Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-000730
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/58576/2023
LH/05537/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
24th July 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LANDES

Between

RANBEER CHAND
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr N Ahmed, Counsel instructed by Ishwar Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms S Simbi, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 11 May 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
Background
1. The appellant is a national of India. On 16 July 2021 he applied for leave to remain. He said that he had arrived in the UK on 25 December 2003 when he was 15 years’ old, had established a family and private life in the UK, and that there would be very significant obstacles to his reintegration into India. His application was refused on 5 July 2023. A judge of the First-Tier Tribunal (“the FTTJ”) dismissed his appeal against the refusal of his human rights’ claim by decision promulgated on 11 November 2024, finding that he was not satisfied that the appellant had entered the UK before 2010 or even if he had, had not lived continuously in the UK before 2010. He was not satisfied that there would be very significant obstacles to the appellant’s reintegration into India but made no finding about family life in the UK.
2. The appellant appealed on two grounds (although the grounds, settled by counsel who appeared before the FTTJ (not Mr Ahmed) are not formally so divided). In the first ground (“Ground 1”) the appellant referred to the FTTJ’s concerns about the reliability of certain copy utility bills with names and addresses misaligned and wrongly referring to a place as “Road” rather than “Street” but submitted that the FTTJ had not noted the appellant’s contention that the original documents had not been sought in advance, nor any of the appellant’s submissions in respect of a late challenge to the evidence depriving him of the opportunity to put forward rebutting evidence. It was said that counsel had raised examples of non-alignment on other non-disputed pages and the respondent had not sought to exercise the right to inspection of original documents under the tribunal procedure rules. The FTTJ had not allowed into evidence a google search showing there was no “Road” at the relevant postcode. It was averred that the FTTJ had committed a procedural irregularity which had meant that the appellant had not had the opportunity to rebut the challenge to his credibility. In the second ground (“Ground 2”) it was said that the appellant had made submissions about enjoying family life with his uncle and the FTTJ had not considered that ground.
3. On 19 January 2025, Resident Judge Phillips having reviewed the grounds, proposed to aside the decision under rule 35 of the First-Tier Tribunal Procedure Rules as he considered there to be a material error of law as the FTTJ had given no consideration to the family life element of the appeal. The respondent disagreed with that proposal, agreeing that failure to consider the family life element was an error (Ground 2) but contending that the FTTJ’s consideration of private life (Ground 1) was safe and consideration of the same should be left to an oral hearing at the Upper Tribunal. Accordingly, on 6 February 2025 the First-Tier Tribunal granted permission to appeal rather than setting aside the decision.
4. On 9 September 2025 the directions of Upper Tribunal Judge Jackson were issued. In those directions, UTJ Jackson noted that she considered that even if there had been any procedural unfairness it could have had no material bearing on the outcome of the appeal, as the point concerned the credibility of documents from 2008 and 2009 so that the appellant would still not have been in the UK for more than 20 years and the extra year or two could not possibly have made any difference. She concluded that the Upper Tribunal would be minded to find a material error of law in respect of Ground 2 only and minded to set the FTTJ’s decision aside whilst preserving all the findings in relation to private life except for the final proportionality assessment and listing a further hearing to determine the outstanding family life claim. She gave both parties 14 days to inform the Upper Tribunal in writing if they wished to object to that course and directed that if there was no reasoned objection to the approach, her directions would stand as the decision finding an error of law and setting aside the decision of the FTTJ with preserved findings of fact and listing a remaking hearing.
5. There was no objection made in writing. On 24 March 2026, the parties were sent notice of a remaking hearing on 11 May 2026. By letter of 24 April 2026, the appellant requested an extension of time for responding to UTJ Jackson’s directions, explaining that the fact of non-response had only been discovered in a recent conference with Mr Ahmed and their submission was that the proper course was to have the appeal listed as an error of law hearing to determine Ground 1 as the private life findings were not confined to the documents around 2008 – 2009. They also requested an adjournment of the hearing of 11 May to give time for further submissions.
6. By directions issued on 5 May 2026, I refused to adjourn the hearing of 11 May and directed that the application for extension of time would be considered at the hearing on 11 May and gave consequential directions, including that the parties should be prepared for all eventualities at the hearing on 11 May.
Application for extension of time
7. In his skeleton argument, prepared for the hearing on 11 May, Mr Ahmed submitted that the appellant’s representatives had explained that it was their fault that they had not responded to directions, but the proper procedure should have been an oral error of law hearing. He said that no party had suggested that the hearing be decided on the papers and there was no proper procedural basis to do so without an opportunity for parties to plead their full arguments. He added in submissions that the question of materiality should have been left to an oral hearing. The respondent had already said that they wanted an oral hearing. He referred me to rule 7 (2) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 (“the Upper Tribunal Procedure Rules”) and reminded me that on failure to comply with the rules, the Upper Tribunal could take such action as it considered just, which could include waiving the requirement. He pointed me to the skeleton argument for why he said it was just to proceed to full argument – the Regent Road bills dated back to 2004.
8. Ms Simbi submitted that there were other credibility findings apart from the issue with the bills. The bills did not take the case further. Rule 34 of the Upper Tribunal Procedure Rules permitted the Upper Tribunal to make a decision without a hearing. There had to be a place for such procedure and there was nothing inherently wrong with using that procedure.
9. Mr Ahmed replied that the respondent had always submitted that there should be an oral hearing. UTJ Jackson as a matter of fairness simply should not have decided the matter on the papers. It was just in the circumstances to extend time.
10. I said at the hearing that I considered that the application for extension of time was in reality an application out of time to set aside UTJ Jackson’s decision under rule 43 of the Upper Tribunal Procedure Rules. I said that having heard the representatives I would extend time for the application and set aside the decision that there was no error of law on ground 1 and that the facts found as to private life should be preserved.
11. The case of EP (Albania) & ors (rule 34 decisions; setting aside) [2021] UKUT 233 explained that a rule 43 application could be made notwithstanding that an appeal had been retained for remaking in the Upper Tribunal but had not yet been remade.
12. Rule 43 provides as follows:
“(1) The Upper Tribunal may set aside a decision which disposes of proceedings, or part of such a
decision, and re-make the decision or the relevant part of it, if—
(a) the Upper Tribunal considers that it is in the interests of justice to do so; and
(b) one or more of the conditions in paragraph (2) are satisfied.
(2) The conditions are—
…. (d) there has been some other procedural irregularity in the proceedings.”
13. I conclude that there was a procedural irregularity in the sense that UTJ Jackson made a mistake of fact as to the dates of the questioned documents in ground 1. She believed that the point concerned the credibility of documents from around 2008 and 2009. In fact, the grounds questioned the FTTJ’s findings at [33 (b)] which related to documents from 2004.
14. The findings at [33 (b)] related to an npower bill and a British Gas bill, the British Gas bill relating to Regent Road. One explanation given for the appellant’s details being on those documents was in case the appellant got lost (see ¾ of the way down [33 (b)]). The explanation about the appellant getting lost came from the witnesses. Manjeet Singh with whom the appellant was said to have been living between January and July 2004 said that he lived with the appellant at Chislehurst Avenue and that the appellant’s name was on the bill in case the appellant got lost [20]. This explanation ties in with the npower bill dated 16 February 2004 bearing the address of Chislehurst Avenue (p 109 of the composite bundle). Mr Chand, the appellant’s uncle said that the appellant had been living with him since 2004. His address at the time was Regent Road, but he agreed the bill referred to “street” and that the reason for putting the appellant’s name on the bill was in case the appellant got lost [21]. This fits with the Regent Road bill dated July 2004 at p 110 of the composite bundle. The FTTJ must at [33 (b)] have been referring to documents other than the 2008/9 documents because he says at [33 (c)] specifically that he is concerned about the reliability of the other documentary evidence and that the May – August 2008 and the December 2009 bills also bear the same misalignment.
15. On the footing that Ground 1 questioned the FTTJ’s treatment of the 2004 bills, any error relating to documents in 2004 must at least arguably be material. If the documents dated in February and July 2004 are reliable, they place the appellant in the UK six years earlier than the FTTJ’s findings and more than 20 years before the hearing in the First-Tier Tribunal. It is right that it was not more than 20 years before the application to the respondent, but it cannot be said that any error of law in relation to the documents could only be immaterial. UTJ Jackson could not have come to the same decision if she had appreciated that the questioned documents dated back to 2004.
16. However, the application seeking extension of time was very late. The time within procedure rules is twelve days after notice of the decision. UTJ Jackson’s decision on error of law became effective after 14 days had elapsed with no objection taken, so after 23 September 2025. An application for extension of time to set aside should therefore have been made by 6 October 2025.
17. I apply the well-known principles relating to extensions of time set out in Denton v White Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 906 and R (Hysaj) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] EWCA Civ 1633. The delay is significant, more than six months. There is no good reason for the delay; fault by representatives is not a good reason. However, when considering all the circumstances of the case I consider that the merits of the set aside application have a significant part to play. This is a strong application on the merits because it seems clear that UTJ Jackson made a mistake of fact about the grounds and would not have come to the same decision if she had appreciated the correct facts. There is no real prejudice caused to the respondent by the delay, the respondent has always been prepared to have an oral hearing on Ground 1 and everyone accepted that the FTTJ’s decision would have to be remade, the question is simply the factual basis on which it should be remade.
18. I therefore extend time and admit the application which I treat as an application to set aside that part of UTJ Jackson’s decision which stands as a finding that there is no material error of law in Ground 1 and preserving relevant facts. I have already explained that I have found a procedural irregularity in the decision in the sense of a mistake of fact, and I consider it in the interest of justice to set aside the decision. I consider it in the interests of justice to set aside the decision so Ground 1 can be determined, and the appellant can therefore have the opportunity to argue that the FTTJ’s findings of fact about private life and length of residence in the UK should also be re-opened; clearly that could make a potential difference to the appellant.
19. I therefore set aside the relevant part of UTJ Jackson’s decision whilst agreeing that there was an error of law in the FTTJ failing to determine the appellant’s family life claim (Ground 2). The decision of the FTTJ will therefore have to be set aside and remade in any event, but whether there is an error of law as set out in Ground 1 determines what facts can be preserved.
20. Having informed the representatives of my decision I proceeded to hear argument on Ground 1.
Ground 1
21. Mr Ahmed’s skeleton argument submitted that the FTTJ had failed to conduct a proper assessment of material evidence and failed to take into consideration relevant material evidence. The npower bills had the name and correct postal address and the British Gas bills other than showing Regent Road rather than Regent Street were correct as to the address. As the reliability of the documents were in issue the FTTJ should have permitted the appellant to give evidence in rebuttal. The respondent had ample opportunity to conduct verification checks of the bills. The subsequent consideration of other utility bills was infected by these errors. There was no issue taken by the HOPO in relation to the npower utility bill of February 2004 which was consistent with his claim to having lived at Manjeet Singh’s address – the address being corroborated by the land registry document. The FTTJ also failed to consider the other documentary evidence addressed to the appellant at Raymond Road. This covered the period after 2010 but went to support the appellant’s claim to have lived at the address before 2010 evidenced by the various utility bills.
22. Mr Ahmed added in submissions that although documents were normally admitted and uploaded to the tribunal via the online procedure, the appellant had not been asked to produce original documents at any stage and there had been ample opportunity for the respondent to make verification checks if there had been any argument as to the authenticity of the documents. There was no reason the respondent could not have pleaded the issue and for the originals of any bills to be inspected as a matter of fairness. Reliability should have been looked at in terms of other supporting evidence both oral and documentary which had been consistent as to the appellant’s residence.
23. Ms Simbi submitted that there was no material error of law. She submitted that the documentary evidence was immaterial because in any event the appellant had not been in the UK for twenty years at the date of application. Against the backdrop of the bills appearing misaligned the judge considered this in the context of his findings about lack of credibility as to why the appellant had his name on the bills in the first place. The bills were considered correctly in the context of the case as a whole and care had to be taken to look at the FTTJ’s findings as a whole rather than to cherry-pick.
24. Mr Ahmed replied that mistakes could clearly happen and people did have bills for various reasons and had to prove continuous residence. Any error would be material because by the date of the hearing, the appellant would have resided in the UK for more than twenty years if his contentions were correct.
25. I explained at the hearing that I considered the FTTJ made no error of law and his findings on Ground 1 were open to him. Accordingly, we proceeded to remaking on the basis that the FTTJ’s findings on paragraph 276 ADE, private life (save as far as the relationship between the appellant and his uncle might amount to private life) and length of residence were preserved.
26. I now give my reasons for that conclusion.
27. The respondent’s review says at paragraph 8. “There is no evidence of [the appellant’s] entry and his evidence for the earlier years is extremely limited for 2004 – 2009. The evidence from the earlier years is unreliable as he was said to be wholly financially dependent on others, which raises the question as to why he was the named account holder for various bills provided during these years.” That is a clear statement of the respondent’s position that the bills bearing dates from 2004 – 2009 were unreliable. The appellant was therefore on notice of the same and could not have been taken by surprise.
28. Bearing in mind that the respondent had contended that the evidence was unreliable, the appellant had the opportunity to produce the original documents if he wished or other evidence to support his contention that he had indeed been issued with utility bills on the dates those bills bore. There was nothing unfair about the FTTJ’s approach. That there might be evidence of misalignment on other documents which had not been specifically referred to by the presenting officer was nothing to the point; the respondent in the review was making a general point about the unreliability of the documents. The grounds refer to the right to inspection of original documents under the Procedure Rules, but I am unclear as to what rule is meant as there does not appear to be a specific rule. Of course, a party can always ask, or ask the tribunal for directions, to inspect original documents but there is no obligation on the respondent to ask to inspect original documents – as I have already stated, the appellant and his representatives were made aware by the review of the issue of reliability of the documents.
29. Mr Ahmed submitted that there had been opportunity for verification checks. There may have been an opportunity, but it was not submitted to me by reference to case law that this fell within one of those rare cases where the respondent had an obligation to verify the authenticity of a document relied on by an appellant.
30. I fail to see the relevance of the FTTJ not admitting the google search. The appellant accepted that there was not a Regent Road but a Regent Street.
31. It is right that the presenting officer did not specifically challenge all the utility bills which predated 2010 but this did not mean that the reliability of those documents was accepted; as I have repeatedly said the respondent was quite clear that she was questioning the reliability of all relevant documents. It is said that no issue was taken by the presenting officer with the npower bill of February 2004, but this is not correct; the npower bill referred to in [33 (b)] as questioned by the presenting officer must be the npower bill at Mr Manjeet Singh’s address, see [14] – [16]. Unchallenged documents bearing dates on or after 2010 cannot support the appellant having lived at the same address before 2010, particularly as the documents in 2008 and 2009 refer to Raymond Road, then there are water bills in 2010 and 2011 at a different address and then from 2012 onwards documents refer to Raymond Road again – in other words on the appellant’s case from the documentary evidence he was not living at Raymond Road continuously from 2008.
32. As Ms Simbi submitted, it is important not to look at the documentary evidence in isolation. The FTTJ considered the evidence as a whole and explained why he found the appellant’s narrative inconsistent and unreliable [33]. He found fundamental differences in the evidence of the appellant and his witnesses [33 (a)], that a reasonable explanation had not been given for the appellant’s name being on the utility bills [33 (b)], and that he could not place much weight on what he described as the witness testimonials [33 (d)]. The FTTJ took everything together and did not only rely on his doubts as to the reliability of the documents predating 2010 because of discrepancies with the layout of the documents [34]. He was perfectly entitled to conclude as he did. He made no error of law.
33. Even if contrary to my conclusions, the FTTJ had erred in how he dealt with the documents such error could only be immaterial. On the material before the FTTJ a tribunal properly directing itself could only conclude that the utility bills predating 2010 were unreliable. I drew to the attention of the representatives at the hearing that the bills dated 4 July 2004 and 8 August 2005 showed identical gas use over the course of two different years (7166.03 kwh). This could not just be an unlikely coincidence because they also showed identical gas use over the course of the previous year (1356.99 kwh). However the previous year to 2005 was 2004 so even if the gas use in two years had been identical, the gas use recorded for the previous year on the 2005 bill should have been 7166.03 kwh rather than 1356.99 kwh. Further scrutiny of other pre-2010 utility bills evidences more anomalies. The npower bills of April 2007, August 2008 and December 2009 cover three different periods yet not only is the amount billed precisely the same, but the other details of the bills are also identical in every respect except for the date and the period covered. The estimated meter readings are the same for three different periods (i.e. have not increased from one period to the next although the bill is charging for gas and electricity used in the period) and the bills all record that for both gas and electricity the user is using more each day compared to the same period each year and the amounts of such use referred to are the same on each bill. This is simply not possible. The bills are not reliable documents evidencing the appellant being on record as the utility user at the particular address for that period. That some utility bills can only be unreliable casts doubt on the reliability of all the utility bills predating 2010.
Remaking
34. I heard evidence from the appellant and his uncle Mr Chand through an interpreter. I considered the documents in the consolidated bundle before me. After hearing the evidence, I heard submissions from both representatives. I refer to the evidence and submissions as necessary when coming to my conclusions as to family life between the appellant and Mr Chand.
35. My starting point is the FTTJ’s finding that the appellant has only been living continuously in the UK since 2010 when he would have been 21 or 22 years’ old so that contrary to his case, he did not begin living with his uncle as a child.
36. There are discrepancies about how long the appellant has lived with his uncle, discrepancies identified by the FTTJ at [18] and [21], and further and different discrepancies both with the evidence before the FTTJ and between the appellant and his uncle. For example, contrary to [18] the appellant said in evidence before me that apart from the time when he first came to the UK and lived with Mr Singh he had lived with his uncle all the time, although sometimes there would be short periods when his uncle would be away for work, the longest such time being three months and there must have been a miscommunication in what he was recorded as saying to the FTTJ. Contrary to [21] Mr Chand said that although he had told the FTTJ that the appellant sometimes went away when his, Mr Chand’s, girlfriend came to stay, that was not right as he had not been in the right state of mind before the FTTJ and there was only the period when the appellant first came to the UK when they had lived apart. Inconsistently with the appellant’s evidence at the hearing before me, Mr Chand denied in evidence before me ever working away from home and said the only times he had been away was when he visited India.
37. I am satisfied that the appellant’s base in the UK is with his uncle and that they have lived together for some time, sharing a rented room in a house where they live with other tenants. I am satisfied that the appellant is based with his uncle as I am satisfied that the appellant has no other relatives in the UK and it is credible that he would be living with his only relative, particularly as the appellant and his uncle have given credible evidence that the appellant’s uncle is in touch with the appellant’s family in India, sends them some financial support and visits India from time to time. Given the inconsistencies in the evidence I have set out above, I am not satisfied that the appellant and his uncle have lived together continuously for all but a few months after the appellant’s arrival in the UK.
38. I am satisfied that the appellant’s uncle does give him money, but I am not satisfied that the appellant’s uncle has been his sole support. The appellant accepted in cross-examination that he had worked occasionally as a gardener and had carried out tasks such as painting and would give some money to his uncle from the money he made. The uncle described the appellant as coming to work with him sometimes. I consider it likely that the appellant has been working more than he says; he maintained that he had a better life in the UK and it is difficult to see how that could be so if the appellant has simply come here to depend on his uncle and only been working very occasionally.
39. I am satisfied that the appellant does cook for his uncle as he has said and that they socialise together and the appellant has met his uncle’s friends and people from his uncle’s village who are living in the UK. I am satisfied that the appellant’s uncle is not living with a partner and does not have children so that understandably he and the appellant are close.
40. Ms Simbi relied on IA and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 1516 and said that periods living together and financial dependency were not enough. The Court of Appeal in IA had endorsed the test in Kumari v the Netherlands 44051/20, and that required, for family life, additional elements of dependency other than normal emotional ties; examples were cases where an adult had physical or mental disability or an illness of sufficient seriousness so that the family member was in need of constant care or support from other family members, that was not the case here. Whilst financial dependency played a role, it was not sufficient on his own. The appellant had a family in India and being with his uncle was not fundamental to his development; there was nothing particular to mean that there was family life between the appellant and his uncle.
41. Mr Ahmed submitted that there was not only financial dependency but also emotional dependency; as the uncle did not have a family of his own he and the appellant had a close relationship.
42. I am not satisfied that the appellant and his uncle enjoy family life together within the meaning of Article 8 ECHR. IA makes clear that family life is normally limited to the core family and that there will be no family life even between parents and adult children or adult siblings unless they can demonstrate “additional elements of dependence, involving more than the normal emotional ties”. I have not found complete financial dependency by the appellant on his uncle but even complete financial dependency by itself is not enough. I find it significant that the appellant is perfectly mentally and physically capable of supporting himself, his only difficulty is that he is not permitted to work legally in the UK. Following Kumari (see [42]) it is also significant that the appellant and his uncle retain links with the family in India so that they are not each other’s only surviving relation for example. Whilst the appellant and his uncle are close, I am not satisfied that this involves more than the normal emotional ties; on the preserved findings of the FTTJ the appellant came to live with his uncle as an adult when he moved to the UK.
43. When considering my conclusions, I am satisfied that Article 8 (1) is engaged because of the appellant’s private life in the UK, bearing in mind the length of time he has been in the UK and that his relationship with his uncle is part of his private life.
44. The appellant does not meet the immigration rules, as [36] of the FTTJ’s judgment concerning paragraph 276 ADE is error free and is preserved. The only thing which has changed since the hearing before the FTTJ is the length of time the appellant has lived in the UK, now 16 rather than 14 years. However he remains in contact with his family in India, there is no indication they would not accept him back on his return, and there is nothing to indicate that in the time since the hearing before the FTTJ he has lost his knowledge of the life and culture of India. He has some work experience in the UK. Of course, the appellant would find it difficult to return to India and there would inevitably be obstacles after 16 years’ away, but I am not satisfied that these would be very significant obstacles to his integration. The appellant would be able to form a private life for himself again in India.
45. Having found that Article 8 (1) is engaged, and the appellant does not meet the requirements of immigration rules, I must consider whether the interference with the right to respect for the appellant’s private life is justified under Article 8 (2) ECHR. The question is whether refusal results in unjustifiably harsh consequences such that refusal is not proportionate. When considering that question I take into account the factors set out in s.117B Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 and balance the public interest considerations against the factors relied upon by the appellant.
46. Mr Ahmed submitted that when considering proportionality even if there was only private life between the appellant and his uncle, that was sufficiently strong so that taking everything together it would be disproportionate for the appellant to be removed. He referred me to his skeleton argument which referred in addition to the significant period the appellant had been in the UK and his social and cultural integration, his strong ties to the UK and his friends in the UK, that the appellant’s relationship with his uncle would be unable to continue outside the UK, and that the appellant would not be a burden to the taxpayer.
47. The strongest feature in the balance against the appellant is the maintenance of effective immigration controls. The appellant does not satisfy immigration rules; he arrived illegally and has never had permission to remain in the UK. In addition, the appellant cannot speak English; he said in evidence that he could only speak a bit.
48. I consider the point that the appellant would not be a burden on the taxpayer to be a neutral factor. I accept that the appellant would work full-time legally if he were able to do so and be able to support himself and so I treat him as financially independent for the purposes of s. 117B (3).
49. In favour of the appellant is the consideration that he has lived in the UK for around 16 years, is close to his uncle in the UK and has friends in the UK. He has integrated into his local Punjabi speaking community but inevitably little beyond that because of his lack of English. As the appellant has been living in the UK unlawfully, I must have regard under s.117B (4) to the consideration that little weight should be given to his private life. I do give little weight to his private life, because although it has been formed over a long period, the appellant and his uncle would always have known that his stay in the UK was extremely precarious and that not having leave he could be removed at any time if he came to the attention of the authorities. I appreciate that their relationship will not be the same on the appellant returning to India but the appellant will be able to keep in touch by telephone and over the internet with his uncle and his other friends and his uncle will be able to visit in India even though such visits may not be very frequent.
50. Balancing the appellant’s private life against the public interest, the public interest is clearly much stronger. The decision is perfectly proportionate and does not breach Article 8 ECHR.
51. I would have come to the same conclusion, albeit there would of course be different factors in favour of the appellant, even if I had found on the same facts that the appellant and his uncle enjoyed family life together. The Court of Appeal explained in Arshad v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 355 that the fact a relationship may amount to family life within the meaning of Article 8 ECHR is only the starting point. It is necessary to understand the nature and quality of the relationship before it can be weighed against other considerations. They also explained that the fact a family relationship has been formed or developed when the person is in the UK illegally is relevant to the weight which should be given to that relationship in the assessment of proportionality even if the point arises outside the scheme of the 2002 Act.
52. When considering the weight to give the relationship if it had amounted to family life, I would also have given it little weight. I would have given it little weight because although the appellant and his uncle clearly had a relationship before the appellant came to the UK, the relationship amounting to family life within the meaning of Article 8 (1) was only formed when the appellant was an adult and naturally formed because the appellant came to his uncle as his only relative in the UK. Inevitably over the years because the appellant has based himself with his uncle and because of their lack of other family in the UK the two have become close, but their relationship has developed against the background of them both knowing that the appellant was in the UK illegally and so it was a relationship which might not be able to continue and the two might have to revert to the relationship at a distance which they had previously. The appellant and Mr Chand’s family life in the UK and the appellant’s private life in the UK both having little weight the public interest would again clearly outweigh them.
53. On remaking the appellant’s appeal is dismissed.

Notice of Decision
Time for applying to set aside the decision of UTJ Jackson which became final after 23 September 2025 is extended.
That part of the decision of UTJ Jackson finding no material error of law as averred at Ground 1 and consequent preservation of facts is set aside under rule 43 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal Procedure Rules) 2008.
On reconsideration, there is no material error of law as averred at Ground 1.
The decision of the First-Tier Tribunal remains set aside due to material error of law as averred at Ground 2.
The First-Tier Tribunal’s findings of fact relevant to paragraph 276 ADE of the immigration rules, private life (apart from the relationship between the appellant and his uncle) and length of residence in the UK are preserved.
On remaking the appellant’s appeal is dismissed.

A-R Landes

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

16 July 2026