potential because socio-cultural differences and educational factors are likely to lower his actual intellectual attainment, especially during testing. The central adverse impact of socio-cultural/educational factors are in evidence in his verbal abilities.
• Memorising and Learning Abilities; Mr Romulus’ recall in the auditory-verbal modality ranges between the 50th and the 16th percentiles and in the short-term paradigm is superior to that of clinical samples. His recall in the visuo-perceptual modality is severely impaired and significantly worse than that of clinical samples. In this modality his performance places him around the 01st percentile of his peers. Paired associated learning of difficult material is in deficit: he is unable to formulate and implement a strategy to aid his learning and so to improve upon his initial performance. Nevertheless, he is able to fully retain the material he has initially processed after a delay of 20 minutes.
• Executive Functioning and Verbal Fluency; Mr Romulus achieves the lower limits of the average range on basic fluency tasks, at between the 27th and the 16th percentiles of his peers. However, he displays a severe deficit in the ability to switch attention between task components so as to address different problem-demands. His attention-shift is statistically significantly lower than his basic fluency and places him between the 06th and the 01st percentiles of his peers.
• Mood State; Mr Romulus rates himself as severely depressed and severely anxious. The possibility of repatriation and the obstacles this generates to his working in the UK are the central factors causal to his mood state.
138. Dr Ziyal concluded that the Appellant’s severe memory impairment in some areas led to a strong inference of injury in the non-dominant hemisphere of his brain and his continuing difficulty in the use of the left-side of his body also suggests a right-brain injury in the motor cortex. Dr Ziyal observed that the Appellant displayed no evidence of mental ill health in the psychotic/psychosis sense during their meetings, but had expressed strong feelings of depression and anxiety because of his difficulty in being able to work in the United Kingdom and possible deportation to St Lucia. There was also reference to the impact of his stroke and ankle injury and his encounters with the police as causal factors for his within the report. Dr Ziyal also sought to compare the results with those of Dr Haldane previously, although a direct comparison was not possible, the Appellant scored better in some areas and worse in others.
139. The report includes little by way of explanation of the practical impact of the conclusions as to the Appellant’s results on his day-to-day life. However, it is said that his neurological condition impacts on his cognitive effectiveness, with the severe impairment in visual-perceptual memory and his ability to alternate focus between task requirements meaning that his ability to effectively problem solve in activities of day-to-day living would be significantly reduced. These difficulties would include an inability to find his way, inability to orient himself in new environments, difficulty in remembering people he has recently met, in expressing himself fluently and in dealing with more than one task at any one time. Later in the report it is stated that the Appellant’s neuro-cognitive impairments will cause forgetfulness, poor problem-solving, an inability to modify habits and behaviour in line with social demands and result in general ineffectiveness (particularly in the context of a return to St Lucia).
140. In terms of recommended treatment, Dr Ziyal considered that the Appellant would benefit from Cognitive Behaviour Therapy and brain injury rehabilitation which would introduce him to and train him in deploying behaviours that would enable him to compensate for his deficits and also target his mood-state. If returned to St Lucia, Dr Ziyal considered that the Appellant would be alienated which would exacerbate his depression and anxiety, it would be highly improbable that he would be able to make a living there and unlikely to find a job involving acting. The Appellant would also find it difficult to adapt to the way of life there. The Appellant’s impairments would make adjustment more difficult and he would be at risk of an adjustment disorder.
141. In an addendum report dated 21 February 2024, Dr Ziyal expressly considered the impact of the Appellant’s difficulty in visual-perceptual recall on giving evidence in court and the report includes more detailed reference to his day-to-day abilities. In particular, Dr Ziyal stated that the Appellant’s estimate intellectual ability scores were fully adequate for him to meet basic ADL activities, such as managing basic physical needs and would equip him to meet the demands of independent living, of attaining educational proficiency, and of obtaining a profession. The Appellant’s functional effectiveness would likely be impacted in three ways, (i) he will be unable to remember visual material such as maps, plans and photographs and this will prevent him from orienting to new environments effectively and from finding his way in unfamiliar contexts; (ii) he will be unable to remember auditory-verbal material after a short delay (which for example will reduce his effectiveness in responding to questions involving multiple components, particularly if put to him all at one); and (iii) he will be unable to formulate a strategy to aid his learning of new material even after repeated presentations. Further, the Appellant’s impairment in attention shifts is such that he will be deficient in addressing more than a single aspect at any one time and is likely to forget key aspects of verbal information he is required to memorise, including key components of questions put to him. The Appellant will also be severely impaired in his effectiveness in recalling events that have occurred in the past.
142. There is an unsigned report dated 11 January 2024 (which may or may not be a final draft as it includes square brackets with a note to confirm a detail) from Dr Bell, Consultant Psychiatrist. In it, Dr Bell reviews the report of Dr Haldane and sets out details of his interview with the Appellant and information gleaned from it as to his lifestyle, personal circumstances and history. Dr Bell found the Appellant’s symptoms to satisfy the diagnostic criteria for depressive disorder with phases of depressed mood, severe apathy, self-neglect, feelings of pointlessness and suicidal ideation. The Appellant’s mood is described as being highly sensitive to the external context, including in relation to contact with his children and it is said that there is a complex relationships between the Appellant’s psychiatric state and his abnormal cognitive state; both of which may impact on the other and it may not be possible to identify whether symptoms are derived from one or the other. Dr Bell refers in particular to a significant current stressor for the Appellant being uncertainty as to his immigration status due to the threat of deportation.
143. In terms of treatment, it was not considered likely that the Appellant would benefit from psychotropic medication and instead he should be under the care of the appropriate Community Health Team and continue to involve himself in his close family relationships. Dr Bell’s prognosis for the Appellant is said to be entirely dependent on the outcome of his immigration proceedings and if given leave to remain, he should embark on a course of psychological rehabilitation. Regular liaison between neuropsychologists and the psychiatric team was recommended.
144. Dr Bell also set out the possible consequences of the Appellant returning to St Lucia, which would in his view would highly likely cause a sudden and rapid deterioration in his psychiatric state, becoming more depressed and sink into a profound apathy; which may impact on his cognitive functioning and which may in turn also further affect his neuropsychological condition. The Appellant would be alienated from family, would lack alternative support in St Lucia and this would increase the likelihood of self-neglect and impact on his capacity to use alternative means of communication, be able to work and provide for himself. There would also be an elevated risk of self-harm and suicidal acts.
145. Finally, Dr Bell was asked about the Appellant’s capacity to give evidence, on which he said as follows:
“I am asked if Mr Romulus is fit to give evidence in Court. Mr Romulus is capable of understanding the Court context and the questions put to him. However, the stress of this situation is likely to cause a degree of decompensation. He may seem to answer questions in an ordinary way but then become rambling in his manner of answering or manifest other obvious difficulties such as long silences. It is important that these difficulties be understood as not simply implying lack of cooperation but as arising from his psychological and neuropsychological state. This combination of psychological vulnerability and neuropsychological disorder is very highly likely to cause serious difficulties in his capacity to recall events accurately. If he becomes obviously disturbed, I would urge that he be allowed to stand down.”
146. The bundle also contains the Neuropsychology Assessment Report from Dr Sean Haldane following his assessment of the appellant on 25 September 2019. We have considered this, but given its age and that it has been considered and referred to in the reports above and by the First-tier Tribunal, we do not set out any of the detail of that report here.
Other documentary evidence
147. The bundle also includes various other documents which it is not necessary to refer to individually, such as birth and death certificates for family members; an article as to mental healthcare in St Lucia; additional letters of support including from Ronan Bennett (producer of Top Boy); identity documents for family members; documentation to and from the Home Office as to the Appellant’s immigration status (including historic letters of support from previous decisions and appeal proceedings); letters concerning housing for Ms Muhedin; and details about rheumatoid arthritis.
148. In relation to later allegations of criminality, the bundle includes a letter from the CPS to Isleworth Crown Court dated 12 October 2022 recording that the Appellant pleaded not guilty at a PTPH on 8 September 2022 to a single count of ABH. An adjournment was sought by the prosecution Counsel for the case to be reviewed on evidential grounds, further to which the Crown no longer wished to proceed on the indictment. The hearing date was asked to be brought forward for the Crown to offer no evidence.
149. There is a letter from DWP to Miss Muhedin dated 8 January 2024 in relation to a successful claim for Carer’s Allowance from 18 September 2023 to 14 January 2024. The first page of GP records are also available for Miss Muhedin up to June 2025, showing medication prescribed up to that date (a 7 week course of vitamin D3, painkillers as required and a repeat prescription for folic acid) and separate A&E attendance records for 31 October 2023 are provided showing a shoulder joint tendon injury and for 6 September 2024 for joint pain. A letter from Whittington Health NHS addressed to Miss Muhedin refers to an active disease with multiple joint pains and swelling with an injection given, with a decision on further medications to be decided on at the next rheumatologist clinic.
Closing submissions
150. We are grateful to both Mr Furner and Ms Arifa-Ahmed for their detailed submissions on the appeal (including in skeleton arguments), to which we intend no discourtesy by referring to them only in relatively summary form below.
151. On behalf of the Respondent, Ms Arifa-Ahmed relied on the decision letters and previous Tribunal findings in relation to the Appellant and submitted that there was no good reason to depart from the findings made in 2015 as to the Appellant’s conduct. The later police evidence (in addition to the earlier convictions and appeal findings) only reinforces the decision that the Appellant’s presence in the United Kingdom is not conducive to the public good.
152. The Appellant was described as an unimpressive witness who took an almost blasé approach to his appeal, expecting others to build a case for him and failed to offer any rational reasons for the lack of evidence in support of his appeal. He has previously been found not to be credible and although it is accepted that there has been some impact on his memory from his brain injury, his claims not to remember appeared more deliberate to get out of a difficult question and in any event, there was a lack of updated medical evidence. The Appellant has an established pattern of poor behaviour, aggression and violence, particularly against women and continues to be dishonest, including with partners, shifting blame to them and presenting them as crazy women.
153. Ms Arifa-Ahmed submitted that there was a distinct lack of evidence which could and should have been available from the Appellant and other witnesses, particularly Ms Muhedin about her health and her mother’s health, her caring role and claimed dependence on the Appellant.
154. We were invited to attach little weight to the Independent Social Work reports given the limitations of both of them, the failure to reconcile opinions therein with previous and preserved findings of the First-tier Tribunal and that relevant considerations were omitted from the report.
155. The Respondent’s case is that even if the later incidents from 2018 to 2022 are not made out as criminal offences, the Appellant’s presence is not conducive to the public good given the extent of the non-conviction evidence and a pattern of behaviour and coming to the adverse attention of the police.
156. In closing submissions Ms Arifa-Ahmed maintained that as a matter of law, no regard should be had to section 117C of the 2002 Act even as a guide; but in any event, it would not be unduly harsh for any of the Appellant’s children to remain in the United Kingdom if he were to be deported to St Lucia (it having already been accepted it would be unduly harsh for C1 and C7 to relocate to St Lucia with him). In the context of the traditional Article 8 assessment, the Appellant’s deportation would not be a disproportionate interference with his rights to respect for private and family life.
157. On behalf of the Appellant, Mr Furner relied on his skeleton argument and earlier grounds. As to the Appellant’s credibility, Mr Furner submitted that he is compromised in advocating for himself and accepts that although he was at times difficult to follow, his evidence was genuine, including when not flattering to himself (giving evidence which was truthful even if not helpful to him) and there was no intention to lie. Mr Furner submitted that factual mistakes in the evidence were due to brain damage suffered by the Appellant, albeit he agreed that the medical evidence did not explain the extremes of the Appellant’s evidence between significant detail of certain events and no recollection at all of others.
158. As to the other witnesses, Mr Furner invited us to find them to have been truthful and not exaggerating, particularly Ms Dos Santos and C1, both of whom referred to her fame and the relevance of Top Boy amongst C1’s generation which the Appellant has direct experience of and he shares a unique experience of having acted with C1; which is a highly significant factor. In particular, Mr Absolon was an impressive and credible witness who acknowledged the limitations in the report and substantial weight should be given to it.
159. In terms of the Immigration Rules and section 117C of the 2002 Act, Mr Furner submitted that the Appellant’s deportation would be unduly harsh on C1 because of her more profound emotional connection and dependency on the Appellant and on C7 particularly in light of his mother’s health and her caring role for her own mother (on which it was accepted there was a lack of detailed evidence from Ms Muhedin herself, but more in the Mr Absolon’s report).
160. As to the Appellant’s criminal convictions and non-conviction evidence, his history and past findings were acknowledged; much of it which happened when the Appellant was a juvenile and he is unable to offer any explanation about or any rehabilitation from because of his medical injury, which should not be held against him. Mr Furtner emphasised that at its highest, there was no evidence of any bad behaviour at all between 2012 and 2018, and the allegations from 2018 to 2022 fall very far short of establishing any criminality by the Appellant at all, even to the civil standard and even if they did, they were not serious offences. The Appellant’s last offending was aged 24 and he is now nearly 40, with seven children.
161. Finally, as to the balancing exercise required for Article 8, Mr Furner submitted that the relevant factors to consider included the Appellant’s arrival in the United Kingdom as a child; the best interests of his own children and the impact on them, as British citizens.
Findings and reasons
162. Our findings and reasons are structured as follows in this decision:
(i) the weight to be attached to the various sources of evidence;
(ii) the best interests of each of the Appellant’s children, including whether he has a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with each of them;
(iii) the sibling relationships;
(iv) whether the Appellant’s deportation would be unduly harsh on those with whom he has a genuine and subsisting parental relationship;
(v) conclusions under section 117C of the 2002 Act;
(vi) the Appellant’s criminal history, including non-conviction evidence and in particular, findings on the four latest incidents between 2018 and 2022 relied upon by the Respondent;
(vii) revocation of the Deportation Order;
(viii) the Article 8 balancing exercise.
(i) Weight to be attached to the evidence
163. We begin with general findings as to the weight to be attached to the different evidence before us, in particular the witness evidence and by reference to preserved findings on the same where available.
164. The Appellant has previously been found to be a poor witness and we have reached the same conclusion having heard his oral evidence for the reasons set out below. We have fully taken into account the medical evidence, although we note that the most recent evidence is now over two years old (and another report is now some seven years old) and no explanation has been given as to why this has not been updated for the current appeal. The Appellant stated that there have been changes, in particular to medication and/or treatment, but these have not been detailed or evidenced before us. We have no current assessment of the impact, if any, of any physical or mental health problems on the Appellant’s ability to give evidence in this appeal.
165. On the basis of what is available, we find it hard to reconcile the expert evidence of how the Appellant may be affected, either specifically giving evidence, or generally as to day-to-day functioning, including as to his memory, with the nature of his evidence as he did not present consistently with the expert’s expectations. The Appellant’s oral evidence in particular varied between two extremes, in some instances giving an increasingly detailed account of particular events from many years prior (such as the first domestic incident in 2018, the drugs incident in 2021 and the assault allegation in 2022) and in others, not remembering particular events at all (such as the second domestic incident in 2018, or even multiple events spanning a significant number of years, such as in relation to all of the findings on non-conviction evidence made in 2015). The Appellant also at times showed considerable insight into the line of questioning in cross-examination, anticipating very early the point about to be taken that Mr Absolon did not in fact speak to three of the children’s mothers by phone (and the suggestion that he had not given the correct phone number for them). At other times, he appeared not to grasp basic questions at all, saying he didn’t understand or did not remember and there was no explanation or rational basis we could discern for the significant variation; particularly as none of the expert evidence dealt with this as a possibility caused by any health issues. The wide variations in the Appellant’s approach to giving evidence significantly undermined his credibility, particularly when he appeared to simply be avoiding answering certain questions.
166. We also take into account that even on matters which were not particularly controversial, the Appellant gave evidence which was demonstrably inaccurate, such as in relation to C1’s GCSE grades (which he gave as letters rather than numbers, although the grading system changed many years before C1 took her exams) and what subjects she is studying at A level.
167. Our overall impression of the Appellant was more that he did understand and simply ad-libbed on answers to certain questions, or avoided answering them at all (with no rational or medical reason for the difference in approach) and frequently referred to others who he expected to have engaged with and supported his appeal instead of him taking responsibility for it or taking any action himself. The Appellant gave us the impression that he was not taking the gravity of the situation and nature of his appeal seriously, in particular in relation to submitting evidence which he candidly told us he was advised to get and simply did not and which we find it was reasonable to expect him to provide, particularly following the detailed findings preserved from the First-tier Tribunal which identified a number of gaps in the evidence. For example, the Appellant suggested that he had asked for written statements and evidence from all of the children’s mothers and from some of the children’s schools; but failed to check whether this had been obtained simply passing responsibility to others or assuming that they had done this. An alternative example is the Appellant’s unwillingness to engage at all with previous findings as to his conduct, simply asserting that he has no recollection of that (or even a further domestic incident in 2018) which is not wholly explained by the medical evidence, which, specifically, indicates some difficulty with memory, particularly visual memory, but not that he has whole years of lost memory which would cover a range of incidents over a multi-year period. Given the various serious nature of the findings against the Appellant in 2015, we found it of concern that the Appellant did not seem concerned by these or even curious about what happened to speak to others who may have known something and simply failed to address them at all. Contrary to Mr Furner’s submission, this is something on which we draw an adverse inference given the lack of specific supporting evidence.
168. For these reasons we have approached the Appellant’s evidence with a good degree of caution and on the whole we did not find him to be a credible witness.
169. In relation to the other individual witnesses, we generally found Ms Dos Santos, C1, Ms Romulus and Ms Muhedin to be credible; albeit there were aspects of some their evidence which we also approach with some degree of caution. In relation to Ms Dos Santos, we take into account that she has previously been found not to be credible in her evidence as to an assault in 2009 but otherwise we considered her to give truthful evidence in support of C1 and her relationship with the Appellant. In relation to C1, taking into account her age, we considered her evidence to be given naturally and honestly, up to a point at the end where she seemed to give a rehearsed line about not being able to live without the Appellant. In relation to Ms Muhedin, we had concerns that evidence that she could reasonably have provided to the Appellant to submit in support of his appeal, such as up to date medical evidence in relation to her own health or as to the care for her mother, was not available. The very limited evidence that was submitted lacked detail (for example, there was no detail as to her mother’s care needs or what Ms Muhedin provided for her, what Ms Muhedin’s own care needs were, the carer’s allowance letter did not identify who care was provided for) and was not up to date (for example the carer’s allowance letter which shows an award only up to the period ending 21 January 2024), for which Ms Muhedin gave no reasonable explanation.
170. We turn next to the professional witnesses, beginning with Mr Absolon and make no additional comment on the earlier report of Ms Brown on which there are preserved findings of fact as to the weight to be attached to that. Although Mr Absolon told us that the time spent on meeting individuals and making his assessment was comparable to other social work reports, we do find that a period four hours plus some phone calls of unknown duration (and where no confirmation of identity was sought) was relatively brief for Mr Absolon to gain sufficient insight in to the best interests of seven children (only two of whom were full siblings) and their relationships with the Appellant and each other. Given the limited face-to-face assessment and only short interactions he could observe with just three of the Appellant’s children, we also consider that the report somewhat over relies on the individual reporting made to Mr Absolon without critical assessment (for example, Mr Absolon seemed unaware of how young C1 was when she appeared in Top Boy with the Appellant, but placed substantial reliance on her being recognised for this despite only being somewhere in the region of age 2-6 and the assertions that the Appellant was the ‘lynchpin’ for sibling relationships without evidence of the same) or reference to the underlying documents, which themselves were of the same limited nature in terms of supporting evidence (for example lacking from some of the children’s mothers, from the children’s schools, medical evidence in relation to C3s diagnosis of ADHD, medical evidence in relation to Ms Muhedin and so on) that is before us.
171. Further, there are a number of aspects in the report where only general conclusions are reached which lack the detail which would reasonably be expected, such as in relation C3’s and C7’s behaviour and potential future impact. Although further detail was given in oral evidence, the written report did not even include basic information such as the level of contact between the Appellant and each of his children or as between the children themselves. We are also further concerned that there was no engagement at all by Mr Abosolon with the adverse findings of criminality against the Appellant, particularly as to rape and having sex with a minor, drugs and gang involvement and whether these impacted on his assessment or not, relying instead on limited child protection inquiries.
172. In oral evidence, Mr Absolon gave clear answers and additional information not contained in his report. Overall, we attach some weight to Mr Absolon’s report, but find that it lacks detail and supporting evidence for the opinions given in relatively broad terms and following only a relatively short assessment. We also note than when considering Mr Absolon’s report in the round together with all the other evidence available, that even the relatively little detail given in it is much more than the individuals included in their own written statements whereas one would expect the greatest detail to come from the individuals themselves, particularly the Appellant.
173. The final witness was PC Fox, who we found to give clear, professional and helpful evidence (particularly in explaining the nature and scope of the underlying evidence referred to and disclosed to the Tribunal); albeit understandably limited in some respects as she was not the officer in charge in relation to any of the specific incidents relied on in earlier statements from police officers (both of whom have since left the police force and for that reason were no longer available to give oral evidence).
174. The documentary evidence from the police, in particular the CRIS reports, was self-explanatory and stands as a record of the police involvement with the Appellant and those who have made allegations against him or calls to the police about him, and witnesses of the same. The evidence does not extend to interview records or body-worn camera footage of particular incidents, however we consider it is sufficiently comprehensive for the additional findings which we need to make in relation to the more recent allegations.
175. As noted above already, we found the documentary evidence in support of the Appellant’s appeal to otherwise be somewhat lacking in providing an up to date assessment (in particular in relation to the Appellant’s health and ability to give evidence) and generally lacking in detail, both in what was before us and in what was not produced at all. We find it would have been reasonable to expect, particularly in light of the preserved findings from the First-tier Tribunal, the Appellant to address previous evidential gaps and to update as to the current circumstances, including with evidence of his Whatsapp group for arranging contact with his children; medical evidence (in relation to himself, Ms Muhedin, Ms Muhedin’s mother and C3); evidence from all of the children’s mothers (only two out of the five giving written and oral evidence) and evidence from schools (in relation to the Appellant’s involvement with them in relation to particular children). There were other more minor pieces of evidence which have never been produced, such as all of the birth certificates of the children. There was no reasonable explanation from the Appellant or Ms Muhedin (as to her own or her family circumstances) for the lack of evidence, to the contrary, both were aware of what was needed and what would have been helpful and appeared to choose not to take steps to provide it.
176. We have taken all of the above into account when reaching the specific factual findings set out below.
(ii) Best interests of the children & relationships with the Appellant
177. The preserved findings of fact are that the Appellant has a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with only C1 and C7 and we were not invited by Mr Furner to reconsider the preserved findings that there was no genuine and subsisting parental relationship between the Appellant and C2, C3, C4, C5 or C6 (the findings on which are set out in Annex C). We have considered the parts of Mr Absolon’s report which in part indicate to the contrary but do not consider that it provides a sufficient basis for departing from the preserved findings, nor that there has been any material or positive change in the nature of the relationship between the Appellant and these five children (in fact the relationship if anything has weakened with C2, C5 and C6 in particular) to do so. We do however still deal briefly with their current circumstances which will are relevant to the overall Article 8 balancing exercise below; but focus on the circumstances of C1 and C7. We also note that Ms Arifa-Ahmed did not invite us to depart from the findings in relation to C1 and C7 as to there being a genuine and subsisting parental relationship.
178. When considering the best interests of the children, we have proceeded on the basis that it is in their best interests to remain in the United Kingdom, particularly for those who are British citizens and given that they were all born and have lived all of their lives in the United Kingdom with their mothers and extended family here, and having attended education here. Further and in any event, the Respondent has accepted that it would be unduly harsh for any of the children to relocate to St Lucia with the Appellant (although they would be free to do so as a matter of choice if they wished).
179. The evidence before us is consistent (and has been consistent in the past) that the Appellant and C1 have a particularly close relationship, which at present involves regular face-to-face contact at least fortnightly as well as ad-hoc but regular phone and text contact; and that C1 relies on the Appellant in particular to discuss certain issues and as a source of support in relation to her appearance on Top Boy. Ms Dos Santos refers to co-parenting C1 with the Appellant (although the only example given of this was very old, in relation to her appearing on Top Boy when she was very young) and the Appellant refers to taking an active role in relation to her education (albeit without any supporting evidence).
180. As to contact if the Appellant were to be deported, the consistent evidence from C1, Ms Dos Santos and Mr Absolon in particular was that this would be detrimental to C1 and they would not be able to maintain the same type of relationship by phone, text, video calls or visits.
181. Overall, we consider it is in C1’s best interests to remain in the United Kingdom and for the Appellant to remain here as well to maintain their relationships as they currently enjoy it. We address the separate question of whether the impact of deportation would be unduly harsh, for which the best interests assessment is relevant but not determinative.
182. In relation to C7, again there is no real dispute and the consistent evidence is that the Appellant has an ongoing close relationship with his youngest son and sees him very frequently as a primary care giver alongside Ms Muhedin, even though they do not live together. An example of co-parenting was given in relation to the application for C7’s nursery and future school place. As with C1, the evidence from the relevant parties to this relationship and from Mr Absolon was that the Appellant’s deportation would be harmful to C7 and it would be even more difficult given his age to maintain contact by modern means of communication. In all of the circumstances, we also find that it would be in C7’s best interests to remain in the United Kingdom with both parents, as he is currently and as with C1, we consider separately whether the impact on him would be unduly harsh.
183. In relation to the other children, further to the preserved findings of fact and lack of any substantive evidence of a more meaningful relationship with the Appellant; we find that for C2, C4, C5 and C6 their best interests are no more than to remain in the United Kingdom with their mothers (and any extended family members) as their primary carers, as they have always done. The contact between the Appellant and these four children ranges between none at present to relatively infrequent, up to six times a year and there is no evidence of any ongoing co-parenting or significant involvement with the Appellant, if at all. There is insufficient evidence for us to find that it would be in their best interests for the Appellant to also remain in the United Kingdom.
184. The position for C3 is slightly different in that she currently has more regular contact with the Appellant, on a fortnightly basis; albeit there is a lack of information about the relationship beyond this and no written statement from her mother, Ms Sutherland, as to the Appellant’s involvement directly or by way of co-parenting. On balance, because of the more regular contact, we just find that it is in C3’s best interests for the Appellant to remain in the United Kingdom to maintain their relationship as it is currently; albeit far less strongly so than for C1 and C7.
(iii) Sibling relationships
185. The Appellant and Mr Absolon in particular rely heavily on the Appellant being the ‘lynchpin’ for contact between all of the Appellant’s children and that there would be detriment to their sibling relationships and contact without his physical presence in the United Kingdom. However, we find that whilst this may have been the case in the past, the position has currently been significantly exaggerated and does not reflect the reality now of established relationships and current levels of contact between at least some of the siblings without the Appellant’s involvement.
186. In relation to the Whastapp group, no documentary evidence of this has been produced, although the witnesses have all consistently referred to it, even though the Appellant himself was inconsistent as to whether it still existed or how much it was used. The evidence before us was that it included the Appellant and his mother (both of whom used it to suggest dates for contact and meeting up at Ms Romulus’ house), the children’s mothers (albeit not all may still be members) and some of the children themselves now that they are old enough to have their own phone/contact details. There was also evidence before us of direct communication and contact between C1 and C3 in particular, and probably their mothers as well as to staying over at each other’s houses and meeting up; as well as evidence of direct contact between the children and extended family (in particular with the Appellant’s sister and to a lesser extent his brother). It was not suggested that any of this direct contact was facilitated by or even involved the Appellant at all and that as the children got older, they were managing their own communication and contact, in particular between C1 and C3. In relation to contact between the mothers, it seemed that this was not generally happening, although Ms Dos Santos said they all get along and there is therefore the potential for them to contact each other if needed or to maintain contact between the siblings if they so wished.
187. As to the frequency of sibling contact, the evidence before us was that the last time all seven children met together was last summer at Ms Romulus’ house, although smaller groups of them have had more frequent contact there since. Given that the Appellant has had no contact with C2 for over five months (at the date of hearing), has only rare contact with C4 and limited contact (around six times a year) with C5 and C6; we consider that at the present time the Appellant is only having regular contact with three of his children (C1, C3 and C7) and at its highest, could therefore only be facilitating regular contact between the same three children and in reality, two of them are organising seeing each other themselves.
188. For these reasons we do not find that the Appellant’s physical presence in the United Kingdom is necessary or even regularly used now to facilitate contact between all of his children and that his deportation to St Lucia would not significantly reduce this contact, if at all, given that it can be maintained by the older children themselves (and by the younger children as they get older in the future), by his mother (who has previously been involved in organising contact, albeit we accept is limited by her working hours as to when she could offer her home for this to happen) and between the mothers generally who are all said to get along.
(iv) Unduly harsh
189. We do not repeat here the legal test in relation to whether deportation would be unduly harsh on a child, which is set out above, and consider this in relation to the ‘stay scenario’ for C1 and C7 only given that those are the only children who the Appellant has been found to have a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with and given that it has already been accepted and found that it would be unduly harsh in the ‘go scenario’ for them to relocate to St Lucia with the Appellant.
190. In relation to C1, we accept the consistent evidence of the close relationship between C1 and the Appellant and her reliance on him for advice on various aspects of her life. We do however find that aspects of this have been exaggerated and over relied upon, particularly in relation to their shared acting experience given that this dates back to when C1 was very young (somewhere between two and six years old and from which she would not now be physically recognisable, although her name is still associated with the earlier series of Top Boy and with the Appellant) and C1’s own evidence was that issues arose from this from time to time, which she normally managed herself and the advice from the Appellant when issues arose was fairly consistent just to ignore it. Although we accept C1’s evidence that the show is still popular amongst her generation, we find it difficult to see that new or frequent problems arise from this for her that would need any new or different in person support from the Appellant beyond what he has already provided or what he could do by phone or text; in conjunction with the wider family support that C1 has, particularly from her mother, and based on her existing experience and resilience developed for such situations.
191. We also question just how involved the Appellant continues to be in matters such as C1’s education given he was unable to accurately recall her GCSE grades or even what subjects she is studying at A Level (which is basic information to know that wasn’t obviously affected by any memory problems, he didn’t say he didn’t remember, he just got the details wrong). There is no evidence at all as to his prior involvement with her school or in relation to sixth form college and given that C1 is nearly 18 and almost half-way through her A Levels already; his direct involvement would be expected to decrease further over time in any event.
192. We accept that if the Appellant were to deported to St Lucia, this would have a detrimental impact on C1, particularly in the shorter term as she transitions to adulthood and that replacing her current flexible and regular face-to-face contact with him with communication restricted to phone, text, video calls and occasional visits (which we find would be possible, albeit likely to be infrequent for practical and cost reasons) would not be of the same quality as they currently enjoy. We note the concern expressed by the witnesses that C1 would be unable to visit the Appellant in St Lucia as he would have no home there and there would therefore be nowhere for C1 to stay. However, taking into our findings as to the Appellant's health (and the lack of evidence as to any ongoing negative impact arising from the stroke which would inhibit his ability to support himself) and the evidence as to his acting, cooking and potential clothing business, there is no reason why the appellant cannot establish himself in St Lucia and be in a position to accommodate himself and C1 should she visit him there. In our view the relationship can be maintained by alternative means and it is reasonable to expect that as C1 becomes an adult and goes to university (as she hopes to do) face-to-face contact is likely to decrease over time in any event.
193. Mr Absolon’s opinion is that C1 is at a pivotal and important stage in her development for which she needs the support of both parents and the loss of direct contact with the Appellant at this time would be severe in terms of the impact of her emotional development and general well-being. He states that for the reasons given below in his report, remote communication and occasional visits would not mitigate these harms, although the reasons which followed were generic in terms of the benefit of nonverbal cues, presence and attention and no specific consideration is given of video-calls or any factors that would be specific to C1.
194. Taking into account all of the above, as well as the fact that C1 is very close to adulthood; has good relationships and support from her mother and wider family members (including a close relationship with C3 in particular) and has no physical or mental health problems; we find that although the adverse impact on C1 of the Appellant’s deportation would be significant, there is insufficient evidence before us that it would meet the elevated threshold of being unduly harsh, something beyond severe or bleak. C1 presents as a motivated, academically successful and confident young woman who is well supported and we find would continue in the same way even if the Appellant were deported.
195. In relation to C7, the preserved findings of fact on whether deportation would be unduly harsh on him are in paragraphs 110 to 111 of the First-tier Tribunal’s decision (set out in Annex C), concluding that it would not be given that although there would be a the loss of face to face contact and support, there was little, if any, evidence identifying how this would be severe or bleak for C7. We find no reason to depart from this finding taking into account the very limited further evidence in relation to C7 before us, which only included updated witness evidence from Ms Muhedin and the Appellant (but which still contained very little detail of the relationship or possible consequences of separation) and further assessment by Mr Absolon.
196. In reaching this conclusion we have taken into account the following:
(a) C7 has no known medical or other conditions and Mr Absolon’s reference to behavioural issues was clarified as those normal for a four year old rather than any specific or unusual concerns as to his behaviour, and no behavioural disorder.
(b) Although C7 has frequent contact with the Appellant, he does not currently live with him.
(c) The Appellant undertakes an active parenting role for C7, in terms of practical day-to-day tasks and planning as to his education. The relationship could be maintained in terms of contact via modern means of communication, although this would be less meaningful particularly given his young age. Visits would be possible, although we accept are likely to be infrequent given Ms Muhedin’s financial and other circumstances.
(d) C7 is currently only 4 years old and whilst we take into account Mr Absolon’s concern that he would be too young to understand the reasons for separation from the Appellant, we also consider that he is young enough to adapt; has broad family support and will increasingly be able to stay in touch with the Appellant more effectively as he gets old.
(e) Whilst research more generally shows detriment from separation from a parent in terms of mental and emotional well-being, there are no particular factors identified by Mr Absolon specific to C7 or any specific detriment to him personally identified.
(f) There is no clear or up to date medical or other evidence as to Ms Muhedin’s mental or physical health (beyond her basic diagnosis) and details as to the support she receives (or needs) from the Appellant are vague and go no further than looking after C7 at times to allow her time for herself to meet medical needs for rest, exercise and social needs. It is difficult to reconcile Ms Muhedin’s claimed need for personal support from the Appellant for health reasons with her claim to also be a full-time carer of her own mother, the latter suggests either that Ms Muhedin’s own needs are not as extensive as claimed, or her caring role is not as extensive as claimed. In any event, there is no evidence before us as to the direct impact on Ms Muhedin or on her ability to parent C7 alone if the Appellant were deported. Undoubtedly it would be more difficult, but nothing to suggest it would be unmanageable or that C7’s basic needs would not continue to be met. Mr Absolon’s opinion that any escalation in C7’s behaviour linked to separation from the Appellant would present a significant challenge to Ms Muhedin is nothing more than speculation, both as to possible future behaviour and as to Ms Muhedin’s ability to manage it and it is wholly unsupported in his report, such that we attach very little weight to that part of it.
(g) C7 has a wide extended family on both maternal and paternal sides with whom he has regular contact (including aunts, uncles, siblings and grandmothers) and there is nothing to suggest that he would not continue to benefit from wider family support, as would Ms Muhedin, if the Appellant were to be deported. This also addresses Mr Absolon’s concern about C7 being of dual heritage given that he would continue to benefit from wider family backgrounds on both sides to support his sense of identity and heritage.
197. Overall, whilst we acknowledge that it would be in C7’s best interests for the Appellant to remain in the United Kingdom and that the Appellant’s deportation would be detrimental to their current regular face-to-face contact; there is insufficient evidence before us to find that the impact would be harsh, as in severe or bleak and falls significantly short of the elevated threshold of being ‘unduly harsh’ in accordance with the test set out in MK as endorsed in later cases.
(v) Conclusions on section 117C of the 2002 Act
198. For the reasons set out above, we do not find that the Appellant’s deportation would be unduly harsh on either C1 or C7 if they were to remain in the United Kingdom if he were to be deported. It was not in dispute that the Appellant could not otherwise meet the family life exception to deportation; nor the private life exception (including for the reasons given in the preserved findings, set out in Annex C) and therefore he does not meet the requirements of section 117C(4) or (5) of the 2002 Act. For the reasons already given, that is not in any event determinative of the balancing exercise required for Article 8 or for the appeal generally, we considered these provisions only as a guide and on the basis, as submitted by Mr Furner, that if one of the exceptions were met that would have been a powerful factor to consider in the Appellant’s favour.
199. The only other potentially relevant part of section 117C is in subparagraph (6) as to whether there are in any event very compelling circumstances to outweigh the public interest in deportation. Given the very significant overlap between this assessment and a traditional proportionality balancing exercise, we see no merit in undertaking a separate assessment of very compelling circumstances in this appeal and return below to the ultimate balancing exercise for Article 8 purposes.
(vi) Appellant’s offending history
200. We do not repeat here the Appellant’s criminal history, both of convictions as shown on his PNC and of criminal conduct on the basis of non-conviction evidence as per the findings of the First-tier Tribunal in 2015 (as set out in Annex B) and maintained by the First-tier Tribunal in 2024 (as set out in the preserved findings in Annex C). All of those together show, up to around 2012, a significant and serious offending history which initially escalated from minor offences to much more serious criminality. It is not in dispute that there is no evidence of any criminality (by way of convictions or non-conviction evidence) by the Appellant between 2012 and 2018. The only further findings we need to make in relation to criminality are for four incidents relied upon by the Respondent between 2018 and 2022; with no specific reliance by the Respondent on the recorded allegations more recently which resulted in no further action being taken by the police and on which we therefore make no specific findings.
201. We consider together the first two incidents in 2018 referred to in DC Dollery’s statement given their similarity of relating to domestic arguments between the Appellant and a partner or ex-partner, involving one or both parties being drunk and in which the threshold was not met for any criminal offence, such that no further action was taken by the police. We do not find that taken at its highest, either of these incidents establish any criminal conduct on the part of the Appellant.
202. The third incident in 2021 relating to possession of Class A drugs involved the Appellant’s arrest and being taken into custody (which we accept from PC Fox’s evidence meant that a certain evidential threshold was met to justify custody in particular) but which also resulted in no further action being taken against the Appellant as there was insufficient evidence to establish that the drugs found at the scene were his (or belonged to either of the other two individuals also arrested at the same time). Whilst we note there were minor discrepancies between the Appellant’s account of the incident (to which he added considerable detail in oral evidence beyond what he originally stated in writing) and the police reports of it; this falls very far short of any basis upon which it could be found on the balance of probabilities that the Appellant was in possession of Class A drugs on this occasion. His account of the exchange seen being of tobacco and/or a lighter was a plausible one.
203. We pause here to note that although no criminal conduct has been established in relation to these three incidents; we take into account that to some extent they follow a pattern of behaviour, with altercations involving alcohol, involving partners or ex-partners and of poor associations with those likely involved in drugs.
204. The final incident relied upon was for ABH in January 2022 which is of a different nature to the others as although it did not result in a trial or conviction; there was more detailed evidence in relation to it and the Appellant was initially charged. The police evidence does not specify why the case was withdrawn, it may have been for a number of reasons; although we note from the CRIS report that there was a fluctuating position as to whether a witness or victim was willing to be involved and/or give evidence. There is reference to both VIW1 and VIW2 in the CRIS report, with the former initially stating that she did not want to pursue an allegation, give a statement or go to court (as at 21 January 2022), although VIW1 appears to be a witness (so we are unsure if there was a mix up between VIW1 and VIW2 in the records because of the way the reference was phrased) and VIW2 the victim, who did later state she was willing to give a statement (in May and June 2022). The records do not contain any entries for later in time when the case was not pursued. It seems to us from what was available, including a note that this was one person’s word against another, that the case was dropped for lack of evidence from the victim and/or witness. We do not have any of the interview records in relation to this incident, nor the statement said to have been made.
205. In the absence of this further information and taking into account that the charge was dismissed as it was not pursued, we do not find on the balance of probabilities that the criminal offence of ABH has been established by the Respondent. However, we do give weight to the fact that even if criminality was not established, the incident again involved a situation where alcohol was a factor; where drugs were a factor (on the Appellant’s account an argument caused by him refusing to pay for drugs for someone); where the victim was someone the Appellant had been intimate with (although not a partner) and where there was a physical altercation (even on the Appellant’s own account, even if not an assault by him). This continues to form part of a pattern of incidents where the Appellant has kept poor company and been involved in arguments and, on this occasion, a physical altercation and casts doubt on his evidence to us of moving away from previous bad associations and not having many friends, focusing on his immediate family instead.
(vii) Revocation of the Deportation Order
206. The first part of consideration of an application for revocation of a Deportation Order as set out in paragraph 390 and following of the Immigration Rules relies on an assessment of all of the circumstances and is also by reference to whether an exception to deportation has been made out (in paragraph 398 of the Immigration Rules as replicated in section 117C of the 2002 Act). These considerations are material the same as what we have already considered above in relation to the statutory scheme as to the private and family life exceptions (which have not been met) and which will further be considered below as to the final balancing exercise. We do not therefore consider those points in detail in this section and only pause to note that paragraph 390A of the Immigration Rules would in our view be satisfied for revocation of a Deportation Order if its maintenance would be a disproportionate interference with the Appellant’s right to respect for private and family life pursuant to Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
207. Paragraph 391 of the Immigration Rules is not relevant to nor applicable to the Appellant given that he has not yet been deported, although we do take note of the position that it is expected that a period of 10 years after deportation should have elapsed before revocation.
208. Paragraph 391A of the Immigration Rules looks to revocation in cases where the situation has been materially altered since the Deportation Order was made, either by change of circumstances or by fresh information coming to light not previously before the Tribunal or the Respondent. The reference to the passage of time possibly amounting to a change of circumstances does not assist this Appellant as it is tied to the passage of time since deportation, not since the Deportation Order was made, and the Appellant has not yet been deported nor left the United Kingdom.
209. As to any other change of circumstances, in our assessment above and below, together with preserved findings of fact from the First-tier Tribunal in 2024 (in Annex C) we have already directly considered the additions to the Appellant’s family since the Deportation Order was made (including three further children and several partners, including his current wife) and the period without any further convictions or criminality; all of which are taken into account and balanced below as part of the proportionality balancing exercise. Outside of that, we do not consider, in a case where the Appellant does not otherwise meet either of the exceptions to deportation, that these changes would of themselves justify a departure from the normal position that the Deportation Order would not be revoked; particular where the Appellant has not been deported or left the United Kingdom and instead has pursued numerous applications to delay that.
(viii) Article 8 balancing exercise
210. There is no dispute in the present case that Article 8 is engaged in this appeal, with the Appellant having established private and family life in the United Kingdom. His family life consists of relationships of some sort with seven children (albeit only a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with C1 and C7) and with his wife; all of which are detailed above and in the preserved findings of fact in Annex C. The Appellant’s private life has been established by living in the United Kingdom since 2000 when he arrived in the United Kingdom aged 12 with other family members and during which time he has completed his education; has worked as an actor and a chef and continues to have relationships with adult family members, including his mother, brother and sister. The Appellant claims also to have been involved with charity work (albeit there is no substantial evidence as to this, only a passing reference to a named charity in his first written statement) and setting up a clothing business which was ultimately not pursued. The Appellant has also received health care in the United Kingdom, albeit there is no information of any current treatment and preserved findings that his removal would not breach Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights on medical grounds (in Annex C).
211. There is further no dispute that the Appellant’s deportation would be an interference with his right to respect for private and family life; is in accordance with the law and in pursuit of a legitimate public interest in both maintaining law and order and immigration control.
212. The focus of the issues in relation to Article 8 is the final proportionality balancing exercise and when undertaking this, we take into account our findings above as to the best interests of the Appellant’s children and adopt a balance sheet approach following the guidance in Hesham Ali v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] UKSC 60.
213. Before we set out the specific factors on both sides of the balancing exercise, we have considered the following factors from section 117B of the 2002 Act which apply to every human rights appeal. Those include that the maintenance of effective immigration control is in the public interest (noting that the Appellant has remained unlawfully in the United Kingdom for the majority of his time here, including over ten years since a Deportation Order was made against him in 2015); that the Appellant speaks English (albeit a neutral factor); that the Appellant is financially independent (to the extent that he relies on financial support from family and illegal working and is in any event also a neutral factor) and that little weight should be given to private life and a relationship with a qualifying partner (albeit his current partner does not fall within the definition of qualifying partner) established at a time when a person is in the United Kingdom unlawfully, as the Appellant has been in relation to most of his partners, including his current wife. The final factor in section 117B(6) of the 2002 Act, although accepted on the facts in relation to C1 and C7, does not assist the Appellant as he is subject to a Deportation Order.
214. The factors on the Respondent’s side of the balancing exercise include:
(a) The Appellant has five criminal convictions between 2006 and 2011 (an offence against property, theft and kindred offences and a public disorder offence), in addition to a caution in 2010 for an offence against the person2.
(b) The Appellant was found by the First-tier Tribunal in 2015 to have committed rapes, sexual assaults and engaged in the dealing of class A drugs, as well as having sex with minors (see Annex B for the detail of these findings). We do not repeat the detail here, but emphasise the very serious nature of those offences which carries significant weight and supports a very strong public interest in deportation.
(c) The Appellant has never addressed any of his offending behaviour or criminality, he neither acknowledges it (which for the reasons already set out above we do draw some adverse inference from) nor has he shown any engagement in any form of rehabilitation work and continues to be involved in confrontational situations and physical violence (even if not reaching the criminal threshold) involving alcohol despite earlier identification of alcohol dependency as an issue.
(d) The Appellant has spent the vast majority of his time in the United Kingdom unlawfully, save for a short period between 2011 and 2014. We take into account both that the earlier parts of this period included a time when the Appellant was still a child and therefore not to be held directly responsible for his lack of immigration status but also that in the period since 2015, he has been the subject of an extant Deportation Order. In respect of the latter, the original reasons for deportation, as clearly set out by findings of the First-tier Tribunal in 2015, still remain (there being no change in relation to those except for the categorisation of the Appellant as a foreign criminal, shown later to be in error) and the Appellant has not yet served any of the expected time outside of the United Kingdom pursuant to the Deportation Order.
(e) The Appellant does not meet any of the requirements of the Immigration Rules either for a grant of leave to remain on family or private life grounds; nor does he meet any of the statutory exceptions to deportation by reference to the Immigration Rules or section 117C of the 2002 Act, considered by way of a reference guide although not directly applicable to the Appellant.
(f) The Appellant does not face very significant obstacles to reintegration in St Lucia, where he could support and maintain himself and where he could continue to be financially and emotionally supported by family in the United Kingdom, particularly his mother. The Appellant would be able to maintain all of his relationships through modern means of communication (phone, text and video calls) and through occasional visits (particularly from his mother who has visited St Lucia frequently over the years when her mother was alive and went most recently last year). There is no reason why the Appellant would not be able to obtain employment in St Lucia, particularly as a chef which he has stated he currently works as in the United Kingdom and has a passion for.
(g) The Appellant would be able to access and obtain any medical treatment required in St Lucia, albeit the medical evidence before us is such that there is no current treatment or support service involvement for the Appellant.
(h) The Appellant speaks English which is spoken in St Lucia, so there are no linguistic barriers to his reintegration.
215. On the Appellant’s side are the following factors:
(a) The Appellant has lived in the United Kingdom since the age of 12 (albeit mostly unlawfully), with only one known visit back to St Lucia. He has lived lawfully in the United Kingdom for three years and is accepted to be socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom. In contrast, he is a relative stranger to life in St Lucia.
(b) The Appellant has a British citizen wife in the United Kingdom3 with whom he has a genuine and subsisting relationship (albeit not one of cohabitation and not one which meets the definition of ‘partner’ in Appendix FM). The Islamic marriage took place in 2020, it is unknown when the marriage commenced or whether Ms Muhedin was aware at the time of whether there was an extant Deportation Order against him (or as to his past criminality); although this was clearly known to the Appellant at the time.
(c) The Appellant has seven children in the United Kingdom; with whom he has a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with two of them (C1 and C7, whom he shares with his wife) and regular contact with a further child (C3). It is in the best interests of all three of these children for the Appellant to remain in the United Kingdom. We also take into account, albeit to a lesser extent, that he has some form of relationship with his other children, or has done in the past at least. We do not repeat all of the detailed findings set out above and in the preserved findings in relation to all of the children, which we have taken fully into account here.
(d) The Appellant does not meet the threshold for automatic deportation.
(e) The Appellant has committed no criminal offences since 2012.
(f) The Appellant has some medical issues from an earlier brain injury which continues to affect some of his day-to-day functions including in relation to cognition, memory, things like route planning and so on (set out in full above but not repeated here) and he would not have the in-person support he receives in the United Kingdom to help manage these issues. However, there are preserved findings of fact that deportation would not breach Article 3 on medical grounds and that medical treatment would be available if needed in St Lucia.
216. Taking into account all of the findings above and the factors both in the public interest in deportation and in favour of the Appellant; we find that the Appellant’s deportation would not be a disproportionate interference with the Appellant’s private and family life. Although now some time ago and without any recent offending; the very serious nature of the Appellant’s criminality continues to provide the basis for a very strong public interest in his deportation (the reasons for which have not really diminished since findings were initially made in 2015), together with the lack of any compliance with the Deportation Order to leave the United Kingdom and long periods of remaining in the United Kingdom unlawfully; against which there is his current relationship with his wife to which little weight should be attached given it was established when the Appellant already had a Deportation Order against him and his relationships with his children; only two of which are genuine and subsisting relationships. This was not in any way a finely balanced decision but one where we find the very significant public interest very easily outweighs the Appellant’s private and family life established in the United Kingdom.

Notice of Decision

For the reasons set out in the decision annexed, the making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did involve the making of a material error of law and as such that decision was set aside.

The appeal is remade as follows:

The Appellant’s appeal is dismissed on human rights grounds.

G Jackson

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

10th June 2026

ANNEX A

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-000725
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/58203/2022

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

…………………………………

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE JACKSON
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE GRIMES

Between

SHONE ROMULUS
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr D Furner of Counsel, instructed by Birnberg Peirce Ltd
For the Respondent: Mr E Tufan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 10 June 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant appeals with permission against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal promulgated on 14 November 2024, in which the Appellant’s appeal against the decision to refuse his human rights claim and refuse to revoke his Deportation Order dated 19 October 2022 and refusal of his human rights claim dated 15 June 2023, was dismissed.
2. The Appellant is a national of St Lucia, born on 30 October 1987, who arrived in the United Kingdom on 17 April 2000 with his family. An application for indefinite leave to remain under a family concession route was made on 15 August 2005, which was refused, however following a successful appeal on 2 March 2010, the Appellant was granted discretionary leave to remain to 27 January 2014.
3. On 20 July 2006, the Appellant was convicted of obstruction of an engine or carriage on a railway and fare evasion, for which he was sentenced to 40 hours of community service.
4. On 9 January 2007, the Appellant was convicted of theft from a motor vehicle, for which he was sentenced to a 12 months’ supervision order; 60 hours’ unpaid work and required to pay £100 compensation and £50 costs.
5. On 9 September 2010, the Appellant received a caution for assault by beating.
6. On 17 November 2011, the Appellant was convicted of using threatening, abusive and insulting words or behaviour with intent to cause fear or provocation of violence; for which he was sentenced to 16 weeks’ imprisonment, suspended for 12 months.
7. On 11 December 2013, the Respondent made a Deportation Order against the Appellant on the basis that his deportation was conducive to the public good. The First-tier Tribunal dismissed the Appellant’s appeal against this decision on 28 April 2015. In essence, the First-tier Tribunal made a number of findings that the Appellant had committed a number of crimes beyond those he had been convicted of, including that he had raped or had sex with minors; a number of assaults; that he was involved in the supply of drugs and had gang affiliations. At the appeal, the Appellant was found to be a poor witness. Overall, the First-tier Tribunal found that the Appellant was a foreign criminal and a persistent offender pursuant to section 117D of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (the “2002 Act”). He did not meet the private life exception as although he was socially and culturally integrated within the United Kingdom, he had not been here lawfully for more than half of his life and there were no very significant obstacles to his reintegration in St. Lucia, where he had visited family. In relation to family life, it was not accepted that the Appellant was in a genuine and subsisting relationship with the mother of his youngest child (as claimed) and although it was accepted that he did have such a relationship with all three of his children, his deportation would not be unduly harsh on any of them to remain in the United Kingdom. Finally, there were no very compelling circumstances to outweigh the significant public interest in deportation.
8. The Appellant’s appeal rights were exhausted on 17 August 2015, further to which a Deportation Order was signed on 18 September 2015.
9. On 11 December 2016, the Appellant applied for leave to remain which was treated as further submissions and an application to revoke the Deportation Order. On 12 March 2019, the Respondent refused to revoke the Deportation Order and refused to treat the further submissions as a fresh claim.
10. The Appellant made further submissions on 20 December 2019, which the Respondent refused on 19 October 2022. Further submissions based on Article 3 health grounds were made by the Appellant, which were refused by the Respondent on 15 June 2023. These are the two decisions which are the subject of the present appeal.
11. In summary, the Respondent refused the Appellant’s human rights claims and refused to revoke his Deportation Order by reference to the exceptions to deportation. The Appellant’s claim was based on having five children in the United Kingdom; his private life and in particular his work as an actor and on the basis that he had suffered brain damage and needed support to manage his condition. The Respondent noted that there was no up to date evidence in relation to the Appellant’s claimed partner and little information to as to his children (including no details at all in relation to two of them) and found that neither the family life exception nor the private life exception to deportation had been met. In relation to the Appellant’s health condition, there was no ongoing treatment but support to manage the condition, which would be available on return to St Lucia.
12. The First-tier Tribunal dismissed the Appellant’s appeal on all grounds in a decision promulgated on 14 November 2024. We return to the detail of that decision as relevant to the grounds of appeal pursued, but summarise it by way of introduction as follows. Due to a change in the interpretation of ‘persistent offender’ in section 117D of the 2002 Act in Chege (“is a persistent offender”) [2016] UKUT 00187 (IAC), (that non-conviction evidence could not be relied upon to establish the same) the First-tier Tribunal found that given the Appellant’s last convictions were over fifteen years ago, he could no longer be a persistent offender; nor were any of the other conditions met to establish that he was a foreign criminal for the purposes of Part V of the 2002 Act. However, the framework within section 117C of the same, whilst not specifically applicable, was applied to the Appellant’s appeal.
13. The First-tier Tribunal, applying the principles in Devaseelan, relied on the earlier findings from the Appellant’s appeal in 2015. Whilst it was accepted that there was now evidence that the Appellant had been suffering from the effects of a stroke at the time of the previous hearing and when he gave evidence, which affected his memory and impaired his executive function; that was not found to undermine his evidence or the findings in relation to it given that he had failed to engage in the substance of the case against him in the year before his brain injury, so his evidence was not likely to have been different for that reason. There was consideration of whether the police had mixed up the Appellant with his cousin, but considered not to have been due to the use of fingerprints for identification. Overall, it was found that the Appellant had not given any new response to the previous material, or none that could not have reasonably been before the previous First-tier Tribunal. There was therefore no reason to depart from the previous findings on the Appellant’s criminal activity which had been established on the balance of probabilities.
14. In relation to Article 8, the First-tier Tribunal found that the Appellant did not meet any of the exceptions to deportation, for essentially the same reasons as before in relation to private life. In relation to the family life exception, by the date of this decision, the Appellant had seven children in the United Kingdom between the ages of three and fifteen, at least three of whom were British citizens. The First-tier Tribunal found that the Appellant only had a genuine and subsisting relationship with C1 and C7 but that remaining in the United Kingdom if he were deported would not be unduly harsh on them. Finally, there were no very compelling circumstances to outweigh the significant public interest in deportation.
15. Lastly, the First-tier Tribunal found that there would be no breach of Article 3 by the Appellant’s deportation to St Lucia on medical grounds, nor was there any evidence that he would face destitution on return.
The appeal
16. The Appellant appeals on five grounds as follows. First, that the First-tier Tribunal erred in law in its approach to the proportionality assessment for the purposes of Article 8 given that it said that the Appellant does not fall within section 117D of the 2002 Act such that section 117C of the same and the corresponding parts of the Immigration Rules do not apply [at 42], but then went on to use this framework as an applicable measure to determine whether the Appellant’s deportation was conducive to the public good without undertaking a separate Article 8 assessment in accordance with Razgar v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 27. Further, that although the self-direction given by the First-tier tribunal in accordance with paragraph 38 of Hesham Ali v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] UKSC 60 was correct; the self-direction [at 113] was not as it would be applicable only to ‘foreign criminals’ within the statutory scheme, which the Appellant was not for the reasons given by the First-tier Tribunal. This essentially led the First-tier Tribunal to ask itself ultimately to ask the wrong question as to whether there very compelling circumstances to outweigh the public interest in deportation as opposed to a holistic assessment of proportionality.
17. Secondly, that the First-tier Tribunal erred in law in applying a heightened test for whether the Appellant’s deportation would be unduly harsh on family members given the reference at paragraph 108 to the evidence not showing that “there will be hardship going beyond what would necessarily be involved for any child faced with the deportation of a parent”, which is a notional comparator test disapproved of in HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22.
18. Thirdly, that the First-tier Tribunal erred in law in failing to properly consider the evidence before it from the Independent Social Worker and failed to give adequate reasons for rejecting it. This was specifically relevant to the evidence contained in the report as to the Appellant’s particularly close bond with C1 given their work together on a TV series and the impact of fame on C1, with the Appellant undertaking a more protective role as a result.
19. Fourthly, that the First-tier Tribunal erred in law in failing to give adequate reasons for its findings in relation to DC Dollery’s statement and in relation to the allegations of criminal conduct between 2018 and 2022. In particular, the First-tier Tribunal did not deal with all of the allegations and none in sufficient detail to establish criminal conduct on the balance of probabilities.
20. Finally, that the First-tier Tribunal erred in law as a matter of procedural fairness because no relevant police officer had been produced to speak to the earlier statement of DC Petrov (who was no longer in service in the police by the time of the last hearing) as directed by the First-tier Tribunal. Further, that issues in relation to the previous First-tier Tribunal findings had not been properly address or reasoned.
21. At the oral hearing, on behalf of the Appellant, Mr Furner relied on the written grounds of appeal which set out the issues in the appeal in detail and for which we are grateful for their clarity and comprehensiveness, which has not been necessary to repeat in full in this decision.
22. In relation to the first ground, Mr Furner submitted that this was an overarching point which is itself material regardless of any of the other grounds on the basis that the First-tier Tribunal, having found the Appellant was not a foreign criminal, went on to assess him as such within the statutory scheme for foreign criminals. Whilst it was accepted that this was a relevant consideration, in that if the Appellant met one of the exceptions or the very compelling circumstances test then the appeal would be allowed in his favour as such findings would carry over in a traditional Article 8 assessment; it was not sufficient without the First-tier Tribunal going on to undertake a separate assessment in accordance with the approach in Razgar given that this would include other relevant matters as part of the consideration, such as those in Maslov v Austria [2009] INLR 47 ECHR.
23. In relation to the second and third grounds of appeal, Mr Furner submitted that if the unduly harsh test was satisfied in relation to C1 (or any other children) then, as above, that would be determinative of an Article 8 proportionality assessment. In relation to the third ground more specifically, Mr Furner accepted that there were problems with the methodology of the Independent Social Worker report and that the First-tier Tribunal were entitled to take a dim view of that evidence overall. However, some of that evidence was accepted and there was greater detail in places, particularly in relation to C1, with whom the Appellant has a close relationship and contrasts with the finding that there was no evidence as to the consequences of C1s fame when this was covered specifically in the report.
24. In relation to the fourth ground of appeal, Mr Furner submitted that even if the factual findings in relation to DC Dollery’s evidence were not established, these points remained relevant to an Article 8 proportionality assessment, particularly if there had been no adverse conduct established since 2012. On the specific points in the ground, it was submitted that there were essentially no reasons or clear findings on any of the allegations between 2018 and 2022. In relation the drugs issues, at best the First-tier Tribunal appeared to rely on there being ‘no smoke without fire’ but that is not sufficient for a finding on the balance of probabilities of criminal conduct. In relation the domestic incidents in 2018, these were not serious crimes and in any event, DC Dollery accepted that no crimes in relation to these incidents were even alleged. In relation to the drink driving and cannabis points, there was no explanation as to why these were not on the PNC record for the Appellant. All of these points are relevant as if no further criminal activity was found on the balance of probabilities for the period from 2018 onwards, then the Appellant’s last criminal conduct was in 2012 and he has since had some thirteen years of good character. This would be of considerable importance in the balancing exercise required.
25. As to the final ground of appeal, Mr Furner admitted to some difficulty in pursuing this because of the application of the principles in Devaseelan; but did pursue it in relation to the evidential underpinning of the three most serious allegations against the Appellant and the issue of procedural fairness without a police witness to address the earlier allegations. Mr Furner accepted that the appeal was unlikely to turn on this ground in isolation.
26. On behalf of the Respondent, Mr Tufan resisted the appeal on all grounds. In relation to the first ground of appeal, Mr Tufan submitted that there was no material error of law in the First-tier Tribunal’s decision given the great weight to be attached to the public interest in deportation in a case such as this even outside of the statutory scheme in section 117C of the 2002 Act which would need a very strong claim indeed to outweigh it. The assessment undertaken by the First-tier Tribunal in relation to the exceptions and the Appellant’s circumstances would in any even be very similar to that which would be considered for an Article 8 assessment. Although Mr Tufan accepted that the two assessments were not exactly the same, they were similar enough, particularly given that the relevant principles for an Article 8 assessment were embedded within section 117C of the 2002 Act.
27. Further, Mr Tufan referred to the Respondent’s guidance ‘Criminality: Article 8 of the ECHR’ in which the Respondent also referred to the use of the Immigration Rules as a ‘guide’ to apply in conducive deportation cases. There were other metrics which the First-tier Tribunal could also have used as a guide, including in Appendix FM; but the Appellant would inevitably fail to meet the suitability criteria for these. In any event, there is no doubt in the present case that the police assessment is that the Appellant is a ‘high harm offender’ within the terms of the Immigration Act 1971.
28. In relation to the second ground of appeal, Mr Tufan referred to the threshold for unduly harsh being a high and elevated test which was not met on the facts of this appeal.
29. In relation to the Independent Social Worker report and the third ground of appeal, Mr Tufan noted that the Appellant had accepted issues with the report and submitted that there was no need for further or additional paragraphs of it to be referred to expressly in the First-tier Tribunal decision. Overall, the First-tier Tribunal did not err in law in attaching only limited weight to the report for the reasons given.
30. As to the fourth ground of appeal, Mr Tufan submitted that whilst the First-tier Tribunal could have provided fuller reasons and findings, in particular in relation to the drugs offences alleged; these should be read and considered in light of the earlier findings of the First-tier Tribunal in 2015, that the Appellant had been found on the balance of probabilities to have engaged in further serious criminal conduct.
31. Finally, Mr Tufan submitted that the final ground of appeal could not be material and that there was no error of law in the application of the principles in Devaseelan.
32. In reply on behalf of the Appellant, Mr Furner emphasised that this Appellant had never been to prison and his only offending was many years ago. The Appellant’s convictions are below the threshold for deportation. He is not a ‘foreign criminal’ and as such is not covered by the Immigration Rules or statutory scheme at all, contrary to those in paragraph 38 of Hesham Ali who simply don’t meet the rules. In these circumstances, the use of the statutory scheme and/or the Respondent’s guidance is not sufficient alone.
Findings and reasons
33. In relation to the first ground of appeal, we find that the First-tier Tribunal materially erred in law in solely using the statutory framework in section 117C of the 2002 Act to determine the Appellant’s Article 8 appeal in circumstances where it correctly, expressly found [at 38] that it did not apply because the Appellant was not a ‘foreign criminal’ as defined in section 117D of the 2002 Act. Paragraph 93 of the First-tier Tribunal’s decision referring to Article 8 within the rules and using the statutory exceptions in section 117C of the 2002 Act as “an applicable measure for conducive to the public good deportations” was an error of law.
34. There was no dispute between the parties that an assessment under the statutory scheme should be undertaken as a reference point, as a finding that the Appellant met one of the exceptions under it would likely carry significant weight in the Article 8 proportionality exercise (although we do not necessarily accept that it would be determinative of it). However, it should not have been the end point of the First-tier Tribunal’s assessment of whether the Appellant’s deportation would be a disproportionate interference with his right to respect for private and family life contrary to Article 8. The First-tier Tribunal erred in failing to go on to follow the usual Razgar questions to determine the appeal.
35. We accept Mr Tufan’s submission that the assessments are likely to be similar both under section 117C of the 2002 Act and using a traditional Article 8 approach and may in many cases lead to the same outcome; but they are not exactly the same and would not necessarily lead to the same result. In particular, on the facts of this case, we consider that considerations such as those in Maslov would need to be taken into account within a traditional Article 8 assessment but would not feature as such within an assessment of very compelling circumstances. In a different way, the assessment under section 117C(6) of the 2002 Act does not include a balancing of the seriousness of the offence (given the specific thresholds set out in the Immigration Rules and statutory scheme already factor this in) but would be relevant and required for the final proportionality assessment in Article 8. Further, the statutory scheme also contains certain expressions of the public interest, for example by reference to length of sentence which would not necessarily apply in the same rigid way in a broader Article 8 assessment.
36. For these reasons, we find that the First-tier Tribunal erred in law in not going on to undertake the more traditional freestanding Razgar assessment for the purposes of Article 8. It is likely that many of the considerations and findings made will be relevant, but are not, on the facts of this appeal, sufficiently comprehensive to conclude that had a freestanding proportionality balancing exercise been carried out, the result would have been the same; particularly as this assessment would need to be undertaken through a different prism and with some additional factors potentially on both sides of the balance sheet.
37. In relation to the second ground of appeal, we find that the First-tier Tribunal erred in law in its assessment of whether it would be unduly harsh for C1 to remain in the United Kingdom if the Appellant were deported by failing to apply the correct legal test. In paragraph 107 of the First-tier Tribunal’s decision a lawful and accurate self-direction was given as to the appropriate test as set out MK (Sierra Leone) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] UNLR 563, as endorsed by the Supreme Court in HA (Iraq), together with the reminder in paragraph 108 that it is an elevated test. However, the First-tier Tribunal then fell in to exactly the error identified in HA (Iraq) by assessing the impact on C1 as against a notional comparator when it found in paragraph 108 that, “Considering the evidence in the round, on balance, we find that it would not be unduly harsh, as the evidence before this Tribunal does not paint a picture that there will be hardship going beyond what would necessarily be involved for any child faced with the deportation of a parent: the loss of face to face contact and the parental support that goes with it.”. What follows by way of factual assessment is infected by that overall comparator approach.
38. We do not consider in any detail the third ground of appeal. It is not necessary to do so in circumstances where the unduly harsh assessment must be set aside and remade, that will necessarily be needed on all of the evidence as at the next date of hearing as to the impact on C1. At that point, submissions can in any event be made on behalf of the parties in relation to the evidence in the Independent Social Worker’s report and any other updated evidence which may be available at the hearing.
39. In relation to the fourth ground of appeal, we find the First-tier Tribunal erred in failing to make any, or any adequate findings on the allegations of criminal conduct between 2018 and 2022. The First-tier Tribunal sets out limited reference to the allegations and the Appellant’s response to them in paragraphs 71, 76 – 78, and 83. However, the only discussion or findings in relation to those are in paragraph 89 (which refers to it being too much of a coincidence that the Appellant happened to be in locations where cocaine was found on three separate occasions, in 2005, 2008 and 2021; thus not even addressing the 2021 incident in isolation) and in paragraph 90 which states, “We also find that the domestic incidents the police were called out to in 2018 and the charge of assault occasioning actual bodily harm in 2022 add to the overall negative picture of the appellant’s conduct, character and associations.” On that basis, the First-tier Tribunal found no reason to depart from the findings in 2015 that the Appellant’s deportation is conducive to the public good.
40. The First-tier Tribunal self-evidently failed to make any specific findings in relation to each of the allegations made of criminal conduct between 2018 and 2022, as required on the balance of probabilities. The allegations are not set out or addressed individually, which is particularly important in circumstances where the alleged drink driving incident was not included in the Appellant’s PNC and where the domestic incidents were, at a minimum accepted by DC Dollery not to be serious crimes (and in submissions on behalf of the Appellant, not crimes at all, a point simply not engaged with anywhere in the decision).
41. Although the First-tier Tribunal set out the Appellant’s response to certain allegations, there is no engagement with the Appellant’s evidence or the submissions made on his behalf in relation to it. There are simply no findings as to whether the Appellant was involved in any crimes or whether, even on the balance of probabilities, it was shown that he had committed any specific offences in this later period. Whilst such matters may be relevant to possible inferences about the Appellant’s character and associations, findings were required on the actual conduct to inform those. We reject Mr Tufan’s suggestion that these were not needed in light of the 2015 findings – they were of course required and relevant given the accepted gap in any criminal conduct between 2012 and 2018 and the passage of time since the last offending in 2012. Overall, it was woefully inadequate for the First-tier Tribunal to simply find that three of the allegations were sufficient to add to an overall negative picture of the Appellant. Much more specific findings were required and will be needed in the remaking of this appeal.
42. The final ground of appeal does not disclose any error of law with the First-tier Tribunal’s assessment of the previous findings of the Tribunal in 2015; which was entirely in accordance with the principles in Devaseelan. The fact that DC Petrov, nor another officer able to speak to the earlier statements was in attendance at the hearing was not procedurally unfair in all of the circumstances, particularly when in essence, there was no new evidence in relation to matters from this earlier period relied upon by the Appellant. The First-tier Tribunal gave detailed consideration to the three main issues raised in relation to the safety of previous findings, namely the Appellant’s brain injury, the possibility of confusion of identity with his cousin and in relation to insufficient evidence of offending (in particular in relation to the lack of forensic evidence). Clear and cogent reasons were given for the final conclusions given in paragraphs 84 to 90 of the decision on these points, which followed detailed consideration of the issues in paragraphs 53 to 70; 72 to 74; and 78 to 82.
43. For all of these reasons, we find that the First-tier Tribunal materially erred in law, such that it is necessary to set aside the decision. However, as we have not found that all of the grounds pursued were made out and some findings not challenged at all (for example, but not limited to the findings in relation to offending in the period up to 2021; in relation to C2 to C7 and in relation to Article 3); there are a significant number of findings that can be preserved for the purposes of remaking the appeal. This is also because ground one in particular relates to the First-tier Tribunal not undertaking the final proportionality assessment required for the purposes of Article 8, albeit the majority of the relevant facts required for this are already contained within the decision.
44. In light of the findings above, we consider that the following paragraphs of the First-tier Tribunal should be preserved:
• Paragraphs 27 to 75
• Paragraphs 76 – 83 (albeit these record evidence and submissions rather than containing any findings per se)
• Paragraphs 84 to 90 (save for the part of paragraph 89 which touches upon the incident in 2021 upon which more detailed findings are likely to be necessary)
• Paragraphs 94 – 104
• Paragraphs 106 – 107
• Paragraphs 110 – 111
• Paragraphs 113 – 134 (albeit in respect of the balance sheet factors in paragraphs 114 – 115, these are findings in respect of the very compelling circumstances assessment in section 117C(6) of the 2002 Act and are not preserved as comprehensive for the purposes of a freestanding Article 8 assessment).
45. We accept that it is possible that some of these findings may need to be updated in light of any updated evidence at the remaking hearing; but as it stands at present, these findings should be preserved. The parties will be at liberty to make submissions as to the preserved findings at the remaking hearing if there is any disagreement in relation to the list above.
46. Having considered the relevant guidance and history of this appeal and that the further findings of fact required are relatively limited (compared to the breadth of the original appeal and the significant volume of preserved findings) broadly in terms of the alleged offending between 2018 and 2022, in relation to C1 and then in relation to Article 8 for the overall proportionality balancing exercise, we consider that the appeal should be retained in the Upper Tribunal. Directions are given below for the remaking of the appeal. The parties are at liberty to apply for any further directions as needed and any disagreement with the time estimate should be communicated to the Upper Tribunal as soon as possible.
Notice of Decision
The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did involve the making of a material error of law. As such it is necessary to set aside the decision (with preserved findings of fact set out above).
We set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal.
Directions
1. The appeal to be relisted for a face-to-face hearing at Field House on the first available date after 29 September 2025, before UTJ Jackson with a time estimate of 1.5 days. DC Dollery, or another suitable officer is required to attend the hearing to attest to the information in DC Dollery’s statements dated 18 December 2023 and 8 July 2024.
2. The Appellant to file and serve any further evidence upon which he wishes to rely no later than 28 days before the relisted hearing. A written statement (or updated written statement) is required to stand as evidence in chief for any person intending to give oral evidence in support of the Appellant’s appeal.
3. The Respondent to file and serve any further evidence upon which she wishes to rely no later than 21 days before the relisted hearing. A written statement (or updated written statement) is required to stand as evidence in chief for any person intending to give oral evidence in support of the Respondent’s case. It is expected that the Respondent will submit an up to date PNC record for the Appellant.
4. No later than seven days before the relisted hearing, both parties to file and serve a skeleton argument dealing with the remaining issues to be determined in this appeal.

G Jackson

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

4th August 2025

ANNEX B: Relevant findings from the First-tier Tribunal promulgated on 28 April 2015
18. I now consider the documentary evidence before me. As indicated above, the respondent relies on police records relating to a significant number of specific incidents which did not lead to the appellant being convicted. In addition, to these non-convictions, the appellant has a criminal record for a smaller number of offences, as set out in the PNC print-out and summarised above. The respondent states that the appellant is a persistent offender, that he has caused serious harm to the public and represents a continued risk to the public. The appellant denies that this is the case and argues that he is a victim of an institutionally racist police force. I have been guided by the decision in Farguharson (removal - proof of conduct) [20 13] UKUT 146 (lAC) and note that it is for the respondent to substantiate the conduct relied upon to the civil standard, the balance of probabilities.
19. Having considered the MG 11 witness statement of DC Petrov as well as the 459 pages of CRIS reports, I am satisfied that the latter represents contemporaneous records of the appellant's dealings with the Metropolitan police, both minor and serious. The appellant's response to the majority of these records amounted to little more than a bare denial and where detail was provided it often conflicted with either forensic evidence or the account he provided to the police at the time.
20. The appellant has also repeatedly claimed that the police confused him with his cousin, Shane Trim, however he has never claimed this at the time he was arrested; there is no evidence before me that he has a cousin of this name and this explanation does not address the fact that the appellant's fingerprints would indicate his identity regardless of what name he used at the time of arrest. Indeed the appellant is known by a range of aliases by the police.
21. There are a number of serious offences which the police argue were committed by the appellant but for which he has evaded justice. The appellant was a poor witness and did not take the opportunity to engage with the copious evidence provided by the respondent. Much of his responses during cross-examination consisted of "I can't remember." Yet the appellant's evidence is that he is an actor, which would involve recalling his part and I consider it unlikely that he would have difficulty recalling his arrests for serious offences and the circumstances which led to those arrests. The appellant's evidence was guarded and minimal. Not only did he provide any credible account to support his claim that the police had invented evidence against him, he gave no indication that he had reformed as indicated in his grounds of appeal. I find, after considering the police evidence and the appellant's oral and written evidence that, on balance, the appellant has either raped or had sexual intercourse with minors; has carried out a number of assaults; has been involved in the supply of drugs and has been affiliated with gangs. My reasons, in relation to those alleged offences are set out below.
22. On 25 January 2005, a girl aged 14 reported that she had been gang-raped by 8 youths. The appellant's evidence in his witness statement was that he had never seen this girl nor had sex with her. However, the victim identified the appellant at a parade and a used condom containing his DNA was found at the scene. On being pressed on this inconsistency during cross-examination, the appellant suggested that the used condom might have been there from before. On this occasion the appellant was charged with rape and false imprisonment but the charges were dropped owing to what were said to be inconsistencies in the victim's account. The CRIS reports refer to the victim receiving hospital treatment and counselling after the incident. On balance, I find that this child was unlikely to have consented to have sex with a series of men who had literally dragged her off the street and that she was in need of counselling underlines that. However, I conclude that irrespective of whether the girl was raped or not, the appellant had sex with a minor. At the time the appellant was aged 17.
23. On 19 August 2005, the appellant is said to have raped a 13 year old girl in the stairwell of a block of flats. A medical examination showed that the victim's hymen was broken after this incident. The appellant's evidence in his witness statement, was that he did not have sex with the victim or ejaculate. Yet at the time of his police interview, he said that he did. The appellant was charged with rape. The victim in this case provided the police with a lot of background information on the appellant's conduct, including his targeting of underage girls for sexual activity. Prior to the court hearing, the victim told the police that she had been threatened with violence by a third party and that friends had heard a series of rumours that she and her family would be stabbed or shot. In addition, on 14 February 2006, at his trial, the appellant was reported to have taken photographs of the witnesses on his mobile telephone. He was arrested once this conduct was brought to the attention of the trial judge. The rape allegation was ultimately withdrawn from the jury owing to the Crown's view that the witness evidence had been inconsistent and the appellant was formally acquitted.
24. The appellant was charged with both witness intimidation and juror intimidation, however these matters were ultimately not proceeded with. Notwithstanding the acquittal, which occurred after reports by the victim and her aunt of several threatening comments made by associates of the appellant and the appellant photographing witnesses, I find that it is more likely than not that he raped the child in question.
25. On 21 April2010, a 25 year old woman reported being raped by a series of men. While the appellant was not charged with this offence, penile swabs taken from the appellant indicated that he had sexual intercourse with a 15 year old girl who was present at the scene. By this stage the appellant was aged 22. In his witness statement, the appellant denies having sex with anyone on this occasion despite the DNA evidence showing that he had sexual activity with a minor.
26. The appellant's violent behaviour began at a young age. Just months after arriving in the United Kingdom, aged 12, the police had to be called following the appellant throwing a stone at a 12 year old girl who was injured as a result. He admitted the offence but the matter did not proceed further because the victim declined to substantiate the allegation.
27. On 30 October 2002, a bus driver was assaulted and robbed by a gang of youths. One of those youths spat on the driver. The saliva sample matched the DNA of the appellant. The appellant's oral evidence was that he was not present during this incident. No further action was taken against the appellant because the victim did not want to go to court. The appellant had no explanation as to why his DNA was present at the scene if he was not there.
28. A third allegation of assault against the appellant followed an incident on 29 March 2003 when the appellant is said to have entered the vehicle of the victim, spat at the victim and struck him with a pick axe handle. The appellant's evidence was that he was the victim; yet he had no explanation to the question posed in cross-examination, as to why he had not simply run away if this was the case. Ultimately the victim told the police that he would not be available to attend court.
29. A fourth incident of assault was reported to the police on 10 October 2005 when it is said that the appellant assaulted a female student at his former college. No police investigation took place because the victim did not want to substantiate the allegation. However, the appellant was suspended from his college thereafter. His evidence was that he was discriminated against by the college for being male. I find that it is more likely than not that the appellant assaulted the student in question and this is why he was suspended.
30. A fifth allegation of assault involving the appellant dates from 5 November 2008. The appellant and his younger brother were identified punching and kicking a victim, aged 15 years old, whom was also stabbed. The appellant says that he was not present and came to break up a fight involving his brother. Yet, the CRIS reports show that the victim's blood was on the right sleeve of the appellant's jacket. The appellant does not believe this, saying that the police invented a forensic report solely to avoid returning his jacket to him. I consider that to be a ridiculous suggestion. While this matter was discontinued by the CPS, I note that the police wrote a letter on behalf of one of the victims to support their need to be rehoused owing to the risk of further violence from the suspects. I am satisfied that the appellant and indeed his brother were involved in this assault.
31. The sixth allegation of assault took place on 1 March 2009, when a female friend of the appellant's ex-partner was said to have been assaulted by the appellant during a fight he was having with that ex-partner which occurred at a time when he was under curfew. The appellant claimed that he slapped her in self-defence. However the victim required hospital treatment for a fractured eye socket and bruising to her face. The case did not proceed to court because neither the victim nor the appellant's ex-partner were willing to give evidence against him. In view of the medical evidence of the fracture referred to in the CRIS, I am satisfied to the relevant standard that the appellant assaulted this female.
32. The appellant was cautioned for assaulting a further female victim on 8 September 2010.This would be the seventh assault. CCIV footage showed the appellant pulling the victim out of a building and punching her in the face with a closed fist, hitting her again and shoving her into a wall where she hit her head. In his witness statement, the appellant denied punching her, stating that he "pushed her out and closed the door to the flat .. I simply asked her to leave until the police came." I do not accept that account which conflicts with the CCIV evidence which led to the appellant accepting a caution.
33. An eighth allegation of assault was said to have taken place on 11 May 2012. A different female victim, a former intimate partner, had five separate facial injuries and her top was tom. The matter was discontinued because the victim refused to assist the police.
34. The appellant was arrested on 29 January 2005, having been seen loitering in an area known for drug dealing. Two wraps of cocaine were found on the ground next to him. He was not charged with possession of Class A drugs on CPS advice. On 11 December 2008, the appellant and his mother were arrested at an address where neither lived wearing latex gloves. During a search, crack cocaine, heroin and electronic scales covered in white powder were recovered. The appellant and his mother denied involvement in drugs, stating they were cleaning the flat as a favour to a friend. That is not exactly the explanation the appellant now provides. His account is that the friend was allowing him to stay in his flat while he was away. Furthermore, the appellant hesitated during his oral evidence before stating the first name of the claimed friend and also stated that he could not remember the surname of the person concerned. The appellant denies seeing drugs at the premises and that he was only there for 5 minutes when the police arrived. I reject the appellant's account. A substantial amount of drugs were found in a variety of locations throughout the flat. No charges were brought because the CPS could not prove the drugs were his, owing to being in another's flat. I find that, on balance, the appellant was aware the drugs were there and that he was associated with those dealing drugs.
35. In terms of the appellant's links to gangs and their activities, there are a number of detailed references to his associations to various gangs in the CRIS reports, made by victims and witnesses. In addition, the appellant has been observed to be present on 22 July 2006 when two males were found with gun shot wounds. The male with the more serious injuries was said to be a member of the same gang as the appellant. Furthermore, on 18 September 2010, the appellant was in the company of someone wanted for a firearms offence. On 13 December 2010 the appellant was stopped and searched in an area of anticipated violence. He was found not to have an offensive weapon on him.
36. In addition, the appellant and his mother were victims of criminal damage and threats to kill on 8 October 2011 when a large group of young males smashed several windows, instructed the appellant to come out or they would "do his mum" and threatened to bum the house down if the police were called. Following that incident, the appellant's family were moved to emergency accommodation. Neither the appellant nor his mother assisted the police with the investigation. The appellant was similarly unwilling to provide details regarding this incident during his oral evidence.
37. The appellant's last conviction was in relation to his conduct towards the police on 9 August 2011 for which he was convicted of using threatening, abusive, insulting words or behaviour with intent to cause fear or provocation of violence. I accept the police evidence that the appellant deliberately smashed a beer bottle and raised his hand which contained the broken bottle at a police officer in a threatening manner. Following that matter, there was an allegation of criminal damage in relation to the appellant's tenancy of a flat as well as a series of allegations of antisocial behaviour, including racist language, noise nuisance and cannabis being smoked on his property. The last incident was recorded on 30 September 2013. The appellant has since been evicted from this accommodation. DC Petrov advised me that there had been no further incidents since the appellant's PNC and his own MG 11 statement dating from October 2013 and November 2013 were produced.
38. As indicated by my remarks above, I did not find the appellant to be a witness of truth regarding his offending history. Furthermore, there was no evidence before me to support the allegation sprung on DC Petrov during cross-examination, that the appellant was a victim of racism at the hands of the police.

ANNEX C: Preserved findings from the First-tier Tribunal decision promulgated on 14 November 2025
Persistent Offender
27. On the question of whether the appellant is a persistent offender or has been convicted of an offence causing serious harm, we remind ourselves that the starting point following Devaseelan¸are the findings of First tier Tribunal Judge Kamara.
28. Judge Karama found the appellant was a foreign criminal as defined by section 117D of the 2002 Act as he was a persistent offender, [39] [41]. In coming to this finding Judge Kamara relied on the appellant’s criminal convictions [28]. In addition she relied on the evidence of DC Petrov and police CRIS (Crime Recording Information System) reports totalling 459 pages which set out incidents where the appellant was investigated by the police but did not result in the appellant being convicted. These incidents are set out at paragraphs 22-35 of Judge Kamara’s determination and include allegations of rape, robbery, assaults and the possession and supply of class A drugs.
29. In addition to the matters set out by Judge Kamara, the respondent relies on further incidents involving the appellant between 11 August 2018 and 20 January 2022. These are detailed in a statement and crime reports produced by DC Dollery.
30. We deal first with the “non conviction” matters taken into account by Judge Kamara. We note her determination was made before the UT decision in Chege (“is a persistent offender”) [2016] UKUT 00187 (IAC). In that decision the UT considered the meaning of the phrase persistent offender under part 5A of the 2002 Act. At [36] and [54] the UT stated:
The third limb of s.117D(2) is not engaged unless the individual “is a persistent offender”. There was no dispute that an “offender”, in this context, means a person who has committed a criminal offence (proof of which is established by a conviction or a caution, or a request by him that the offence be taken into consideration, (our emphasis).

There has to be a history of repeated criminal conduct carried out over a sufficiently long period to indicate that the person concerned is someone who keeps on re-offending, … How long a period and how many offences will be enough will depend very much on the facts of the particular case and the nature and circumstances of the offending … Persistence may be shown by the fact that a person keeps committing the same type of offence, but it may equally be shown by the fact that he has committed a wide variety of difference offences over a period of time. [54]
31. It follows from Chege that only offences that have resulted in a conviction or caution can be taken into account for the purposes of deciding if an individual is a persistent offender and thereby a foreign criminal as articulated in statute. We find adopting this definition that the “non conviction” incidents detailed in the police crime reports produced by DC Petrov and DC Dollery cannot be taken into account in deciding whether the appellant is a persistent offender for the purposes of Section 117 of the 2002 Act.
32. Secondly, we note from Chege that the period of time over which a person has committed offences as to be “persistent”. The appellant’s last criminal conviction was in 2011, over 15 years ago. His convictions spanned a period of five years when was aged between 18 and 23. He as 35 at the date of the hearing before us. We find the appellant has not continued to commit offences of the same type nor do we consider he has been convicted of committing a wide variety of offences, given the relatively low number of convictions.
33. We have taken into account further police incidents that occurred between 2018 and 2022 referred to by DC Dollery.
34. The appellant was involved in two domestic incidents occurring on 11 August 2018 and 12 September 2018. He was not arrested for these incidents and no offences were recorded. On 31 December 2019, the appellant was given a penalty charge notice for driving whilst uninsured. This is not recorded on his PNC and no crime report was produced by DC Dollery about this incident. The appellant was arrested on 2 July 2021 on suspicion of supplying class A drugs but no further action was taken against him. On 22 January 2022 the appellant was arrested and then subsequently charged with assault occasioning actual bodily harm. The charge was discontinued by the Crown Prosecution Service on 12 October 2022.
35. As none of the matters referred to by DC Dollery resulted in the appellant receiving a criminal conviction or caution they, like the non conviction evidence relied upon by Judge Kamara, cannot be taken into account in deciding whether the appellant is a persistent offender.
36. We are satisfied for the reasons we have set out that we can depart from Judge Kamara’s finding that the appellant is a persistent offender. We find applying Chege, that the number and nature of the appellant’s convictions do not justify describing him in this way. We conclude that the appellant is not a persistent offender for the purposes of paragraph 13.2.1 of the Rules or section 117D(2)(ii) of the 2002 Act.
Serious Harm
37. We turn to the question of whether the appellant has committed an offence of serious harm. We remind ourselves that paragraph 13.2.1 and section 117D(2)(b) and (c) of the 2002 Act, require the appellant to have been convicted of an offence causing serious harm.
38. The Court of Appeal in R (Mahmood) v Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) [2020] EWCA Civ 717, when considering this question said:
what matters is the harm caused by the particular offence. The prevalence of (even minor) offending may cause serious harm to society, but that does not mean that an individual offence considered in isolation has done so, [39]

… In most cases the nature of the harm will be apparent from the nature of the offence itself, the sentencing remarks or from victim statements. … harm in this context does not include a potential for harm or an intention to do harm, [41]

The record of the conviction, which is really in dispute, stands as the authoritative evidence of conviction.
39. Apart from the caution the appellant received in 2010, the appellant has not been convicted of an offence which caused physical harm to a member of the public. The most serious offence was committed in 2011, when the appellant threatened a police officer with a broken bottle. Although this was a serious incident, the officer was not physically harmed and the offence did not result in the appellant receiving custodial sentence.
40. We note the appellant received a caution for assault in 2010. This incident is referred during the statement of DC Petrov and occurred on 8 September 2010. CCTV showed the appellant pulling the victim out of the building, punching her in the face and pushing her against a wall. The victim sustained bruising and a cut to her face. The victim did not require hospital treatment and did not support a prosecution of the appellant. In the circumstances we do not consider the offence to have caused serious harm as defined in Mahmood.
41. We do not consider the other convictions the appellant has for obstructing a railway engine, fare evasion and theft from a motor vehicle can be described as causing serious harm. We note the appellant received non-custodial sentences for these offences. We find for the reasons we have set out that the appellant has not been convicted of an offence causing serious harm for the purposes of the paragraph 13.2.1 or section 117D(2)(b) or (c) of the 2002 Act.
42. We conclude the appellant has not been sentenced to a term of imprisonment for at least 12 months, pursuant to paragraph 13.2.1 of the Rules and he is not a persistent offender or been convicted of an offence causing serious harm, the family and private life exception is in the rules and section 117C of the 2002 Act do not apply to him nor does the question of very compelling circumstances.
Conducive Grounds
43. We turn to consider whether the appellant’s deportation is justified on grounds that it is conducive to the public good pursuant to section 3(5) of the Immigration Act 1971.
44. Page 40 of the Home Office guidance on conducive deportation, version 3.0, 15 March 2024 states:
It will only be appropriate to consider deportation on the ground it is conducive to the public good under the 1971 Act … in the following types of cases …
• where a person has been assessed by the police as a high offender and is a threat to the public
45. A person can be a high harm offender and a threat to the public even where he has not been convicted of a criminal offence. In Farguharson (the UT adopting paragraph 46 of Bah stated:
… In other words, the Secretary of State considers that, in the light of the individual’s character, conduct and/or associations, his deportation is conducive to the public good. It is possible that this may arise even where the intended deportee does not have any criminal convictions at all.
46. At paragraph 13 of her determination Judge Kamara referred to the respondent deeming the appellant’s deportation to be conducive to the public good on the basis of his conduct. She reminded herself following Bah, that were a decision to deport relies on conduct, the Tribunal must consider whether the material facts alleged by the respondent are made out to the civil standard, if they are the Tribunal must consider whether on the facts established the appellant’s conduct, character and associations reach such a level as to justify the decision to deport him.
47. Judge Kamara summarised the non-conviction incidents at paragraphs [22]-[35] of her determination. We set out the incidents in chronological order:
i. On 20 July 2000, the police were called following a report of the appellant had thrown a stone a 12 year old girl causing her injury. The appellant admitted causing the injury, however the complainant did not want to substantiate the allegation and no further action was taken, [26].

ii. On 30 October 2002, a bus driver was assaulted and robbed by a gang of youths, one of whom sat at him. DNA in the saliva match that of the appellant. The appellant claimed he was not present at the incident but could not explain how saliva came to be present at the scene. No action was taken, as the complainant did not want to go to court [27].

iii. One 29 March 2003, the appellant was said to have entered a vehicle and struck a driver with a pickaxe handle. The appellant claimed to be the victim in the incident but could not explain why he ran away from the scene. No proceedings were brought as a complainant told the police he would not attend court [28].

iv. On 25 January 2005, a 14 year old girl reported to the places she had been gang raped by eight youths. The complainant picked the appellant out at an identity parade as one of the youths who had raped her. A condom containing his DNA was found at the scene. The appellant claimed the condom may have been there before the rape occurred. Judge Kamara found the complainant was unlikely to have consented to have sex with a series of men who had a director of the street. She found the appellant had had sex with a minor. At the time of the incident the appellant was aged 22 [22].

v. On 29 January 2005 the appellant was seen loitering in an area known for drug dealing. Two wraps of cocaine were found on the ground near to where he was standing, no charges were brought on the advice of the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) [34].

vi. On 19 August 2005, the appellant was said to have raped a 13 year old girl in the stairwell the block of flats. The appellant gave conflicting accounts of whether he had sex with the complainant. He was charged with rape. Prior to the trial the complainant told the police that she had been threatened. The appellant was also reported to have taken photographs of witnesses. The appellant was charged with witness and juror intimidation. The rape allegation was ultimately withdrawn from the jury due to inconsistencies in the complainant’s evidence and intimidation charges not proceeded with. Subsequently, the complainant and her family members reported receiving several threats from associates of the appellant. Judge Kamara concluded that on the balance of probabilities the appellant had raped the child in question [23-24].

vii. On 10 October 2005, the appellant was reported to have assaulted a female student at a college he had been attending. The complainant did not want to substantiate the allegation but the appellant was suspended from the college after the incident. Judge Kamara found it was more likely than not that the appellant had committed the assault and this was the reason for suspension, [29].

viii. On 5 November 2008, the appellant and his younger brother were identified punching and kicking a 15 year old youth who was also stabbed. The appellant claimed he was not present but blood from the victim was found on his jacket. The appellant also claimed the police had invented the forensic report. Judge Kamara rejected this explanation as fanciful. She noted that even though the CPS had discontinued the proceedings, the police had written a letter supporting the re-housing of the complainant due to the risk posed to him by the appellant and his brother. Judge Kamara was satisfied the appellant and his brother were involved in the assault [30].

ix. On 11 December 2008 the appellant and his mother were arrested wearing latex gloves at an address in which police had found crack cocaine. The appellant and his mother claimed to be cleaning the property as a favour for a friend. In his evidence before Judge Kamara the appellant’s account changed. He said he was going was staying in the flat whilst his friend was away. Judge Kamara found on balance that the appellant was aware of the drugs and was involved in dealing them, [34].

x. On 1 March 2009, the female friend of the appellant’s ex-partner was said to have been assaulted by the appellant during a fight. She sustained a fractured eye socket and bruising to her face. No criminal proceedings were brought as neither the complainant nor the appellant’s ex-partner willing to give evidence against him. On the basis of the injuries sustained by the complainant Judge Kamara was satisfied the appellant had committed the assault [31].

xi. On 21 April 2010, a 25 year old woman reported being raped by a series of men. Although penile swabs taken from the appellant did not implicate him in the rape of the woman, they did indicate he had had sexual intercourse with a 15 year old girl present at the scene. The appellant denied having sexual activity with a minor, [25].

xii. On 8 September 2010, the appellant was cautioned for assaulting a female victim. The appellant denied the offence but his account conflicted with the CCTV evidence [32]. The victim did not want to support a prosecution. The appellant accepted a caution on the basis of the CCTV evidence.

xiii. On 11 May 2012 the appellant was alleged to have assaulted his former partner who had five separate facial injuries. No proceedings were brought as the complainant refused to assist the police [33].

xiv. There were a number of detailed references in the crime report from victims and witnesses about the appellant being associated with various gangs. On 22 July 2006, the appellant was present when two males were found with gunshot wounds one of whom was said to be a member of the same gang the appellant. On 18 September 2010, the appellant was found in the company of an individual wanted for a firearms offence [35].
48. Judge Kamara also noted at paragraph [36] that on 8 October 2011 the appellant and his mother were subject to criminal damage and threats to kill when a large group of young males smashed the windows of the appellant’s house and made threats towards the appellant and his mother. Although the appellant and his family were moved to emergency accommodation, neither the appellant or his family were willing to assist with the police investigation into the incident, [36].
49. There were further allegations of anti-social behaviour relating to racist language, loud music and the smoking of cannabis in the appellant’s flat [37].
50. Judge Kamara noted in paragraph 19 of the determination that the appellant’s response to much of the material in the police report amounted to little more than a bare denial and way provided detailed it was often in conflict with the forensic evidence or the account he provided to the police at the time.
51. Judge Kamara found the appellant was a poor witness who did not take the opportunity to engage with the copious amount of evidence provided by the respondent. His responses during cross examination consisted of saying he could not remember anything about the incidents. The appellant’s evidence was guarded and minimal. He did not provide a credible account that the police had fabricated evidence against him [21].
52. Judge Kamara was satisfied after considering the police evidence and the appellant’s written and oral evidence that he had either raped or had intercourse with minors, carried out a number of assaults, been involved in the supply of drugs and been affiliated with gangs [21].
53. We remind ourselves of the principles in Devaseelan. Judge Kamara’s finding the appellant committed the offences set out in the “non-conviction” material are our starting point. Facts occurring since her determination can be taken into account by us. In particular, we remind ourselves that time has passed; and the situation at the time of our determination may be different from what was before judge Kamara. The appellant is entitled to ask us to consider arguments on issues that were not or could not be raised before the first Adjudicator; Devaseelan, [38].
54. We also remind ourselves that is personal to the appellant were not brought to the attention judge Kamara, although relevant to the issue she was considering, should be treated by us with the greatest circumspection, save where the existence of the additional factors beyond dispute. We bear in mind the judge Kamara’s determination was made at a time closer to the event is alleged and that in terms of both fact-finding and general credibility assessment to attend to have the advantage, Devaseelan, [38], [39](1), (2), [40](4).
55. Finally, we are not bound by judge Kamara’s findings and we are obliged to consider the appellant’s appeal on his own individual merits, LD (Algeria) [2004] EWCA Civ 804 [30].
56. The appellant has provided medical evidence that at the time he was giving his oral evidence before judge Kamara he was suffering from the effects of a stroke. This explains his poor memory recall of events.
57. It was submitted by Mr Furner that Judge Kamara specifically made reference to the poor quality of the appellant’s evidence that he kept saying he could not remember the incidents the police had investigated. Mr Furner argued it was evident from Judge Kamara’s findings that the appellant’s inability to recall events played a significant part in her findings that he had committed the offences referred to in the police reports, as there was now medical evidence explaining the reason for the appellant’s poor memory, we could depart from Judge Kamara’s findings.
58. Secondly, Mr Furner argued that the evidence in the crime reports was flawed as the police confused the appellant with his cousin Shane Trim. Thirdly there was insufficient evidence in the CRIS reports, even on the balance of probabilities, to implicate the appellant in the offences are alleged.
59. In terms of the appellant’s memory issues, we note from the appellant’s GP records that there is an entry on 26 February 2015 referring to him attending the surgery with a history of left-sided weakness. The entry goes on to state the appellant had attended an accident and emergency department on three occasions and had been seen by the stroke Unit at Homerton University Hospital. A CT scan of the appellant’s head was normal. The appellant was seen again at the surgery on 9 March 2015. He presented with “functional neurological disorder and left-sided weakness,“. An entry on 6 October 2015, refers to a scan revealing gilomatous changes in the right frontal lobe and “stroke and cerebrovascular accident unspecified – ischaemic.”
60. The appellant relies on medical records of consultant neuropsychologists, Dr Sean Haldane and Dr Leyla Ziyal dated 25 September 2019 and 8 January 2024, respectively. Paragraph 2.4 of Dr Haldane’s report refers to a report from Dr Maria Stavrou dated 18 July 2016, which states the appellant presented at the Emergency Department of St Bart’s hospital with acute left-sided weakness. An MRI scan of his brain showed “right-sided focal cerebral atrophy in keeping with old ischaemic changes”. Dr Haldane concluded the appellant’s symptoms of left-sided weakness were consistent with right-sided brain damage. Whilst Dr Haldane could not definitely attribute the brain damage to a stroke, the scan showed Ebola symptoms are genuinely neurological and not psychological.
61. At paragraph 6 of his report Dr Haldane said that as a result of this injury, the appellant’s executive functions were severely impaired and he would find it difficult to retrieve historical memories as the “cerebral event” in 2015 impaired his ability to “search” his past experiences.
62. Paragraph 2.14 of Dr Ziyal’s report notes;
“Accessing long-term historic events requires effective search and planning functions that pivot on the ability to switch between problem/task demands

Both of these functions are governed by the frontal lobes. Mr Romulus’ deficit in this executive domain will severely impair his effectiveness in recalling events that have occurred in the past.”.
63. We also took into account the evidence of Mr Ronan Bennett on the issue of the appellant’s memory. Mr Bennett is the producer and writer of the television series, “Top Boy”, which the appellant acted in for three seasons. Mr Bennett said that between seasons 2 in 2013 and season 3 in 2018, the appellant suffered a stroke. Mr Bennet noted a significant physical deterioration in the appellant when he returned for season 3. The appellant was physically slower and the movement in one of his arms was impaired.
64. We are satisfied after considering the medical evidence and that of Mr Bennett that the appellant was suffering from some form of cerebral injury a few months before his hearing in April 2015 before Judge Kamara. The diagnosis of his injury was only made in September 2015 after his appeal had concluded and we accept the injury caused the appellant problems with his long term memory. However, we note from the appellant’s GP records that the appellant’s problems started from mid-February 2015 at the earliest. There is no evidence the appellant had been experiencing any problems with his memory before this date, indeed Mr Bennett in his oral evidence said that before his “stroke” the appellant was one of the most dedicated, reliable and disciplined members of the Top Boy cast.
65. We note from paragraph 8 of Judge Kamara’s decision that following a case management hearing on 20 February 2014, the appellant was directed to file a witness statement that addressed the material provided by the respondent. The appellant provided a statement dated 7 April 2014. A second statement was included in a bundle served on Tribunal on 24 April 2014 and in a subsequent bundle served by the appellant’s new representatives. Judge Kamara observed that none the appellant’s statements addressed the police material in any real detail, [8].
66. We are satisfied that a year before any memory problems surfaced, the appellant had a number of opportunities to engage with the police reports relied on by the respondent but chose not to do so. We find that having not responded in any detail to the respondent’s material in three statements it is unlikely he would have done so in his oral evidence before Judge Kamara, even if he was not suffering from any memory problems. We find that Judge Karama’s findings are not undermined by evidence of the appellant’s brain injury.
67. We turn to the issue of the appellant being confused with his cousin Shane Trim. In his oral evidence before us, the appellant accepted that he had on occasion when stopped by police used his cousin’s name instead of his own. He had only used the alias of Sean Trim and never Shane Trim. He used his cousin’s name as his cousin looked like him. He was aware that his cousin had committed offences and had been to prison.
68. DC Dollery was shown the bio data page of the British passport of the appellant’s cousin, Shane Trim and asked by Mr Furner what steps she had taken to confirm the crime reports she had complied from both DC Petrov and herself and relative to the appellant and not Shane Trim. DC Dollery said that every time the appellant had been arrested he had been fingerprinted and on occasion DNA swabs taken, these were compared to his file name, (the name he had given to the police when he was first arrested). This meant even when the appellant gave alias names the police could verify his real identity upon his fingerprints compared with those held on the police database. This also meant that if Shane Trim gave the appellant’s details, his (Trim’s) real identity could also be established by a comparison of fingerpints.
69. DC Dollery accepted she had not looked at any body worn footage of the incidents the appellant had allegedly been involved in to confirm it was the appellant and not his cousin who had been arrested. She maintained that video evidence was not as reliable as fingerprints as people can change their physical appearance.
70. Mr Furtner also pointed out that the appellant’s height had variously been given as 1.73cm and 1.83cm in different crime reports. He put to DC Dollery that this meant his identification in the reports was unreliable. DC Dollery said that the heights of suspects were entered manually by officers on to the CRIS and were based on estimates either from the officer or someone who had given the officer the appellant’s height. DC Dollery maintained that height was subjective whereas fingerprints were a much more reliable method of identification.
71. In response to further questioning by Mr Furner, DC Dollery accepted that the drink driving incident referred to in her statement was not shown on the appellant’s PNC record nor was there a crime report about the incident. She also accepted that according to DC Petrov the appellant had received a police reprimand in 2004 which was also not recorded on the appellant’s PNC. She could not explain the reason for the missing information and said it may have been the result of human error. She accepted there was no evidence of the appellant offending between 2012 and 2018. She also accepted the 2018 incidents referred to in her statement were not serious crimes but maintained they contributed to the overall picture of the appellant being a danger to the community.
72. We accept that the appellant has a cousin called Shane Trim as not only was his passport produced but Ms Dos Santos and Ms Romulus both confirmed the appellant had a cousin of that name and that they were close friends. We accept DC Dollery’s evidence that the appellant was identified by his fingerprints and even where he did give a false name or someone like his cousin used his name, the real identity would be verified once an arrest had been made and fingerprints compared with those on the police database. We find that estimating height is a notoriously subjective matter and we place little weight on the difference in heights as tending to show the appellant was not the person identified in the crime reports. We are satisfied the appellant was the subject of the police reports referred to by DC Petrov and DC Dollery because of his fingerprints and not his physical appearance. We accept the appellant’s fingerprints would only be taken if he was arrested and taken into custody so there is a possibility that for the incidents that did not result in the appellant’s arrest, his cousin Shame Trim could have given the appellant’s details. We have taken this into account in our finding of whether on balance the appellant was responsible for the offences which did not result in a conviction.
73. We turn to Mr Furner’s submissions that the police reports relied upon by Judge Kamara were not made out to the civil standard.
74. In terms of the appellant’s oral evidence before us, his answers were largely the same as those he gave to Judge Kamara. He could not remember anything about the incidents referred to in the police reports produced by DC Petrov.
75. However, the appellant was able to recall most of the incidents referred to by DC Dollery.
76. In the August 2018 domestic incident he picked up a dog by its neck to put it in a crate. The woman he was seeing was angry about the way he was handling the dog and called the police. The police came and he agreed to leave for the night because of how angry and drunk the woman was.
77. The appellant denied being in possession of crack cocaine in July 2021. He stated that he had been approached by two men for a cigarette and the police had run past chasing somebody. One of the men the appellant was with shouted something so the police came back and arrested the appellant and the two men as they found three wraps of cocaine near them. No charges were brought as the police had no evidence linking the appellant to the drugs. In relation to driving without insurance in December 2019, the appellant said he had never held a driving licence or driven on a road. He denied committing the offence of actual bodily harm and said he acted in self-defence after he was attacked by his ex partners friend at a party.
78. The appellant denied being in a gang but accepted he had been given advice about moving out of his local area by a gang prevention officer.
79. In relation to the robbery allegation of October 2002, Mr Furtner submitted the crim report referred to the suspect being on bail at the time, however there was no evidence the appellant was on bail when he was being investigated for the offence.
80. He submitted that in relation to the appellant assaulting a motorist with a pick axe handle on 19 March 2003, the CRIS report recorded that the incident was not as it appeared to be and that it was the driver of the vehicle who picked up the pick axe handle. In relation to the rape of 25 January 2005, the victim’s account was undermined by her conduct on CCTV as she was seen hugging one of her assailants after the alleged rape had taken place and there was a reference in the crime report to the vast majority of the evidence implicating somebody else. There was also no forensic evidence linking the appellant to the complainant. In relation to the rape of a 13 year old girl in August 2005, the charge was withdrawn from the jury and charges of witness and juror intimidation were dropped.
81. Mr Furtner maintained no charges were brought against the appellant for being found in a house with crack cocaine in December 2008 and he was not forensically linked to the drugs. In relation to the allegation of rape on 21 April 2010, DNA from penile swabs taken from the appellant did not match the complainant and no charges were brought.
82. In other incidents the appellant was the victim of an offence or had been stopped with people in possession of firearms but had not been in a possession of a firearm himself. Although the appellant had been investigated for anti-social behaviour such as playing loud music this did not amount to a criminal offence. An entry at page 407 of the crime reports referred to the appellant being known for police stops but not having any links to gangs.
83. In relation to the matters set out by DC Dollery, Mr Furner submitted that no offences had been disclosed in the domestic incidents of 2018. The no insurance incident did not appear on the appellant’s PNC and no crime report had been produced. No charges had been brought in relation to the assault occasioning bodily harm incident in 2022.
84. We have carefully considered Mr Furner’s submissions and the CRIS reports relied on by the respondent. No new evidence has been produced by the appellant undermining the reliability of the crime reports before Judge Kamara. We note that the appellant was legally represented in the previous proceedings and that many of the arguments made by Mr Furtner about the shortcomings in the crime reports produced by DC Petrov would have been made by the appellant’s previous representatives.
85. We regard as significant, the fact that the appellant was implicated by DNA evidence in the rapes of three females under 16. In relation to the rape of a 13 year old girl on 25 January 2025, the appellant was picked out at an identity parade by the complainant and in relation to the rape of a 13 year old girl on 19 August 2005, the appellant was charged with the offence. Although the appellant was not implicated in the rape of the adult complainant in April 2010, DNA evidence at the scene linked him to having sex with a 15 year old girl. We are satisfied on the balance of probabilities that in light of the similarity in age of the appellants, the appellant’s DNA being present in all three incidents, and the positive identification of the appellant made by one of the complainants, that the appellant was responsible for the rapes that occurred on 25 January 2005, 19 August 2005 and 21 April 2010.
86. We are satisfied the appellant has committed a number of assaults on females. He received a police caution for beating an ex-partner which was caught on cctv. We note the appellant initially denied the offence before accepting a police caution. We are satisfied that the victim’s reluctance to assist the police was the only reason the appellant was not charged with the offence of assault by beating.
87. We are satisfied that on 01 March 2009, the appellant violently assaulted a friend of his ex-partner Hayley Dos Santos, causing the victim to sustain a fractured eye socket. We heard evidence from Ms Dos Santos about this incident. Ms Dos Santos said the appellant was innocent of this matter and it was in fact she and her friend who attacked him for talking to another woman. We did not find this evidence to be credible. Ms Dos Santos did not give this account to the police at the time the appellant was arrested and interviewed. She could not explain how her friend ended up with a fractured eye socket nor did she refer to this incident in her statement dated 22 May 2024 despite giving evidence in the proceedings before Judge Kamara when she must have been aware that the respondent was relying on this incident as part of her decision to deport the appellant.
88. We are satisfied that the assault of Ms Dos Santos’s friend was consistent with him hitting a female when he received a caution in 2010. We find this is also consistent with the appellant throwing a stone at a female when he was twelve causing her an injury and assaulting a female at his college resulting in his suspension. We are also satisfied based on DNA evidence that the appellant was involved in the robbery of a bus driver.
89. We are satisfied the appellant was involved in the possession and supply of class A drugs. […] We do not consider our findings are undermined by any confusion about the appellant’s identity when he was named in incidents where no arrests had taken place. These were minor incidents that do not disturb our overall finding that the appellant has been involved in serious and sustained criminality.
90. We are satisfied on the basis of the seriousness of the offences made out that there is no reason to depart from Judge Kamara’s finding that the appellant’s deportation is conducive to the public good.
…
Exception 1
94. With regards to Exception 1, the appellant arrived in the UK on 17 April 2000, aged 12. As at the date of hearing he has been in the UK for over 24 years. He has had lawful residence for 5 years. Accordingly, we find the appellant has not been lawfully resident for most of his life. Thus, he cannot meet this exception.
Exceptions 2
Genuine and Subsisting Parental Relationship
95. The respondent in her decisions does not accept the appellant currently has a genuine and subsisting relationship with his 7 children [C1 born 2008, C2 born 2011, C3 born 2013, C4 born 2014, C5 born 2016, C6 born 2019 and C7 born 2021]. The appellant accepted none of his children live with him but argues he plays an active part in their lives. It is unclear from the evidence before this Tribunal if all the children are British as claimed by the appellant, however, C1, C2 and C3 are accepted as British by the respondent [278/CB]. The children range from age 15-3 years old. We remind ourselves that the starting point is Judge Kamara’s decision. We note at paragraph 46, Judge Kamara did at that time have a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with C1, C2 and C3. We are also mindful that over 9 years have passed and relationships could have changed in view of the passage of time. Thus, we consider the current evidence before us, when considering whether to depart from these findings. We are also mindful of SSHD v AB (Jamaica) & Anor [2019] EWCA Civ 661, specifically paragraph 98, 105 and 106, that this “evaluation is high fact-specific”.
Chris Brown ISW report 18 September 2023 [157/CB]
96. The appellant relies on the report of Chris Brown who is a qualified social worker [since 1986]. They set out their career history stating they have been employed by various authorities, the probation service and been a lecturer. They set out their duty to this Tribunal. The report has a caveat, that it was compiled on the basis of one meeting with those interviewed and whilst there was one call with the appellant after, no further follow up meetings took place as planned due to the appellant’s unavailability on one occasion and organising issues. The report was updated in June 2024, but it was entirely based on accounts gathered at that initial meeting and documents provided to Chris Brown. The caveat stated the “report is perhaps limited in its content as a consequence and that a furthermore extended assessment would provide greater clarity to the Court.” We note Chris Brown did not meet three children, as had been anticipated and she had not met wit the mothers of C2-C6. The Tribunal enquired with Mr Furner why there was such a caveat and he indicated that this was partly to do with legal aid issues and other matters. We do find this caveat peculiar as it appears to indicate Chris Brown was unable to provide an accurate and holistic view of the family dynamic due to limitations. We note that the report records the direct account of the appellant, Petra Romulus, Hailey Dos Santos and Nahiya Mohammed Muhedin, C1 and C2. As clarified below we find it surprisingly that Chris Brown would consider C2’s account in the context provided for by the appellant, particularly given C2’s mother was not available for interview. We also find Chris Brown does not sufficiently engage with the findings of Judge Kamara but disregards them as these are not criminal convictions. We find much of the report simply accepts the appellants account as presenting, particularly about him being the “lynch pin” of the children seeing each other. Chris Brown did not seek to ask about the claimed “WhatApp” group or ask for confirmatory evidence of the appellant playing an active role with the children. The details are lacking in the interview of the appellants role in this regard. We find it curious that Chris Brown would not seek to consult C2, about her fathers claims about attending parents evenings or decision making in her life. We do not find the account of taking children to the park, eating ice cream or bike rides is sufficient to find he is an active father. We have taken into account the interviews of Petra Romulus, Hailey Dos Santos and Nahiya Mohammed Muhedin and whilst they support the account given, we find they are close family/friends and so exercise caution, which Chris Brown does not. We find the report is not balanced and by its own admission is limited. Accordingly we attach some weight to it but exercise caution.
97. In support of the appellants relationship with his child C1, Hailey Dos Santos, C1’s mother, provided a witness statement and gave evidence before this Tribunal. Ms Cunha argued this witness was not reliable for various reasons, which will be addressed further in this decision. On the issue of the relationship with C1, Hailey Dos Santos stated that she co-parents with the appellant. She accepted he was not financially supporting C1. She stated C1 regularly visited her grandmothers home, where the appellant lives. Hailey Dos Santos also stated when important decisions had to be made about C1, the pair make them together. She referred to their joint decision to let C1 act. Whilst we have some concerns about Hailey Dos Santos’s evidence, we are prepared to accept her evidence, on balance on this aspect as it was consistent with other evidence. We note there is no evidence before this court from C1 directly, such as a letter, we are mindful of her age in this regard but this would have assisted. We also note, there is no evidence from her school, which again may have assisted such as setting out the appellant’s involvement with the school, given C1’s claimed difficulties with fame and school life.
98. We also heard evidence from Mr Bennett, the producer of Top Boy. He also set out how C1 was given the part upon observing her come to the set and the close bond between the pair. We note Mr Bennet’s evidence in this regard was accepted by Judge Kamara. Mr Bennet, could not give evidence about the current status of the relationship between the pair now.
99. We also heard evidence of Petra Romulus, the appellant’s mother. She was consistent with the appellant and Hailey Dos Santos about the frequency with which C1, visits her home and the level of her interaction with her father. Again we have concerns about other aspects of Petra Romulus’s evidence, but on this we find we can attach some weight in view of the consistency.
100. We also note in Chris Brown’s report, we have her observations of her interview with C1 and C2. We note Chris Brown’s comments about C1’s account of her relationship with her father, which we find is much more detailed about the role he plays and it is consistent with the accounts presented by other witnesses. Accordingly, standing back and considering the evidence as a whole we are prepared to accept the appellant has a genuine and subsisting relationship with C1.
101. Turning to C2, we note we have no statement from her mother, this we find damaging. We also do not have direct evidence from C2, such as a letter but this is unsurprising in view of her age. Chris Brown records C2’s account of her relationship with the appellant. Chris Brown notes that the relationship between the appellant and C2’s mother at the time of the interview was fractious due to a conflict of C2 use of social media. We note, however this assertion is based on the appellant’s account and that C2 did not state this. We are also mindful that C2 gave her interview to Chris Brown with C1 present and thus may not have felt comfortable disclosing detail. We note her account of the appellant taking the children to the part and other activities. However, C2 states she does not see her father often and this did not bother her and she described their relationship as “reasonable”. This we find is not indicative of an active father as claimed by the appellant. We have little evidence of his role in C2’s life and we note no external evidence such as a letter rom her school confirming his attendance at parents evenings or sports days. We are mindful of our starting point but in view of the passage of time and the lack of evidence we find we are able to depart from that finding. Standing back on balance we find the evidential burden has not been discharged by the appellant on this aspect.
102. Turning to C3, Judge Kamara within her determination found a genuine and subsisting parental relationship existed between the appellant and C3. We note at that time Judge Kamara heard evidence from C3’s mother, who was in a relationship with the appellant at that time. C3’s mother did not provide a witness statement or attend court in support of the appellant’s current appeal, this we find damaging. There is little evidence of contact and the type of relationship the appellant has with C3, beyond his account of visiting the children and having a WhatsApp group with the mothers. Yet we note we have not been provided with a copy of the messages within this group. Standing back and considering the evidence as a whole, we find the evidential burden has not been discharged that C3 and the appellant have a genuine and subsisting parental relationship.
103. Turning to C4, C5, and C6. We have the same observations about these children as C3. We do not even have the birth certificates showing the appellant is their father. There are no supporting statements from the mothers and none of them attended the hearing in support. There is little external evidence of the parental role he plays such as letters from joint friends, the school or nurseries. The only evidence is that of the appellant and Petra Romulus. Their evidence in this regard is limited as it states in general terms activities and visits the children are claimed to make or partake in. There is however, a lack of detail that one would expect given the claimed active parent role. We note both C1 and C2, refer to seeing their siblings on occasions when interviewed by Chris Brown, thus we accept there is some contact. There is however a lack of detail about decision making in the children’s lives, which we would expect. We find the appellant again has not established on balance that he is in a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with C4, C5 and C6.
104. Turning to C7, C7’s mother, Nahiya Mohammed Muhedin provided a witness statement and oral evidence. She was cross examined by Ms Cunha at length. We found her evidence and account was credible as she did not seek to exaggerate or embellish her account. She was candid in accepting she and the appellant did not live together, this she stated was because she was on a housing list and her mother’s home was small. She stated that the appellant stayed at her mothers home approximately 4 times a week but this varied. She in detail set out the role the appellant plays in C7’s life such as changing nappies, cooking food, taking him to the park and nursery. She set out in detail how C7 is close to his father. We found her evidence credible. Accordingly, we accept the appellant does have a genuine and subsisting relationship with C7.
Best Interests of the Child
…
106. For the reasons given above we accept the appellant is playing an active role in C1 and C7’s lives. He is more involved with the mothers and the children. The appellant is co-parenting both children. Accordingly we find, it is in the best interests of these children for the status quo to remain as it is. Whilst this is a primary consideration, this is not the only consideration.
Unduly harsh
107. The respondent accepts it would be unduly harsh for C1 and C7 to have to go to St Lucia. She does not however, accept it would be unduly harsh for C1 and C7 to remain in the UK without their father. When considering the meaning of unduly harsh, the description in MK (Sierra Leone) v SSHD [2015] UNLR 563, was affirmed in the Supreme Court judgment of HA (Iraq) [2022] UKSC 22 that: “’unduly harsh’ does not equate with uncomfortable, inconvenient, undesirable or merely difficult. Rather it poses a considerably more elevated threshold. ‘Harsh’ in this context, denotes something severe, or bleak. It is the antithesis of pleasant or comfortable. Furthermore the addition of the adverb ‘unduly’ raises an already elevated standard still higher.”
…
110. Turning to whether it would be unduly harsh for C7 to remain in the UK without his father. C7 is 3 years old and is currently being looked after full time by Nahiya Mohammed Muhedin. Nahiya Mohammed Muhedin currently lives with her mother and the appellant visits her family home 3-4 times a week. For reasons given above it is in C7’s best interests for both parents to co-parent as they have been. We remind ourselves of the elevated test. C7 is fit and well according to Nahiya Mohammed Muhedin. He is not in education and is relatively young, hence he is adaptable. He is supported by his extended family namely Nahiya Mohammed Muhedin’s mother and sister but also his paternal grandmother, Petra Romulus. Again, we accept that the loss of face to face contact and support is an inevitable consequence of deportation but there is little evidence of how this would be severe or bleak for C7. Nahiya Mohammed Muhedin states that she would be unable to travel to St Lucia as she is a carer for her mother, yet we have no evidence to support this. Even if she is, she has a sister who can assist her to enable her to make a visit to the country. Nahiya Mohammed Muhedin also states she is not working at the current time, so we are prepared to accept financially she may not be able to afford trips, however she still has the use of modern means of communication to ensure some level of contact.
111. We accept the appellant’s deportation will be uncomfortable, undesirable and very difficult. However, again, we are unable to determine on this evidence that this would be bleak or severe for C7. It follows that we conclude that it would not be unduly harsh for C7 to remain in the United Kingdom were the appellant to be deported.
112. …
Very compelling circumstances/Proportionality/The ‘Balance Sheet’4
113. As set out by the Court of Appeal in NA (Pakistan) v SSHD [2016] EWCA Civ 662, cases where appellants cannot bring themselves within the exceptions to deportation will be dealt with on the basis that great weight should generally be given to the public interest in the deportation of such offenders, but that it can be outweighed, applying a proportionality test, by very compelling circumstances: in other words, by a very strong claim indeed, as Laws LJ put it in SS (Nigeria). The countervailing considerations must be very compelling in order to outweigh the general public interest in the deportation of such offenders, as assessed by Parliament and the Secretary of State.
114. On the respondent’s side of the balance sheet is:
a) The appellant is a convicted offender having received 4 convictions for 6 offences from 2004-2009. He also received 2 cautions in 2003 and 2005.
b) Judge Kamara’s findings that on the balance of probabilities the appellant has committed rapes, serious assaults and engaged in the dealing of class A drugs. Further that the appellant has had sex with minors.
c) In terms of rehabilitation, the appellant has not provided evidence of rehabilitation work as he does not accept he has committed the crimes he has been accused of. For the crimes he has been convicted of, again there is no evidence of any rehabilitation work in this regard. The medical evidence identifies the appellant has an alcohol dependency and there is no evidence he has sought to address this, despite his GP advising him to lower his intake. We note some of the “non conviction” offences, refer to the appellant being under the influence.
d) The appellant is unable to meet any of the requirements of the applicable Immigration Rules.
e) The appellant is supported financially by his family in the UK and could be supported in St Lucia.
f) The appellant has a successful career working as an actor and by his own account seeks to open or has opened a clothing business. Thus, the appellant is able to work.
g) The appellant has been able to navigate his life since his stroke in the UK with minimal support, in time he will be able to establish such networks in St Lucia. We have considered the medical evidence referred to below. We note Ms Ziyal’s addendum report in this regard namely, that ‘the appellant is intellectually equipped to met demands of independent living and obtaining a profession. His functional effectiveness will effect him in reading maps, plans or photographs.” We note the appellant is not on any treatment in the UK or accessing support services, and thus does not require medical assistance in St Lucia. Even if he did, it is available to him.
h) English is spoken in St Lucia.
i) The appellant is returning to St Lucia as an adult.
115. On the Appellant’s side is:
a) The best interests of C1 and C7 are to remain as part of the family unit, currently that is in the UK and they are both settled here. C1 in particular, is at important point in her academics, GCSE’s. It is accepted by the respondent that both children are integrated/rooted into UK society.
b) The appellant has health issues requiring support particularly with coordination and he does not have family in St Lucia who can support him. In this regard we have considered the medical evidence below in particular Ms Ziyal addendum report.
c) The appellants partner, is in the UK and is a Somali national. Whilst she does not meet the qualified partner definition, she is still in vested in her relationship with the appellant, having had a child with him.
d) The appellant has not been convicted of offences requiring automatic deportation. Thus does not meet the threshold envisages by the Secretary of State as set out in statute.
e) The appellant is accepted as being socially and culturally integrated by the respondent.
f) The appellant does have a relationship with a qualifying child (Section 117B(6) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002).
g) The appellant does speak English (Section 117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002). This is a neutral factor.
h) The appellant has lived lawfully in the UK for 5 years.
i) The appellant has been financially independent whilst in the United Kingdom (Section 117B(3) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002). This is a neutral factor.
j) The appellant has never accessed any public funds during his residence in the UK and so has not been a burden on taxpayers (see section 117B(2) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002). This is a neutral factor.
116. Thus, standing back and applying the proportionality test, we find that the public interest in the appellant’s continued deportation is not outweighed by very compelling circumstances. The factors in the appellant’s favour set out above do not, in our view, outweigh the public interest in his deportation.
Article 3
117. The appellant claims he will suffer ill-treatment in breach of Article 3 of the ECHR if he is deported to St Lucia, firstly on account of the risk of a serious deterioration in his mental health including the risk of suicide and secondly by his exposure to social stigmatization, exploitation and prolonged destitution, (paragraph 42 of the appellant’s consolidated skeleton argument, 4 July 2024).
118. In relation to the appellant’s mental health, we remind ourselves that the threshold which must be reached in order for treatment to breach Article 3 on health grounds is high. What is required to be shown by the appellant is either a “serious, rapid and irreversible decline” in his health “resulting in intense suffering” or “a significant reduction in life expectancy”. In this context, “significant” means “substantial., AM (Article 3, health cases) [2022] UKUT 00131, [17] (2)(3). The same test applies where the appellant claims his Article 3 rights will be breached due to the risk of suicide, MY (Suicide risk after Paposhvilli) Occupied Palestinian Authority [2021] UKUT 232 (IAC). We set out below the medical evidence the appellant relies on in support of his claim.
Medical Evidence
Dr Seán Haldane Report undated 2019 [381/AB]
119. Dr Haldane, is a consultant Clinical Neuropsychologist in private practice, mainly in forensic neuropsychology providing expert witness reports in civil and criminal cases. At section 1.3 he sets out his instructions. At section 2, he sets out the documents he considered which include Judge Kamara’s determination and medical records from February 2015-March 2019. He conducted a face to face assessment of the appellant. Dr Haldane finds that the appellant does not have a form a psychiatric diagnosis, he has a medical diagnosis of Alcohol dependence, ischaemic changes and cerebrovascular accident. This we note is as per the GP records. At 2.4 he records 25 Appeal Reference: HU/58203/2022: his conclusion that the appellants symptoms of left sided weakness are neurological and not functional. He sets out his interview with the appellant we note that the appellant stated he had “no memory problems now” [385/CB]. The report outlines the assessments conducted. We note Dr Haldane states that for the Cantab insight assessment the appellants responses produced “unusual patterns of scores”. Dr Haldane records no signs of exaggeration, but does not consider malingering. He states the appellant may have difficulty retrieving historical memories due to his very poor rating within the executive function aspect of the Cantab assessment. He states “his basic ability to recall details and concentrate is intact, and he would be able to give cogent testimony. However (see 5: 5) his ability to ‘search’ his past experiences in providing testimony may be impaired by deficits in Executive Function and in other complex cognitive functions.” At 6.1 he concludes stating the appellant is mentally and physically fragile.
120. In terms of the risk of suicide Dr Haldane notes at paragraph 4.1 of his report that he asked the appellant to complete a brief reading and writing test. He was asked to write two sentences about anything, the appellant wrote, “sometimes I drink to feel better but if I don't I think of killing myself.”
121. At page 12 of his report [172/CB], Dr Haldane finds the appellant’s deportation to Jamaica would precipitate a mental and emotional crisis requiring psychiatric help which may not be available in St Lucia or if it was available would have to be paid for privately, this he states would put the appellant at risk of suffering from clinical depression. Dr Haldane noted the appellant was already at risk of suicide, furthermore since the appellant has suffered ischaemic brain changes he is at risk of further changes requiring specialist support and treatment which is probably unavailable in St Lucia.
122. At paragraph 6.1 of his report Dr Haldane states it cannot be over emphasised that the appellant’s neurological, neuro psychological and psychological conditions render him mentally and physically fragile. He is able to compensate for this through his work as an actor however his current work would not continue in St Lucia and without it, in a place he has not been since the age of 12, his mental and physical health would undoubtedly deteriorate, this would put him at risk of mental illness and of suicide.
123. We exercise caution when attaching weight to his report. We are mindful that Dr Haldane has simply accepted the account as presented by the appellant without considering Judge Kamara’s findings that he was not a witness of truth. There is no evidence of suicidal ideation recorded in the appellant’s GP records and so the appellant’s statement that he had thought of killing himself at paragraph 4.1 of the Dr Haldanes’ report is surprising. Equally surprising is Dr Haldane not exploring this statement further in the course of his report. We are mindful the appellant is a skilled actor and whilst Dr Haldane has considered this, he does not address malingering. We are also mindful of Dr Haldane’s assessment that the appellant’s brain injury “may” impair the appellant’s ability to recall. Accordingly we attach some weight to this report, exercising caution.
David Laurence Bell Report 11 January 2024 [84/CB]
124. David Bell is a retired consultant psychiatrist who worked until 2021 at the Tavistock clinic, specialising in assessment and management of severe psychiatric 26 Appeal Reference: HU/58203/2022: disorder/personality disorder. He sets out the documents he had reference to, this includes the appellant’s GP medical records and Dr Haldane’ s report. He is aware of his duties, the relevant caselaw and practice directions. Mr Bell interviewed the appellant via zoom on 28 July 2023. Mr Bell diagnosed that the appellant suffers from Depressive Disorder. He states the appellant’s conditions are likely to cause serious difficulty in his capacity to recall events accurately. We again have concerns that Mr Bell has not considered the findings of Judge Kamara or the fact the appellant is an actor, when assessing his account in the context of the assessment. There again is no reference to the possibility of exaggeration or malingering. Accordingly we attach some weight to the report but exercise caution.
Leylâ Ziyal report 08 January 2024 [97/CB]
125. Ms Ziyal is a Chartered Consultant Clinical Neuropsychologist. At section 1.2 she sets out her instructions. At section 1,3 she sets out the documents she was provided with, this includes GP record and Dr Haldine’s report. She set out her assessment tools and considers the appellants responses with reference to research. She sets out her conclusions that the appellant has “severe memory impairment in the visual – perceptual modality”, this she considers is consistent with an injury in the brain. Further that he has difficulties on the left side of his body due to injury to the motor cortex of the brain. She addresses each of the instructions she was given. We note that she states that the appellant’s neurological conditions impairs his visual-perceptual memory and his ability to alternate focus between task requirements, this she states is consistent with the difficulties he reports. She sets out these difficulties such as inability to find his way, remembering people he recently met and expressing himself fluently. We have again born in mind Ms Ziyal does not consider exaggeration or malingering but we are mindful that she employed psychometric testing to form her assessment. Accordingly, we are prepared to attach weight to this report.

Leylâ Ziyal report 21 February 2024 [127/CB]
126. Ms Ziyal provided an addendum report, setting out the reasons for this at page 3 of her report [129/CB], namely how her conclusions impacted the appellant’s ability to give evidence and his ability to recall historical facts. At 2.7 she states the appellant is intellectually equipped to meet demands of independent living and obtaining a profession. His functional effectiveness will effect him in reading maps, plans or photographs. He would find it difficult to recall multiple components to questions. He cannot formulate a strategy to aid learning. She sets out he will have difficulty memorising visual and pictorial information, memorising to give evidence and key components of a questions put to him. At 2,14 and 2.15 she states :
“2.14… Accessing long-term historic events requires effective search and planning functions that pivot on the ability to switch between problem/task demands Both of these functions are governed by the frontal lobes. Mr Romulus’ deficit in this executive domain will severely impair his effectiveness in recalling events that have occurred in the past.”.
…
2.15 Intact executive functions of planning, ordering, sequencing and alternating between various task components are required for effective recall of past events. Mr Romulus’ 27 Appeal Reference: HU/58203/2022: deficit in these functions will severely impair his competence in recalling historic information for the purpose of giving evidence.”
127. We find the report is well balanced and based on Ms Ziyal ’s expertise. Accordingly, we attach weight to this report.
GP Records 25 February 2015-28 March 2019.
128. The appellant has also provided his GP records. There are entries in Feb 2015 for his lefts sided weakness which were being investigated. The GP records also document the appellant’s physical issues in March 2015 and diagnosis of function neurological disorder. The records disclose a history of alcohol dependence. We also note from Feb-March 2016, the appellant reported chest pain and palpitations. We attach weight to these records as they are clinical record of the appellant presentation and medical history.
129. We have taken the entirety of the medical evidence into account but find the appellant has not come close to establishing he will suffer Article 3 ill treatment on the basis of his mental health.
130. The appellant in oral evidence said he had chosen not to take any medication to treat his depression and made no reference to suicidal thoughts in his statement or oral evidence nor did any of the witnesses called on his behalf. Whilst we accept the appellant suffered some form of brain injury which has affected his memory, this has not interfered unduly with him being able to conduct his daily life. At page 5 of Mr Bell’s report, the appellant describes a busy social life of going to parties, clubs and gigs. The appellant told us he is in the process of developing movie and TV scripts and has started his own fashion label. He told us he would be keen to return to acting when his immigration proceedings are resolved. Although Dr Haldane speculates that appropriate psychiatric treatment would not be available for the appellant in St Lucia, we were not provided with any objective evidence from the appellant to support this. Dr Haldane is not a country expert and we consider his observations on the healthcare available in St Lucia to be outside his area of expertise, accordingly we place little weight on them. For the reasons we have set out we find that the appellant has not established that his deportation to St Lucia will breach Article 3 on health grounds.
Article 3 – Destitution / country conditions
131. We do not accept the appellant would be at risk of Article 3 ill treatment on the basis of the country conditions in St Lucia and his destitution. The appellant’s mother, Ms Petra Romulus, confirmed in a statement dated 22 May 2024 and in oral evidence that she supports the appellant financially. She said she would not support the appellant financially if he was deported to St Lucia nor would she visit him, however she was unable to explain in answer to questions from us why this would be the case.
132. We noted she is in full time employment as a carer for the elderly and she has visited St Lucia in the past, in these circumstances we do not find her evidence that she would not visit or financially support the appellant in St Lucia to be credible. We consider this evidence was given simply to bolster the appellant’s case that he would be destitute. We find the appellant will be financially supported by his mother in St Lucia. We also note from the refusal decision of 19 December 2021 that the appellant would be eligible 28 Appeal Reference: HU/58203/2022: for a reintegration package on return to St Lucia under the Facilitated Return Scheme (FRS) and if accepted by the scheme, he will receive £500 in cash on departure. We find the financial support from the appellant’s mother as well as the money he may obtain from the FRS will help him establish himself in St Lucia.
133. The appellant lived in St Lucia until he was 12 years old. Dr Haldane confirmed at paragraph 3.2 of his report that the appellant understands the “broken French” of St Lucia although he cannot speak it. The appellant can continue to pursue his interests in acting, fashion and screen writing in St Lucia. These factors will aid the appellant’s integration on return. We accept acting opportunities may be more limited in St Lucia but we are not persuaded that this will render the appellant destitute. We remind ourselves that where an appellant relies on destitution upon being returned to their home country, they must show they have seriously addressed their minds to returning to their country of origin and have made proper enquiries about how they could establish themselves. If they fail to do this, it will be most unusual for them to be able to show that they would be destitute in the event of return. MA (Proved destitute) Jamaica [2005] UKIAT 00013, [14]. The appellant has not advanced any evidence in the way of a country expert report or oral or written evidence that he would be destitute on return to St Lucia or face conditions amounting to a breach of Article 3, much less “appalling humanitarian conditions” referred to in paragraph 42 (b) of the consolidated skeleton argument lodged on his behalf. Accordingly, we find the appellant will not be subject to Article 3 ill treatment on the basis of the conditions he will face in Jamaica.
134. Standing back and considering the entirety of the appellants claim, we find the decision to deport the appellant on conducive grounds does not … breach his right not to be subject to inhuman or degrading treatment under Article 3. …