Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-000729

First-tier Tribunal Nos: PA/50034/2024
LP/04036/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 14 May 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LOUGHRAN

Between

CAQ
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr F Ahmad, Counsel instructed by Hanson Law Ltd
For the Respondent: Ms R Arif, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 28 April 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant.
Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals with the permission of First-tier Tribunal Judge Dainty against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Moon (‘the judge’) dated 28 November 2024.
Background
2. The appellant is a national of Iraq who was born in 1997. He left Iraq on 3 September 2021 travelling through several countries including Turkey and France arriving in the UK on 11 November 2021.
3. On 12 November 2021 the appellant claimed asylum on the basis that he would be at risk on return because of his political opinion and because he is a member of a particular social group, a potential victim of an honour crime.
4. The appellant’s claim was refused in a decision dated 29 December 2023 and it is against that decision that the appellant appeals.
The appeal in the First-tier Tribunal
5. The appeal came before the judge on 18 November 2024.
6. The appellant was represented by Mr R Chandrapala of Counsel, and the respondent was represented by Mr T Port, a Home Office Presenting Officer.
7. The decision records that the parties agreed that the following issues were in dispute:
“(a) The credibility of the appellant’s account to have had a sexual relationship with S whose family are prominent in the Ako tribe who control the area. If the appellant’s account is accepted, Mr Port conceded that the claim for asylum should be allowed because if the account were true, there would not be sufficiency of state protection and internal relocation would not be reasonable.
(b) The credibility of the appellant’s account to have been politically active in Iraq and if so, whether these activities would place him at risk on return.
(c) Whether the appellant’s sur place activities place him at risk.
(d) Whether the appellant could be safely returned to the IKR without a breach of the United Kingdom’s obligations under Article 3 of the ECHR. This involves an assessment of the credibility of the appellant’s account to have left his identity documentation in Iraq as well as an assessment of the credibility of his account to have no contact with family members in Iraq. If the appellant establishes he has no documentation and cannot redocument himself, his claim for humanitarian protection should also succeed.”
8. The judge also considered the appellant’s Article 8 ECHR rights even though the appellant’s representative confirmed that Article 8 ECHR was not being relied on.
9. The appellant gave evidence through a Kurdish Sorani interpreter and the judge noted that the appellant became distressed whilst giving his evidence.
10. In a decision dated 28 November 2024 the judge dismissed the appellant’s appeal.
11. The judge did not accept that the appellant was involved in any political activities in Iraq. The judge placed very little weight on a letter provided by the New Generation Movement (‘NGM’) confirming the appellant’s affiliation with them and political activity because the letter did not contain a postal address, the envelope it was sent in had not been provided and there was no corresponding evidence to confirm existence of a branch in the UK. The judge also noted that there was no suggestion the appellant had met the author of the letter at [29]. The judge did not accept the appellant had any interest in politics because he had not taken much of an interest in politics since leaving Iraq and could not remember the year the election took place at [30].
12. The judge accepted that the appellant had attended demonstrations in the UK but did not accept that he had attended any more than two or three demonstrations. The judge did not consider that the appellant had established a profile that would attract the attention of the authorities and noted that the appellant’s TV interview could not be accessed online at [33].
13. In respect of the appellant’s Facebook activity the judge noted that the appellant had not provided a full timeline of his Facebook activities and that he had therefore not established that his Facebook account was his own and or that it had attracted the number of followers or attention that he claimed at [35]. The judge found that the appellant is not a person that the authorities would have a pre-existing interest in and that there was nothing to indicate that the authorities would seek to access his Facebook account at [37].
14. The judge rejected the appellant’s claim that he has come or will come to the adverse attention of the authorities on account of his sur-place activities and found that his political views were not genuinely held at [38].
15. The judge did not accept that the appellant had visited the Iraqi Embassy in an attempt to redocument himself at [39]. The judge did not accept that the appellant left his CSID card in Iraq and found that the appellant had his CSID documentation with him in the UK at [41]. The judge also considered that the appellant could contact his aunt to help him get relevant documentation at [42].
16. The judge considered that the appellant’s failure to claim asylum in France damaged his credibility at [43]. The judge considered that the appellant had given a consistent account of his relationship with S but concluded that the appellant had not established that S was connected to a powerful family and rejected his account to have fled Iraq because he was in danger. The judge accepted that the appellant had a relationship with a female S but did not accept that S was a member of a powerful and influential family who considered dishonour had been brought on the family on account of the relationship at [46-48].
17. The judge considered that the appellant had not provided any evidence of connections or ties or work undertaken in the local community and so concluded that he had not provided an Article 8 claim of any strength. The judge concluded that the situation as presented did not approach the level where any interference with the appellant’s private life outweighed the public interest in maintaining effective immigration controls at [51].
The appeal to the Upper Tribunal
18. The appellant sought permission to apply to the Upper Tribunal on grounds which can be summarised as follows:

Ground 1: The judge applied to high a standard of proof
The judge applied too high a standard of proof which was evidenced by requiring evidence of the providence of the letter from NGM and because the judge did not accept the appellant had any interest in politics because he could not remember the year the election took place.
Ground 2: The judge erred in considering the appellant’s sur place activities
The judge erred in his consideration of the appellant’s sur place activities by finding that the appellant was not at risk because he had not undertaken any organisational role.
The judge made inadequate findings as to the appellant’s TV interview and erred in requiring more information regarding his Facebook account.
The judge failed to consider country background evidence.
Ground 3: The judge erred in his consideration of re-documentation
The judge erred in his consideration of redocumentation by failing to consider the appellant’s submissions on that point and making assumptions, not based on the evidence.
Ground 4: The judge erred in law
The judge erred in law by rejecting the appellant’s account to be a potential victim of an honour killing because the appellant had not claimed asylum on his journey to the UK.
Ground 5: The judge erred in considering factually the appellant being a victim of an honour crime.
The judge erred in his consideration of the appellant being a victim of an honour crime by making assumptions. In particular the judge erred in his finding that it was not possible for the appellant to remain in hiding.
19. The respondent did not provide a response under rule 24 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) rules 2008.
The Hearing and Discussion
20. At the outset of the hearing Ms Arif confirmed that the respondent accepted that the judge had materially erred in respect of grounds 3, 4 and 5.
21. Ms Arif stated that it was the respondent’s position that the judge had materially erred in his application of the country guidance case of SMO & KSP (Civil status documentation; article 15) Iraq CG [2022] UKUT 00110 (IAC) and his assessment of the appellant’s sur place activities and in his assessment of whether the appellant would be at risk by being a victim of an honour crime. Ms Arif explained that it was accepted that it had not been put to the appellant whether he had a CSID in this country. Ms Arif also accepted that the judge had not given sufficient reasons for rejecting the appellant’s account to be at risk of an honour crime.
22. The respondent’s concessions were rightly made. I am satisfied that the judge erred in finding that the appellant had his CSID with him in the UK without this being raised as an issue or put to the appellant. I also agree with the representatives that there is a material error of law in respect of the judge’s reasoning for finding that the appellant could get assistance from his aunt to obtain his identity document(s). The judge materially erred in his application of SMO & KSP to the appellant’s case.
23. I am persuaded that the judge failed to give adequate reasons for his rejection of the appellant’s claim to be at risk of an honour crime in the circumstances where the judge found that the appellant had been consistent in respect of that aspect of his claim.
24. Ms Arif and Mr F Ahmad both agreed that no findings of fact could be preserved and that it was appropriate to remit the matter to the First-tier Tribunal.
Notice of Decision
(a) There is an error of law in the decision of the First-tier Tribunal. Accordingly the decision of the First-tier Tribunal is set aside.
(b) The decision will be remitted to the First tier Tribunal to be heard by a different judge.
(c) No findings of fact are preserved.

G. Loughran

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

09.05.25